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Underfunded and overburdened, the World Health Organisation has been unable to respond 
swiftly and effectively to existing and conceivable global health challenges. It became 
perceptible after the slow and highly criticised response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 
in 2014. Currently, while the WHO has been facing a financial crisis, the growing 
participation of several non-State actors such as non-governmental organisations, 
pharmaceutical companies, transnational organisations, philanthropic foundations and others 
has led to a weakening of the Organisation’s leadership. The involvement of these ‘new’ 
actors can undoubtedly bring institutional, technical, political and financial resources not 
only to global public health but also to support the WHO in accomplishing its guiding and 
coordinating role. However, the rise of several non-State actors also creates challenges for 
coordination and raises questions about the roles these organisations should play, the rules by 
which they play, and who should set those rules. Considering the intense relationship of the 
WHO with a vast number of non-State actors, Member States have historically been trying to 
establish a policy to regulate these relations. In 2012, the Framework of Engagement with 
non-State Actors (FENSA) was presented with the main goal of regulating the relation of the 
WHO with non-governmental organisations, the private sector, philanthropic foundations and 
academic institutions. By investigating the negotiation process through document analysis 
and interviews, I seek to identify the positions of the most active Member States during the 
negotiation of the Framework and to understand the different coalitions that were designed. I 
would also take in to account the perspective of the non-State actors embraced by FENSA 
and pertaining to the WHO itself. By disclosing FENSA, specifically its context and the 
negotiation process, the ongoing powerful influence of some non-State actors on global 
health governance, and consequently at the WHO, becomes easier to understand.  
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Subfinanciada e sobrecarregada, a Organização Mundial da Saúde tem sido incapaz de responder 
de forma rápida e eficaz aos desafios de saúde global. Isso se tornou bastante perceptível após a 
lenta - e altamente criticada - resposta ao surto de Ebola na África Ocidental, em 2014. 
Simultaneamente, enquanto a OMS enfrenta uma crise financeira, a crescente participação de 
vários atores não estatais como organizações não-governamentais, empresas farmacêuticas, 
organizações transnacionais, fundações filantrópicas e outras, levou a um enfraquecimento da 
liderança da Organização. O envolvimento desses “novos” atores, de fato, contribui para trazer 
novos recursos institucionais, técnicos, políticos e financeiros, não apenas para a saúde pública 
global, mas também para o trabalho da OMS no cumprimento de seu papel de liderança e 
coordenação de assuntos de saúde. No entanto, o surgimento de novos atores cria também 
desafios para a coordenação de ações e levanta questões sobre os papéis que essas organizações 
devem desempenhar, as regras que devem cumprir e quem deve defini-las. Assim, tendo em vista 
a intensa relação da OMS com um grande número de atores não estatais, os Estados Membros, 
historicamente, têm tentado estabelecer uma política para regular essas relações. Em 2012, o 
Marco de Colaboração com Atores Não Estatais (FENSA, do inglês Framework of Engagement 
with non-State Actors) foi apresentado, tendo como principal objetivo regular a relação da OMS 
com organizações não-governamentais, setor privado, fundações filantrópicas e instituições 
acadêmicas. Ao investigar o processo de negociação por meio de uma análise de documentos e 
de entrevistas, procuro identificar as posições dos Estados Membros mais ativos durante a 
negociação do FENSA e entender as diferentes coalizões possivelmente formadas. Além disso, 
também levo em consideração a perspectiva dos atores não estatais abarcados pelo FENSA e da 
própria OMS. Ao minuciar o FENSA - seu contexto e o processo de negociação - a poderosa  ( e 
crescente) influência de alguns atores não estatais na governança global da saúde, e 
consequentemente na OMS, torna-se mais fácil de entender. 
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INTRODUCTION	
Since the aftermath of World War II, we can observe a wide range of international 
organisations that help manage problems that transcend not only national borders but States' 
autonomy. Traditionally seen as authority holders in International Relations (IR), the 
supremacy of nation States as well as the exclusion of all external powers started to be 
challenged by IR literature. The limitations of mainstream theories like realism in explaining 
the role and importance of other actors that can influence the actions of States became clear; 
a multi-level and interconnected international system started to be analysed without clear 
hierarchy between levels and actors. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO), established in 1948 with headquarters in 
Geneva (Switzerland), is the institution that, over the last seventy years, has shaped the 
landscape of international health and remains the key institution when it comes to global 
health. Despite facing many challenges, specifically a financial and legitimacy crisis, in the 
last three decades, its recommendations still have a forceful impact not only on local public 
health but also on tourism and the economy. To illustrate, in recent times, international 
emergencies related to the AH1N1 flu and Ebola caused, in addition to thousands of deaths, 
significant economic damages to the most affected countries. According to a report 
developed by the World Bank, the economic impact, which outlasts the epidemiological 
impact, in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone was at least $2.8 billion (WORLD BANK, 
2016). The socioeconomic cost of the association between the Zika virus, neurological 
disorders, and congenital malformations and their spread through Latin America was an 
estimated $7-18 billion between 2015 and 2017, according to the Impact Assessment 
launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2017). 
Legitimacy is crucial for international institutions to be able to exercise authority as 
well as to gain acquiescence with rules, decisions and recommendations rather than coercion, 
even because IOs do not have the tools to coerce sovereign governments. Ruger (2014) 
points out that while the WHO was established as ‘a social contract conception of 
legitimacy’, since signatories states agreed to follow the institution’s rule, it cannot demand 
recognition by those not party to the contract, including amongst the increasing number of 
global health initiatives. Most important for this thesis is the author’s argument that the 
WHO’s legitimacy relies on democratic processes, as will be explained in chapter 2, the 
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WHO’s governing bodies have the ‘one State, one vote’ rule, which is vulnerable to power 
relations that underlie such processes. The negotiation of the Framework of Engagement with 
non-State actors (FENSA), the main object of this thesis, brings together power and 
legitimacy debates as it is a unique effort of the WHO amongst all international organisations 
worldwide to reassure its legitimacy not only between Member States, but among non-State 
actors (NSAs) and, above all, public opinion. Likewise, FENSA disclosed the influence of 
powerful actors and power imbalances at the organisation confirming Shiffman’s (2015) 
argument that global health, besides being an arena made up of actors driven by normative 
concerns and by the aim of addressing health inequities, is also led by power dynamics and 
non-normative interests.  
When it comes to non-State actors, they can be defined as individuals or organisations 
with economic, political or social power and the ability to influence at a particular level, or all 
levels, while not belonging to or being allied to any specific country or state. They have 
increasingly taken part in international conventions, forums and negotiations, consequently 
being seen as part of 'public diplomacy', which is defined by Gregory (2011, p.276) as ‘an 
instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to 
understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships, and to 
influence thoughts and mobilise actions to advance their interests and values’. 
The role of States has been reshaped, and when it comes to health, Kickbusch and 
Szabo (2014) assert that as the movement of people and goods across borders intensifies, not 
only epidemic control has become internationalised, but health issues have started to require 
a multi-level governance that embraces several actors. The concept of global health, 
therefore, has been associated with the increasing weight of new actors as well as 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies and organisations, such as the media, 
foundations and transnational corporations (Brown, 2012). Since health issues cannot be 
restricted to geographical boundaries nor to the traditional actors of International Relations, I 
started to think about the importance of these actors, particularly at the WHO, beyond their 
huge financial contribution. Hence, the main object of this thesis is to understand the 
increasing role of the so-called non-State actors (NSAs) at the World Health Organisation. 
While the involvement of these ‘new’ actors can undeniably bring institutional, 
technical and financial resources to health policies, it is important to question how best these 
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contributions be can marshalled towards the global health agenda. On one hand, there are 
entities in defence of the right to health and on the other, we find entities that directly or 
indirectly represent the interests of powerful actors. The exercise of power permeates global 
governance processes and include multiple ways in which one actor can influence the 
thinking or actions of others. But the discussion about how international relations' scholars 
have conceptualised power in global governance is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
current literature, for instance, portrays the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as the most 
influential actor in global health nowadays, promoting ‘philanthrocapitalism' as argued by 
Birn (2014). Furthermore, the influence of the private sector, especially from the 
pharmaceutical industry, upon on the WHO has been denounced countless times, as this 
thesis will further expose in chapter three.  
It is essential to enquire: do non-State actors have any participation in the decision-
making processes at the World Health Organisation? When trying to answer this question, the 
issue of social participation at the WHO arises, and, consequently, a wide range of actors. 
In May 2016, after five years of debate, extensive consultations and 17 months of 
intergovernmental negotiations, the Sixty-ninth World Health Assembly (WHA) approved the 
Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA). It recognises four non-State 
actors: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Philanthropic Foundations, the Private 
Sector and Academic Institutions and foresees five types of engagement: participation; 
resources; evidence; advocacy; and technical collaboration.  
If on one hand the Framework identifies five benefits of the engagement between the 
WHO and NSAs, seven risks are pointed out. The benefits are: the contribution to the work 
of the Organisation; additional resources; influence on the social, economic and 
environmental determinants of health; improvements in compliance with WHO policies, 
norms and standards; and wider dissemination of WHO policies. Meanwhile, the risks are 
enumerated as: conflicts of interest; undue influence; negative impact on the WHO’s 
integrity, credibility or reputation; NSAs being primarily benefited instead of public health; 
conferring an endorsement of the NSA’ name, brand, product, views or activity; competitive 
advantage for the NSA; whitewashing of NSA’s image by association with the WHO.  
Therefore, the great tension behind the discussion about the participation of non-State 
actors at the WHO is to understand if giving more space would favour actors truly concerned 
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about global health or rather would institutionalise and legitimise undue influence and vested 
interests of some actors. It is also worth noting that the greater or lesser capacity of influence 
of non-State actors on the WHO has repercussions not only in international forums, in which 
they can manifest themselves, but also in the ability to impact the opinions of Member States 
and, therefore, their positions and votes in the governing bodies. In order to assess such 
influence, the specific case study proposed is to outline the positions taken by Member States 
during the negotiation of the new rules for participation of non-State actors at the World 
Health Organisation, which ended with FENSA's approval.  
Given the discussions about more involvement of non-State actors at the WHO, the 
potential contribution of these actors to the work of the organisation is highlighted as well as 
a possible negative influence on the global health agenda and priorities. Among the 
arguments in favour of a closer and deeper interaction is the fact that a larger influence of the 
WHO on civil society would consequently increase its impact on global public health as well 
as ensure better compliance with WHO standards, policies and recommendations. 
Additionally, there are expected economic contributions. On the other hand, the enlargement 
of the participation of non-State actors requires transparency of the processes, the 
development of standards for identification and inclusion of new actors and the proof of 
outcomes (Sanchez, 2007). Thus, while part of civil society believes that FENSA can be an 
important tool to safeguard the independence of the WHO from private interest and undue 
influence, others severely criticised its elaboration and negotiations, arguing that the 
Framework gives identical treatment for public interest and for-profit interest groups. 
Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that FENSA establishes a precedent as it is the first 
comprehensive regulatory Framework within the United Nations system that covers all 
categories of interaction with NSAs (Seitz, 2016).  
When I started to follow the FENSA debate inside and outside the WHO, I could easily 
notice that the development of these collaboration rules occurred in a complex scenario of 
conflict of interest at different levels, both in the public and private sector. Moreover, 
divergences arose not only among the Member States but also between different non-State 
actors, especially NGOs and the private sector. The central motivation for this thesis was, 
firstly, the importance of the inclusion, as well as the development of themes related to global 
health, health diplomacy and global health governance in the international relations research 
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agenda. Moreover, there is a lack of scientific literature about the complex and important 
process of negotiation of non-State actors' collaboration with the WHO. Apart from the 
official documents available at the WHO website, only a few watchdog NGOs such as the 
Third World Network and the Global Policy Forum regularly published articles about the 
negotiations. 
Due to its complexity and the potential for it to be used as a model for future 
regulatory frameworks of other UN agencies in their engagement with non-State actors, 
FENSA has the potential to establish a new paradigm for the participation of non-State actors 
in international organisations, while trying to regulate their influence on the WHO and, 
consequently, on global health priorities. Notwithstanding, FENSA is an object of study that 
must be analysed through several perspectives and with a multidisciplinary approach, as it 
involves power, legitimacy, influence and conflict of interest – these can all impact global 
health priorities. It is therefore fundamental to understand which interests prevailed during 
the negotiation process and through which Member States, as FENSA was mainly negotiated 
behind closed doors and without the direct participation of non-State actors. In order to 
accomplish this, I have combined an extensive literature review with the analysis of primary 
sources, composed of archival material, public documents and interviews. While the 
literature provided the general background and framing of the research, the primary sources 
constituted the basis upon which I reconstructed the negotiation process to analyse the 
perspectives and positions of all actors involved.  
It is important to bear in mind that despite some difficulties and setbacks, which will 
be detailed in this thesis, the WHO is still recognised as the world’s health conscience that 
seeks equity and ‘health for all’ and provides a moral and public interest agenda for health. 
This enduring role cannot be undermined through the subordination of health standards and 
priorities to profit objectives.  
The Research Pathway 
The literature research conducted revealed the almost non-existence of scientific 
literature about FENSA and, at the same time, exposed signs of influence by NSAs on WHO 
policy processes. Hence, the research problem is if the positions and coalitions assumed by 
the most active Member States during the negotiations of FENSA are somehow connected to 
the interests of the four categories of non-State actor embraced by the Framework. Therefore, 
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the following hypotheses were initially proposed:   
I. The North/South division that characterises the WHO's history (CHOREV, 2012) was 
reflected in FENSA negotiations with the formation of two groups of negotiators: 
developed and developing countries;  
II. The final text of FENSA reflects the positions of North countries more than those of the 
Global South; 
III. The positions taken by the most active Member States in the negotiations embraced the 
interests of non-State actors, especially philanthropic foundations and the private sector. 
 In order to assess the research problem, I sought to identify the positions of the most 
active WHO Member States during the FENSA negotiation process and the probable 
coalitions that were shaped. At the same time, I observed if a North/South cleavage in the 
States' alignment occurred, and if there is any association between the considered positions 
and the desires of the non-State actors.   
Methodological Considerations  
Considering that a case study is a ‘detailed examination of an aspect of a historical 
episode to develop or test explanations that may be generalisable to other events’ (George 
and Bennet, 2005, p.5), a qualitative case study was chosen, as it provides tools to scrutinise 
complex phenomena within their contexts. Moreover, it is an empirical investigation aiming 
to comprehend a contemporary problem, for this research, the FENSA negotiation, 
contextualised around the application of exhaustive analysis, interpretation and discussion, 
frequently resulting in recommendations for actions or for improving prevailing situations. 
Given that my main objective is to delineate the positions taken by the Member States and 
their potential co-related influences, it is worth highlighting that case studies are designed to 
bring out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple sources of data. 
(Tellis, 1997) 
According to Yin (2001), a case study should be considered when the focus of the 
research is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. My main objective is to understand how the 
Member States settled and advocated their positions on the participation of non-State actors 
at the WHO and why, especially by wondering if there were unknown motivations. A case 
study, therefore, is used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon in its real context, 
allowing the explanation of causal connections of singular situations (YIN, 2001). 
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Furthermore, case studies are a multi-perspectival analysis - they reflect not only the voices 
and perspectives of the actors directly involved but also of the relevant groups and 
individuals and the interaction between them.   
Through a qualitative approach, characteristics considered fundamental were pursued, 
including the interpretation of available data considering the context; the progressive search 
for new enquiries; the complete and profound description of the fact and the context; the use 
of a variety of sources of evidence; and particularly the exposure of the different perspectives 
about the object of study. The use of multiple data sources is a strategy to improve data 
credibility (Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003). Potential data sources may include but are not limited 
to documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, and participant-observation. 
In this sense, the use of more than one method to collect data to assure the validity of 
research is known as triangulation. According to Yin (2012), triangulation is ‘constantly 
check[ing] and recheck[ing] the consistency of the findings from different as well as the same 
sources (…) or establishing converging lines of evidence’. However, the purpose of 
triangulation is not necessarily to cross-validate data but rather to capture different 
dimensions and perspectives of the same phenomenon. It is the reason why this research 
combines document analysis and interviews. 
One should note that although the negotiation of FENSA is a contemporary event, the 
historical background is essential in order to understand its conception. Likewise, considering 
the importance of exploring some preliminary concepts in order to make this research an 
interdisciplinary study related to both global health and international relations research 
agendas, an in-depth historical literature review about the participation and impact of non-
State actors on Global Health was also conducted. The aim is to outline the background 
against which the FENSA was proposed. For this, it is also significant to understand how the 
(economic and legitimacy) crisis at the World Health Organisation led to FENSA. A 
document examination will complement this dense literature review, official and unofficial 
documents were used, including meetings reports, policies, documents prepared by non-State 
actors, publications from watchdog organisations in the main media, among others.  
The second step was to analyse the negotiation process itself, based primarily on 
documents about the FENSA process, available at the WHO's homepage, including decisions, 
resolutions, protocols of consultations and background papers. Additionally, all the legal 
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basis documents were also important as they underlie all the discussions that involve 
relations between the WHO and non-State actors. The documents were then organised into 
three groups, as shown in Table 1: (a) documents derived from WHO decision-making 
bodies; (b) basic documents; and (c) documents directly used in the negotiations or meetings. 
Additionally, papers, pronouncements, letters and any relevant documents from non-State 
actors were considered. Similarly, manifestations from any sectors of civil society and 
particularly the watchdog organisations' reports, all related to the participation of non-State 
actors at the WHO or the content of FENSA, were also essential.  
                Table1: documents on which this research was based  
 Basic Documents, such as the WHO Constitutions and the policies that were replaced 
by FENSA, were crucial in understanding not only the gaps in the relationship with NSAs 
but also in detailing what changes the FENSA brought. Considering the intergovernmental 
nature of the WHO, FENSA was discussed at the World Health Assembly and the Executive 
Board; this is why documents from governing bodies were important - the seven FENSA 
versions analysed in chapter four were presented to the WHA and the EB, and through their 
analysis it was possible to track modifications, suggestions and amendments. 
Notwithstanding, reports from the Secretariat from the Programme, Budget and 
Documents from 
Governing Bodies Basic Documents
FENSA related 
Documents
World Health Assembly WHO Constitution Drafts
Executive Board
Principles governing the 
relations between the WHO and 
NGOs
Agendas
Guidelines on interaction with 
commercial enterprises to 
achieve health outcomes
Reports
Guide for WHO Collaborating 
Centres Consultations
Regulations for Study and 
Scientific Groups, Collaborating 
Institutions and other 
Mechanisms of Collaboration.
Proposals submitted by 
the Member States
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Administration Committee were also presented to the WHA and the EB and were essential to 
contextualise and deepen the analysis. Finally, with regards to FENSA-related documents, 
informal consultations and comments sent by Member States and NSAs were extremely 
valuable to map the positions taken, as well as financial and administrative implications 
reports, non-papers developed by the Secretariat, and reports of regional meetings. 
The documentary analysis was chosen because once analysing documents, the 
researcher can be fully aware of the origins, purpose and the original audience of the 
documents (Grix 2001). Therefore, documentary sources become necessary if past behaviour 
can be inferred from its material traces and represent visible signs of what happened at some 
previous time. A documentary analysis seeks to identify factual information in the documents 
from questions or hypotheses of interest.  
Taking into consideration theoretical concepts of International Relations, the book 
‘WHO between North and South’ (Chorev, 2012), and the pursuit of an unbiased 
representation, five developing and five developed countries were chosen, despite an 
awareness that this represents an outdated definition.  The method used to choose the 1
countries (once more aiming for impartiality) was to firstly count how many times the States 
made modifications, suggestions, amendments or interventions in the available documents. 
Subsequently, I analysed all the available reports from the watchdog organisations that were 
following the FENSA negotiations in order to observe if the countries which were mentioned 
more due to their participation were the same ones observed in the documents. Those with 
greater participation were selected and, lastly, confirmed during the initial interviews. The 
countries initially selected were: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, Norway, Brazil, India, Mexico, Bolivia and Zambia. 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were also carried out and analysed. Diplomats, 
negotiators and individuals from the most active Member States, WHO high-level personnel 
involved with FENSA, and representatives of the non-State actors who were directly or 
indirectly involved in the negotiation process were chosen for interview. According to Yin 
(2001), there are generally three types of interview: in-depth, focused and survey. The 
 For the aims of this thesis, Porter et al. (2002) will be taken into consideration, given that the phases of 1
economic development are distinguished based on a country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the 
share of primary goods relative to its total exports: factor-driven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven. 
The developing countries are all efficiency-driven economies, while the developed countries are all 
innovation-driven economies.
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focused interview (more widely known as semi-structured), was chosen, considering that it 
remains open-ended and is addressed as a conversation, but the interviewer must follow some 
specific questions previously formulated. The use of semi-structured interviews is justified 
because it allows similar questions to be asked of all the interviewees, despite the necessary 
adaptation to the particularities of certain actors. With this dynamic in place, no interruption 
takes place and the interviewees can express themselves in different ways. Besides, it allows 
for the confirmation (or otherwise) of already known data, and the acquisition and revelation 
of different perspectives and more details of the matter in question. 
In social research, the term ‘triangulation’ is used to refer to the observation of the 
research issue from at least two points of view (Flick, 2004). Considering that between-
method triangulation aims to validate the interpretation of the data collected, by interviewing 
different actors and analysing the official documents it is possible, to some extent, to 
crosscheck the information gathered.  
It is important to highlight that, before the semi-structured interviews, exploratory 
interviews were needed, due to the difficulty accessing official documents and the negotiators 
or individual involved in the FENSA negotiations. Moreover, given that the FENSA was 
unexplored by academic researchers or by the media, it was essential to improve the 
understanding of the dynamics and the content of the negotiations, as they happened mainly 
behind closed doors. According to a personal source: ‘no one is warmly welcoming 
researchers analysing hot political potatoes, which FENSA obviously is. Hence expect some 
frustrations and biting nails. Thus, keep on pushing, contacting, following up on 
messages’ (personal message received on 11th July 2018).  
Interviews  
Through twenty-one interviews, a material that is not documented (or in a document 
inaccessible to the public) was collected and confronted with speeches and narratives of 
different actors to understand how the negotiation process happened. One should note that on 
the 16th July 2018, a request was sent to the WHO Records and Archives to access documents 
related to FENSA and non-State actors between 2012 and 2016. Access, however, was 
denied, due to the WHO Archives access policy, which determines that ‘WHO archives are 
accessible to researchers once the records are at least 20 years old’. (Message received from 
WHO Archives <erardr@who.int> on 16th July 2018) 
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The ideal sample of interviewees would have included individuals from the three 
levels of the WHO (headquarters, regional and country offices), from all the most active 
Member States during FENSA negotiations, and all four groups of NSAs covered by the new 
rules of engagement (NGOs, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations and academic 
institutions). However, this is beyond the control of the researcher. This ideal sample was 
insistently pursued through numerous contacts via email. The request for an interview was 
sent, alongside an explanation of the research, as well as its aims and scope. Generally, it can 
be said that almost no one seemed to be open to participate as an interviewee. While staff, or 
former staff from the WHO headquarters were more open, professionals from the regional 
offices denied or did not answer the request to take part in this research. With regards to the 
Member States, developed countries were more accessible and open than developing 
countries, which is the reason why not all the initially selected countries were interviewed. 
Non-State actors were, on the whole, less reserved than Member States, even though many 
NSAs denied or never replied to my request for an interview.  
Table 2: interviews made 
Reference Kind of Interview From
Number and type 
of interview
Interviewee 1 Exploratory Former staff of  
NGO
email exchange
Interviewee 2 Exploratory Former staff of NGO email exchange





Interviewee 4 semi-structured Member State: Brazil Face-to-Face, one 
time
Interviewee 5 semi-structured Member State: Brazil Face-to-Face, one 
time












Interviewee 9 semi-structured Member State: 
United States
Face-to-Face, one 
time        Skype 
call, one time
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The interviews were conducted between September 2018 and October 2019; most of 
them were face-to-face, took around 60 minutes and were recorded in audio format via the 
iPhone Voice Memo facility. All the interviewees were asked to give their written consent. 
The majority of interviewees choose to talk in anonymity and confidentiality, which can be 
explained due to the political sensitivity of FENSA. Moreover, it is the reason why the level, 
post or kind of participation weren’t revealed. After conducting the interviews, they were 
transcribed and the result amounted to over 200 pages. Apart from the Brazilian individuals 
and a former WHO high-level staff member, the interviews were conducted in English and 
their transcriptions were written out with the support of the program ‘Temi’. Depending on 
the recording quality and the English proficiency of the interviewee, a brief or more 




Interviewee 11 semi-structured Member State: Egypt Skype call, one 
time
Interviewee 12 semi-structured Member State: 
Zambia
Skype call, one 
time
Interviewee 13 semi-structured Member State: 
Argentina
Skype call, one 
time








Interviewee 16 semi-structured Private Sector: IFBA Skype call, one 
time
Interviewee 17 semi-structured Philanthropic 
Foundation: Bill and 
Melinda Gates
Skype call, two 
times
Interviewee 18 semi-structured Philanthropic 
Foundation: UN 
Foundation 
Skype call, one 
time
Interviewee 19 in-depth WHO – former staff Face-to-Face, one 
time
Interviewee 20 semi-structured WHO – former staff Face-to-Face, one 
time Skype call, 
one time
Interviewee 21 semi-structured WHO – current staff Face-to-Face, one 
time
   Total: 21 
individuals
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extensive manual revision was required on occasion. 
Considering that FENSA was mainly negotiated behind closed doors and that ‘external 
researchers may access archival records once the records are 20 years old’ (WHO Access 
Policy), the interviews made were crucial to understand just how contentious the negotiating 
process was. Moreover, as a result of the interviews, it was possible to map similar positions 
advocated by non-State actors and Member States and crosscheck them with different 
versions of the FENSA (a comparative analysis was conducted in chapter 4), and trace a 
cause-consequence relationship of the positions taken, which, in turn, reveals the influence of 
NSAs in the WHO policymaking process.  
Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 1 has a key role in contextualising 
the overall motif: the importance of the four non-State actors embraced by the FENSA: 
NGOs, academic institutions, private sector and philanthropic foundations, for the global 
health agenda. It is an important literature review as FENSA understands non-State actors to 
be essential in addressing health challenges because they complement WHO leadership in the 
health field. Chapter 2 provides an institutional background by analysing the World Health 
Organisation in a historical perspective, focusing essentially on the financial and legitimacy 
crisis, and, consequently, the context in which the FENSA was developed. Chapter 3 reveals 
how was the participation of the four non-State actors at the WHO before FENSA. It is not 
possible to investigate the FENSA negotiation process without understanding how the 
Organisation used to engage with NSAs, as the old rules,  which were mainly replaced by the 
Framework, were an important variable to the FENSA proposal. Chapter 4 is an extensive 
description of the content and process of the FENSA, including how the selected Member 
States behaved, according to official documents. Chapter 5 describes the interviews made 
with individuals from the selected active Member States and chapter 6 outlines the 
perspectives of non-State actors affected by the FENSA. Chapter 7 presents the analysis of 
results, alongside final remarks.  
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CHAPTER ONE: NON-STATE ACTORS AND GLOBAL HEALTH, WHY 
IS IT IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND? 
The growth of governance beyond the historical dominance of states and international 
organisations (IOs) has been characterised as one of the most important political 
developments of the past half-century (Bexell et al., 2010). Over time, there has been a 
gradual perception not only that other actors should engage in the different topics of a global 
agenda, but also that other options should be sought, given the political and financial 
limitations that constrain the actions of governments and IOs. Accordingly, it is widely 
recognised that States have gradually reduced their influence in several international issues, 
such as terrorism, environment and epidemics, amongst others.  
The formulation of global health policies must, then, be analysed and understood 
considering the existence of complex systems, which encompass not only governments but 
also a multiplicity of actors, such as NGOs, pharmaceutical companies and other powerful 
businesses, international organisations, and civil society. Ruggie (2004) argues that, given the 
major transformation that the traditional international political world has experienced, 
researchers are increasingly reaching beyond the traditional focus on the roles performed by 
States, since several non-State actors play important roles in the definitions and strategies for 
access to health and other health-related topics. Moreover, health determinants are gradually 
being influenced by circumstances external to the health sector, which demands even stronger 
joint action between agendas, levels and actors.  
In fact, the concept of global health has been associated with the growing importance 
of different actors and can be defined in several ways, depending on the backgrounds and 
perspectives of these actors. In this sense, Kickbush (2006, p. 561) describes global health as 
‘health issues that transcend national boundaries and governments and call for action on the 
global forces that determine the health of people. It requires new forms of governance at 
national and international levels which seek to include a wide range of actors’. Global health 
is defined as ‘an area of study, research, and practice that places a priority on improving 
health and achieving health equity for all people worldwide’ (Koplan et al., 2009, p.1995 ), 
whereas a third, shorter definition posits global health as ‘collaborative international research 
and action for promoting health for all’ (Beaglehole and Bonita, 2010, p.1). 
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These three different definitions illustrate the difficulty in obtaining one approach for 
tackling global health challenges. Despite a similarity regarding the intention of promoting 
health, they do contain differences and therefore result in distinct methods to solve problems. 
While the definitions by Beaglehole and Bonita (2010) and Kickbush (2006) focus on the 
notion of health for all, they do not consider equity. According to Marmot’s (2007) study, 
equity in health means taking the necessary steps so that all countries are capable of 
providing equally good care and basic needs, not by imposing the same strategies but by 
attributing country-specific ones. Similarly, Koplan et al. (2009) and Beaglehole and Bonita 
(2010) refuse to acknowledge geographic boundaries when discussing global health due to 
the different ways in which they can appear. Despite Beaglehole and Bonita’s (2010) being 
the most recent definition, it mainly focuses on sharing information and acquiring 
knowledge, rather than instructive action to tackle global issues. 
Conscious of the limitations of all the definitions presented, this doctoral thesis will 
use the one delineated by Kickbusch (2006), understanding that it addresses global health as 
an issue that can be discussed in the context of foreign policy – one with a multidisciplinary 
approach that includes international relations studies. It is worth noting that although 
historically health and international relations have been in dialogue since the eighteenth 
century, the focus was exclusively on the control of epidemics and diseases, which could 
jeopardise international trade. Health-related issues secured a permanent place on the global 
political agenda with the establishment of the League of Nations Organisation in 1922, which 
will be discussed further in the second chapter. However, it was not until the 1990s, when the 
so-called New World Order arose, that health started to enjoy greater prestige as part of the 
international agenda and, consequently, in foreign policies. The increasing presence of health 
topics on the international agenda alongside the performance of specific agencies in this field 
led to a new focus within the scope of diplomacy, the so-called ‘global health diplomacy’.  2
The chosen definition is seen as the best option, given my proposed interdisciplinary 
debate, and also to fill a gap observed by Stoeva (p.97,  2016): ‘the marginal place of the 
global politics of health in the discipline of IR is surprising, given the richness of political 
 According to the World Health Organisation, the “global health diplomacy brings together the disciplines of 2
public health, international affairs, management, law and economics and focuses on negotiations that shape and 
manage the global policy environment for health. The relationship between health, foreign policy and trade is at 
the cutting edge of global health diplomacy”. Available at: https://www.who.int/trade/diplomacy/en/ . Last 
access on 28/01/2020. 
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interactions, the diverse of public and private actors involved, and the existential value of 
health politics for people across the world’.    
After World War I (particularly after World War II and the Cold War) the participation 
of civil society institutions and social movements in the international agenda started to 
increase. These multiple civil initiatives were seeking to build participatory democracies, to 
preserve collective interests, and to influence decision-making processes. When it comes to 
health, social participation is broadly recognised as essential to promote health equity and to 
empower affected communities. For instance, interaction, consultation, and cooperation with 
civil society have been encouraged by the World Health Organization since the launch of its 
constitution in 1948. It is important to note, however, that the growing influence of non-State 
actors in the health field, alongside the need to achieve global and national health goals, has 
prompted a review of non-State actors’ roles in health, both within and beyond the WHO.  
In order to comprehend the role and importance of these (not so) new actors, it is 
imperative not only to understand the different concepts of global health but also those 
related to health governance. Rosenau (2000) distinguishes governance from governments by 
relating governance with activities united by common goals, supported or not by formal 
responsibilities, that do not rely on coercive power to be accepted. Thus, health governance 
implies ‘the use of formal and informal institutions, rules and processes by states, 
intergovernmental organisations, and non-State actors to deal with challenges to health that 
require cross-border collective action to address effectively’ (Fidler 2010, p. 3).  
According to Dodgson, Lee and Drager (2002), the essential elements of global health 
governance are: (1) deterritorialisation, i.e. to ignore the geographical boundaries of states; 
(2) the definition of determinants of health from a multi-sectoral perspective; and (3) the 
involvement, both formally and informally, of a broader range of actors and interests. 
As mentioned above, once restricted to domestic politics, health has increasingly 
become an important macroeconomic and political factor in all societies and, as a 
consequence, governments, businesses, communities, and citizens are more engaged in 
health-related issues. Additionally, pluralism, a political theory that aggregates a set of other 
theories such as complex interdependence, institutionalism, and decision-making, assumes 
that, despite politics and decision-making mostly being placed within the framework of 
government, all types of actors can affect political outcomes. This means that international 
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diplomacy and action cannot operate on a separate sphere, excluded from global civil society. 
Although it is not possible to estimate the precise number of current non-State actors, 
especially because these categories are very difficult to define and to monitor, Willetts (2001, 
p. 358) illustrates the importance of non-State actors numerically: 
While there are less than 200 governments in the global system, there are 
approximately:  60,000 major transnational companies (TNCs),  such as Shell, Coca 
Cola, Ford, Microsoft, or Nestlé, with these parent companies having more than 
500,000 foreign affiliates; 10,000 single-country non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), such as Freedom House (USA), Médecins sans Frontières (France) 
(…);  250 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN, NATO, the 
European Union, or the International Coffee Organization; and 5,800 international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), such as Amnesty International, the Baptist 
World Alliance, the International Chamber of Shipping, or the International Red 
Cross, plus a similar number of less-well-established international caucuses and 
networks of NGOs. 
Given this scenario, this first chapter aims to discuss the importance of the four non-
State actors considered by FENSA - non-governmental organisations, private sector, 
philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions - in the global health agenda. A 
literature review was conducted aiming to synthesise the current studies and to identify the 
gaps of NSAs, Global Health and International Relations research.  
Considering that an academic literature review selects the available papers on the topic 
‘to fulfil certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic (…) and [to carry 
out] effective evaluation of these documents in relation to the research being proposed’ (Hart, 
1998), the main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how the research topic fits into a 
wider context. The goal is, by examining the background that involves non-State actors’ 
influence on the global health agenda, to be able to understand why FENSA should be an 
important tool to improve transparency and advocacy with regard to the increasing role of 
these actors, and unequal power dynamics. 
The proposed literature review involves more than merely summarising the findings of 
the existing literature. My main goal is to contextualise the role of each non-State actor in 
global health through an examination of ideas and perspectives. The aim of the chapter is to 
answer two questions.  Firstly, what are the current political issues and debates related to the 
four non-State actors? Secondly, what is the current state of knowledge about them 
concerning global health and international relations?  
Two databases were chosen considering their notoriety regarding the health and social 
sciences perspectives: Web of Science and PubMed. The inclusion and exclusion criteria 
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were outlined with included papers focusing on the general role or impact of each NSA in the 
global health agenda. The first step was to use the same search terms in both search engines 
to see how many works related to them are available, as the table below exemplifies: 
To avoid double counting, I checked if any article appeared as a result in both search 
engines. Titles and abstracts of articles obtained from database searches were reviewed to 
identify which articles should be analysed. Articles that were seen as potentially relevant 
were assessed further through a full-text review. Articles were excluded at this stage if the 
information presented was not related to the influence of the NSA on the global health 
agenda and governance. To summarise, this first chapter can be seen as a classic and 
‘traditional’ narrative review. In other words, a review of the existing literature whilst making 
a qualitative interpretation of prior knowledge. 
Paré and Kitsiou (2017) argue that a narrative review summarises or synthesises what 
has been written on a particular topic but does not work towards a generalisation about what 
is being reviewed. Rather, the goal is to synthesise the literature in order to reveal the 
importance of a particular perspective. The authors, however, warn that the traditional 
narrative review is criticised due to the subjectivity of selecting information from primary 
articles, and also because it does not have clear criteria for inclusion, leading to potentially 
biased interpretations. Regardless of these criticisms, the narrative review is valuable when 
gathering and synthesising a great amount of literature in a specific subject. 
When conducting the literature review, the term philanthropic might have skewed the 












‘global health.’ 437 53
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results, given that foundations can be described in different ways, such as ‘charitable 
foundations’, or simply by their names, e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Global 
Health Foundation. However, the goal is to analyse the NSAs in the Global Health scenario 
as defined by the World Health Organisation, therefore, the search terms used were those 
named in the Framework of Engagement with non-State actors. Moreover, as will be 
explained further, one of the weaknesses of current research relating to philanthropic 
foundations is the focus on a small number of institutions without a critical analysis of the 
broad context.  
1.1 Non-Governmental Organisations 
The Oxford Dictionary defines a non-governmental organisation (NGO) as ‘a non-
profit organisation that operates independently of any government, typically one whose 
purpose is to address a social or political issue’.  For the World Bank (WB) it is a ‘private 3
organisation that pursues activities to relieve suffering’.  The term was coined in 1945 as the 4
United Nations needed, in its Charter, to distinguish the participation rights for 
intergovernmental agencies and private organisations. Overall, NGOs can be described as 
organisations that are independent of governmental control and can embrace private 
individuals or associations, organised on a non-profit and voluntary basis to reach common 
purposes in specific areas. NGOs can operate at the local, national or international level. 
There is no accurate data about how many NGOs there are in the world, but their 
growth since the 1990s is undeniable. According to the Human Development Report, only the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council grant consultative status to more than 4,500 
non-governmental organisations (UNDP, 2016). It is speculated that across the world the 
number of  NGOs operating internationally is around 40,000. If considering local and 
national NGOs, some estimate that there may be 10 million worldwide.   5
Non-governmental organisations have become key actors in many countries due to 
their cooperation with basic social services like health care and education. However, it is 
important to distinguish NGOs from philanthropies, as NGOs diverge from the notion of 
charity. NGOs are not-for-profit and can be political without being partisan, while keeping 
 Definition available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ngo . Accessed on 20/05/20193
 Definition available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/809681468319759319/pdf/multi0page.pdf4
 In 2013, when announcing the release of its annual Top 100 NGOs, The Global Journal affirmed that  5
according to estimations of the Public Interest Registry (PIR), the sector encompassed close to 10 million 
organisations. Available at: http://www.theglobaljournal.net/group/15-top-100-ngos-2013/article/585/ 
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straight cooperative relations with governments. Their distinctive characteristic is providing 
alternatives to conventional institutional practices whilst, at the same time, working close to 
these traditional actors. NGOs normally have technical competence, a category of 
‘professional activists’ that although keeping a distance from religion, universities, or 
political activists, preserve connections with them. Moreover, NGOs usually have a direct 
and efficient dialogue with international entities and bodies, such as the United Nations and 
its specialised agencies – a relation that is central to this thesis.  
Also, a very unique characteristic of non-governmental organisations is that their board 
members and business donors are mainly from ‘developed’ Western countries while the 
‘recipients’ are ‘developing’ countries. It is precisely due to this complexity that NGOs have 
been adapting themselves to different conjunctures and specific fields.  
As previously mentioned, civil society actors have considerably increased their 
involvement in global and local policy processes, including in the health field. According to 
the WHO (n/d), NGOs ‘include (…) groups that represent consumers and patients, 
associations with humanitarian, developmental, scientific and/or professional goals and not-
for-profit organisations that represent or are closely linked with commercial interests’. 
Considering that the civil society is helping to shape global health milestones, (like for 
example, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control ), this topic of the chapter focuses 6
on the literature review of non-governmental organisations and their role in the global health 
agenda. Of the 216 articles found in PubMed and Web of Science, 53 were not considered 
due to double counting. Then, after reading titles and abstracts, the articles below were 
believed to have contributed to the understanding of the role of NGOs in global health and 
will be explored.    
Non-governmental organisations are important players in addressing global health 
challenges as they complement the efforts of international governmental organisations while 
balancing the self-interest emphasis of States and private business. Therefore, by using the 
International Society of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine (ISPRM) as a case study, 
 The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) is the first treaty negotiated under the 6
auspices of the World Health Organization. (…) The treaty, which is now closed for signature, has 168 
Signatories, including the European Community, which makes it one of the most widely embraced treaties in 
UN history. Member States that have signed the Convention indicate that they will strive in good faith to ratify, 
accept, or approve it, and show political commitment not to undermine the objectives set out in it. (…) The 
Convention entered into force on 27 February 2005 - 90 days after it had been acceded to, ratified, accepted, or 
approved by 40 States. Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/ Last access on 04/03/2020
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Reinhardt et al. (2009) analyse the multifaceted responsibilities that NGOs have, especially 
those in official relations with the WHO. According to the authors, NGO roles can be 
summarised as follows: 1) to catalyse international support for the improvement of public or 
collective goods and collaborate to compensate market and/or government failure due to an 
effective community involvement; 2) to influence the world media and policy agenda and 
consequently the public opinion as well as to spark social movements; 3) to mobilise 
resources and to deliver health services in a faster and flexible way; 4) to support the 
minorities and powerless majority groups; 5) to enable transnational research; 6) to define the 
field of competence, appropriate education and training curricula of professions as well as to 
set standards of knowledge and skills needed; 7) to bring players from diverse societal areas 
together, subsequently enabling a comprehensive problem-orientated discourse. 
On the other hand, the authors argue that NGOs lack formal authority and may be 
biased due to conflicts of interest, which can arise from the influence and resources of their 
partners or donors. Moreover, as NGOs are commonly from the North-Western world, they 
may also act based on incorrect assumptions about the implementation capacities of 
developing countries, which could lead to unsustainable health systems and ‘brain drain’ of 
health professionals when monetary support is withdrawn. Although analysing a particular 
NGO, the article International non-Governmental organisations in the emerging world 
society: the example of ISPRM concisely depicts the increasing role of NGOs in activities 
once managed exclusively by states and international state initiatives. Finally, it is argued that 
besides official relations with the WHO, NGOs can also seek alliances with key external 
actors. They are, therefore, becoming powerful players within health policies, including when 
it comes to influencing the design of policies.  
Regarding research capacity and correlated roles, Reinhardt et al. (2009) and Delisle et 
al. (2005) explain that although NGOs can take part in all phases of the research cycle: 
promotion and support of pertinent topics, priority setting, resource mobilisation, production, 
application and management of knowledge, and capacity development, this is normally due 
to partnership with universities, research and funding agencies, and other stakeholders. 
NGOs’ goal, therefore, is to support the pursuit of effective global health research by 
ensuring that all these groups can work together. Regarding evidence collection, NGOs’ role 
is greatly highlighted, as they often have close and trusting relations with citizens, given their 
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reputation for being very supportive in the development and distribution of information and 
evidence. To illustrate, human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and International 
Amnesty have been collecting evidence and stories from victims and witness for decades.  
Finally, the authors point out that NGOs can efficiently translate knowledge into 
action. At the same time, their research capacity efforts can increase research leadership 
(especially in low and middle-income countries (LMIC)) and support workforce capacity, 
both seen as part of implementation activities. The main critique, however, is that some 
NGOs might be selective about health research and the dissemination of findings, 
contributing to increased knowledge gaps. (Reinhardt et al. (2009) and Delisle et al. (2005)).    
NGOs are also experts in spreading opinion and influencing political issues, 
contributing to what is called world public opinion, and giving them the potential to catalyse 
social movements that address specific issues. In this regard, Reich (2002) affirms that the 
information technology revolution has boosted new sources of power through a speedy flow 
of ideas, information, alliances and strategies; consequently, the hierarchy of States started to 
weaken. These technologies reduce States’ monopoly of information and also increase the 
dissemination of alternative ideas.  
Therefore, ‘considering that the citizens of many countries do have no means to make their 
voices heard even locally, the notion of a global public opinion refers mainly to the confrontation 
in the world arena of a still limited number of citizens and elites’ (Sorj, 2005, p.20). Sorj argues 
that some of the most important topics of the contemporary world such as human rights, 
feminism and environmentalism have shaped transnational public opinion through a complex 
process of forming global agendas. Accordingly, Reinhardt et al (2009) assure that NGOs can 
influence policy agendas and reorientate government priorities through public opinion. 
As previously observed, one of the main capacities of non-governmental organisations 
is their leadership in addressing problems, whether local or global. It is possible due to their 
ability to cross borders and link perspectives from different social areas and groups. 
Moreover, NGOs often have a comprehensive problem-orientated discourse, focusing on the 
formulation of goals. In this regard, the literature shows that both international and domestic 
NGOs can help to institutionalise community-focused health strategies in partnership with 
national health systems as they normally have leaders who already cultivate relationships 
with government officials, communities, and other people of influence.  
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Clarke (1992) argues that NGOs can complement, reform, and/or oppose the State. 
Thus, according to Reich (2002), States are being reshaped by NGOs as some can take over 
social services previously delivered by governments at the national level. As mentioned 
previously, NGOs can usually be quicker and more flexible when translating knowledge into 
action, which means converting policy principles into social and political realities. Moreover, 
their role in managing and implementing programmes and policies is well-known, as well as 
providing support and acting between local communities and local governments, while 
endorsing civil rights principles and public interests. This can be seen as part of their actions 
as a ‘watchdog’.  
An illustration of NGOs’ relevance at the local level is found in the article Securitizing 
HIV/AIDS: a game-changer in state-societal relations in China? Lo (2016) argues that 
although China has experienced impressive economic development, it happened alongside a 
harsh health crisis, marginalisation of infectious diseases and persisting deficiencies in public 
health provision. Moreover, concurrently to the economic reform, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
was discovered and spread through the entire country. The author points out that due to the 
low priority of health policies since the economic reform and the restriction to ‘third sector’ 
activities in authoritarian China, combined with the political sensitivity of HIV/AIDS in the 
country, NGOs were constrained. However, acknowledging the prevalent health problems, 
the Chinese government adopted a ‘state-led approach’ to manage civil society: ‘civil society 
is created by and belong to the State, thus the independence and autonomy of civil society are 
at all-time bounded by the state’ (Lo, 2018, p.4). This approach, alongside the awareness of 
the impacts that health problems and infectious diseases could have on economic and social 
development, made the Chinese government stimulate the expansion of health-related non-
governmental organisations to respond and support the failures of the government in 
delivering public health.  
Regarding a more international role of NGOs, their open dialogue and tight 
cooperation with international entities and agencies like the World Health Organisation, the 
United Nations Children's Fund, the Food and Agricultural Organisation, and the World Bank 
are essential. They have played a major role in setting up cooperation with other partners, 
including bilateral donors and the private sector, which can work jointly to improve 
awareness of health issues at the international, regional, and national levels amongst 
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policymakers and the general population. 
The sociological debate about how NGOs can be an alternative created by 
governments in order to delegate the accomplishment of some public services to civil society 
goes beyond the objective of this research. However, it is important to note some problems 
presented by NGOs. The main one is probably legitimacy, considering that NGOs often have 
no formal authority or right to speak on behalf of others. A lack of transparency can also be 
mentioned, and, finally, the biased approach due to conflicts of interest that can arise from the 
influence of partners or donors. During FENSA negotiations, a Manichaean perspective 
emerged, in which NGOs were presented by many as the blameless agents of benevolence, 
and as private sector, evil entities seeking profit at any cost. However, as it will be detailed in 
chapter six, mainly by Interviewee 11 from Zambia, NGOs have increasingly accommodated 
the wishes of their donors to work within the system, instead of challenging it.  
1.2. Private Sector 
Among all the non-State actors analysed, the private sector was the one with more 
results in both databases, PubMed and Web of Science. Articles about private sector-specific 
actions in certain places were in general discarded as well as those related to their 
relationship with the WHO, considering that the third chapter will detail this. Hence, the aim 
was to select articles that could contribute in any way to an overall understanding of the 
actions and involvement of the private sector in the global health agenda. 
As obvious as it may be, the private sector is the part of the national or local economic 
system that is not under direct state control, but is managed by individuals and companies, to 
make a profit. When it comes to health, the private sector includes any channel, facility or 
person that provides clinical or diagnostic services. (Bennett et al, 2017). Historically, it was 
since the 1990s that partnerships with the private sector in health-related issues became 
relevant, not only regarding the health agenda overall but specifically health systems in low- 
and middle-income countries. In this regard, the WHO (2018, p.2) states that ‘the private 
sector provides a mix of goods and services including direct provision of health services, 
medicines and medical products, financial products, training for the health workforce, 
information technology, infrastructure and support services’. 
Advances in science and technology are perceived as the turning point for the 
participation of the private sector in health summed to the awareness that previous 
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interventions were not enough to address the increasing health challenges. To understand the 
challenges and opportunities that encompass the private sector, a first step is to recognise 
how extensive and heterogeneous it is in terms of size, objectives, and quality. The private 
sector in health can range from nomadic drug traders and individual clinical practitioners to 
business hospital chains and international private insurers. It is impossible to talk about the 
private sector in health without talking about the pharmaceutical industry - the main entity 
responsible for drugs and vaccines, essential to the prevention and treatment of disease. If on 
one hand it is widely recognised that the pharmaceutical industry brings numerous positive 
effects on health and, consequently, to the welfare of citizens worldwide; on the other hand it 
has become exceedingly commercialised, aiming to maximise profit. 
Pagliusi, Ting and Lobos (2017) argue that after decades of intense competition for 
high-value markets, collaboration with developing countries has become critical, and the 
involvement of public and private sector investments essential, in order to develop new 
vaccines against emerging infectious diseases. However, while the global health community 
has advanced in providing already-existing vaccines to developing countries, there is a gap in 
the development of vaccines without a market in the North-Western world that should be 
addressed, as advocated by Barocchi and Rappuoli (2015).  
This gap is commonly justified by the lack of economic incentives for the private 
sector to support investments needed for vaccine development. The authors clarify that 
sometimes industries may have the technology but do not use the resources in the 
development of vaccines to specific diseases because the priorities are utterly based on 
economic considerations, without taking into account the mortality, morbidity and/or 
potential social and economic impacts. The 2014–2015 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa illustrates how a vaccine that was achievable years before was only developed after a 
humanitarian disaster forced the global health community to contribute efforts and resources. 
As the title Delivering vaccines to the people who need them most suggests, it is argued that a 
lack of leadership in decision-making bodies led decision-makers to use an erroneous 
economic analysis to decide on vaccine development. The authors also suggest a global effort 
that would include ‘a clear policy, global coordination of funds dedicated to the development 
of neglected disease and an agreement on regulatory strategies and incentives for the private 
sector’ (Barocchi and Rappuoli, 2015, p.1). 
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Regarding healthcare, although focusing on the performance of the private sector in 
malaria, Bennett et al (2017) explain that the private sector is often the first source of primary 
healthcare services, probably due to the availability and access to private providers, 
sometimes accounting for three-quarters of all treatments. In rural and poor areas, (and 
consequently with higher risks of malaria infection), informal private providers are 
frequently used. From this article, it can be inferred that countries where diseases like 
malaria, with high potential of spread, are common, and the population has limited access to 
the public sector, which itself is also very limited, support from the private health sector to 
provide healthcare is required. In this direction, Wadge et al. (2017) argue that health systems 
in many low-income and middle-income countries, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, rely 
on private providers.  
In September 2018, Amina J. Mohammed, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, gave a 
speech  highlighting that ‘one-third of health expenditure in Africa comes from private 7
sources, (…) additionally, the private sector accounts for up to 60 per cent of the value chain 
for health, whether for medical provisions, manufacturing, distribution or retail’. Although it 
is not yet possible to achieve health targets without the contributions of the private sector, 
there are concerns about its role, mainly regarding accountability. Brinkerhoff (2004) argues 
that accountability is generally vague and undocumented, even though healthcare represents 
a key budgetary expenditure in all countries. The author suggests that suitable and transparent 
auditing should be a priority.  
It is also important to note other problems that come with private sector engagement in 
health: inadequate regulation, insufficient access for the poor, increased risk of inappropriate 
treatment that maximises provider profit, and over-reliance on public sector trained staff 
(Wadge et al., 2017). According to Wadge et al., governments normally focus their efforts on 
primary care and prevention, aiming that the private sector can collaborate in the form of 
secondary and tertiary care. Private sector actions, however, must be complementary, fill 
gaps and always act in a manner that is integrated with local health system. This same vision 
is shared by Nachtnebel et al. (2015), who believe that the private sector can fill gaps even in 
the provision of primary health care while taking into account contextual factors, appropriate 
mechanisms for services provided, and governance arrangements. Nevertheless, simply 
 Africa’s Health Targets Cannot be Met Without Contributions of Private Sector - Deputy Secretary-General 7
Tells High-level Dialogue (2018) Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/dsgsm.doc.htm 
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filling a gap is not enough, actions must be integrated within local health system and actors, 
including civil society, and an investigation of local context and capacities should be 
conducted. 
The involvement of the private sector in health systems, especially in providing health 
services in low and middle-income countries, is under extensive debate both amongst 
academics and policymakers. Hallo de Wolf and Toebes (2016) highlight some arguments 
favouring an expansion of the private sector's role, which can be more resourceful and 
sustainable in providing higher-quality services and also offer a significant complement to 
usually deficient government-provided services. In contrast, opponents argue that private 
healthcare services are predisposed to market failure, whilst often delivering low-quality 
care. Moreover, the common use of private providers and high out-of-pocket expenditures, 
particularly in low- and middle-income countries, alongside low public financing of 
healthcare means they will not achieve universal health coverage.  
The access to quality healthcare is a key component of universal health coverage. In 
this sense, Grépin’s article Private Sector an Important But Not Dominant Provider Of Key 
Health Services In Low- And Middle-Income Countries (2016) shows that there is a varied 
range of health service providers in both the public and private healthcare sectors. While the 
private sector is known to provide more than half of all treatment for sick children in low- 
and middle-income countries, public providers seem to remain the dominant source of care 
for delivery, antenatal care, and modern contraception. Apart from differences in private 
sector usage according to socioeconomic status, urban and wealthier women tend to use the 
private sector more frequently than rural and poorer women. This, therefore, supports the 
argument that private provision is inherently inequitable as it naturally favours those who are 
more able to afford it.  
When analysing the historical experience of the private sector in health, Jeremy Youde 
(2016) argues that 'private actors and philanthropies played similar roles and faced similar 
questions about their intentions and how they fit into the larger cross-border health 
governance processes’. He supports the argument that the emergence of both private actors 
and philanthropies is a consequence of gaps left by state-based actors. However, it is not 
because private actors are filling gaps where services are not being provided, that they cannot 
work together, transparently, with national governments and international organisations.  
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Although recognising efforts by international donors and national governments to 
strengthen public health systems in low- and middle-income countries, as well as the 
important role played by the private sector, especially in the delivery of maternal and child 
health services, the literature review reaffirms a remarkable variation in the use of the private 
sector worldwide and points out a lot of ongoing discussion about the right way to engage 
with it. Moreover, the private sector’s biomedical perspective should be further discussed, as 
there is a lack of focus on addressing the social determinants of health and basic healthcare 
services. Private actors tend to prioritise scientific research and pharmaceutical development, 
not to mention a more technological approach. This is understandable, due to their orientation 
towards profit.  
The private sector has undoubtedly become a core part of the global health scenario, 
and this was reflected during FENSA negotiations, as chapter 4 will show. Malloch-Brown 
(2017), however, emphasises that ‘private-sector (sic) investments need to be responsible 
investments that accept the social contract that comes with being invited into the 
development sector (…) The world's poorest, most marginalised, and vulnerable people 
cannot be subjected to market capitalism that focuses only on short-term investment returns 
rather than long-term needs’.  
Private sector investments, therefore, need to embrace governments and communities 
that are being assisted to guarantee the investment is responsible and long term. Finally, if the 
aim is to become a trust partner, the private sector needs to be transparent and accountable for 
its claims and commitments. When analysing the literature on the private sector role in 
health, it became clear why its participation at the World Health Organisation, which was 
legitimised through FENSA, was the main point of the negotiation process. Due to its profit-
focused nature as well as historical episodes of undue influence, the private sector is 
generally seen as an actor that requires more attention, and this was reflected during FENSA 
negotiations.  
1.2.1. Public-Private Partnerships 
At the beginning, the literature review did not aim to contextualise the Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP) in global health. But when looking at the participation of NGOs and the 
private sector, it was observed that many of the studies were about PPP. Moreover, during my 
field research I took part in several civil society meetings in Geneva, in parallel to WHO 
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Governing Bodies’ conventions, and they were mostly very critical of the overspread concept 
of multi-stakeholder partnerships. The articles analysed in this subsection were selected from 
NGOs and private sector results. The goal is to briefly understand the collaboration between 
the business and public sectors in health. 
According to the World Bank website,  a PPP is ‘a long-term contract between 8
a private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which 
the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is 
linked to performance’. The World Economic Forum  refers to it as ‘a voluntary and 9
collaborative agreement for cooperation among participants of equal capacities from various 
fields to accomplish a communal objective or to meet a particular requirement that carries 
with it a collective risk, liability, measure, and capability’.  
Kraak et al. (2012) explain that not only agencies from the UN system but also public 
health experts have encouraged governments, non-governmental organisations and civil 
society organisations to tackle complex public health challenges by working together with the 
private sector through PPP. The WHO defines a public-private partnership for health as a 
‘wide variety of ventures involving a diversity of arrangements, varying about participants, 
legal status, governance, management, policy-setting prerogatives, contributions and 
operational roles. They range from small, single-product collaborations with industry to large 
entities hosted in United Nations agencies or private not-for-profit organizations’.  Broadly 10
speaking, PPPs are coalitions planned to accomplish common goals that are expected to 
benefit society; however, part of the literature criticises the inadequate advocacy of these 
partnerships, since NGOs are compelled to act under corporate norms of work. 
Historically, public-private partnerships ascended in the latter half of the 1990s, in a 
context where bureaucracies were seen as inefficient, and market mechanisms seen as a 
solution to efficiently promote development. Therefore, the influence of private actors in the 
decision-making process (on both a national and international level), and in global health 
governance, has grown exponentially with an increase in their political power, articulated to 
the growth of resources for health. According to Buse and Walt (2000), the term was coined 
 Available at: https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-8
partnerships 
 Available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/strategic-infrastructure-steps-prepare-and-accelerate-public-9
private-partnerships Last access on 04/03/2020
 Definition available at: https://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story077/en/ 10
 43
in 1969 in the report Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International 
Development, coordinated by Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada. However, 
until the 1970s, public-private partnerships within multilateral organisations did not exist, but 
some rare ones were established directly between donors and national governments.  
Almeida (2017) explains that the economic crisis of the mid-1970s and the global rise 
of neoliberal politics provided the perfect scenario for the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to encourage structural macroeconomic adjustments, and to open 
public policies to the private sector. By overestimating the market and the entrepreneurial 
perspective concurrently to the disqualification of the State, social policies and the provision 
of public goods, PPPs became part of this dynamic. By joining resources and knowledge 
amongst industries, research institutions, governments and non-profit organisations, PPPs are 
seen by many as the solution to global health challenges, because they have expressively 
increased the resources available to global health action. For instance, funds allocated to the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and Global Alliances for Vaccines and 
Immunizations (GAVI) have grown from US$1.67 billion to US$4.9 billion over the ten 
years between 2005 and 2015 (Hawkes, Buse and Kapilashrami, 2017). PPPs are also 
perceived to have promoted enhancements in efficiency, equity, value for money, and 
outcomes of health challenges.  
However, some authors have been extremely critical of this increasing, and sometimes 
unnoticed, participation of PPPs in health. Judith Ritcher (2012), for instance, argues that 
when the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was launched by 
UNICEF’s Executive Director at the World Economic Forum in 2000 and the Global Alliance 
for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Children in 
2002, the presence of the main financial sponsor Bill Gates, also CEO of the Microsoft 
Corporation, revealed that the PPP model put private sector representatives on the decision-
making board from the national to the global level.  
It is important to note that those who advocate a more significant role of PPPs often 
argue about the non-distinction between the different actors involved, since they are all called 
partners, indiscriminately, regardless of their role in society. Almeida (2017), however, makes 
us aware that this biased uniformity hides the fact that public actors and different private 
actors do not have the same status, nor the same objectives and interests, and it ends up 
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relativising the legal role and legitimacy of intergovernmental public organisations. Taylor 
(2018) supports this argument by calling attention to power imbalances within this new form 
of governance that are hidden by the use of the term ‘partnership’. Buse and Harmer (2004, 
p. 49) affirm that the ‘northern elite wields power through its domination of governing bodies 
and also through a discourse which inhibits critical analysis of partnership while imbuing 
partnership with legitimacy and authority’.  
Some authors attest that the growth of PPP has opened spaces for civil society 
participation in global health governance, which can not only contribute to legitimacy, but 
also democratise global governance processes. However, others argue that although civil 
society participation is almost universally recognised, there is scarce evidence of such 
engagement within contemporary global health governance mechanisms and processes - 
therefore giving civil society a place in decision-making processes of global health would 
represent a way to respond to critiques regarding the legitimacy and authority of the 
partnerships. (Storeng and Bengy Puyvallée, 2018). The public-private partnership model is 
also criticised for its hint at privatisation, undue influence on decision-making processes and 
promotion of an excessive focus on high-tech solutions for health problems, ignoring the 
social determinants of health. A result-driven approach, therefore, also has to be considered.  
Notwithstanding increasing criticism, public-private interactions are expected to rise 
across all sectors, mainly health. The partnerships are seen, or are promoted, as mechanisms 
that can integrate the strengths of private actors (such as innovation, technical knowledge and 
managerial efficiency), with the role of public actors, (such as social responsibility, social 
justice, public accountability and local knowledge). The United Nations Agenda 2030 for 
Sustainable Development, for instance, enthusiastically advocates for countries to ‘encourage 
and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the 
experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships’.  11
A stronger joint workforce is widely recognised as a way to boost public health goals. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that PPPs have become increasingly powerful actors. 
They constitute a major source of funding for health programmes in low- and middle-income 
countries and exert influence over health decision-making at national and global levels 
(Storeng and Bengy Puyvallée, 2018), which raises justified worries about legitimacy, 
 Target 17.17: Public, private and civil partnerships. Available at: https://stats.unctad.org/Dgff2016/11
partnership/goal17/target_17_17.html . Last access on 04/03/2020
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priority-setting, resource allocation and accountability.  
1.3 Philanthropic Foundations 
Of all non-state actors analysed in this chapter, philanthropic foundations were the 
least researched topic. Only 14 articles were found in PubMed and Web of Science when 
using the broad term ‘philanthropic foundation’. However, when using ‘Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation’ and ‘global health’, the results increased to 287 articles on PubMed. It is 
interesting to note that Interviewee 1 warned to ‘not just focus only the BMGF. The Ted 
Turner Foundation, for instance, is just as important. It had a ‘secondment’ at the highest 
level in WHO as Member States found out after asking repeatedly for a list of secondments’. 
It can be noted that even though philanthropic foundations have a historical role in health 
(such as the Rockefeller Foundation, as it will be further detailed), the Bill and Melina Gates 
Foundation is almost the only emphasis of the current literature. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that apart from BMGF, philanthropic foundations are still an unexplored subject, 
despite their incontestable relevance.  
Firstly, it is important to highlight that as Anheir and Daly (2005) describe, 
‘philanthropy is a culturally and historically specific concept that, in the most general terms, 
refers to the voluntary use of private assets (finance, know-how, among others) to the benefit 
of specific public causes’. Historians such as Karl and Katz (1987) point out that the earliest 
philanthropic foundations have distinguished themselves from charities by directly 
addressing public and social problems, to systematically explore their causes and generate 
long-term solutions, rather than just relieve them. Further, Salamon (1994) argues that the 
inherent limitations of States, allied with growing citizen activism, triggered a significant 
increase in private non-profit activity in every corner of the world. One should also consider 
the rise in inequality. According to Oxfam (2002),  the richest 1% of billionaires have more 12
than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people, and normally prefer providing through 
private foundations instead of paying to governments.  
One could inquire, in times of economic crisis and consequent cuts in essential social 
sectors, what could be wrong with voluntary donations from private wealth to benefit the 
people? 
 Available at: https://www.oxfam.ca/news/worlds-richest-1-have-more-than-twice-as-much-wealth-as-6-9-12
billion-people-says-oxfam/ Last access 09.03.2020
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Supporters of philanthropy argue that foundations can improve existing international 
health structures by not only injecting additional resources but also dealing with the control 
and eradication of infectious diseases. Thus, foundations tend to be vehicles for the semi-
privatisation of certain tasks that are not so easily or efficiently carried out by States, given 
the limitations of public administration.  
Although rules apply differently from country to country, private foundations tend to 
be exempt from federal taxes. Behind the bewildered generosity of billionaires who don’t 
know what to do with their money, is the recognition that philanthropy cannot substitute the 
tax system and public investments in poverty alleviation, infrastructure, economic 
opportunity, and social protection. Therefore, private foundations should not benefit private 
(or their own) interests, particularly because their tax exemption implies that their work 
justifies the redistribution of taxes from their private accounts to public programs. As 
philanthropic assets can sometimes replace public funds, it is important to keep in mind that 
the public fund mirrors the priorities of public policies, and should ensure resources for the 
financing of necessary social policies. Moreover, as Rausch (2018) points out in her article 
The Birth of Transnational U.S. Philanthropy from the Spirit of War, foundations can ignore 
the State’s – where it comes from – position and policies and act according to its interests, as 
happened during the First World War in the case of the Rockefeller Foundation.  
On the other hand, besides advocating objectivity and non-involvement, since their 
main goal is to promote development, the actions of philanthropic foundations can be 
dubious and interest-driven, as Rausch (2018, p.652) explains: ‘the outbreak of war in 
Europe seemed a suitable laboratory to pursue their managerial, progressive visions for 
optimising the state of American affairs (….) Rockefeller philanthropists also pursued a 
preparedness agenda for intervention abroad’. In this sense, the article details how the RF 
moulded the wartime philanthropic agenda, specifically through committing to European 
relief work - a strategy linked to US government plans to use foreign aid as a stabilising 
instrument for intervention in the post-war world.  
When it comes to the health agenda, Rausch (2018) elucidates that the anti-
tuberculosis campaign in France, led by the Rockefeller Foundation, was less a consequence 
of the uncommon circumstances of war than a domestic and international strategy to promote 
the professionalisation of medical experts focused on campaigns against hookworm, malaria, 
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tuberculosis, and yellow fever. Accordingly, the RF started to widen its interventions (a so-
called ‘civilising mission’) outside the U.S. borders through ‘operations against diseases and 
epidemics in Latin America (Cuba and Panama) and the British Caribbean before expanding 
further into the tropical sphere’ (Rausch, 2018, p.656). Besides using the American-occupied 
places as ‘laboratories for implanting racialised medicine and health concepts’, according to 
the author, the Rockefeller health interventions were made aiming not only to fit the 
Foundation in an inter-imperial public health system with the European powers, but also to 
focus on regions either with potential for American colonial expansion or that had gained 
geopolitical strategic attention due to the First World War.  
Finally, Rausch’s critiques of the RF’s operations in the WWI period is quite similar to 
those made of contemporary philanthropic foundations. For example, involvement in regions 
with geo-strategic importance, actions and projects that are based on standardising the 
laboratory-biomedical approach, which normally downplays social-economic contexts and 
long-term solutions. Contrary to Rausch’s article, the role of new actors, specifically 
philanthropic foundations, is often seen as having many positive elements without critical 
analyses of their problematic and negative outcomes. For example, Santos and Franco-
Paredes (2011) argue that public health initiatives from philanthropic foundations, non-
governmental organisations, and bilateral or multilateral international donor organisations 
have produced considerable improvements in Latin America. The authors emphasise that the 
Rockefeller Health Foundation contributions were essential for public health in Latin 
America in the first half of the twentieth century. The contributions started targeting the 
reduction of port diseases associated with the maritime exploration of commercial routes – 
e.g. yellow fever, cholera, malaria, and other tropical diseases. Later, programs to improve 
living conditions were included, with nutritional interventions and maternal-foetal health.  
By way of comparison, the article Philanthrocapitalism (2014), written by Anne 
Emanuelle Birn, severely criticises these influential global health players. Birn (2014) argues 
that the Rockefeller Foundation presence enabled and naturalised the dissemination of a 
structure of institutions and policies, and also ideologies and practices which were all defined 
by the foundation, often to the detriment of local knowledge and interests. Moreover: 
‘RF’s efforts went well beyond health, stabilising colonies and emerging nation-
states by helping them meet the social demands of their populations, encouraging the 
transfer and internationalisation of scientific, bureaucratic, and cultural values, 
stimulating economic development and growth, expanding consumer markets, and 
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preparing vast regions for foreign investment, increased productivity, and 
incorporation into the expanding system of global capitalism’ (BIRN, 2014, p. 4) 
In this sense, Anheier and Leat (2002) in the book From charity to creativity, philanthropic 
foundations in the 21st century claim that organised philanthropies operate outside of social 
and economic realities.  
The article Challenges for nationwide vaccine delivery in African countries written by 
Mario Songane (2018) investigates the role of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunizations (GAVI)  in the development, purchase, and delivery of vaccines, and how 13
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) acted as a sponsor. To illustrate, the author 
gives Zambia as one example of a government that, due to the small percentage of their 
national budget, dedicated to routine immunization programmes, needs support from GAVI, 
currently the largest external funding source for vaccine purchases in Africa.  
According to Songane (2018), since 1999, the BMGF has spent over US$2.5 billion on 
GAVI projects. However, the money is precisely addressed to ‘the multiple challenges in 
vaccine delivery (…) and these grants could be used to build and equip research laboratories 
and manufacturing units in various African countries’ (p. 214). Regarding this, Birn (2014) 
warns that whereas the BMGF has injected ‘life’ into the global health field, it follows a 
technically-oriented approach, with programs planned to achieve positive evaluations, and 
launches the global health agenda through narrowly-defined goals, focusing on short term 
achievements. These actions, while important, do not embrace the ‘Health for All’ movement 
of the World Health Organisation, which proposes that resources for health should be 
consistently distributed and essential health care accessible to everyone. The ‘Health for All’ 
focus is on long-term solutions to tackle health inequalities.   
In a context of financial stagnation, a crisis of legitimacy of foreign aid, and the 
growing burden of chronic diseases and cutting social expenditures, the role of philanthropic 
foundations in global health has been increasing in tandem with health challenges. In this 
sense, Owain D. Williams’ article Access to medicines, market failure and market 
intervention: A tale of two regimes (2012) analyses how philanthropic foundations interfere 
in the global pharmaceutical market ‘either with respect to drug prices (through subsidisation, 
 GAVI is a public-private partnership created in 2000 and includes key United Nations (UN) agencies, 13
governments, the pharmaceutical industry, the private sector and civil society. The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation gave US$750 million for its creation (SONGANE, 2017) 
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negotiation or other forms of financing), or in terms of innovation and R&D, and sometimes 
with combinations of these two basic strategies’. Consequently, they have created what the 
author calls a multifaceted global pro-access regime to medicines.  
According to Williams (2012), international development, associated with the 
Millennium Development Goals, has shaped philanthropic foundations’ activities in 
increasing access to medicines. It was in this context, led primarily by the G8 and World 
Bank, that the new global health governance regime was created, and with it, initiatives such 
as the Global Fund and GAVI. What should be noted is that a template for what these 
agencies should do in global health, as well as their governance role, was mainly settled by 
major donors. These ‘new actors’ describe themselves as a new modality of health assistance 
and their actions were presented as an essential step towards (economic) growth and poverty 
alleviation through selected disease interventions. Additionally, their programmes need to 
demonstrate results in the short term to legitimise their worth and satisfy donors. 
Another point that is important to emphasise is the global health agenda focus on the 
‘big three diseases’ (malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis) - philanthropic foundations 
actively contributed to this, instead of bringing attention to the lack of acknowledgement of 
other diseases, such as the neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). Fenwick, Zhang, and Stoever 
(2009) argue that among the NTDs, seven are preventable by simple yearly oral drug 
treatment, and the elimination of one NTD would be possible after seven years of annual 
treatment. The article Control of the Neglected Tropical Diseases in sub-Saharan Africa: the 
unmet needs illustrates that despite a growing recognition of the importance of NTDs, a 
greater integration of NTD control from WHO, the Gates Foundation and the USAID, (and 
consequently more funds dedicated to controlling these diseases), it is not enough as the 
funds in total are less than a quarter of the continent’s needs. The authors also point out that 
some existing programmes had funding for only a few years, and without guaranteed 
funding, control programmes cannot be sustainable. McCoy et al. (2009) argue that the 
BMGF’s strategy is to concentrate efforts on priority diseases which enables their focus on 
vaccines and technology - clearly not the case of the NTDs. They also affirm that the Gates 
Foundation’s power is boundless, and many academics feel inhibited to confront them, also 
because the Foundation sponsors several researchers based in elite academic institutions in 
the global North countries. 
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This led to and supports Laurie Garret’s (2007) main argument that if the biggest 
problem in global health was once the lack of resources accessible to tackle increasing health 
challenges, nowadays, while a lot of money is available, the actions are largely uncoordinated 
and mostly directed to specific diseases, rather than at public health in general. In addition, 
Anne Emanuelle Birn (2014) maintains that philanthropic foundations take the State’s role in 
social protection, cherishing voluntary efforts in place of citizen's rights and, consequently, 
weakening the State in the face of private initiative in the provision of social welfare 
services. Critical voices such as Nielsen (1972) also point to the inherent democratic deficit 
of foundations, since they are not subject to market forces or consumer preferences, nor do 
they have an affiliation or constituency to oversee their decisions and performance. 
Potential conflicts of interest resulting from the action and influence of philanthropic 
foundations on the global health agenda is also observed, and was extensively discussed, 
during FENSA negotiations. The legal meaning of conflicts of interest under US law is ‘a 
situation in which there is a real or apparent incompatibility between private interests and 
public or fiduciary duties.’  
Stuckler et al. (2011) explain that, historically, foundations have kept the management 
of their donations and the decisions of donations separated. However, these practices and the 
degree of separation can differ in each foundation. Despite the existence of explicitly 
designed policies to mitigate potential conflicts of interest, the boundaries between 
foundations, their investments, and their parent companies or private lenders, may become 
blurred. Often directors of founding councils also sit on the board of private companies, 
taking on multiple roles. In this regard, Birn (2014) shows that constant accusations 
surrounding investment in pharmaceutical companies, industries associated with 
environmental and health crises, as well as private companies that profit from philanthropic 
support of global health initiatives, have led to the Gates Foundation giving up their role in 
the pharmaceutical sector in 2009. 
Finally, one should not overlook the importance of philanthropic foundations, or of any 
actor involved and interested in improving global or public health, as it is shown that 
although governments remain the major source of Development Assistance for Health 
(DAH), accounting for about 70% of the total, private sources (foundations, NGOs and 
corporations) have grown from 6% in 1990 to 16% in 2000, and to 17.3% in 2014, with the 
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largest single contributor being the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Moon and Omole, 
2017). 
Ravishankar et al. (2009) point out that the proportion of DAH conducted by UN 
agencies and development banks decreased, whereas the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and 
non-governmental organisations became key channels for health actions and interventions. 
This escalation, in both funds and actions, was mainly possible due to increased philanthropic 
donations and in-kind contributions from corporate donors. It may also be worth noting that 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded the study.  
Although it is undeniable that the WHO crisis of legitimacy (that will be further 
discussed in chapter 2) added to a context of economic stagnation encouraged by the 
participation of other actors in the global health agenda, there is an alarming lack of 
transparency and undue power over the public good - specifically an increasing and 
uncontrolled dependence on philanthropic foundations’ resources.  
1.4 Academic Institutions 
Academic institutions, normally referred as research institutions, are key actors that set 
the overall agenda, develop expertise in global health, and specifically address health 
inequalities. However, when it comes to policy and decision-making processes, they unfairly 
become overlooked players. When discussing the influence of non-State actors in health, the 
focus is on where the money comes from - the private sector and the contemporary increasing 
role of philanthropic foundations.  
Despite the gradually increasing presence of academic institutions in the world of 
health care (there are much more articles about academic institutions and global health than 
about NGOs or philanthropic foundations), little has been done to unveil how, by whom and 
to what ends they operate, nor how they can influence the global health agenda. Therefore, 
this literature review shows that most of the research is narrowly focused on international 
curriculum and academic partnerships to tackle specific problems and diseases, or domestic 
gaps in scholarly activities, especially in low and middle-low income countries (LMIC).  
Kickbusch and Hanefeld (2017), however, point out that think tanks and academic 
institutions can (and must) ‘play a key role in political decisions that aim to tackle 
inequalities, shape healthy living and working environments, and ensure universal health 
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coverage at both a national and global level’ (p.2), given their indispensable partnerships with 
international agencies and foundations, international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, and the private sector, among others. The authors advocate that academic 
institutions could also behave as mediators between stakeholders from many areas, not only 
to develop relations and networks but also to allow better dialogue amongst the general 
public, decision-makers, and civil society.  
Bennett et al. (2012) indicate that, recently, a rise in the number of independent health 
policy analysis institutes is being observed, especially in the LMICs, as a consequence of the 
limitation of governments’ analytical capacity and pressures for accountability. These NSAs 
are important both nationally and supra-nationally, as they can bring together global policy 
actors with national level implementers, and those most affected by global policies. However, 
only 15 articles out of the 437 found in the Pubmed database have this perspective.  
In this regard, the main argument of the article Academic Medical Support to the Ebola 
Virus Disease Outbreak in Liberia written by McQuilkin et al. (2017) is that academic 
medical support has ‘resources to offer in humanitarian crises, including the ability to 
leverage funding and faculty members with expertise and experience in basic and clinical 
sciences’. The worldwide mobilisation of researchers during the new COVID-19 epidemic  14
is a current example of synchronised action within academia. Conversely, if unprepared, it 
can hinder or slow the humanitarian response, as firstly happened in Liberia during the Ebola 
outbreak. The American residents and fellows had their return to West Africa limited because 
of the risk of contracting Ebola, whilst Liberian trainees were left on the frontline without 
support. As the epidemic progressed, few faculty members kept teaching and hospitals were 
under siege, trying to treat infected patients. The outcome was drastic - Liberia lost 8% of its 
already-limited health care workforce during the epidemic. 
Another example to emphasise the role of academic institutions as partners of 
important stakeholders is the Medical Education Partnership Initiative (MEPI), established in 
2010 to increase the number of medical graduates, the quality of their education, and their 
retention in Africa. Noormahomed et al. (2017) explain that the partnership’s goal was to 
strengthen medical research capacity and was supported by the U.S. President’s Emergency 
 A pneumonia of unknown cause detected in Wuhan, China that was first reported to the WHO Country Office 14
in China on 31 December 2019 and declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30 January 
2020. On the date of this thesis, there are 93.000 cases confirmed globally.
 53
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which allowed African institutions to receive grants to 
implement MEPI from 2010 to 2015. Apart from enabling growth in the numbers enrolled in 
medical school , the partnership supported curricula revision, recruitments, the expansion of 
clinical skills laboratories and the strengthening of computer and telecommunications 
capacity. Overall, a more robust community of practice in medical education and research 
was formed by bringing together governments and academic institutions.  
In this direction, when analysing the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, Kiefer et al. (2017) highlight the importance of operational and implementation 
research. The main goal is to support an evidence base for context-specific execution of 
global interventions, and recognise what prevents programmes from operating successfully. 
The leading implementers of studies funded through Global Fund grants were the Ministries 
of Health (MoH), but NGOs and academic institutions were also involved. The main barrier 
identified was research capacity, specific technical capacity (research methods, for example), 
time, and funding. According to the authors, ‘technical capacity has often been reported to be 
concentrated within selected institutions (for example government research institutes and 
academic institutions), resulting in qualified staff and technical capacities being heavily 
centralised in the capital cities’ (Kiefer et al., 2007, p.5). The recommendation from the 
Global Fund secretariat is that academic and research stakeholders should be closely 
involved in the elaboration of concept notes. The authors also point out that policy-making 
and decision-making are not always evidence-based, and this argument is supported by Allen, 
Lavis, and Shemer (2016). 
According to the WHO (n/d),  health policy and systems research (HPSR) is an 15
emergent field that seeks to understand and improve how societies organise themselves to 
accomplish collective health goals, and how different actors can co-operate in the policy and 
implementation processes, to contribute to the outcomes. It can be observed, hence, that to 
integrate HPSR into decision-making is simultaneously essential challenging, since it 
primarily involves two actors: researchers (the knowledge producers) and the policy-makers 
(the knowledge users). However, Allen, Lavis, and Shemer (2016) argue that, frequently, 
health policies and management decisions are made without using or consulting the greatest 
research evidence offered, which can lead to ineffective and inefficient health systems.  
 Available at: https://www.who.int/alliance-hpsr/about/en/ . Last access on 05/03/202015
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The authors conducted a study case of Israeli health systems to find out the limits of 
the use of academic knowledge and evidence in the policy-making process. It was recognised 
that researchers are one of the key actors to ensure the use of evidence, while ‘government/
provider relations, policymakers lacking the expertise for acquiring, assessing, and applying 
HSPR and priorities in the health system drawing attention away from HSPR’ are the barriers 
(Allen, Lavis and Shemer, 2016, p.7). It was also noted by the same authors that, (at least in 
the case of their study), health insurance funds and physician organisations also have a strong 
influence in the policy-making process.  
Considering the articles analysed, it can be argued that health systems and, 
consequently, health outcomes, would have undoubted benefits and advantages if researchers 
could work efficiently together with governments and other stakeholders.  
Furthermore, academic institutions are recognised to play an important role in 
healthcare workers supply, distribution, and migration in the context of an increasing brain 
drain, as defended by Jennifer Kasper and Francis Bajunirwe (2012). The WHO and World 
Bank currently estimate a potential worldwide lack of 18 million skilled healthcare workers 
(SHWs) by 2030, with the weight projected to fall largely on LMICs, particularly sub-
Saharan Africa (WHO, 2016). Considering that nowadays 57 countries face severe shortages 
in their healthcare workforce, it is not a surprise that the migration of SHWs is recorded as 
one of three main factors that threaten health systems in SSA. With this scenario, the authors 
argue that inter-country collaborations between organisations and researchers could offer 
more opportunities for professional progress without migrating.  
As analysed in this item, a vast range of organisations, actors, coalitions, activities, and 
interactions work together to shape the policy-making health processes. Although academic 
institutions are included in this miscellaneous crowd, a common complaint about lack of 
evidence-based actions shows that they are undervalued actors, especially concerning policy-
making. It was clear during the investigation of the FENSA negotiation process, as academic 
institutions were the non-State actor less involved and less mentioned by the interviewees.  
Thus, there is a clear opportunity for health institutions (academia, think thanks) to 
positively engage in promoting evidence-informed decision-making in governments as well 
as support the development of solutions to some challenges, for example, some degree of 
independence in governance and financing. Moreover, establishing partnerships with health 
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service delivery platforms (such as non-governmental organisations or the public sector) 
would also strengthen patient care and public health interventions by exploiting expertise on 
the research and training of academic institutions. 
Finally, academic institutions should not only be centres of excellence in research but 
should also seek to dialogue with policymakers at all levels, not only due to an evidence 
base, but also to improve integrated monitoring and strengthen evaluation mechanisms. 
Accountability is crucial and should be pursued by academic institutions, since current global 
health actions lack independent monitoring of policy commitment.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CRISIS AT THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION AND THE GESTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK OF 
ENGAGEMENT WITH NON-STATE ACTORS, WHY DID IT ALL START?  
To understand how the Framework of Engagement with non-State actors was 
conceived, it is important to take some steps back and see how, after 60 years of respected 
leadership, the World Health Organisation got involved in a crisis of identity characterised by 
underfunding, incoherent policy prioritisation and administrative disputes. This second 
chapter aims to present a historical perspective of the WHO by clarifying its governance, 
structure, policies, priorities, financing and management. The first question for this approach 
will be whether history-driven analysis has relevance to global health, broadly speaking, or to 
the FENSA negotiation process. The historical perspective on health can be clarified with 
reference to Hobsbawm (1972). The author introduces the idea of the ‘social function of the 
past’ as a tool to understand how the transformation of society occurs. In this research, the 
transformation of the International Health scenario, specifically its institutions, is 
characterised by the constant tension between past and present. This research recognises 
history as scientific knowledge, essential to understanding the present.  
In this second chapter I propose a historical perspective that methodologically and 
analytically perceives health strategies and policies as phenomena linked to the nuances of 
the social and historical context. What will lead to a deeper understanding of the WHO’s 
complexities and, consequently, to a truthful comprehension of the governance of the WHO? 
What is the role of FENSA in this context? 
2.1 A Historical Perspective of the World Health Organisation 
History has a key function in enabling the understanding of the past and increasing the 
comprehension of the present. It is impossible to understand a complex negotiation like 
FENSA without returning to the history of international public health, and consequently, the 
creation of international health institutions. According to Pires-Alves, Paiva & Hochman 
(2008), the return to history is not an isolated movement in the field of public health; since 
the mid-1980s the Anglo-Saxon social sciences have been bringing back the past, not only in 
training and practice, but as part of the analysis of health policies, due to an understanding 
that ‘public policy is always history’. Correspondingly, the authors point out that Charles 
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Rosenberg claims that history's greatest contribution to health policy would be its 
fundamental sense of complexity, and also as a way to prevent depoliticised contexts. 
Although it was not until 1948 that the World Health Organisation was established as a 
specialised agency of the United Nations, joint efforts focusing on international health 
cooperation began almost a century before, with the first International Sanitary Conference in 
Paris in l851. Due to the increasing trade and travel that, consequently, aggravated outbreaks 
of diseases in Europe, ‘the French Government was inspired by the (…) desire that 
international agreement should be reached on the standardisation of quarantine regulations 
aimed at preventing the importation of cholera, plague, and yellow fever’ (Aginam, 2005, 
p.62). The early International Sanitary Conferences are considered a first attempt to establish 
a mechanism for international cooperation for disease prevention and control. When 
analysing the history of international health, it can be said that, between 1851 and 1902, the 
focus was on meeting and agreements to share information on epidemic outbreaks. In 1892, 
for instance, the International Sanitary Convention for the control of cholera was adopted.  
Later, the period that starts with the creation of the International Sanitary Bureau (a 
precursor to the Pan American Health Organisation, PAHO) in 1902 and continues until 1939 
is considered a time of institution-building. In Europe, L’Office International d’Hygiene 
Publique (OIHP), commonly known as the ‘Paris Office’, was established in 1907. Its main 
responsibility was ‘to collect and bring the knowledge of the participants states the facts and 
documents of a general character which relate to public health and especially as regards 
infectious diseases, notably cholera, plague, and yellow fever, as well as the measures to 
combat these diseases’ (Wortley, 1974, p.133).  
Global health literature generally considers the OIHP to be the first formal 
international health institution, due to its permanent staff and main office. However, after the 
First World War, its limitations were exposed as the OIHP wasn’t able to successfully 
mediate and communicate, in wartime, with deteriorated conditions, in order to address 
diseases. For illustration, between 1918 and 1919, it is estimated that influenza killed around 
50 million people, as troops could not be warned about the outbreak of the disease.  
Soon before the creation of the League of Nations Health Organisation (LNHO), in 
1919, in Geneva, some health-related non-state actors started to arise. In 1913, the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) was created, aiming to develop ‘the well-being of mankind 
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through the world’. Through the International Health Board, charged with the ‘promotion of 
public sanitation and the spread of knowledge of scientific medicine’, the RF became not just 
a significant player but went on to shape international health actions and interventions, as 
was analysed in the previous chapter.  
Regarding the LNHO, according to Birn, Pillay and Holtz (2009), the initial idea was 
to include the Paris Office in the health office to be created as part of the League of Nations. 
The French government, however, wanted to preserve the OIHP, while the United States 
declined to join the League, and consequently hampered the union. Initially, the LNHO's 
main goal was the epidemic crisis after the First World War. Nonetheless, as an international 
organisation, it also assumed both a technical and social role. It is important to note that at 
this moment, there were three independent official international health institutions: the OHIP 
(Paris Office), the International Sanitary Bureau in Washington and the LNHO in Geneva.  
It is worth noting that the creation of the LNHO occurred in a context that Hedley Bull 
calls ‘idealistic' in his article The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969, which 
generically is characterised by several theorists who believed in the idea of progress and the 
possibility of an evolution in international relations, in order to lead to a more peaceful 
world. The creation of international organisations would therefore be a way to promote the 
ideal of peace and security among States in a post-war scenario. In this regard, Weindling 
(2006) points out that the idealistic view inspired the LNHO that the equitable provision of 
health and welfare could reduce internal social conflicts, and, consequently, help to avoid 
another war. The emergence of idealism theory in international relations spread the 
perspective of transferring internal stability to the international stage. The focus of idealistic 
theorists was not to comprehend historical experiences, but to elaborate new models and 
solutions, while arguing why the future should not have to repeat the past. The League of 
Nations was the idealists’ envisaged outcome, as it emphasised the harmony of interests 
between all peoples disregarding the superficial conflicting interests of their states or 
governments. 
Apart from setting biological standards, producing medical statistics and disseminating 
best practices, the LNHO also supported initiatives to advance medical science, as part of an 
agenda of social modernisation, and to improve health and living conditions. Its activities 
were, therefore, far wider and more ambitious than those of the OIHP, in the earlier decades. 
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As a consequence of the outbreak of the Second World War, international health work was 
mostly suspended. The LNHO, however, was able to continue activities with a military focus. 
Borowy (2010) reminds us that, despite assuming worldwide responsibilities, in practical 
terms, the LNHO was a small institution, and although at the end of the war 43 States were 
still Members of the League of Nations, for all intents and purposes, it had succumbed. 
Nevertheless, an official termination of the organisation was necessary; a final and official 
disposition transferred the League of Nations’ properties to the United Nations. 
In 1945, the United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO) in San 
Francisco, (commonly known as the San Francisco Conference), approved a recommendation 
made by Brazil and China to establish a new and independent international organisation, 
entirely dedicated to public health. The proposed organisation was meant to unite the 
different health organisations that had been established in various countries around the world. 
In June 1948, the first World Health Assembly (WHA) took place and the WHO 
Headquarters was officially established in Geneva, aiming for the ‘attainment by all peoples 
of the highest possible levels of health’.  
In its constitution, the WHO defines health as not merely the absence of disease but ‘a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ (WHO, 1946). It is worth noting 
that this sentence can be seen as an eagerness to overcome the perception that public health 
should focus on standardisation and the accomplishment of successful campaigns for disease 
control. In this direction, the preamble goes beyond the technical and biological dimension, 
presenting health as a human right: ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition’ (WHO, 1946). It is important to 
highlight that with this social approach to health, the WHO was a pioneer, given that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN only two years after, in 
1948. In the article ‘El proceso de creación de la Organización Mundial de la Salud y la 
Guerra Fría,’ Cueto, Brown and Fee (2011, p. 137) argue that: 
la definición del preámbulo versaba sobre lo que debía ser la salud, no sobre la salud 
pública, y esto se hacía a diferencia de otras agencias de la ONU –como la Unesco o 
la FAO– que no se sintieron urgidas a definir lo que era la educación o el desarrollo 
agrícola. De esta manera, ello sugiere que existió una motivación idealista y en favor 
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de una equidad universal, que en muchos sentidos era nueva.    16
From the beginning, the WHO has been involved in public health campaigns more 
focused on the improvement of sanitary conditions, and became known as the organisation 
within the United Nations system with leading responsibility for international health. 
However, Brown, Cueto and Fee (2011) point out that it wasn’t such an easy path, firstly 
because its constitution had to be ratified by the Member States, which was a slow process - 
by 1949, only 14 countries had signed it; secondly, due to the timeless contradictory role 
played by the United States, one of the main contributors to the WHO budget. According to 
the authors (2011, p.64), on one hand, the United States supported the UN system regarding 
the comprehensive international goals, on the other, the country was concerned with UN 
sovereignty. Therefore, the US maintained the right to intervene unilaterally in the Americas 
in the name of national security. 
Health agencies and their activities are shaped by political context. Therefore, in a 
Cold War milieu, two opposing ideological views of public health were aggravated by the 
tensions between the two blocs. While for the communist countries, there was an inseparable 
nature of social, economic and health problems, this perspective was divergent to the disease 
control approach, conducted specifically by the Rockefeller Foundation. Thus, the Soviet 
Union, along with its allies Ukraine, Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary decided to withdraw from the WHO in 1949. The countries 
believed that the United States was controlling the WHO and the United Nations in general. 
The Soviets then decided to boycott the agencies (Fee, Cueto and Brown, 2016, p.1912).  
The tension between the superpowers and, consequently, the relationship of the Soviet 
Union with the UN and the WHO changed in 1953, when Joseph Stalin died, and the de-
Stalinization process started. Subsequently, Nikita Khrushchev stressed that foreign affairs 
would be guided by ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘friendly competition’ with the non-
communist world - a policy that was reflected both within and outside the UN system as all 
the communist countries (with the exception of China) returned to the WHO in 1956. In this 
direction. Birn, Pillay and Holtz (2009) argue that political tensions added to the withdrawal 
of Soviet bloc countries, and pushed the WHO to prove its commitment to improving health 
 It is important to note that the definition of the preamble was about what health should be, not about public 16
health, and this was done unlike other UN agencies - such as UNESCO or FAO - that did not feel urged to 
define what was education or agricultural development. Thus, this suggests that there was an idealist motivation 
in favour of a universal equity, which in many ways was new. (Translated by the author)
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in underdeveloped countries.  
In the early 1970s, decolonisation represented another political milestone that 
influenced the WHO’s policies. Subsequently, the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) was promulgated as a United Nations declaration in 1974. The NIEO was most 
extensively debated  transnational governance reform initiative of the 1970s, of which the 
main objetive was to ‘eliminate injustice and inequality (…) and to accelerate the 
development of developing countries, believing that the overall objective of the new 
international economic order is to increase the capacity of developing countries, individually 
and collectively, to pursue their  development’ (UN, 1975). With that in mind, Chorev (2012) 
argues that developing countries’ demands challenged the WHO Secretariat, as they expected 
the organisation to develop policies and projects that were in agreement with NIEO 
principles such as health conditions under the apartheid regime in South Africa.  
During the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1975, 
the resolution Development and International Economic co-operation (3362 S-VII) declared: 
The World Health Organization and the competent organs of the United Nations 
system, in particular the United Nations Children's Fund, should intensify the 
international effort aimed at improving health conditions in developing countries by 
giving priority to prevention of disease and malnutrition and by providing primary 
health services to the communities, including maternal and child health and family 
welfare (UN, 1975). 
Moreover, in 1979, the Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean published the paper 
Health and the New International Economic Order as the Technical Discussions Session in 
the Executive Board of the following year would be ‘Contribution of Health to the New 
International Economic Order’. The document should give the background to support the 
Member States on the discussions by pointing out the interrelationship of health and the New 
International Economic Order, and also discussing how to increase political commitment at a 
national and international level. At the Thirty-Third World Health Assembly in 1980, given 
this context, health was advocated to be ‘an output and an input in the development process 
and is essential to a man-centred development, being the main and first ingredient of the 
quality of life’ (WHO, 1979, p.3).  
In more practical terms, the straightforward outcome of the NIEO at the WHO was the 
majority of votes from developing countries at the WHA and consequently a dependence on 
least developing countries as the governing bodies follow a one-country/one-vote rule. The 
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so-called G77  group was, therefore, able to sustain a reliable coalition, and they were 17
consistently unified in how they voted. Chorev (2012) explains how, since at that time the 
WHO’s budget was mainly based on compulsory rather than voluntary contributions,  the 18
level of the WHO’s dependence on rich countries for resources was fairly low. Accordingly, 
they also did not have much power on budget decisions. 
In 1981, the Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000 was published by the 
WHO. The main idea was a nationwide health system based on primary healthcare, as 
described in the Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, 
1978.   The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly adopted an Executive Summary of the 19
strategy (Resolution WHA34.36), and the literature sees it as an effort to redirect the WHO 
back to its constitutional commitments as: 
it means simply the realisation of WHO's objective of "the attainment by all peoples 
of the highest possible level of health"; and that as a minimum all people in all 
countries should have at least such a level of health that they are capable of working 
productively and of participating actively in the social life of the community in 
which they live. (WHO, 1981, p. 15) 
In the 1980s, the WHO started to face the growing influence of the World Bank, 
which, although established in 1946 to assist in the reconstruction of Europe, extended its 
mandate to deliver credits, grants, and technical assistance to developing countries. In the 
first instance, the main focus of the World Bank was investment in capital and infrastructure, 
however it soon started financing population control, health, and education.  
The dispersal of power and authority among different levels of governance from the 
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s began to weaken the authority and control of the 
World Health Organisation. In a complex post-Cold War scenario with multifaceted demands, 
an underfunded and overly politicised WHO had its roles diminished in the face of other 
international organisations and private entities. Although still capable of retaining its 
prominence as the primary reference on health-related topics, the WHO’s stagnation and 
crisis, which will be discussed further in this chapter, led to the inevitable reform of the 
Organisation. In this scenario of crisis, reform, and the increasing participation of different 
 The Group of 77 at the United Nations is a coalition of 134 developing nations, designed to promote its 17
members' collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations
 The budgetary structure of WHO will be explained later in this chapter. 18
 The International Conference on Primary Health Care took place in Alma-Ata/URSS and expressed the need 19
for urgent action by all governments, all health and development workers, and the world community to protect 
and promote the health of all the people of the world. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/
almaata_declaration_en.pdf 
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institutions, FENSA was conceptualised.   
2.2 Structure and Functions  
The World Health Organisation is one of 15 autonomous specialised agencies linked to 
the United Nations and has 194 Member States (all UN Member States, except Liechtenstein, 
plus Niue and the Cook Islands that are not a member of the UN but are part of the WHO). 
Territories, or groups of territories which are not responsible for their international relations, 
may be admitted as Associate Members by the Health Assembly, upon application made on 
their behalf by the Member, or other authority responsible for their international relations. 
Associate members have full access to information, but limited participation and voting 
rights; currently, the WHO has two Associate Members: Puerto Rico and Tokelau.  
Membership of the WHO is open to all States, and members of the United Nations 
may become members of the WHO by signing or accepting its Constitution. States may 
otherwise be admitted as members when a simple majority vote can approve their application 
of the Health Assembly. The non-member States and other entities may be invited to attend 
sessions of the Health Assembly in an observer status, as Taiwan did from 2009 to 2016. 
The Vatican, the Palestinian Authority, the Order of Malta, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union have also participated as observers. 
Representatives of the United Nations, its specialised agencies, programmes and funds, and 
other International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) frequently attend sessions of the 
Health Assembly in an observer capacity (OECD, 2016). 
When it comes to WHO staff, the Secretariat has 7916 employees and the most recent 
budget (for the financial period 2020-2021) is US$ 4840.4 million (WHO, 2019). The WHO 
is partly financed by duties payments from the Member States, which must pay according to 
the country’s wealth and population. Additional financing comes from voluntary 
contributions which, in recent years, have accounted for more than three-quarters of the 
Organisation’s financing (WHO, 2016). Voluntary contributions come from the Member 
States and partner organisations such as foundations and civil society. Contributions from the 
private sector, usually in the form of in-kind donations,  provide less than 1% of the WHO’s 20
financing.  
  In-kind donation is a kind of charitable giving in which, instead of giving money to buy needed goods and 20
services, the goods and services themselves are given. Gifts in kind are distinguished from gifts of cash or stock.
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Apart from providing leadership on global health topics, the WHO is responsible for 
21 other functions, according to its Constitution, including to:  
establish and maintain effective collaboration with the United Nations, specialised 
agencies, governmental health administrations, professional groups, and such other 
organisations as may be deemed appropriate. (WHO, 1948, p.2) 
Overall, the work of the WHO can be divided into three categories: (1) normative functions, 
like international conventions and agreements, regulations and non-binding standards and 
recommendations; (2) directing and coordinating functions, including health for all, poverty 
and health, essential medicine activities and its specific disease programs; (3) research and 
technical cooperation functions, including disease eradication and emergencies. A non-
exhaustive list of WHO functions includes assisting governments, giving technical assistance, 
conducting health research, promoting international standards regarding food, pharmaceutical 
and others, activities related to teaching and training, and also to carry out diagnostic 
procedures. Clause K of article 2 states that the Organisation has a responsibility to ‘propose 
conventions, agreements and regulations, and make recommendations with respect to 
international health matters, a function that supports FENSA proposal and negotiation.  
To enable these twenty-two responsibilities, the WHO engages with various 
stakeholders, and works closely with decision-makers such as Ministries of Health, 
government agencies, and other government departments at the national level. According to 
the WHO website, the engagement with the United Nations at the global, regional, and 
country level is also a major duty. Therefore, the WHO has six regional offices: the Regional 
Office for Africa in Brazzaville (Congo), the Regional Office for the Americas in 
Washington, D.C. (United States), the Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean in Cairo 
(Egypt), the Regional Office for Europe in Copenhagen (Denmark), the Regional Office for 
South-East Asia in New Delhi (India), and the Regional Office for the Western Pacific in 
Manila (Philippines).  
Although the regional offices can adopt their own rules of procedure, they are part of 
the Organisation and, consequently, must follow the Constitution. Many authors from global 
health literature argue that the independence and autonomy of the six regional offices is one 
of the most evident weaknesses in the WHO’s decentralised structure. Regional offices and 
Regional Directors (RDs) try to obtain more sovereignty from the Geneva headquarters to 
focus on programmes of their preference. Furthermore, RDs have to keep a good working 
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relationship with delegates from host countries who are largely politicians, which leads to an 
excessive political influence at the regional offices.  
Similar to the Healthy Assembly and the Executive Board, the regional offices meet 
with their member states regularly. They also have a great deal of flexibility in setting their 
agendas and deciding how much they want to cooperate with Geneva. This was proven 
during FENSA negotiations, where the PAHO was seen as a thorn in the WHO’s side.  
On the local level, the WHO operates 149 country offices, the majority of which are in 
low- and middle- income countries (LMICs). Overall, regional offices have seven functions 
which include to ‘formulate policies governing matters of an exclusively regional character’ 
and to ‘cooperate with the respective regional committees of the United Nations and with 
those of other specialised agencies and with other regional international organisations having 
interests in common with the Organisation’ (WHO, 1948, p.12). Thus, according to the WHO 
website, the main responsibility of the regional offices is to support the Member States in the 
generation and use of appropriate health information, to support decision-making, healthcare 
delivery and management of health services, at the national and sub-national levels. 
As explained above, the PAHO precedes the WHO, and it may be the reason why their 
relationship is more complex than with other regional offices. It is worth noting that this 
effort to keep PAHO’s independence is historically exposed when analysing the XII Pan 
American Sanitary Conference, in 1947. Although the 21 American republics signed the 
WHO Constitution, they insistently drew attention to the fact that they wanted to cooperate 
with and participate in the Organisation, but they were not interested in being completely 
incorporated. 
The XII Conference decided to consolidate the Bureau’s separate identity, reorganising 
it as the Pan American Sanitary Organization (PASO),  with four organs: the Pan American 21
Sanitary Conference, as the supreme governing body of the Organisation; the Directing 
Council, with one representative from each Member Country; the Executive Committee; and 
the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the Director and his staff. The Conference also requested 
a draft of a Constitution for the Pan American Sanitary Organisation.  
To establish a relationship between the regional and global health bodies, the 
Executive Committee acted as a negotiator with the World Health Organisation on the 
 In 1958, the first Latin American Director, Dr. Abraham Horwitz of Chile, was elected and PASO changed its 21
name to PAHO (Fee and Brown, 2002)
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conditions that the Pan American Sanitary Organisation should continue to function as an 
independent identity. It can be noted that Article 54 from the WHO Constitution states that: 
The Pan American Sanitary Organization represented by the Pan American Sanitary 
Bureau and the Pan American Sanitary Conferences, and all other inter-governmental 
regional health organisations in existence prior to the date of signature of this 
Constitution, shall in due course be integrated with the Organization. This integration 
shall be effected as soon as practicable through common action based on mutual 
consent of the competent authorities expressed through the organisations concerned. 
(WHO, 1948, p.13) 
Therefore, in May 1949, the first Director-General of the WHO, Dr Brock Chisholm, 
along with the Director of the Bureau signed an agreement officially establishing the 
relationship between the two organisations. As a result, the Bureau was converted into a 
regional office of the World Health Organisation, whilst being able to preserve its identity as 
the Pan American Sanitary Bureau.  
Various interviewees endorsed this effort of the PAHO to maintain its own rules, 
procedures and decisions; a former adviser to WHO Director-General (Interviewee 19) 
described PAHO behaviour as ‘false independence’. According to the interviewee, when it is 
appropriate, the PAHO listens to what Geneva says but ‘if there is something that PAHO does 
not like, then claim its independence to not apply’. Furthermore, some Member States, like 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway, stated that with regard to FENSA, there was a 
concern about guaranteeing that the PAHO would apply the framework in its entirety. This, 
however, will be discussed further in chapter four.  
Concerning the World Health Organisation’s structure, it consists of the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), the Executive Board (EB) and the Secretariat. The World Health 
Assembly is the supreme decision-making body with its own rules of procedure. It is 
composed of delegates that represent the Member States. The WHA meets annually to 
discuss a specific health agenda prepared by the Executive Board. Article 18 from the WHO 
Constitute determines thirteen functions for the Health Assembly - the most important is to 
determine the policies of the Organisation. It is also important to highlight that the decision-
making body is also responsible for appointing the Director-General, for supervising 
financial policies and reviewing and approving the proposed programme budget. When it 
comes to functions related to the participation of non-State actors, the WHA shall: 
g) to instruct the Board and the Director-General to bring the attention of Member 
and of international organisations, governmental or non-governmental any matter 
with regard to health which the Health Assembly may consider appropriate; h) to 
invite any organisation, international or national, governmental or non-governmental, 
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which has responsibilities related to those of the Organization, to appoint 
representatives to participate, without right of vote, in its meetings or in those of the 
committees and conferences convened under its authority, on conditions prescribed 
by the Health Assembly; but in the case of national organisations, invitations shall be 
issued only with the consent of the Government concerned. (WHO, 1948, p.6) 
 The WHA has the authority to approve and implement conventions or agreements with 
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organisation. As already mentioned, the 
decision-making process of the WHO is formally ruled by the principle of ‘one state, one 
vote’. The Rules of Procedure of the Health Assembly and the Executive Board, regarding 
decision-making, is a simple majority, apart from decisions on significant questions like the 
adoption of conventions or agreements and amendments to the Constitution. In these cases, a 
two-thirds majority of Members present is required, along with a vote. However, realistically, 
almost all decisions are adopted by consensus. Regarding the leadership and the mandate of 
the WHO, Iboro Ekpo Nta notes in his Master’s Dissertation that it cannot be ignored:  
the fact that like the UN, the basic governing units of the WHO are national 
governments, who by their very characterisation represent groups of interests which 
would either cooperate or compete with each other’s spheres of influence as they 
struggle to set agenda. This is the nature of international relations and WHO is not 
exempt from its sway. (NTA, 2011, p.20) 
The Executive Board is composed of thirty-four members,  technically qualified in 22
the field of health, designated by the Member States to serve for three years, with the 
possibility of re-election. The Board meets at least twice a year, with its own rules of 
procedure, and is led by a Chairman, elected among the Member States. According to the 
Constitution, the Board has nine functions, which include putting into practice the decisions 
and policies of the World Health Assembly, to advise the WHA and generally facilitate its 
work by, for instance, preparing the agenda. The Executive Board is also responsible for 
emergency actions, regarding the functions and financial resources of the Organisation, to 
handle events requiring immediate action. 
Responsible for the daily administrative and financial transactions, the Secretariat 
comprises the technical and administrative personnel of the organisation, and the Director-
General (DG) is the procedural and directorial chief. The DG is appointed by the World 
Health Assembly and is subject to the authority of the EB. Currently, the DG is Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, an Ethiopian politician, academic, and public health authority. 
 The 34 members are drawn from six regions: 7 represent Africa, 6 represent the Americas, 5 represent the 22
Eastern Mediterranean, 8 represent Europe, 3 represent South-East Asia, and 5 represent the Western Pacific. 
Available at: http://apps.who.int/gb/gov/en/composition-of-the-board_en.html . Last access on 14/05/2019. 
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During FENSA negotiations, Margaret Chan held the position. Article 37 states that ‘in the 
performance of their duties the Director-General and the staff shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any government or any authority external to the Organisation’ (WHO, 
1948, p.37). However, according to interviewee 19, a former staff member at the WHO, when 
the first ideas for engagement with non-State actors were being delineated, the ‘Secretariat 
changed its position due to a lot of pressure from some Member States’. Perceived incoherent 
actions of the Secretariat will be discussed further in this thesis.   
2.3 Crisis at the WHO: Leadership and Budgetary Challenges  
Since its establishment, the World Health Organisation has passed through political 
and historical moments in which its leadership was challenged. In a transformed international 
political context, with the globalisation of trade, information, human rights and diseases, 
global health became more plural, encompassing an increasing number of actors and voices. 
Additionally, health debates have shifted from reclusive and exclusive health departments at 
the WHO to regularly be part of various multilateral meetings. Global health governance, 
therefore, gradually requires more coordination to address health priorities successfully and 
to direct investments.  
The World Health Organisation, once seen as the unquestioned leader of international 
health, started to face a crisis due to budget deficits and deteriorating status - particularly 
with the growing influence of new and powerful players. Although global health has 
benefited significantly from these new funds, actors and actions, it has also suffered a 
splintering due to an increasingly fragmented, uncoordinated, and incongruent agenda.  
Ventura and Perez (2014) argue that amongst the many difficulties faced by the WHO 
in carrying out its functions, the five main elements of the crisis at the organisation are: the 
erosion of its leadership; both the insufficiency and the type of financing; conflicts of interest 
of experts which came to light during the administration of influenza pandemic (H1N1); 
communication difficulties; and problems of internal governance.  
Moreover, some critics in the literature point to a ‘politicisation’ of the WHO led by 
the developed countries, especially the United States, to whom the organisation should be 
merely a technical agency and its activities based only on biomedical evidence. As previously 
mentioned, in the Cold War scenario, particularly during Ronald Reagan's government 
(1981-1989), the dissatisfaction of the United Nations with ‘the dominance of Third World 
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countries in UN agencies’ (Chorev, 2012, p. 125) was clear. The Reagan-Thatcher Era, and 
their socioeconomic and political agenda can be seen as the beginning of the WHO’s 
weakening. The prominent role of the World Bank and its spending on health are other 
important elements of the crisis.  
The World Bank’s first noteworthy health project was the Onchocerciasis Control 
Programme launched in 1975 in West Africa. While the WHO had established a program to 
support global efforts to combat neglected infectious diseases that excessively affect poor and 
marginalised populations, a different perception from the dominant health policy discourse 
started to arise, as the World Bank was discouraging ‘unnecessary health care and charging 
for services at their real cost’ (Fidler, 2010). 
According to the Health Sector Policy Paper developed by the World Bank in 1980, 
formal health policy was adopted in 1974 ‘after several years of informal activity in the 
sector’. From the 1980s on, therefore, the Bank started investing in the health sector, mainly 
in ‘basic health infrastructures, the training of community health workers and para-
professional staff, the strengthening of logistics and the supply of essential drugs, maternal 
and child health care, improved family planning and disease control’ (World Bank, 1980, 
p.8). According to Birn, Pillay and Holtz (2009), this new involvement was driven by the 
perceived inefficiency of the WHO and the UN bureaucracy. The World Bank quickly 
became the world’s main external financier of health in low-income countries focusing on the 
predominance of the market. Additionally, the decision-making and funding priorities were 
decided by the donors. To illustrate, in 1993 the World Bank published the World 
Development Report: Investing in Health, emphasising private-sector competition and cost-
effectiveness as governing principles for the health sector: 
governments need to promote greater diversity and competition in the financing and 
delivery of health services. Government financing of public health and essential 
clinical services would leave the coverage of remaining clinical services to private 
finance, usually mediated through insurance, or to social insurance. Government 
regulation can strengthen private insurance markets by improving incentives for wide 
coverage and for cost control. Even for publicly financed clinical services, 
governments can encourage competition and private sector involvement in service 
supply and can help improve the efficiency of the private sector by generating and 
disseminating key information. The combination of these measures will improve 
health outcomes and contain costs while enhancing consumer satisfaction (WORLD 
BANK, 1993, p.iii). 
While the World Health Organisation was facing a crisis, the World Bank became 
notable in developing international health policy and strategy, focusing on external 
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assistance, especially for antimalarial drugs and vaccines. When the fight against HIV 
became a global priority, the Bank launched the Multi-Country AIDS Programme. However, 
due to the appearance of new players and initiatives such as the Global Fund, the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Gates Foundation, the 
Bank’s dominance in health started to shrink.  The spread of the HIV pandemic from the start 
of the 1990s (in 1990, 8.9 million people were living with HIV, by 1997 this had risen to 23.1 
million) is also seen, by some authors, as another occurrence that impacted WHO authority. 
Lidén (2014) argues that the creation of The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS), autonomously from the WHO, in 1996, reinforced the perception that the 
Organisation was not prepared to tackle such a ‘modern’ disease. Dealing with HIV required 
a complex and multifaceted response, as it also involved other issues like discrimination, 
behavioural change, and prevention strategies, that confronted cultural and religious customs. 
The 1990s, for the WHO, can be seen as a period of listening to critics and trying to 
find a way to overcome its deep crisis. To this effect, Fiona Godlee (1994, p.1424), wrote that 
‘the World Health Organisation has an image problem. People know that it exists, and 
most people know that it eradicated smallpox, but few have a clear idea of what it does’. This 
was part of a series of articles in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) analysing and criticising 
the WHO’s administration, efficiency, strategies, negotiations, and its weak operational 
capacity.  
During this period, in 1992, the Executive Board established a working group to report 
on the ‘WHO Response to Global Change’. The aim was to analyse the WHO’s efficiency in 
implementing the main functions. The Working Group made some detailed 
recommendations, such as the necessity to pursue ‘changes in structure and process with a 
view to improving health status and health care throughout the world’ (WHO, 1993, p. 13) 
through better-defined policies and procedures. In the following years, the Executive Board 
chased several different paths that came under the rubric of WHO reform. For instance, from 
May 1996 to November 1997, the Executive Board special group for the review of the 
Constitution held six meetings, at which the WHO’s mission and functions were analysed. A 
report was published, and the special group suggested adjustments in coordination (by 
reviewing the WHO’s core functions), health policy development, norms and standards, 
advertising and technical cooperation.  
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Another report from the Executive Board special group was published in 1998, on a 
necessary review of the WHO’s Constitution. One should note that in the 1990s, it was 
already concerning that extra-budgetary programmes were driven by donor interests, rather 
than mirroring health priorities. Therefore, the report recommended that ‘if a Member fails to 
meet its financial obligations to the Organisation, the Health Assembly may, on such 
conditions as it thinks proper: (i) suspend the voting privileges to which the Member is 
entitled’ (WHO, 1998, p.1).  
According to Ventura and Perez (2014), the swine influenza pandemic, which lasted 
from early 2009 to late 2010, characterises the largest public disclosure of the WHO's 
dysfunctions. The sanitary crisis became an indissociable epidemiological, political and 
governmental crisis. In June 2009, the H1N1 Pandemic was declared a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC),  and this was the first time that the new 23
version of the International Health Regulations (IHR), adopted in 2005, was used. The 
Organisation was widely accused of exaggerating the alarm due to ties with the 
pharmaceutical industry. A report in the BMJ alleged that three scientists at the WHO not 
only received payments from Roche and GlaxoSmithKline (manufacturers of antiviral drugs), 
but also helped to draw up the 2004 pandemic guidelines, which included the use of 
antivirals. 
However, the WHO’s Director-General, Margaret Chan, claimed that she did not 
believe that the threat had been exaggerated. In September 2010, during the International 
Health Regulations Review Committee, she stated that: 
For the pandemic, WHO has received some praise and support from early 
assessments published in the medical and scientific literature, in addition to support 
and feedback from our Member States. WHO has also received some criticism. Large 
sums of money were invested in commodities that were not used, sometimes because 
the public saw no need for them or questioned their safety. The definition of a 
pandemic and the pandemic phases have been questioned. The clinical value of 
oseltamivir has been questioned. Conflicts of interest and their influence on decisions 
have become an issue. (…) When I announced the move to phase 6, I reminded the 
world that the number of deaths worldwide was small and that we did not expect to 
see a sudden and dramatic increase in this number. I stressed that the overwhelming 
 The term Public Health Emergency of International Concern is defined in the IHR (2005) as “an extraordinary 23
event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: 1) to constitute a public health risk to other States 
through the international spread of disease; and 2) to potentially require a coordinated international response”. 
This definition implies a situation that: is serious, unusual or unexpected; carries implications for public health 
beyond the affected State’s national border; and may require immediate international action (WHO). Available 
at: https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/ Access on 10/05/2019.
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majority of patients recovered fully without any medical care. (WHO, 2010)  24
Nevertheless, Fiona Godlee (2010) wrote an editorial at BMJ arguing that the WHO's 
credibility was damaged and the Organisation should ‘[publish] its own report without delay 
or defensive comment; [make] public the membership and conflicts of interest of its 
emergency committee; and [develop, commit to, and monitor] stricter rules of engagement 
with industry that keep commercial influence away from its decision making’.  
An independent committee, made up of experts from 24 countries, was created to 
review WHO's management of the outbreak. As a result, in 2011, a Report of the Review 
Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations  (2005) and on 25
Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) (2009) was published with three key objectives: to assess the 
functioning of the International Health Regulations; to assess the ongoing response to H1N1 
pandemic (including the role of the WHO), and to identify lessons learned for strengthening 
preparedness and response for future pandemics and public health emergencies. 
The Organisation was mainly criticised due to a ‘needlessly complex’ definition of a 
pandemic which had six levels of alert based on the virus’s geographical spread, not on its 
lethality. Moreover, references to severity were removed from online pages. Regarding the 
conflict of interests with the vaccine industry, the expert advisers pointed out that the WHO 
did not overcome the misunderstanding in a timely way. The report also stated that there 
existed a ‘lack of openness over the working of the Emergency Committee and 
communications in general’ and the bureaucracy created ‘an unmanageable number of 
documents’ as countries were requested on a weekly basis to submit laboratory-confirmed 
cases, even though knowing hospitalisation and death rates would have been enough. This 
overwhelmed some countries, particularly those with limited epidemiological and laboratory 
capacity. Additionally, countries that needed technical help could not obtain it suitable 
languages. 
The panel recommended the creation of a global reserve workforce for emergencies 
 Speech available at: http://www10.who.int/dg/speeches/2010/ihr_review_20100928/en/ Last access on 24
19/02/2020
 The updated IHR was adopted by the 58th World Health Assembly in 2005, and officially entered into force 25
in June 2007. Under the terms of the IHR 2005 member states tasked themselves with developing national 
disease surveillance and response capacities to prevent the international spread of disease, while instructing the 
WHO to provide technical support to those countries struggling to meet these requirements. In addition, new 
powers were conferred upon the secretariat to utilise non-government sources of information to detect disease 
outbreaks, and to ‘name and shame’ countries that refused assistance or attempted to cover up public health 
risks.
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that would be placed for service in countries that requested assistance. The goal was to:  
significantly expand the current Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network by 
strengthening its composition, resources and capacity, with a view towards better 
support for sustained responses to public-health emergencies. At present, WHO’s 
capacity to prepare and respond in a sustained way to any public-health emergency is 
severely limited by chronic funding shortfalls, compounded by restrictions on the use 
of funds from Member States, partners and other donors. Mindful of concerns about 
efficiency and accountability that motivate some of the restrictions, the Committee 
concludes that the establishment of a contingency fund outside of WHO, but 
available for deployment by WHO at the time of a public health emergency, will be a 
prudent step to assure an immediate and effective global response (WHO, 2011, 
p.137) 
The report also urged vaccine makers to reserve 10 per cent of their production for poor 
countries and criticised some international rules. Nonetheless, it concluded, ‘no critic of 
WHO has produced any direct evidence of commercial influence on decision-making’. 
Despite the measures recommended to strengthen the WHO’s capacities for managing 
a PHEIC more effectively, three years later, in 2014, the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak 
in West Africa killed 11.310 people out of a total of 28.616 suspected cases (almost 40%)  26
and put the Organisation under scrutiny again. It was noted that limited progress had been 
made in implementing emergency measures, and many of the recommendations remained 
unaddressed.  
Due to its reduced budget and, consequently, reduced capacity to respond, the WHO 
was largely sidelined in the global response to Ebola. However, Kamradt-Scott (2016) argues 
that it is erroneous to accuse the Organisation of doing nothing - a response team was sent to 
Guinea to assist local health authorities as soon as it was confirmed that ‘the virus [that] had 
been circulating undetected for some three months (…) initially suspected to be Lassa Fever, 
within hours of confirming that the etiological agent was Ebola’. Moreover, the author 
alleges that in May 2014, technical experts were sent to assist the health authorities in 
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and at the WHO African regional office (AFRO). It is 
important to remember, however, that the first case was reported in December 2013 and 
rapidly spread to Guinea’s capital city of Conakry by March, making the Ministry of Health 
in Guinea issue an alert for an unidentified illness. On March 23, with 49 confirmed cases 
and 29 deaths, the WHO officially declared the Ebola outbreak. 
  In July 2019, a new outbreak of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo was declared a Public Health 26
Emergency of International Concern. According to updated information at WHO website,  “the Ebola virus can 
cause severe viral haemorrhagic fever (Ebola HF) outbreaks in humans with a case fatality rate of up to 90%”. 
Available at: https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/ebola-virus-disease . Last access on 19/02/2020
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According to the Associated Press, staffers from the AFRO recommended that the 
WHO’s Geneva headquarters declare a PHEIC in April, but they were told that invoking the 
IHR 2005 could ‘anger the African countries involved, hurt their economies or interfere with 
the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca’.  Moreover, Dr Bart Janssens, director of operations for 27
Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) said that ‘we raised the alarm publicly again on 21 June, 
declaring that the epidemic was out of control and that we could not respond to a large 
number of new cases and locations alone’ (MSF, 2015, p. 7). Ebola was only declared a 
PHEIC on August 8, five months after the WHO first received the warning information. At 
that point, there had already been 1711 cases and 932 deaths. This delay undoubtedly 
contributed to the unprecedented scale of the outbreak. 
The delay in declaring Ebola as a PHEIC was one of many critical problems, but 
tensions between the WHO and Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) highlighted other 
weaknesses, including a failure to lead. According to the report Push to the Limit and 
Beyond, released by MSF in 2015, there was little sharing of information between countries, 
with officials relying on the WHO to act as a connection between them, and it was not until 
July when new leadership was brought into the WHO country offices and insisted on the 
urgent need for extra support. 
In September 2014, non-governmental organisations led by MSF, the WHO and 
representatives from affected countries were invited to the United Nations Headquarters in 
New York. An unprecedented call for urgent military intervention, declaring the response 
‘lethally inadequate’. After the speech of the MSF international president at the UN General 
Assembly in New York, the UN Security Council approved the resolution UNSC 2176 and 
Ebola was declared a threat to international peace and security. According to the MSF report: 
this was a very unusual call for MSF, known for keeping a safe distance from 
military and security agendas to protect its independence in conflict zones. However, 
the catastrophe unfolding on the ground could clearly not be brought under control 
by international aid organisations alone – a desperate call of last resort had to be 
made. (MSF, 2015, p.13) 
Kamradt-Scott (2016) elucidates that although the Organisation's reputation became 
unquestionably damaged during the Ebola outbreak, the WHO continued activities such as 
training healthcare workers in infection control, community engagement activities, and 
providing epidemiological data. The Organisation also issued several technical guidance 
 UN Health Agency resisted declaring Ebola emergency. Available at: https://www.apnews.com/27
2489c78bff86463589b41f3faaea5ab2 Accessed on 10/05/2019.
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documents, hosted meetings on vaccine possibilities, and expanded laboratory services. 
However, none of these actions provided the infection control that was needed. Christopher 
Stokes, MSF general director, said: ‘the WHO should have been fighting the virus, not MSF’. 
One should note that funds allocated for emergency response had been drastically reduced in 
previous years at the WHO, according to the Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel 
(2015): 
the Panel has concluded that WHO should be the lead health emergency response 
agency. This requires that a number of organizational and financial issues be 
addressed urgently. The Panel considers that WHO does not currently possess the 
capacity or organizational culture to deliver a full emergency public health response. 
Funding for emergency response and for technical support to the International Health 
Regulations (2005) is lacking. Currently, less than 25% of WHO’s Programme 
budget comes from assessed contributions (and the remainder from voluntary funds). 
There are no core funds for emergency response. The longstanding policy of zero 
nominal growth policy for assessed contributions has dangerously eroded the 
purchasing power of WHO’s resources, further diminishing the Organization’s 
emergency capacity. Although a significant number of Member States were in favour 
of increasing assessed contributions, the Sixty-eighth World Health Assembly 
decided to maintain the zero nominal growth policy. The Organization’s capacity for 
emergency preparedness and response must be strengthened and properly resourced 
at headquarters, regional and country levels (WHA, 2015, p.6) 
With a wide-ranging consensus in the global health community that the WHO had 
failed in its leadership responsibilities and due to a vacuum of international leadership in the 
operational response (which was, on the whole, expected to be accomplished by the WHO), 
the patient care and infection control were left to other institutions, including MSF, the 
United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) and even domestic and 
international militaries.  
Although the confusing and late response to the Ebola outbreak is undeniable, some 
literature, e.g. McInnes (2015), Gostin & Friedman (2015) and Yach (2016), points out the 
distinction between the normative and operational roles of the WHO, which has been largely 
ignored in academic and journalistic analysis. Yach (2016), for instance, stresses that the 
WHO’s fundamental role is as the global health conductor of an emerging health diverse 
group. The authors, therefore, claim that despite the delay, the WHO fulfilled its normative 
function through the declaration of the PHEIC, the production of technical advice, 
community engagement activities, the sharing of epidemiological data, support with the 
development of vaccines and training activities. However, international community attention 
was on the operational role, which the WHO proved, remarkably, not to be able to provide.  
In this regard, we must keep in mind that since the WHO’s creation, there have been 
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debates and disagreement over whether it is mainly a normative organisation that develops 
norms and standards, leads and coordinates health researches; an operational organisation 
supposed to eradicate diseases, control pandemics and tackle humanitarian crises; or an 
amalgamation of the two. While a consensus is not achieved internally or externally, 
divergences between expectations and what the WHO is delegated (and able) to do will 
persist. Notwithstanding the lack of leadership (essential to comprehend the WHO crisis), 
financial vulnerability also played a major role.  
The WHO’s Programme Budget is financed through a mixture of assessed (based on 
countries’ population and income) and voluntary contributions. Historically, assessed 
contributions were seen as the ‘core’ funding, as they are flexible funds which are normally 
used to cover general expenses and program activities. Voluntary contributions, on the other 
hand, are ‘specified’ funds and can come from Member States (in addition to their assessed 
contribution), or from other partners.  
Currently, the WHO’s new website  on Budget and Financing divides the source of 28
financing into Voluntary Contributions, Specified, and Flexible Funds. Flexible Funds can be 
Assessed Contributions (AC), Core Voluntary Contributions Account (CVCA) and 
Programme Support Costs (PSC). Voluntary contributions can be earmarked or flexible.  
Core voluntary contributions are funds provided to the WHO that are fully flexible at 
the level of the Programme Budget, or highly flexible at the category level. Greater flexibility 
of funding is, therefore, a key principle of the WHO Financing Dialogue. However, as the 
Organisation mainly has to use the assessed contributions to pay salaries and other 
establishment-related expenses, the programmes end up being mainly financed through 
voluntary contributions.  
From 1948 until the early 1980s, the WHO was dependent on the assessed mandatory 
membership contributions for the regular budget. However, the exogenous environment, both 
political and economic, affected the Organisation. As was previously described, since the 
1960s a political awakening of developing countries called for an improvement in their terms 
 Information of the Organization’s work, financing and implementation progress can be found at the WHO's 28
Programme Budget Portal.  As part of the reform, the budget portal is updated every quarter and provides a 
breakdown of the WHO’s work by categories, programmes and outputs.
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of trade  and tariff reductions, an increase in development assistance and a joint negotiating 29
capacity in the United Nations. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, they experienced a debt crisis. 
Being unable to repay the debt, they had to ask for help. The problem exploded in August 
1982 as Mexico declared inability to service a $62 billion debt to the United States, and a 
similar problem quickly spread to the rest of the world. Therefore, macroeconomic 
compression and structural adjustment (known as liberalisation and privatisation) were 
requested as a conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank, since governments of 
developing countries were unable to repay the debt, and financial rescue operations became 
necessary. 
Internally, in this same period, the World Health Assembly adopted a policy of zero 
growth for the regular budget. As a consequence, it started to dramatically rely on voluntary 
contributions, called extra-budgetary funds (EBFs).  It is important to highlight that 30
although, since its creation, the WHO utilised EBFs,  especially for key initiatives like 31
malaria and smallpox eradication programmes, they were not a central component of the 
WHO budget. Additionally, some developed countries started paying voluntary donations 
 In the 1950s, the economist and former Central Bank president Raúl Prebisch created the concept of 29
"deteriorating terms of trade". Prebisch analysed how income and outcomes of technical progress were 
distributed in countries with different economic and social structures. He argued that the prices of export 
products from the centre and the periphery were formed on very disparate wage levels, generating high levels of 
inequality. Moreover, as primary goods have negative income elasticity of demand, the demand for this type of 
goods increases less than income. 
 The UN defines extrabudgetary funds as ‘all resources, other than those of the regular budget, administered 30
by the Organisation’. 
 It is authorised by the Article 57 of WHO Constitution: “The Health Assembly or the Board acting on behalf 31
of the Health Assembly may accept and administer gifts and bequests made to the Organization provided that 
the conditions attached to such gifts or bequests are acceptable to the Health Assembly or the Board and are 
consistent with the objective and policies of the Organization”
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instead of mandatory contributions. For instance, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Japan are amongst the greatest donors to the WHO. While 26.53% of American 
funding is Assessed Contributions, 73.47% is Specified Voluntary Contributions.  It has 32
been causing a donor-control over these funds, leading to major implications for the WHO’s 
international role as the leader for health topics. Vaughan et al. (1996, p.229) explain:  
between 1984-85 and 1992-93 the real value of the EBFs apparently increased by 
more than 60% and in the 1990-91 biennium expenditure of extrabudgetary funds 
exceeded the regular budget for the first time. All WHO programmes, except the 
Assembly and the Executive Board, receive some EBFs. However, three cosponsored 
and six large regular programmes account for about 70% of these EBFs, mainly for 
vertically managed programmes in the areas of disease control, health promotion and 
human reproduction. 80% of all EBFs received by WHO for assisted activities have 
been contributed by donor governments, with the top 10 countries (in Europe, North 
America and Japan) contributing about 90% of this total, whereas the UN funds and 
the World Bank have donated only about 6% of the total to date. By contrast, about 
70% of the regular budget expenditure has been for organisational expenses and for 
the support of programmes in the area of health systems. 
 Chorev (2012) argues that Ronald Reagan took advantage of this scenario of financial 
susceptibility in order to push the American neoliberal agenda into the United Nations’ 
system; he inflexibly opposed any New International Economic Order demands or 
negotiations that were seen as a politicisation of technical issues. Consequently, the United 
States and other industrial countries could exploit the resource dependence of international 
organisations as by 1986, according to the UN Secretary-General, ‘the United Nations [was 
facing] the most serious financial crisis in its history’.  
To understand how the growing dependence of the WHO on earmarked funds has been 
influencing the priorities in global health agenda in favour of donors’ interests in specific 
diseases or treatments, it is important to comprehend how the Organisation’s programmes 
and activities are financed. According to the WHO website, the Programme budget is a tool 
for the Member States to set and approve the priorities of the Organisation, and, also, to set 
out the resources required to address the jointly-defined goals as well as to supervise their 
achievement. The WHO’s actions are financed based on the biennial Programme - resultant 
from the General Programme of Work approved by the Member States - using both regular 
and extra-budgetary funds. The direction of the Organisation is guided by a 5-year plan of 
action endorsed by the Assembly. However, actual expenditures may diverge from the 
budgeted amount, such as when extra expenses occur in response to health emergencies. 
 Available at: http://open.who.int/2018-19/contributors/contributor Last acess on 05/03/202032
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As previously mentioned, the budget was frozen by the World Health Assembly in the 
early 1980s due to the policy of zero real growth for the regular budget. Therefore, the 
countries’ contribution to the budget started falling in real terms, and the Organisation has 
increasingly depended on extra-budgetary contributions from donors. As explained 
previously, the majority of the WHO’s revenue in past decades came from assessed 
contributions, but over time, voluntary contributions surpassed them. For instance, the 
biennial 2016-2017, assessed contributions equalled $927 million (18% of revenue), 
while voluntary contributions equalled $4.116 billion (80%) and ‘other revenue’ equalled $96 
million (less than 2%) as can be seen in Figure 2. And this is worsening as nowadays 
assessed contributions accounts for 13.39% of WHO budget .  33
The budget is considered a central element of the WHO crisis for three main reasons: 
1) the fear that the unconcealed reliance on earmarked funds would boost member states’ 
indifference to the regular budget; 2) the unavoidable answerability and reliance that follows 
receiving sponsor money; 3) the weakened collective ability for the WHO to independently 
prioritise and execute projects. Therefore, the main critique present in global health literature 
is that the WHO's priorities reflect donors' preferences instead of the democratically-decided 
priorities. 
Moreover, instead of rationally allocating the resources, the specified voluntary 
contributions give the Secretariat no flexibility to use the funds in a manner that meets the 
prioritised programme set by member states, which is seen as a problem of governance. 
Additionally, Reddy, Mazhar and Lencucha (2018, p. 2) argue that:  
Some of the acute financing challenges facing the WHO include misalignment 
between programme budgets and member states financial commitments, 
unpredictability of financing, lack of transparency of financing, and efficiency in 
resource management, vulnerability due to just 20 contributors funding 75% of the 
programme budget, and inflexibility of financing.  
In recent years, the agency’s $2.3 billion annual budget has been increasingly allocated 
up before it reaches the WHO, earmarked by donors for their priorities such as polio, HIV/
AIDS, or malaria. Simultaneously, giving larger health priorities - notably, the development 
of basic healthcare infrastructure seems like tender mercies. For instance, when analysing the 
2018-19 budget,  the voluntary contributions specified fixed 775,635K to Polio, 655,977K 34
 Funding by contributor. Available at: https://open.who.int/2020-21/contributors/contributor33
 Available at: http://open.who.int/2018-19/budget-and-financing/gpw-overview Accessed on 13/05/2019.34
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to communicable diseases and only 194,017K to promote health through the life-course. One 
could question whether this contradicts the Health for All strategy.  
Many critics argue that the WHO is no longer setting the agenda of global health, since 
20 contributors, of which 11 are non-State actors, account for 80% of all voluntary 
contributions.  Moreover, in 2012, the year in which FENSA started being negotiated, 35
contributions from NSAs represented 25.5% of WHO total income. Although all these 
contributions are now registered at the WHO Budget and Financing website, the agreements 
between donors and the Organisation remain closed to the public domain. As the WHO does 
not have any regulation to prevent donor-driven implementation, it is difficult to analyse the 
real influence of NSAs at the WHO, which might be much higher.  
In January 2010, Margaret Chan organised an informal consultation on the future of 
financing for the WHO. The initial motivation for this meeting came from budget discussions 
at the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly in 2009. The key issues the debate 
focused on were: how to more efficiently align the Organisation’s priorities with the funds 
available to finance them, and how to ensure better certainty and stability of financing in 
order to promote more realistic planning and effective management. Additionally, there was 
an awareness that the existing reality, in which 80% of WHO income relies on voluntary 
donor contributions, predominantly earmarked for specified purposes, was not sustainable. 
Hence, without extreme changes, better alignment with agreed priorities would be 
unachievable because ‘we [the WHO] have to rely on a financing system which favours some 
parts of the budget, leaving many areas and functions dangerously under-funded’. (WHO, 
2010).  
According to the report The Future of Financing for WHO of 2010, the participants 
analysed the changing landscape for global health, acknowledging the growing number of 
actors involved, the consequent risks of fragmentation and duplication of effort, and the 
growing number of competing demands on the WHO’s resources: 
Partnership with others is key in all aspects of WHO’s work. The term covers the 
relationships with all the donors to WHO, with other UN agencies and with a wide 
range of partners in civil society and the private and voluntary sectors. While some 
partnerships are founded on contractual arrangements, all require trust. To focus the 
debate, participants sought to define different types of partnership and their 
implications for the business of WHO (…) Certain issues require a response that is 
both rapid, focused and that engages stakeholders - as equal partners - that are not 
automatically part of WHO’s normal constituency. Proponents on both sides of the 
 Available at: http://open.who.int/2018-19/contributors/contributor Accessed on 13/05/2019. 35
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argument, however, acknowledged that there was a case to be made for all purpose-
specific partnerships to have a finite lifespan (WHO, 2010, p.15) 
The report concluded that because there was little possibility that Assessed Contributions 
would increase to past levels, new approaches were needed, for example, new procedures for 
raising funds to subsequently increase predictability and flexibility. 
The report was criticised by many non-State actors in official relations with the WHO. 
During the 64th session of the World Health Assembly, the People’s Health Movement 
statement claimed that:  
(…) the current crisis could compromise WHO's capacity to play this role. The report 
is short on detail. The detailed reform program was only available on the website late 
last week, and this also lacks specifics on the reforms. We are concerned that the 
scope of operations of the Secretariat could be reduced with 'mainstreaming' of some 
important functions and that private foundations and corporates will have new 
opportunities to influence the WHO agenda through the proposed World Health 
Forum. While we support innovative mechanisms and consultations and public 
hearing sessions with public interest groups, we believe that the task of setting 
WHO's agenda and the decision-making process should always remain with the 
member states. (…) To fulfil its mandate the WHO needs a budget that is adequate, 
predictable and untied. The growing imbalance between assessed and voluntary 
contributions undermines the organisation's independence. We propose that member 
states collectively commit to increasing assessed funding so that it reaches 50% of 
the overall budget over the next five years. This would help WHO to be more 
independent of private philanthropies and the corporate sector and thus better serve 
its member states and people and implement the priorities decided by the assembly. 
(PHM, 2011, p.1) 
In the same direction, Medicus Mundi stated that while welcoming ‘the spirit of 
inclusiveness in the related proposals by the Secretariat’, it could not agree with any 
influence of the private sector through financing, or other means, in WHO priorities and 
programmes. It can be noted that the position of Medicus Mundi, regarding the role of non-
State actors, was clear before the negotiations of FENSA, as in 2010 the NGO was requesting 
a clear definition of NSAs and their roles, goals and conflict of interests. Finally, MMI 
declared that ‘it is crucial that the reform package is characterised by a process in which the 
space for contributions is based on the voice and needs of people, not the power of money’. 
Visibly, the contrasting perspectives among the Member States and non-State actors were 
perceptible before FENSA was properly proposed.  
This chapter offers an analysis of how the international health scenario, which once 
was characterised by the predominance of a single multilateral institution, the World Health 
Organisation and a few international donors, progressively entangled a vast number of actors, 
both politically and financially. Multilateral organisations (the World Bank, UNICEF, and 
others), multi-donor funds (the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria), non-
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governmental organisations (Doctors Without Borders), philanthropic foundations (the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation, UN Foundation, Wellcome Trust), think tanks and institutes 
(Institute Pasteur network), plus a few hybrid institutional arrangements (the GAVI Alliance), 
all became a part of global health governance. This can be seen in Figure 3.  
 
 The increased presence of several actors created new challenges for coordination and 
also raised questions about the roles they should play, the rules by which they should play, 
and indeed who should set those rules. According to Chorev (2012), the ‘authority crisis’ of 
the WHO started when other international organisations, such as the World Bank, established 
global health policies and programs that directly clashed with WHO activities. Additionally, a 
lack of coordination between these new actors (some with great political and economic 
power) and the WHO resulted in a duplication of effort, deficiency of coherence in positions 
and priorities, and a wasting of resources. This served to worsen the WHO crisis.  
2.4. Reform of the World Health Organisation  
As analysed above, the enduring financial constraints amounted to increased 
challenges and demands on the international health system, alongside the rise of new actors 
and leaderships, making the WHO recognise that an adjustment was needed. For years, the 
WHO has discussed a rationalisation of its complex structure, governance and financing to 
make it more efficient, and consequently regain its authority as the global leader for health 
issues. The advancement of the reform, however, has been embarrassingly slow. The decisive 
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pressure for change started after a series of mishaps. Whilst still agonising over accusations 
that it had overreacted to the 2009-10 H1N1 flu pandemic, the WHO was faced with 
contemptuous criticism for not responding fast enough to the Ebola crisis.  
Nevertheless, serious consideration over the need for reform began in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The first formal call was in 1993, with the Report of the Executive Board 
Working Group on the WHO Response to Global Change, which stated that the Organisation 
should conduct ‘efforts to make WHO more responsive to changing needs at the global, 
regional and country levels and improve dialogue between the various Regional Offices and 
between them and Headquarters’ (WHO, 1993). Already in the 1990s, the literature was 
indicating a crisis in international health as inequalities were increasing, whilst the access to 
healthcare for the world's most vulnerable populations was worsening.  
It is important to contextualise the health crisis with the Washington Consensus - the 
neoliberal economic policy prescriptions which arose from a meeting in Washington, D.C. in 
1989. A reform package for developing countries was created by representatives of 
international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and some liberal economists. The meeting 
defined the lines of macroeconomic policy; market deregulation, the opening of trade and 
finance, balancing public accounts, privatisation, among others - to be implemented in 
several peripheral countries. The path towards privatisation and the commodification of 
health care altered the status of health as an inherent right for all people to a market-based 
commodity - one that is subject to cost and profiteering. This, in turn, reduced the emphasis 
on, and indeed the provision of, primary and preventive care, leading to health inequalities. 
However, it is important to highlight that, in the 1990s, the Executive Board special 
group for the review of the Constitution  held six meetings, from May 1996 to November 36
1997. An amendment to the WHO’s core functions was recommended, in order that it would 
become more focused on coordination, international health policy development, setting 
norms and standards and technical cooperation. Furthermore, the group proposed a revision 
of article 7, ‘Consequences for Members failing to meet financial obligations’, to tighten the 
 Resolution WHA48.14 requested the Executive Board to examine whether the WHO Constitution needed to 36
be revised and, if so, the best way for the revision to proceed. At its ninety-seventh session the Board considered 
a report by the Director-General on the matter and adopted decision EB97(11) which established a special group 
of members of the Board to undertake an examination of the Constitution and to report to the Board at its 
ninety-ninth session. (WHO, 1997, p.1)
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existing sanctions. 
Ruger and Yach (2009) point out that, at the same time, the Pocantico Center, part of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, published Enhancing the Performance of International Health 
Institutions (1996). The conclusion was a need for strengthening and updating the WHO’s 
primarily normative functions, as the Organisation should be the ‘normative conscience for 
world health’. On the other hand, new global health actors should address primarily 
operational functions, regardless of the WHO’s emphasis on technical assistance. 
A few years later, in 2001, the Civil Society Initiative (CSI) was launched by the WHO 
General Director and represented a milestone, because it aimed to: 
establish a programme of evidence collection, consultation with a broad range of 
actors and analysis – within and outside WHO – to identify and develop propositions 
for more effective and useful interfaces and relationships between civil society and 
the WHO. This work will be developed within the context of WHO’s mandate, the 
expressed interests of the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly, and in 
response to interest shown by groups from civil society. (Civil society here includes 
social movements, voluntary organisations, nongovernmental organisations, 
grassroots organisations and other non-state and not-for-profit actors.) It is 
anticipated that within a year this initiative will be followed by concerted action at 
country, regional and Geneva levels. (BRUNDTLAND, 2001) 
At that time, these non-State actors were known as Civil Society Organisations. According to 
the 2002 Review Report on the WHO’s interactions with Civil Society and Nongovernmental 
Organisations, the general constraints for WHO-CSO relations were: a) a lack of distinction 
between types of CSOs/NGOs; b) insufficient safeguards on conflict of interest; c) lengthy, 
onerous and rigid procedures; d) an imbalance between the participation of organisations 
from North/West and South/East. 
It is important to note that according to interviewee 14, the Civil Society Initiative was 
shut down by China and others as ‘they saw it as a liberal Western agenda to introduce non-
State actors influencing the direction of WHO’, and they wanted ‘Member States [to] remain 
in the elite. China was the main one, but [there were] also other countries’. This affirmation 
was confirmed by interviewees 19 and 20, both former high-level staff at the WHO. 
With the failure of this initiative, it took almost a decade for the Director-General, Dr 
Margaret Chan, to organise an informal consultation with regards to WHO funding, which 
happened only in 2010. It is worth noting, however, that according to interviewee 14, in 2008 
Professor Ilona Kickbusch alongside Gaudez Silberschmidt, the main party responsible for 
FENSA, ‘proposed to create a Commission C at the World Health Assembly, that was shut 
down by Member States because they didn’t want to have an extra governance body or 
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meeting within WHO’. 
The informal consultation of 2010 was attended by senior officials and ministers of 
health, development, finance and foreign affairs, and as a result The future of financing for 
WHO: report of an informal consultation convened by the Director-General, Geneva 
Switzerland, 12-13 January 2010 was developed. Afterwards, in May 2011, it was discussed 
in Committee A of the 64th World Health Assembly under the chairmanship of Dr Walid 
Ammar, Lebanon. 
The report was heavily criticised by some NGOs such as Medicus Mundi International 
(MMI). Thomas Schwarz, the Executive Secretary of MMI, wrote his comments on WHO 
reform: construction work ahead and argued that the title of the report was confusing as the 
reform should be addressing other things and not only the financing; according to him, the 
WHO’s deep crisis was also a crisis of legitimacy. Schwarz also critiqued the creation of a 
World Health Forum, as proposed by the Resolution WHA64.2. 
Therefore, despite uncoordinated past efforts, the WHO Reform Programme was 
effectively launched in 2011 during the 64th World Health Assembly as it:    
endorsed the agenda for reform as set out in the Director-General’s report; urged 
Member States to support the implementation of the reform programme; requested 
the Executive Board to establish an appropriate process to examine the issues related 
to WHO’s governance identified in the report;  
Moreover, the Director-General was requested ‘to present a detailed concept paper for the 
November 2012 World Health Forum, setting out objectives, a number of participants, format 
and costs to the Executive Board at its 130th Session in January 2012’.  
The WHA64 can be seen as a breakthrough for the (future) involvement of non-State 
actors at the WHO as, apart from the request for creation of the World Health Forum to deal 
with NSAs, Bill Gates, Co-chair of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, was among the 
‘distinguished guests’ and made a speech claiming that: 
As we think about how to deploy our resources most effectively, one intervention in 
particular stands out: vaccines. Today, I would like to talk to you about how you can 
provide the leadership to make this the Decade of Vaccines (…) We have a great 
opportunity in this campaign, and we need to seize it. If we don’t seize it in the years 
ahead, we will have setbacks. This entire decade is an opportunity; we can achieve 
the ambitious goals for the Decade of Vaccines. Everybody will have to do their part. 
Donor countries will have to increase investment in vaccines and immunization 
systems, even as they cope with budget crises. The GAVI Pledging meeting coming 
up in June gives you and your governments the opportunity to show strong support. 
With generosity, we will have the chance to prevent 4 million deaths by 2015 and 10 
million deaths by 2020. The pharmaceutical industry must make sure that we have 
new vaccines and that they’re affordable for poor countries through a commitment to 
tiered pricing.  And all 193 Member States, you must make vaccines a high priority 
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in your health systems, in order to ensure that all your children have access to 
existing vaccines now – and to new vaccines as they become available. Our 
foundation is committed to working with all our partners – civil society, donors, drug 
companies, and national governments – to help you to do these difficult but 
necessary things. (WHA, 2011) 
One must consider that such is the influence of the Gates Foundation at the WHO that the 
article Meet the world’s most powerful doctor: Bill Gates, published by Politico  alleged that 37
‘some billionaires are satisfied with buying themselves an island. Bill Gates got a United 
Nations health agency in Geneva’. The dissatisfaction of many global health actors with the 
involvement of such influential institutions at the WHO became increasingly clear during the 
reform process, especially in FENSA negotiations.  
Subsequently, the 129th Executive Board requested that DG Margaret Chan develop 
three concept papers on the governance of the WHO, an independent evaluation of WHO, 
and the World Health Forum. Consultations among the Member States on these papers took 
place in July and September 2011, at the WHO headquarters. A platform for web-based 
consultations was also required. 
The report WHO reform for a healthy future: an overview  clarified that, to address 38
the health challenges of the 21st century, Member States had recognised priority topics to 
narrow the WHO’s work that should lead to more efficiency and more adequate financing. 
These topics were: ‘(1) health systems and institutions; (2) health and development; (3) 
health security; (4) evidence on health trends and determinants; and (5) convening for better 
health’. Then, in November 2011, a special session of the Executive Board took place so that 
all Member States could review and discuss a proposal for WHO reform, prepared by the 
Secretariat.  
According to the WHO (2011, p.1), the purpose of the World Health Forum was to 
explore ‘in an informal and multistakeholder setting, ways in which the major actors in 
global health can work more effectively together – globally and at country level’. The World 
Health Forum was a consultative forum composed of governments, health-related 
organisations, regional organisations, multilateral and bilateral agencies, philanthropic 
entities, civil society organisations and private organisations, among others (VENTURA, 
2013). The World Health Forum concept paper was the result of this initiative, and 
recognised the complex growth of organisations involved with Global Health, stating:  
 Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/bill-gates-who-most-powerful-doctor/ Accessed on 14/05/201937
 Available at: https://www.who.int/dg/reform/en_who_reform_overview.pdf38
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while the growing prominence of health in international affairs is welcome, there is a 
need to promote greater coherence and to provide an opportunity for a more inclusive 
dialogue between the many different actors involved. At present, however, there is no 
single platform that allows interaction between governments, global health 
organisations, partnerships, regional organisations, multilateral and bilateral 
agencies, philanthropic foundations, CSOs, private sector organisations and other 
relevant stakeholders (WHO, 2011, p.1) 
The initiative, however, was deeply criticised by NGOs during the WHA. For instance, 
the World Health People’s Health Movement (PHM) wrote the statement Stop the World 
Health Forum arguing that ‘as proposed, (WHF) undermines the principles of democratic 
governance and the independence and effectiveness of WHO.  It increases the power of the 
already disproportionately powerful for-profit sector’. Moreover, IBFAN requested that the 
Member States reject the draft resolution for the creation of the World Health Forum, for 
three reasons:  
1) WHO is an intergovernmental organization (…) [and] must protect its 
independence, integrity in decision making and its reputation. It must also guard 
against manipulation of its governing bodies by private interest actors.  We believe 
this forum will undermine WHO’s ability to fulfil its mandate. Paragraph 20 (ii) of 
the report A 64/4 illustrates this point. It states that the expected outcomes of the 
WHO reform will “Improve health outcomes, with WHO meeting the expectations of 
its Member States and partners”. The reassurances given in paragraph 86 that “a 
multi-stakeholder forum […] will not usurp the decision-making prerogatives of 
WHO’s own governance” are not credible.  How can the WHF meet the expectations 
of commercial actors without usurping the prerogatives of WHO’s own governance? 
2. In paragraph 87 of the report A64/4, it is proposed that the multi-stakeholder 
forum will “identify future priorities in global health”. This is a reason for serious 
concern as it is the WHA’s responsibility to set health priorities, benchmarks and 
standards which will effectively protect health for all. Previous experience with 
multi-stakeholder initiatives has shown that health priorities are distorted when they 
have to be agreed by for-profit actors, whose duties and responsibilities are 
ultimately to their shareholders and employees (…) 3. The WHF institutionalizes 
conflicts of interests as the norm within WHO by extending the role of policy and 
decision shaping to for-profit actors that have an interest in the outcome. WHF poses 
an unjustifiable risk, in that it may compromise and distort international and national 
agreed public health priorities and policies. This is ever more worrying in the 
absence of a strong and clear WHO policy on conflicts of interests. Transparency, 
currently promoted as the answer to the problem of conflicts of interests, is an 
essential requirement but it is not a sufficient safeguard in itself. It helps identify 
conflicts of interests but does not deal with them (IBFAN, 2011).  
After the failure of the World Health Forum initiative, in February 2012, a Member States 
meeting on programmes and priority setting intended to develop a joint report to be 
presented at the WHA in May 2012.  
According to the WHO website, ‘a comprehensive series of reforms’ have been 
underway since 2012, and the reform proposals were grouped under three topics: 1) 
programmatic (programmes and priority setting); 2) governance (to increase coherence in 
global health); and 3) management. The relation between the WHO and the increasing non-
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State actors was seen by many as crucial for WHO reform. In 2012, therefore, the WHA 
requested that the Director-General submit a draft of a ‘policy document on WHO's 
collaboration with NGOs’ to the Executive Board. It would become known as FENSA 
(Framework of engagement with non-State actors), the object of this research.  
This second chapter aimed to provide background and historical perspective - both 
extremely relevant to understand how the Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors 
(FENSA) was shaped. It has been a while since the World Health Organisation is not the 
singular player in global health and, as analysed above, it has struggled with how to create 
rules to better engage with these (not so) new actors. No one can effectively understand 
FENSA without comprehending the broader context of global health governance. The next 
chapter will examine how the relationship used to be between non-State actors and the World 
Health Organisation, before FENSA. 
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CHAPTER THREE: BUILDING BRIDGES, A BACKGROUND OF  THE 
PARTICIPATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS AT THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANISATION. 
The World Health Organisation, as well as the United Nations system as a whole have 
tried to find effective ways to engage with non-State actors, considering their increasing 
financial and political influence in global topics, as broadly analysed in the literature review 
completed in the first chapter. Although the WHO has been engaging with NSAs since its 
establishment in 1948, their growing participation and interdependence have boosted new 
architectures of global governance. In September of 1999, for instance, the United Nations 
Department of Public Information (DPI) held the Conference Challenges of a Globalised 
World: Find New Directions. The focus was on the ways in which the United Nations and 
civil society, particularly non-governmental organisations, could influence policies more 
effectively. Since the 1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata, people's participation has been 
recognised as crucial for primary healthcare and accepted as an essential element of many 
public health interventions. Civil Society Organisations (CSO) are seen as a tool to share 
benefits while minimising emerging problems.  
Given the heterogeneity of non-State actors, some concepts need to be clarified in 
order to comprehend their participation in the global health scenario and, specifically, at the 
WHO. CSOs are not-for-profit, voluntary entities, organised at the local, national or 
international level, representing a wide range of interests, but are separated from the State 
and the market. They can include community-based organisations and NGOs. Civil society 
organisations have played an essential role in supporting the WHO in accomplishing its 
mandate, through advocating topics of public health promoted by the Organisation, 
meanwhile raising awareness in a wide-ranging public. Moreover, they have been performing 
a watchdog function, pursuing the promotion of transparency and accountability and acting 
as a representative of public interest by giving a voice to the marginalised or under-
represented. CSOs are also key partners of the WHO at the national level due to their role as 
capacity builders. They are, therefore, able to boost domestic health systems’ ability to 
implement WHO programmes and recommendations. Although CSOs have a greater degree 
of agility due to a somewhat loose organisational structure, allowing more efficient actions 
without formal supervision, they could be considered to have a disproportionate and 
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unmonitored  influence.  
The WHO definition of NGOs is very comprehensive, and it was recognised by 
Margaret Chan, in 2012:  
No one questions the contribution your organisations make to the work of WHO. 
Worldwide, your numbers have increased dramatically in recent years, as have your 
influence on health policies, and your impact on health conditions. Your influence is 
most visible during the negotiation of instruments for global health governance, such 
as those for tobacco control or access to medicines. Your impact is most visible at the 
country level, where many of you work as implementing agencies. As I have said on 
several occasions, improvements in health outcomes within countries are the most 
important measure of the effectiveness of all WHO activities. NGOs occupy a unique 
political space. You gather and express the social power of ordinary people, as 
opposed to the coercive and regulatory powers of governments and the economic 
power of the market. NGOs operationalise WHO technical recommendations, taking 
them in particular to poor and marginalised populations. In conflict situations, or in 
very poor or poorly governed countries, NGOs can be the main providers of health 
services. The same is true during humanitarian emergencies. You bring coalitions of 
researchers, professional societies, medical schools, and medical students to bear on 
specific health problems. You crusade for human rights. (…) I fully understand your 
concern about insufficient safeguards against conflicts of interest, a concern strongly 
voiced by our Member States. At the same time, the NGO community is not a uniform 
group of altruistic organisations. I understand there are many subcategories, like 
BINGOS (business-interest NGOs), PINGOS (public-interest NGOs), GONGOS 
(government-operated NGOs), even CONGOS (community-organised NGOs) and 
TANGOS (technical-assistance NGOs). Organisational and operational frameworks 
differ. The size of operations vary, as do degrees of effectiveness and sustainability of 
results (…) Nothing is clearly black and white. (CHAN, M. 2012. WHO Director-
General addresses NGO community. 18 October 2012. Geneva)  
This understanding, however, contradicts the most notorious definitions of NGOs, which 
should have a non-profit nature. 
The WHO used to accept that NGOs that were representing private sector entities into 
official relations. One example is the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA). The controversy surrounding how ‘business-interest 
NGOs’ representing big companies were allowed to have official relations with very little 
oversight will be discussed further in this chapter. 
It is important to note that, although there is an extensive academic debate about the 
concept of civil society, to make this research practical, I have decided to work with the 
WHO’s conceptual framework, considering that Member States were consensual about it. It 
is worth clarifying that this thesis will not critically analyse the use of these concepts. As a 
starting point, the main concepts adopted for research are presented in the following table. 
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Table 4: Definition of non-state actors under FENSA / WHO 
Private sector
Commercial enterprises, that is to say businesses that are intended to 
make a profit for their owners. The term also refers to entities that 
represent, or are governed or controlled by, private sector entities. This 
group includes (but is not limited to) business associations representing 
commercial enterprises, entities not ‘at arm’s length’ (if it is independent 
of the other entity, it does not take instructions and is clearly not 
influenced or clearly not reasonably perceived to be influenced in its 
decisions and work by the other entity) from their commercial sponsors, 
and partially or fully State-owned commercial enterprises acting like 




Private sector entities that do not intend to make a 
profit for themselves but represent the interests of 
their members, which are commercial enterprises 
and/or national or other business associations. For 
the purposes of this framework, they shall have the 
authority to speak for their members through their 
authorized representatives. Their members shall 
exercise voting rights in relation to the policies of 





Non-profit entities that operate 
independently of governments. They are 
usually membership-based, with non-
profit entities or individuals as members 
exercising voting rights in relation to the 
policies of the non-governmental 
organization, or otherwise consist of 
non-profit, public-interest goals. They 
are free from concerns which are 
primarily of a private, commercial or 
profit-making nature. They could 
include, for example, grassroots 
community organizations, civil society 
groups and networks, faith-based 
organizations, Professional groups, 
disease-specific groups, and patient 
groups. (§10)
The WHO will determine 
through its due diligence 
if a non-State actor is 
subject to the influence 
of private sector entities 
to the extent that the non-
State actor has to be 
considered itself a private 
sector entity. Such 
influence can be exerted 
through financing, 
participation in decision-
making or otherwise. 
Provided that the 
decision-making 
processes and bodies of a 
non-State actor remain 
independent of undue 
influence from the 
private sector, the WHO 
can decide to consider 






Non-profit entities whose assets are 
provided by donors and whose income 
is spent on socially useful purposes. 
They shall be clearly independent of any 
private sector entity in their governance 
and decision-making. (§12)
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   Source: VENTURA and RACHED based on WHO. EB138 / 7. 8 January 2016. 
Considering the close formal and informal relationship between the World Health 
Organisation and a great number of non-State actors, this chapter aims to understand how the 
WHO used to engage with them before FENSA. To understand why FENSA was proposed, 
negotiated and approved, without understanding the previous relationship between the 
Organisation and the four non-State actors involved seems impossible.   
3.1 WHO Legislation regarding non-State Actors  
The World Health Organisation has been a pioneer in addressing the issue of social 
participation in international organisations, going beyond the understanding of health as an 
individual right, and also including the communal and developmental dimensions. In the 
preamble of its Constitution, the Organisation guaranteed that ‘informed opinion and active 
cooperation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the improvement of the 
health of the people’ (WHO, 1948).  
Moreover, the WHO Constitution not only mentions the role of public opinion and the 
active cooperation of citizens but also insists on the participation of non-governmental 
organisations in its bodies. For example, among the functions of the World Health Assembly 
(WHA), I highlight two: 
(g) to instruct the Board and the Director-General to bring to the attention of 
Members and of international organisations, governmental or nongovernmental, any 
matter with regard to health which the Health Assembly may consider appropriate;  
(h) to invite any organisation, international or national, governmental or non-
governmental, which has responsibilities related to those of the Organization, to 
appoint representatives to participate, without right of vote, in its meetings or in 
those of the committees and conferences convened under its authority, on conditions 
prescribed by the Health Assembly; but in the case of national organisations, 
invitations shall be issued only with the consent of the Government concerned 
(WHO, 1948). 
Additionally, article 71 establishes that the Organisation, concerning matters falling 
Academic 
institutions
Entities engaged in the pursuit and 
dissemination of knowledge through 
research, education and training. (§13) 
This can include think tanks which are 
policy-oriented institutions, as long as 
they primarily perform research; while 
international associations of academic 




or an academic 
institution, but may apply 
relevant provisions of the 
WHO’s policy and 
operational procedures 
on engagement with 
private sector entities, 
such as not accepting 
financial and in-kind 
contributions for use in 
the normative work. 
(§14)
 93
within its competence, can make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with 
international non-governmental organisations and, with the consent of the Government 
concerned, with national organisations, governmental or non-governmental (WHO, 1948). 
Apart from the Constitution, relations between the WHO and the civil society were 
originally established at the first World Health Assembly in 1948, as it recognised that 'co-
operation with professional and technical non-governmental organisations would be of value 
to WHO in many fields, and would assist WHO in many of the objectives envisaged by the 
Constitution’ (WHO, 1948, p.82). The working principles in relations with non-governmental 
organisations were adjusted and expanded by the Third, Eleventh and Twenty-first World 
Health Assemblies (resolutions WHA1.130, WHA3.113, WHA11.14 and WHA21.28). 
Accordingly, the number of NGOs in official relations grew from 18 in 1948, to 206 at the 
beginning of 2016.  These initial principles were mainly focused on the participation of 
NGOs at governing bodies’ meetings rather than on programmatic issues.  
Although since its creation the WHO recognises non-governmental organisations as 
important actors to address health challenges, it was from the late 1980s that the Organisation 
started to realise ‘the complementarity of the resources they [NGOs] represent in the network 
of governments, peoples and WHO striving for health development (…) [and] the need to 
mobilize national and international non-governmental organisations for accelerated 
implementation of health-for-all strategies’ (WHO, 1987, p.1). In 1987, the Executive Board, 
in light of article 71, recommended that the WHA adopt the ‘revised version’ of the 
Principles Governing Relations between the WHO and non-governmental organisations. This 
document then became the basic legal instrument for relations between them. The approved 
Resolution (40.25) decided that:      
The objectives of WHO's collaboration with NGOs are to promote the policies, 
strategies and programmes derived from the decisions of the Organisation's 
governing bodies; to collaborate with regard to various WHO programmes in jointly 
agreed activities to implement these strategies; and to play an appropriate role in 
ensuring the harmonising of inter-sectoral interests among the various sectoral bodies 
concerned in a country, regional or global setting (WHO, 1987).   
Regarding the WHO’s policies for engagement with non-State actors, seven documents 
were published between 1948 and 2010. Apart from the aforementioned Working Principles 
of 1948 which were replaced by the Principles of 1987, there were the Regulations for Expert 
Advisory Panels and Committees - published in 1951 and replaced in 1982. It stated that 
‘organisations of the United Nations system, as well as non-governmental organisations in 
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official relations with WHO, may be invited to send representatives to expert committee 
meetings in which they are directly interested’. The purpose of the expert committee was to 
review and make technical recommendations to the Organisation on subjects of interest. 
Moreover, in 1964, the Regulations for Study and Scientific Groups, Collaborating 
Institutions and other Mechanisms of Collaboration were published. The document regulates 
skilled advice on disciplines related to health and social development, and the direct support 
of global, interregional and regional technical cooperation programmes for national health 
development, given by individual, groups and institutions. It was amended once, in 2002.  
In 1982, the thirty-fifth World Health Assembly approved the new regulations for 
expert advisory panels and committees in replacement of those adopted by the 4th WHA and 
amended by the 13th WHA. According to the regulations, an expert advisory panel might be 
established by the Director-General in any field and when required by the development of the 
Organisation's programme. Moreover, ‘any person possessing qualifications and/or 
experience relevant and useful to the activities of the Organization in a field covered by an 
established expert advisory panel may be considered for appointment as a member of that 
panel after consultations with the national authorities concerned’ (WHA, 1982, p.4).  
In 2001, the Guidelines on Working with the Private Sector were established, and in 
2010 the Policy on WHO engagement with global health partnerships and hosting 
arrangements was conceived.  
To summarise, the table below shows all Resolutions and Guidelines which have 
historically coordinated the relationship between the WHO and non-State actors.  
Year Document Will it be replaced by FENSA?
1948 (WHA1.130)
Working Principles in Relations 
with non-Governmental 
Organization
Amended in 1950, 1958 and 
1968. Replaced in 1987.
1951 (WHA4.14) Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees Replaced in 1982
1964 (EB69.R21)
Regulations for Study and Scientific 
Groups, Collaborating Institutions 
and other Mechanisms of 
Collaboration
Amended in 2002 and shall be 
aligned with FENSA
1982 (WHA35.10) Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees Yes
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This chapter was mainly based on the existing literature and documents from WHO 
Archives. The interviews conducted also provided some clarification when needed. The 
methodology used in this chapter is a content and discourse analysis; the aim is to give voice 
and meaning to the topic. Ten visits were made to the WHO Archives in Geneva and one visit 
to the United Nations Archives Office in New York. It is important to note that, according to 
WHO Archives access policy, archives are only accessible to researchers once the records are 
at least 20 years old. While in New York, forty documents regarding Global Health Foreign 
Policy and Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly were considered; in Geneva, one 
hundred and nine documents, with a ten-year timeline from 1987 to 1997 were analysed – 
those that contained at least one of these keywords: private sector, industries, universities, 
foundation, NGO, financial, technical collaboration, technical cooperation.  
According to O’Leary (2014), there are three sorts of documents: Public Records, 
Personal Documents and Physical Evidence. As mentioned above, public records from the 
World Health Organisation and the United Nations formed the basis of this chapter. However, 
personal documents such as meeting notes and unpublished insights from individuals 
associated with non-State actors were also used. Some interviewees provided these 
documents. In view of valuable information about the concrete social, political and economic 
context of the analysed subject, all kinds of voices were sought and heard. 
The next items will analyse the policies used to regulate the WHO’s engagement with 
the four non-state actors embraced by FENSA: non-governmental organisations, the private 
sector, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. 
3.2 Non-governmental Organisations 
As mentioned previously, engagement with NGOs derives from article 71 of the 
1987 (WHA40.25)
Principles Governing Relations 




Guidelines on Working with the 




Policy on WHO Engagement with 
Global Health Partnerships and 
Hosting Arrangements
No, but shall be aligned with 
FENSA
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WHO’s Constitution - whereby the Organisation might make appropriate arrangements for 
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organisations in carrying out its 
international health work. The relation was regulated by the Principles Governing Relations 
between the World Health Organization and Nongovernmental Organisations, last updated in 
1987, which gave as its main objectives ‘to promote the policies, strategies and programmes 
derived from the decisions of the Organisation’s governing bodies; to collaborate with 
various WHO programmes in jointly agreed activities to implement these strategies; and to 
play an appropriate role in ensuring the harmonising of intersectoral interests among the 
various sectoral bodies concerned in a country, regional or global setting’.  
According to the WHA40.25 Resolution (1987, p.1), the Organisation recognises ‘only 
one category of formal relations, known as official relations (…) all other contacts, including 
working relations, are considered to be of an informal character’. For that reason, only 
entities in ‘official relations’ were allowed to participate in the meetings of the Governing 
Bodies, at least officially, and representing themselves. By participating in a GB meeting, an 
NGO in official relations ‘shall be entitled to make a statement of an expository nature’. It is 
worth noting that official relationship status did not give NGOs the right to vote. The 
decision-making of the WHO has always been a prerogative of Member States, given the 
intergovernmental nature of the Organisation.  
The decision about the type of relationship was made by the Standing Committee on 
Nongovernmental Organisations,  which recognised three levels of relations: informal 39
contact, working relations, and formal relations. According to the last register before 
FENSA’s approval, dating from January 2016, 206 NGOs were in official relations with the 
WHO, outlining a very heterogeneous group (WHO, 2016). 
Informal relations consisted of ‘exchanges of information and reciprocal participation 
in technical meetings’ and could remain ad hoc as long as necessary without written 
agreement. When several specific joint activities were identified, collaboration could take a 
subsequent step by proceeding to a period (usually two years) of working relations. For this 
to occur, an exchange of letters was required, indicating details of the activities to be 
 The Standing Committee on Nongovernmental Organisations used to make recommendations to the Board on 39
the application for admission of nongovernmental organisations into official relations with WHO and was 
dissolved by the decision EB139(2) (2016), in follow-up to resolution WHA69.10 (2016) on the Framework of 




undertaken during the period. Additionally, an evaluation of the outcomes of the 
collaboration at the end of the joint activities was needed. Afterwards, the relation could 
result: 
in the continuation of the working relations for a further period; in an application for 
admission into official relations with WHO from an international NGO, for 
examination by the Executive Board, should there be a number of activities which 
might form the basis of a long-term and closer relationship with WHO; or in a 
decision that there is no scope for further contacts in the foreseeable future. (WHO, 
1987, p.2) 
Working and informal relations did not have to pass through the Executive Board. 
They previously required approval from the WHO Secretariat, which, however, could not 
guarantee the right to formal participation in the meetings of the Executive Board or the 
World Health Assembly. For formal recognition, as well as participation in decision-making 
bodies, the NGO would have to successfully complete a period of working relations and then 
apply for official relations. To be admitted into official relations, the interested NGO should: 
(i) present the main area of competence, which must be in line with WHO’s purviews; (ii) not 
pursue commercial interests; and (iii) have activities which ‘shall be relevant to and have a 
bearing on the implementation of the health-for-all strategies’. Every three years the 
collaboration should be reviewed by the Standing Committee on Nongovernmental 
Organisations.  
The efficacy of this arrangement of relations, however, proved to be very limited - 
firstly because official relations were not applied to the WHO’s regional and national offices, 
secondly because the rate of participation of these entities in the meetings of the Governing 
Bodies was less than 50% at the WHA and less than 30% at the Executive Council sessions. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, because of the informal nature of relations between 
NGOs and the WHO, which were to be found in the greatest quantity (WHO, 2012).  
During the interviews, I asked why the WHO did not adjust the 1987 principles instead 
of creating a new Framework. It was pointed out that the main issue at the WHO has always 
been the private sector; specifically, how under the umbrella of NGOs, they were able to have 
official relations with the WHO. Therefore, an update wouldn’t be a solution by itself. 
Furthermore, interviewee 7, from the United Kingdom, affirmed that the discussions on the 
relationship between the Organisation and non-State actors opened a 'Pandora’s box’, as it 
‘became clear that it was a much more complex and complicated process’.  
The relationship between the WHO and NGOs has been a controversial issue, although 
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not as much as its relationship with the private sector. On the one hand this was due to the 
requirements for entrance into official relations, which became a barrier that restricted the 
inclusion of those sections of civil society that are nationally-based or from lower-middle-
income. Consequently, the process was unintendedly favouring big international NGOs to be 
admitted into official relations:  
the NGO shall normally be international in its structure and/or scope, and shall 
represent a substantial proportion of the persons globally organised for the purpose 
of participating in the particular field of interest in which it operates (…); shall have 
a constitution or similar basic document, an established headquarters, a directing or 
governing body, an administrative structure at various levels of action, and authority 
to speak for its members through its authorised representatives. Its members shall 
exercise voting rights in relation to its policies or action (…). In exceptional cases, a 
national organisation, whether or not affiliated to an international NGO, may be 
considered for admission into official relations, in consultation with and subject to 
the recommendations of the WHO Regional Director and the Member State 
involved. (WHO, 1987, p.3) 
On the other hand, there were inadequate safeguards against conflicts of interest, which the 
interviews confirmed to be the principal concern of Member States. Foremostly, however, the 
rules failed to distinguish between public interest NGOs and business interest NGOs. When 
conducting the interviews, I could observe that the potential and veiled influence of the 
private sector was the main concern behind FENSA negotiations.   
We should consider a letter from Dr Yuji Kawaguchi, Director of the Division of 
Interagency Affairs of the WHO Headquarters in Geneva, to the Assistant of the United 
Nations Secretary-General for External Relations in April 1998. It can be observed that since 
that time, the relationship with NGOs was an ongoing topic within the WHO:    
It was generally agreed that ‘civil society’ was composed of a number of elements, 
e.g. the associative type of organisation generally known as ‘nongovernmental 
organisation’, academia, religious groups, the media, foundations, as well as various 
sectors of the business world. (…) Please find attached, as requested, information 
regarding the current policies and practices of WHO in its relations with NGOs. I 
should also mention that WHO is currently involved in a process of reviewing its 
relations with NGOs outside the health sector.  
Bearing in mind that NGOs have always been a key topic, even soon after updating 
the principles governing relations in 1987, the Organisation subsequently tried, in the early 
2000s, to create a civil society initiative, as briefly mentioned in chapter 2. The aim was to 
clarify the different roles that civil society could have while working in collaboration with the 
WHO. In 2002, a review report of the ongoing policies and practices regarding civil society 
and non-governmental organisations was released. The report considered ‘civil society 
organisations’ as ‘non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary organisations formed by people within 
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the social sphere of civil society’ which ‘cover a variety of organisational interests and forms, 
ranging from formal organisations registered with authorities to informal social movements 
coming together around a common cause’. It was highlighted how the borders were blurred, 
not only between state and non-State but also between market and non-market, due to 
excessive involvement of States and commercial enterprises. The report, therefore, pointed 
out that both private sector NGOs and public interest or citizen grouping NGOs were allowed 
to have official relations with the WHO under the same status of ‘NGOs’.   
The 2002 report listed, as general constraints for the relationship between the WHO 
and NGOs: gaps in communication and information, a lack of distinction between types of 
CSOs and NGOs along with insufficient safeguards over conflict of interests. Additionally, 
‘lengthy, onerous and rigid procedures’, ‘personalised linkages’,  ‘insufficient information 40
on NGOs’, ‘uneven participation at governing bodies’ and ‘imbalance between North and 
South’ were cited as specific problems of the official relations system. Finally, the constraints 
upon informal and working relations were also pointed out: lack of participation, lack of 
relevant guidelines and regional and country-level concerns. The latter was emphasised due 
to development aid actions which were ‘increasingly being channelled through CSOs at the 
country level, with or without government consent, country office staff were also uncertain 
about circumstances under which they were allowed to work with CSOs directly or whether 
government endorsement was needed for all WHO collaboration with a national 
CSO’ (WHO, 2002, p.17) 
One of the primary arguments was that in July 2002, 189 non-governmental 
organisations were in official relations, and when analysing the previous four years, ‘around 
40% of these non-governmental organisations have attended the Health Assembly and 25% 
have attended Executive Board sessions. On average over that period, 16 non-governmental 
organisations made statements to each Health Assembly and 11 to each Executive Board 
session’. Moreover, the report revealed that the Organisation had more informal contacts and 
working relations, as ‘an inventory of all interactions of the WHO at Geneva with non-
governmental organisations revealed that 45% were with those in official relations and 55% 
 “The linkage between the NGOs in official relations and WHO is between two individuals – the focal point in 40
the NGO and the WHO designated technical officer. Therefore, the quality and endurance of the relationship can 
sometimes boil down to the personal commitment and rapport between the two individuals. This individual link 
can be broken during a turnover of WHO and NGO staff, leading to difficulties in re-establishing the 
relationship when new people take over” (CSI, 2002, p.15). Available at https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
handle/10665/67596/WHO_CSI_2002_WP6.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Accessed on 10/12/2019
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were with those not in official relations. Regional and country offices report a similar 
pattern’. 
The Civil Society Initiative, through the review report, then suggested that the WHO 
replace the 1987 Principles with a new policy which should involve a collaboration policy 
and an accreditation policy; the latter of which, in contrast with the official relations system, 
would not be conditional on working relations with the Secretariat. 
After extensive debate on a new policy for relations between the WHO and non-
governmental organisations, the 111th Session of Executive Board, in January 2003, decided 
to endorse the proposed policy which should replace the 1987 Principles:  
recognising the importance of civil society and its contributions to public health, and 
the growth in the numbers and influence of nongovernmental organisations active in 
health at global, regional and national levels; (…)  noting that the existing Principles 
governing relations between the World Health Organization and nongovernmental 
organisations adopted by the Fortieth World Health Assembly in 1987 (resolution 
WHA40.25) have been reviewed; Noting the need to improve existing collaboration 
and dialogue with nongovernmental organisations, and to encourage new cooperative 
activities with such bodies.  
The Resolution EB111.R14 also decided that the Director-General should establish ‘suitable 
measures to implement the policy, including guidelines on the accreditation of, and 
collaboration with, non-governmental organisations’.  
In April 2003, the 56th World Health Assembly declared that an improvement on 
dialogue and collaboration was needed, in response to the increase in both numbers and 
importance of non-governmental organisations within the WHO and the international arena. 
The report by the Director-General presented to the WHA, hence, pointed out the main 
findings and conclusion of the Civil Society Initiative review. 
The Policy for relations between the World Health Organization and Non-
governmental Organisations stated in its Introduction that:  
an organisation that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental 
agreement shall be considered a nongovernmental organisation, including 
organisations that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided 
that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the 
organisation. For the purpose of this policy, nongovernmental organisations include a 
wide range of organisations, such as groups that represent consumers and patients, 
associations with humanitarian, developmental, scientific and/or professional goals 
and not-for-profit organisations that represent or are closely linked with commercial 
interests (WHA, 2003, p.5) 
Moreover, the Accreditation Policy established the principles by which NGOs would be 
allowed to attend and participate in meetings of WHO governing bodies. To be eligible for 
accreditation to the World Health Assembly, the Executive Board and committees and 
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conferences convened under their authority, a non-governmental organisation should, 
amongst other stipulations, ‘be non-profit in nature, and disclose information on its 
objectives, structure, membership of the executive body, field of activities and source of 
financing’. The privileges conferred to qualified non-governmental organisations included:  
(a) to appoint a representative to participate, without a right of vote, in governing 
body meetings and committees and conferences convened under their authority; (b) 
to make a statement of an expository nature at such meetings on agenda items of 
relevance to the non-governmental organisation, at the invitation of the Chairman; 
(c) to submit documents pertaining to such meetings, the nature and scope of 
distribution of which shall be determined by the Director-General (WHA, 2003, p.7).  
The Collaboration Policy aimed to boost and simplify cooperative activities with non-
governmental organisations, whether be they national, regional or international. Furthermore, 
collaboration with the WHO would be independent of the Accreditation Policy, and guided 
by four principles: 
 (a) collaboration shall advance the objectives of WHO and be in conformity with 
policies adopted by the World Health Assembly; (b) collaboration shall be with a 
nongovernmental organisation that has a demonstrated competence in a field of 
activity related to the work of WHO; (c) collaboration shall be based on adequate 
knowledge of relevant characteristics of the nongovernmental organisation such as 
its objectives, structure, membership of executive body, field of activities and source 
of financing, so as to enable the Director-General or officials designated by the 
Director-General to assess the suitability of collaboration; (d) collaboration shall not 
compromise the independence and objectivity of WHO and shall be designed to 
avoid any conflicts of interests. (WHA, 2003, p.7) 
Later, in November 2003, at the 113th Session of the Executive Board, it was declared 
that, due to insufficient time to consider the suggestions made, further review by the EB was 
required, and that the proposed Resolution be presented and discussed, once again, in the 57th 
WHA, in April 2004.  
According to the article Overhaul needed on rules on the WHO’s relationship with 
NGOs written by Sangeeta Shanshikant and published in the South-North Development 
Monitor (SUNS), No. 7290 on 19 January 2012,  the new policy had little success and 41
remained ‘in a coma, ignored and unimplemented’. Moreover, as already mentioned, 
interviewees 14, 19 and 20 affirmed that the proposal was shut down mainly by China, 
because ‘they saw it as a liberal Western agenda to introduce non-State actors influencing the 
direction of WHO and the Member States should remain in the elite’. Correspondingly, 
interviewee 19, a former staff member who was the first responsible for elaborating the 
 Available in: https://www.twn.my/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2012/ipr.info.120103.htm  Last 41
access on 09/12/2019. 
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policies for the engagement with NGOs at the WHO, confirmed that some Member States 
historically have a fairly unfavourable position regarding the participation of non-
governmental organisations, due to a strict perception of a central control of the State. China 
was cited as an example. The interviewee also confirmed that China was the main opponent 
to advance the reform on the relationship between the WHO and NGOs in the previous years 
before FENSA.  
It can be observed that the relationship with NGOs has always been a major topic since 
the establishment of the WHO, both in its Constitution and with the first version of principles 
and guidelines launched at the first World Health Assembly. After minor amendments in 
1950, 1958, 1968, they were completely replaced in 1987. However, the topic never 
remained overlooked, as was revealed in this chapter. This ambiguous relationship was then 
resurfaced as part of the WHO Reform, leading to the proposal and approval of FENSA in 
2016, which will be analysed in detail in chapter 4. 
3.3 Private Sector 
In contrast with non-governmental organisations, the engagement with the private 
sector is not directly mentioned by the WHO’s Constitution but is instead based on 
interpretations. It is worth noting that while the World Health Assembly adopted the NGOs 
guiding principles in 1987, the private sector principles were debated and, as they could not 
be agreed, were only noted by the 107th Session of the Executive Board in 2000 - not being 
approved or endorsed by the Member States. 
In December 1999, the 105th Session of the Executive Board stressed how new policies 
and initiatives were being developed for collaboration with the public and private sectors, 
including foundations. It was asserted that:  
WHO is conscious of the potential of collaboration with the private sector at global, 
regional and country levels. The private sector has strong advantages that enable 
WHO to reach wider and to have a more significant impact on global public health. 
Thus far formal or informal partnerships have been established around drug and 
vaccine donations, donations in kind, pro-bono services, advocacy and 
communications, and financial support. (…) The Global Polio Eradication Initiative 
is an outstanding example of successful public-private sector collaboration between 
organisations of the United Nations system, Member States, foundations, 
nongovernmental organisations and the private sector. Rotary International, in 
particular, has contributed millions of volunteer work-hours, donations in-kind and 
advocacy efforts, along with financial support exceeding US$ 325 million, to the 
eradication of poliomyelitis. The recent commitment of De Beers to eradication of 
poliomyelitis has so far resulted in not only significant financial support but also 
advocacy activities ranging from its Chairman’s calls to other business leaders, 
through active community engagement, to global media coverage. Given the 
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imperative need to ensure that donations from the private sector are suitable, avoid 
conflicts of interest and provide clear health benefits, WHO revised its Guidelines on 
interaction with commercial enterprises in July 1999 for implementation on a trial 
basis. Consultations on these guidelines with governments and the private sector are 
being pursued.(EB, 2000, p.2) 
A report by the Director-General Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland was presented at the 
EB105, asking for Member States to join forces with a variety of private sector partners from 
industries that did not traditionally work with the WHO as it could ‘clearly enable WHO to 
have a broader and deeper impact on global public health’. The Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization (GAVI) was cited, for instance, as it had vast support from several public 
and private partners and also due to the WHO’s ‘lead role (…) which aims at saving 
children’s lives and protecting people’s health through the widespread use of safe vaccines’. 
Some literature indicates that the years of Dr Brundtland’s administration (1998-2003) were 
the beginning of more WHO openness to the private sector, under the name of public-private 
partnerships.  
The Draft Policy on Extrabudgetary Resources was also recommended by the 
Executive Board, emphasising a wider resource base, ‘with more Member States 
contributing, and greater involvement of the public and private sectors’.  
Regarding the guidelines on interaction with commercial entities, the Member States 
and non-governmental organisations in official relations with WHO were able to submit 
comments on the draft, which was also used alongside individual proposals for interaction 
with the private sector from previous years. The guidelines were, then, revised, taking into 
account the comments received, and past experience, and submitted to the 107th Session of 
the Executive Board in January 2000. 
The goal of the guidelines were to ‘help WHO staff to interact appropriately with 
commercial enterprises in order to achieve positive outcomes for health’ and commercial 
entities were defined as those planned to make a profit for their owners. Moreover, the 
guidelines could be applied ‘to a variety of other institutions, including State-run enterprises, 
associations representing commercial enterprises, foundations not at arm’s length from their 
sponsors, and other not-for-profit organisations such as academic institutions’ (EB, 2001, p.2) 
It can be observed that there was no mention of NGOs funded by the private sector.  
According to the guidelines, the collaboration between the WHO and commercial 
enterprises was through ‘participation with one or more commercial enterprises in alliances 
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and other relationships (sometimes with other public bodies, governments, nongovernmental 
organisations and foundations) to address specific health issues; exchange of information; 
product research and development;  generation of cash and in-kind donations; advocacy for 
health’ (EB, 2001).  
 Regarding conflicts of interest (the main concern during FENSA negotiations), it was 
stated that WHO Staff should always consider whether a relationship might involve a real or 
perceived conflict of interest, either for the staff member or for the work of the Organisation. 
No real or perceived definition of conflict of interest was assumed, in fact, an indefinite 
‘step-by-step evaluation of the commercial enterprise’ was pointed out ‘as the best way to 
identify potential areas of conflict of interest’. Relations with the tobacco or arms industries 
were advised to be avoided as well as indirect collaboration, ‘particularly if arranged by a 
third party acting as an intermediary between WHO and a commercial enterprise’ (EB, 2001, 
p.3). 
Donations were one of the topics that raised more concern due to scandals surrounding 
the Organisation receiving illegal donations from the pharmaceutical industry. In 2007, for 
instance, the journalist Michael Day, in a report published by the BMJ, revealed that:  
Email correspondence passed to the BMJ seems to show that in June 2006 Benedetto 
Saraceno, the director of WHO's department of mental health and substance abuse, 
suggested that a patient organisation accept $10  000 (£5000; €7000) from 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) on WHO's behalf. The sum was then to be passed on to 
WHO—ostensibly with the intention of obscuring the origins of the donation. GSK 
withdrew its offer of funding when it learnt that acceptance was conditional on 
obscuring its origin. However, the email exchange indicates that other sums of 
money originating from drug companies may have already been channelled to WHO 
through patient groups (…). In the email dated 16 June 2006, Dr Saraceno thanks 
Mary Baker of the European Parkinson's Disease Association (EPDA), for raising the 
$10  000 “requested by the WHO.” The money was to have funded a report on 
neurological diseases, including Parkinson's disease, for which GSK produces 
treatments. Dr Saraceno then seems to advise Mary Baker on how to get round the 
WHO's rules forbidding drug industry funding. “Unfortunately,” he says, “WHO 
cannot receive funds from pharmaceutical industry. Our legal Office will reject the 
donation. WHO can only receive funds from Government agencies, NGOs, 
foundations and scientific institutions or professional organisations. Therefore, I 
suggest that this money should be given to EPDA and eventually EPDA can send the 
funds to WHO which will give an invoice (and acknowledge contribution) to EPDA, 
but not to GSK. (Day, 2007, p.338) 
According to paragraph 15 of the WHO's guidelines on interactions with commercial 
enterprises, which deals with cash donations, funds may not be sought or accepted from 
commercial entities that have a direct profitable interest in the outcome of the project. 
Paragraph 16 then states that caution should be exercised even when the business has an 
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indirect interest.  
Regarding Cash Donations, the guidelines stated that for meetings convened by the 
WHO, financial aid from commercial enterprise may not be accepted if ‘it is specifically 
designated to support the participation of any or all of the invitees (including such invitees’ 
travel and accommodation), regardless of whether such contribution would be provided 
directly to the participants or channelled through WHO’. When staff from the WHO 
participate in an external meeting, support from commercial enterprises for travel ‘may be 
accepted if the company or trade association is also supporting the expenses of other 
participants at the meeting’ and may not be accepted if a third party holds the external 
meeting.  
It is important to highlight that, with regards to activities leading to the development of 
WHO guidelines or recommendations, financial donations should also not be accepted for 
financing staff salaries. Furthermore, paragraph 27 states that for reasons of transparency, 
contributions from commercial enterprises must be publicly acknowledged. 
With regard to non-monetary contributions, in-kind donations, it is worth noting that 
pharmaceuticals should only be accepted under unbiased and justifiable criteria for the 
selection of recipient countries, communities or patients and if the drug donation is not ‘of a 
promotional nature, either with regard to the company itself or by creating a demand for the 
drug which is not sustainable once the donation has ended’ (EB, 2001, p.7). 
Secondments, a topic that led to many confrontational discussions during FENSA 
negotiations, and one that will be analysed in chapter 4, used to be accepted from the private 
sector for a limited period, as long as the individual was not seconded from ‘industries whose 
activities clearly conflict with WHO’s mandate’ or no conflict of interest existed between the 
person’s proposed activities for the WHO and the activities for the employer company. 
Moreover, the guidelines highlighted that exceptional care should be taken when the 
secondment was from health-related enterprises.  
Since the 1990s, when the private sector was raised as a remarkable source of 
financing and leadership in tackling diseases, its relationship with the WHO was seen as 
deceitful.  Extra caution was therefore needed. Undoubtedly, the pharmaceutical industry and 
the food and beverage industries were mainly in the spotlight. For instance, in February 1998, 
a Memorandum from the FSF Director to the INA Director regarding WHO collaboration 
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with the private sector claimed that: 
A Food Safety Programme cannot function effectively without the collaboration of 
the food industry (i.e. primary procedures, processors, vendors/trade, food service 
industry). Our collaboration with the food industry started in the mid-80s. It has 
always been our policy not to collaborate with individual enterprises but with 
industry organisations. Two such organisations, the International Life Sciences 
Institute (ILSI) and the Industry Council for Development were given the status of 
NGOs in official relations with WHO. Collaboration with ILSI extends mainly to 
cosponsoring large regional and global food safety conferences while collaboration 
with ICD is more country-project-oriented with emphasis on development of training 
material and conducting training course.     
Furthermore, in 1998, a Memorandum written by Dr Yuji Kawaguchi, Director of the 
Division of Interagency Affairs of WHO in Geneva stated that: 
The United Nations system, including WHO, is being urged, within the context of the 
movement in the United Nations and through the system, to intensify and consolidate 
collaboration with the private sector, for the benefit of Member States. This matter 
will be on the Agenda of the forthcoming Administrative Committee on Coordination 
(ACC), Geneva, 27-28 March 1998 and the item will be prepared by the 
Organisational Committee (OC/ACC) at its meeting, 6-9 March 1998, prior to ACC. 
I am therefore requesting that we obtain from your division the facts concerning 
WHO collaboration with commercial enterprises, and your views on this, if any.    
In 1997, a fax correspondence to Dr Fritz Kaferstein, Director of Programme of Food Safety 
and Food Aid stated: 
Dear Fritz, thanks for the great news about your new arrangement. I had heard 
rumours but nothing specific. You and your associates must feel particularly good 
about this recognition since you know you earned it all the way – and with some 
risks taken about “political correctness”. On the Business Week article why don’t you 
write to the Personal Business editor, Edward C. Baig (Address) complimenting him 
on the article and pointing out that WHO has a major food safety programme which 
is supported by the global food and allied industries particularly through 
organisations like the ICD and ILSI.  
Kaferstein answered: 
Dear Walter, thank you for the newspaper clipping. Why don’t you write to the 
journal drawing their attention to the fact the WHO has issued Ten Golden Rules for 
Safe Food Preparation which may be obtained free of charge, from our office.   
When it comes to Food and Beverage industry, companies have moved to the 
forefront of global health initiatives, especially those related to noncommunicable diseases. 
The International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA), which was interviewed for this thesis, 
consists of the ‘leading global food and non-alcoholic beverage companies’ aiming to 
‘empower consumers to eat balanced diets and live healthier lives’.  The IFBA includes 42
Nestlé, PepsiCo, The Coca-Cola Company, McDonald’s and others, and has been 
participating energetically in negotiations, taking part in ministerial meetings and chairing 
 Available at: https://ifballiance.org/ . Last access on 20/12/2019 42
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working groups. The concerns regarding this involvement should not be a surprise however, 
as central commercial interests collide with global health problems. The article How Private 
Companies are Transforming the Global Public Health Agenda (2011)  elucidates this 43
conflict of interest:  
Soft-drink and snack companies make a living by reducing whole foods into easy-to-
manufacture processed ones -- the kinds of foods that increase the risk of developing 
NCDs. To maintain their financial health, these firms need to sell more of their 
products in the very countries where NCD deaths are rising. With sales in developed 
countries fat, the industry now relies on increasing revenues in emerging markets to 
sustain future growth. Between 1982 and 2000, U.S. companies quadrupled their 
investments in overseas food processing companies, and sales of processed foods 
overseas grew from $39.2 billion to $150 billion. The average Mexican now 
consumes nearly 30 gallons of Coca-Cola drinks every year, more than the average 
American. Rates of NCDs have risen accordingly. 
In 2012, the article Is the Junk Food Industry Buying the WHO?  was published, 44
denouncing the WHO to be ‘increasingly relying on what it calls ‘partnerships’ with industry, 
opting to enter into alliances with food and beverage companies rather than maintain strict 
neutrality’. In response, Margaret Chan made a statement accusing the media of creating 45
‘misinformation and confusion in the public health arena’ and denying that the Organisation 
was receiving funds from the food and beverage industry to its work on noncommunicable 
diseases. The Director-General, while assuming that the private sector ‘plays an important 
role along with other key stakeholders in taking action to improve health’, assured that when 
working with the private sector, the Organisation ‘takes all possible measures to ensure its 
work to develop policy and guidelines is protected from industry influence’. Moreover, Chan 
affirmed that the Organisation ‘may engage with the private sector on occasion, but 
according to WHO policy, funds may not be sought or accepted from enterprises that have a 
direct commercial interest in the outcome of the project toward which they would be 
contributing (…) For this reason, the Organisation does not accept funding from the food and 
beverage manufacturers for work on NCD prevention and control’. 
The pharmaceutical industry is the private sector most involved in global health 
initiatives and, accordingly, is in a dubious position as its main business is to sell brand 
medicines at high prices, especially given the competition from generic drugs.  In this regard, 
 Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-11-09/how-private-companies-are-transforming-43
global-public-health-agenda . Last access on 20/02/2020
 Available at https://www.motherjones.com/food/2012/11/junk-food-industry-buys-influence-global-level-too/. 44
Last access on 20/12/2019 
 Available at: https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2012/nutrition_20121119/en/ Last access on 45
20/12/2019
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K.M Gopakumar wrote an article in 2014 denouncing a set of leaked emails which showed 
that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) industry 
association had planned a campaign against proposed pro-public health changes in South 
African patent law. Moreover, interviewee 5, from Brazil, explained that the patent issue was 
the main topic of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations between 1986 and 1994. What was 
disclosed was how powerful the pharmaceutical industry is, as it was considered the engine 
of negotiation on trade. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement  was seen as a ‘big fail for the South countries’ as they were not able to negotiate 46
it energetically, especially small and poor countries that could not face the power of the 
pharmaceutical industry. As the health field is one of the largest budgets of any country, 
buying a fight with the pharmaceutical industry is, at least, imprudent. The interviewee then 
clarified that due to the AIDS crisis, precisely when South Africa, through compulsory 
licenses, authorised the imports of generic versions of patented medicines, Big Pharma 
companies sued the South African government, showing their thirst for profit.  
According to Saslow (2009), pharmaceutical companies, threatened by what could be 
considered a weakening of patent protection, opposed the efforts of the South African 
government, arguing that it was violating international trade law, particularly the TRIPS 
Agreement. Therefore, lobbied by the pharmaceutical industry, United States government 
officials proposed bilateral trade sanctions in an attempt to pressure South Africa. AIDS 
activists, especially the civil society and NGOs, started a movement claiming that 
international law is flexible in cases of national emergency. It was clear that profit came 
above public interest, human rights and public health. The countries from the Global South 
took advantage of this increasing social movement to try to correct what they called a 
‘development deficit’ in multilateral negotiations.  
Interviewee 5 also explained that Southern countries started to push the WHO, arguing 
that as a United Nations agency with a mandate to defend the public interest and public 
 The Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was negotiated with other international 46
trade agreements during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) from 1986 to 1994. As one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, it is totally binding for 
all WTO Member States. The TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards in the field of intellectual property 
(IP) protection (such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks) that all WTO Member countries have to respect. To 
achieve this goal, WTO Members have to modify their intellectual property laws to make them consistent with 
the new WTO standards. For instance, the TRIPS Agreement states that all patents shall be available for at least 
20 years from the filing date, whereas before TRIPS the patent term varied greatly among countries (7, 10, 17 or 
20 years). All WTO Members have to incorporate this 20-year patent term in their own patent law. Available at: 
https://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip18e/whozip18e.pdf Last access on 21/12/2019
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health worldwide, the Organisation could not defend the interests of multinationals and 
corporate profit. Countries from the Global South, therefore, ‘shifted a little of the topic by 
putting pressure on WHO to be a place where we could slightly mitigate the trade focus and 
move to the public interest focus and then we got an agenda, including the area of property 
intellectual, in favour of a pandemic crisis or emergency’.  At this time, according to the 47
interviewee:   
there was a confrontational dialogue between the Southern and the developed 
countries, which in turn was under heavy pressure from the pharmaceutical lobby. 
This is home to the largest pharmaceutical group, Roche, so we were under pressure 
from everyone. England, the Nordics, Switzerland, United States. Not to mention 
that the pharmaceutical industry has a representation of our size, it has 20 members 
just to cover these forums dealing with issues with public repercussions and 
commercial interests.  48
The interviewee also mentioned a ‘scandal’ that happened in 2005 at the WHO, when a final 
report was mistakenly distributed with tracking-changes from the head of the pharma’s office 
in Geneva. ‘It was a bit of a shame because it was clear that before being distributed to the 
members of the commission, the text had already passed through the pharma’s mission to 
make the necessary modifications, ensuring that the report would not harm them’. This 
episode was seen as a ‘symbolic moment’ of the progressive capture of the WHO over the 
years by the private sector, especially regarding the patent topic, which was forbidden 
discussion.  
One should also consider the potential conflict of interest from health policy experts 
who are supporting Pharma companies. To exemplify, in 2018, the director of the Margolis 
Center for Health Policy at Duke University was also part of the board of Johnson & 
Johnson. It is worth noting that as a board member of a for-profit healthcare company, the 
expert will have a fiduciary duty of not damaging when writing articles and speaking.  
Not surprisingly, the relationship with the private sector was the crucial issue of 
FENSA negotiations, as much of this engagement has always been unregulated. While it’s 
undeniable that the private sector plays a dominant role in health, careful consideration in 
policy and planning is required. It is precisely this function that FENSA is supposed to have.  
  In 2008 the sixty-first World Health Assembly adopted Resolution 61.21, which endorsed the Global Strategy 47
and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property. This Global Strategy aims to improve 
the delivery of and access to health products and medical devices by effectively overcoming barriers to access.
 Translated from Portuguese. 48
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3.4 Philanthropic Foundations 
According to Gian Luca Burci (2004), philanthropic foundations, as well as the private 
sector, engage with the WHO based on interpretations of its Constitution. However, the 
relations with philanthropic foundations are different from those with the private sector, 
NGOs and academic institutions in that they are not based on any regulation or guidelines. 
One could observe, then, that although the financial contributions to the Organisation from 
philanthropic foundations have increasingly grown, it is the only category of non-State actor 
that receives no instruction. 
One might observe how the relevance of philanthropic foundations to the WHO 
increased over the years; their first mention was during the First World Health Assembly in 
1948. As the Member States were praising the Organisation’s task of ‘improving the health of 
the populations of the whole world (…) [what] indicates a new stage in international co-
operation in the field of health services’.  The URSS representative affirmed that:  
The present state of development of medical science is in contradiction to the basic 
organisation of medical aid for the population in most countries. Medicine, in its 
present state of development, has grown out of the private-practice system of 
treatment for payment, which is not available to the poorer sections of the 
population. Nor are the measures taken by the municipal authorities more effective, 
and still less the activities of philanthropic organisations. All these measures, for 
the most part, are only pitiful palliatives, caricatures of a genuine public-health 
service. (WHA, 1948, p.39 – my emphasis)  
In 1951, philanthropic foundations were mentioned as potential sponsors for the first time but 
related to visual media activities in India.  
The lack of suitable guidelines, nonetheless, was only one part of the problem, given 
the inadequacy of WHO policies on conflicts of interest and the need for more oversight of 
the numerous partnerships - a gap that FENSA is supposed to fill.  
According to the WHO,  in 2012 the Organisation received financial contributions 49
from 212 non-State actors, for a total amount of USD 417 million, representing 25.5% of the 
total income. Philanthropic foundations donated USD 310 million, representing 18.9% of the 
total budget. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) was the first private non-State 
contributor, the second-largest contributor of the WHO’s entire budget, a total of 12.72% - 
second only to the US government.  50
 Available at: https://www.who.int/about/who_reform/governance/mapping-of-WHO-engagement-with-non-49
State-actors.pdf?ua=1 Last access on 17/12/2019
 Available at: http://open.who.int/2018-19/contributors . Last access on 17/12/2019. 50
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Amidst the coronavirus crisis, President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of 
the United States from World Health Organisation due to his criticisms of the agency’s 
handling of the pandemic. The global health community was extremely concerned - not only 
because the departure of its biggest donor could affect the WHO’s ability to respond to the 
ongoing outbreak as well to the future of the agency, but also because the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation would become the top donor. The outstanding financial engagement of the 
BMGF is criticised as it potentially influences WHO’s agenda, making the Organisation 
donor-driven instead of member-driven. However, Germany has become the current top 
donor, accounting for 12.18% of the WHO’s budget, closely followed by the BMGF with 
11.65%.   
As already explained in chapter 2, specified voluntary contributions, which nowadays 
correspond to 74.82% of the WHO budget, offer freedom to donors to choose programmes. 51
For instance, 58.37% of BMGF’s donations are allocated in the Polio eradication 
programme.  As a result, programmes’ implementation by the WHO is more related to 52
donors' demands than public health needs. In this regard, it is important to highlight that, 
according to the Guidelines on working with the private sector (2001), ‘the overall amount of 
the funds raised should not be so large that the programme would become dependent on 
support from a single company, or group of commercial enterprises, for its continued 
operations. The level of dependency of the programme on such support shall be evaluated at 
regular intervals’. Given the Polio Programme and the Private Sector Guidelines statement, 
an excerpt of interview 5, with a Brazilian Ambassador, is enlightening:   
The Polio Programme is funded by the Gates Foundation, which is a very positive 
thing (....), but the way it was done reveals this lack of criteria (...) WHO was “free 
for all”, someone with money used to arrive with a philanthropic assessment, beyond 
suspicion, Melinda Gates offered credibility (...) Finally, polio was eradicated in 
several countries, but the programme could not be deactivated because WHO was 
already using the money for other things and deactivating would be a thud; a lot of 
staff were paid with that money (...) As a parasite, [the BMGF] had fit into the WHO 
in such a way that it represented about 10-15% of the Organisation's annual budget. 
So when it came time to take it out, there was no way, WHO had become dependent 
(...) because the exit would disrupt several other projects in progress.  53
In April 2017, one year after FENSA approval, a piece entitled Meet the world’s most 
powerful doctor: Bill Gates  ironically stated that ‘some billionaires are satisfied with 54
 Ibid. 51
 Ibid. 52
 Interview made in Portuguese and translated by the author. 53
 Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/bill-gates-who-most-powerful-doctor/ Last access on 17/12/201954
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buying themselves an island. Bill Gates got a United Nations health agency in Geneva’, 
going on to point out that Gates’ priorities have become the WHO’s. Therefore, ‘rather than 
focusing on strengthening health care in poor countries — that would help contain future 
outbreaks like the Ebola epidemic — the agency spends a disproportionate amount of its 
resources on projects with the measurable outcomes Gates prefers, such as the effort to 
eradicate polio’. 
To similar effect, in 2008, a New York Times article  denounced that the chief of the 55
malaria programme criticised the growing control of malaria research by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation as it would be ‘stifling a diversity of views among scientists and 
wiping out the health agency's policy-making function’. 
One should also note that the Gates Foundation has been accused of having shares in 
pharmaceutical companies  and, therefore, having mutual financial interest with the makers 56
of drugs, diagnostic tools, vaccines and more. Furthermore, in 2017, Civil Society 
representants sent an open letter to the Executive Board of the World Health Organisation 
reproving the official relations status granted to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as 
according to the United States Government’s Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Foundation’s endowment has been disturbingly invested in many of the food, alcohol, and 
physical inactivity-related products that directly or indirectly cause harm to health. The Gates 
Foundation Trust’s direct investments include: 
Coca-Cola regional company that operates in the Americas south of the U.S. ($466 
million), Walmart ($837 million), the largest food retailer in the U.S. and a leading 
retailer of pharmaceutical drugs and alcoholic beverages, Walgreen-Boots Alliance 
($280 million), a large multinational pharmaceutical drug retailer, and two of the 
world’s largest TV companies (screen-time): Group Televisa ($433 million) and 
Liberty Global PLC ($221 million). In addition, approximately one-quarter of the 
Gates Foundation Trust assets are invested in Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a holding 
company that owns a US$17 billion share in the U.S.-based Coca-Cola company and 
US$29 billion interest in Kraft Heinz Inc., another of the world’s ten largest food 
companies. These investments make the Gates Foundation a beneficiary of sales of 
several categories of products that are the subject of WHO standards and advice to 
governments related to nutrition and physical activity. (CIVIL SOCIETY OPEN 
LETTER, 2017)  57
Notwithstanding accusations of setting the global health agenda in developing countries, the 
 Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/world/americas/17iht-gates.4.10120087.html Last access 55
on 17/12/2019
 In 2002, the Wall Street Journal showed the the Gates Foundation had purchased shares in nine big 56
pharmaceutical companies
 Civil Society calls for Protection of WHO from Undue Influence. Available at https://iogt.org/open-letters/57
civil-society-calls-protection-undue-influence/ Last access on 17/12/2019
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Gates Foundation’s income sources, which as mentioned include food and beverage, 
pharmaceutical and healthcare industries, are increasing the fears of a conflict of interest at 
the World Health Organisation. 
It seems that talking about philanthropic foundations’ role in global health and 
consequently within the WHO amounts to talking about the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. In fact, as the literature review of the first chapter showed, while few articles are 
analysing philanthropic foundations in global health, there is a huge focus by scholars on the 
Gates Foundation’s role in global health.  However, interview 1 affirmed that people should 
not focus only on the BMGF; ‘the Ted Turner Foundation is just as important. It had a 
‘secondment’ at the highest level in WHO’. In this regard, in December 2015 the South-
North Development Monitor (SUNS) exposed that the Gates Foundation and the United 
Nations Foundation seconded their staffers to top management positions at the World Health 
Organisation. The article also explained that the well-known UN Foundation is not a UN 
body but a philanthropy, registered in the United States by media entrepreneur Ted Turner.  
Despite being an undeniably positive role of private philanthropy in global health and 
within the WHO (it was said by many interviewees that no one can afford what the Gates 
Foundation pays to WHO), more attention on the impacts and side effects of philanthropic 
engagement is essential. Youde (2018) brings our attention to how seriously philanthropic 
organisations should be taken, as they ‘have the power to shape and alter the global political 
agenda – and can do so in ways distinct from other types of non-state actors’. This is 
especially true when it comes to the fragmentation of global governance, the lack of 
oversight and accountability tools, and the dominant practice of applying the commercial 
logic to the provision of public goods.  
Researchers of International Relations need to look at the path of philanthropic 
foundations in the health scenario and perceive that, rather than merely trying to influence 
States’ actions, philanthropic foundations are being directly involved in the decision-making 
processes. Youde (2018, p. 43) explains: ‘wealth could provide a donor with power over 
other actors, allowing the donor to force a recipient to do something it would not otherwise 
do – the donor will only give a state money if that government agrees to certain policies’. 
This perspective is important when thinking about the North/South division during FENSA 
negotiations. Although an overall divergence was clear, some specific positions were hard to 
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understand. One should note, however, that philanthropic foundations commonly act at the 
level of low and middle-income countries. The possibility of powerful non-State actors being 
able to shape political and institutional processes, by preventing States from raising issues 
that would be prejudicial to them, is something that should be carefully analysed. However, it 
is also important to note that philanthropic organisations have had serious effects on scholars, 
due to huge financial support. 
Therefore, philanthropy must be understood as a growing force that intersects 
influence, legitimacy, authority, and policymaking. When looking at the pharmaceutical 
treatments and new technologies focus, it is a far-fetched to argue that philanthropic 
organisations are unbiased actors. They are too powerful to be left unexplored.  
3.5 Academic Institutions 
According to the WHO website, the idea of using national institutions for international 
purposes started with the League of Nations, when national laboratories were entitled to be 
reference centres for the standardisation of biological products. Lately, the engagement with 
academic institutions was predicted in article 2 of the WHO’s Constitution, similarly to 
nongovernmental organisations. ‘To promote co-operation among scientific and professional 
groups which contribute to the advancement of health’ is amongst the list of the 
Organisation's functions. In 1949, it was pointed out that research and the coordination of 
research were crucial functions of the Organisation and that priority should be given to 
research that directly relates to the programmes of the WHO. 
Moreover, the second Health Assembly in 1949, while recognising that ‘the 
development of planned programmes requires continuous application of research and 
investigation on many problems, the solution of which may be found essential for the 
diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease, and for the promotion of positive 
health’ (WHA, 1949, p.23), decided that the World Health Organisation should not consider 
the creation of international research institutions under its umbrella, but support the existing 
ones. The 69th Session of the Executive Board, in 1964, approved the Regulations for Study 
and Scientific Groups, Collaborating Institutions and Other Mechanisms of Collaboration, 
which were later revised and amended during the 105th EB, in 1999. 
The Regulations highlighted that the knowledgeable support that the WHO needs 
should ‘reflect high scientific and technical standards, the widest possible representation of 
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different branches of knowledge, and local experience and trends of thought throughout the 
world, and must cover a broad range of disciplines related to health and social 
development’ (WHO, 2014, p. 131). Moreover, the Regulations stipulate the WHO 
Collaboration Centres (WHO CCs), institutions designed by the Director-General should 
become part of ‘an international collaborative network set up by WHO in support of its 
programme at all levels’.  
The WHO engages with academic institutions through the Collaboration Centres, 
mainly to gain expert advice and scientific or technical cooperation. In this regard,  
WHO gains access to top institutions worldwide and the institutional capacity to 
support its work. Similarly, institutions designated as WHO CC gain increased 
visibility and recognition by national authorities and greater attention from the public 
for the health issues on which they work. The centres also gain opportunities to work 
together (e.g. sharing objectives, exchanging information, pooling resources and 
developing technical cooperation), particularly at the international level; and 
opportunities to mobilize additional and sometimes important resources from funding 
partners. (WHO, 2018, p.6) 
 It is important to note that FENSA did not replace the relationship between the WHO 
and CCs. Therefore, academic institutions are the only non-State actors that can have official 
relations or be a collaborating centre, but they are mutually exclusive. Either the institution is 
a collaborating centre or has official relations under FENSA. Institutions with the capacity to 
fulfil functions related to the WHO’s programme, as well as institutions of ‘high scientific 
and technical standing having attained international recognition’, may qualify for 
designation. The functions of WHO collaborating centres include: 
(a) collection, collation and dissemination of information; (b) standardisation of 
terminology and nomenclature, of technology, of diagnostic, therapeutic and 
prophylactic substances, and of methods and procedures; (c) development and 
application of appropriate technology; (d) provision of reference substances and 
other services; (e) participation in collaborative research developed under the 
Organisation’s leadership, including the planning, conduct, monitoring and 
evaluation of research, as well as promotion of the application of the results of 
research; (f) training, including research training; and (g) the coordination of 
activities carried out by several institutions on a given subject” (WHO, 2014, p.134) 
The Director-General makes the designation of a Collaboration Centre after 
consultation with the national government. It is an agreement with the head of the 
establishment to which the institution is attached or with the director of the institution, if it is 
independent. According to the WHO website,  the designation is ‘independent of financial 58
support being given to the institution by WHO. Grants may be made to any institution that is 
 Available at: https://www.who.int/collaboratingcentres/cc_historical/en/index1.html Last access on 58
21/02/2020
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able to perform a specific task connected with WHO's programme but this has no relevance 
to the eligibility or ineligibility of an institution for designation’. 
Moreover, at least two years of collaboration in joint activities with the WHO is 
required. The collaboration is initially granted for four years, renewable for the same or 
shorter periods. As of 2017, the network of CCs consisted of over 800 academic and 
scientific institutions in over 80 countries ‘supporting WHO programmes and priorities with 
time, expertise and funding’.    59
The 2018 guidelines for WHO CCs clarify that institutions which might be qualified 
for designation comprise parts of universities, research institutes, hospitals or academies; 
parts of governments may also be eligible. Usually, the designation is limited to the specific 
department, division, laboratory, or another part that collaborates with the WHO. One must 
consider that ‘eligible institutions can be public or private, but should not be of a commercial 
or profit-making nature’ (WHO, 2018, p.6). In this regard, after FENSA approval, to 
guarantee the credibility, independence and objectivity of the work conducted by a 
Collaboration Centre, the WHO ‘seeks to ensure that the interactions this institution may 
have with the private sector entities (…) conform to the requirements of the Framework of 
Engagement with NonState Actors (FENSA) adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 
2016, in particular with regards to the management of conflicts of interest and other risks’. 
It can be observed that the Member States, while concerned about the undue influence 
of the private sector, have always been silent regarding the engagement with academic 
institutions. However, it is worth noting that academic institutions can be influenced by 
private sector entities, making it impossible to recognise whether a corporation has had any 
undue influence on research. In 2016, for instance, a paper commissioned by the 
International Life Sciences Institute, financed by companies such as The Coca-Cola 
Company, Nestlé, McDonald’s and PepsiCo, minimised the importance of regulating sugar 
intake. The professors who had authored the paper were quickly blamed for conflicts of 
interest.  
Many countries have been experiencing austerity measures which directly impact 
social investments; while the government’s funding for research has declined, academics 
need to pursue alternative funding sources. Given that there are no guidelines for how these 
 Available at: https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/about-us/factsheetwhocc2018.pdf?59
sfvrsn=8c7166ee_2 Last access on 12/12/2019
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relationships should be conducted, all industry-funded research is likely to be distrusted.  
3.5 Undue Influence of non-State actors at WHO   
While it is almost impossible to accurately measure the influence of non-State actors in 
global health agenda, broadly speaking, and precisely at the WHO - the assumption that the 
private sector may have vested interests in influencing the WHO’s work has proven to be 
true. Many companies that are active in global health initiatives come from a narrow range of 
industries, many of which are immensely criticised for their negative impact on public health. 
These private companies are accused of playing a double game - disrupting local 
communities while writing big cheques to allegedly help them. That’s the reason why, when 
it comes to engagement with the private sector, special attention is needed, as profitable 
entities have tried to unduly influence the WHO’s work and policy-making numerous times.  
In 1975, for instance, the 28th World Health Assembly requested the Director-General 
to advise the Member States on ‘the selection and procurement, at a reasonable cost, of 
essential drugs of established quality corresponding to their national health needs’. Therefore, 
in 1977, the WHO adopted the Model List of Essential Medicines (MLEM), which consisted 
of medicines of suitable quality and in adequate quantity, aiming to ensure the ‘access of the 
whole population to essential drugs at a cost the country can afford’,  as recognised by the 60
resolution WHA31.32 (1978). However, in 1982, the Expert Committee on the Selection of 
Essential Drugs modified the description to ‘those that satisfy the health care needs of the 
majority of the population; they should, therefore, be available at all times in adequate 
amounts and in the appropriate dosage forms’ (WHO, 1983, p.9). This description was 
recognised and used until 1999, when the Committee decided to take into account the 
affordability concept from resolution WHA31.32, and defined that, ‘essential drugs are those 
that satisfy the health care needs of the majority of the population; they should, therefore, be 
available at all times in adequate amounts and in the appropriate dosage forms, and at a price 
that individuals and the community can afford’.  
It is worth noting that according to Fione Godlee (1994), the pharmaceutical industry 
was strongly opposed to the MLEM since the beginning, and in 1985, ‘partly in protest at the 
essential drugs programme, the United States withheld its contributions to WHO's regular 
 Essential Medicines and Health Products Information Portal. Available at: https://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/60
en/d/Js4875e/5.2.html . Accessed on 16/12/2019 
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budget. At that time the United States was home to 11 of the world's 18 largest drug 
companies’. Godlee also argued that the WHO was launched out of the discreet shelter of 
technical consensus into the political arena, ‘being aggressively lobbied by industry on the 
one hand and pressure groups on the other’ (Godlee, 1994, p.1491).  
Hence, it is not a coincidence that the potential undue influence of big-Pharma was a 
contentious subject during FENSA negotiations. In this regard, interviewee 18, from a 
philanthropic foundation, confirmed that: 
access to medicines is a really significant part of this overall and one of the most 
significant dimensions that always gets charged and heated among the Member 
States at the World Health Assembly and then in New York when it comes up. And 
that it's one of the issues why the negotiations around FENSA were so contentious, 
because of the concern about undue influence that not certain pharmaceutical 
companies but those multinational pharmaceutical companies or other major private 
sector partners could have in how WHO did, for instance, the list of essential 
medicines or now the list of essential diagnostics. So, that was the most significant 
piece that they wanted to make sure it was protected.  
Pharmaceutical industries, however, are not the only concern when it comes to undue 
influence. The baby food industry, especially infant formulas, is seen as a threat as it has been 
undermining breastfeeding and, therefore, fuelling the obesity epidemic. Lee (2009) claims 
that the debate over the International Code on the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, 
which was adopted at the 34th WHA in 1981, was ‘one of the most dramatic moments in the 
history of international health [as] the food industry lobbied furiously to prevent the adoption 
(….) with Nestlé seating its own attorney on the Guatemala delegation’ (Lee, 2009, p. 88). 
Non-State actors trying to push the WHO through the Member States is not a new movement. 
Regarding the 1981 negotiations, Stanley Fink  wrote to the Secretary-General of the United 61
Nations, Kurt Waldheim, to express ‘outrage at the vote by the United States’ Representative 
to the World Health Organisation in opposition to the proposed code of regulation for the 
marketing of infant formula’. 
Until recently the breast-milk substitute industry was a concern, and this was reflected 
in FENSA negotiations; consequently, IBFAN was one of the most proactive NGOs, arguing 
that FENSA would make the ongoing work on preventing and addressing conflicts of interest 
at the country level even more challenging. To illustrate, IBFAN argued that in Botswana:  
a country that has comprehensively implemented the International Code and relevant 
WHA resolutions. Its MoH recently announced that appropriate action will be taken 
 An American politic from the Democrat Party. In 1968, Fink was appointed as chief counsel to the Assembly's 61
Committee on Mental Hygiene. He was a member of the New York State Assembly from 1969 to 1986, He was 
Majority Leader in 1977 and 1978; and Speaker from 1979 to 1986.
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against Professor Gabriel Anabwani for serving as the Executive Director of Baylor 
Children’s Clinic, while at the same time being the Chairman of the Board of Nestle 
Nutrition Institute (NNI). A clear conflict of interest. The Professor also was a 
member of several MoH committees on public health and infant and young child 
feeding.   62
Similarly, an analysis by Save the Children showed that the six companies (Nestlé, Danone, 
RB, Abbott, Friesland Campina and Kraft Heinz), which together own more than 50% of the 
industry’s market share, failed to adhere to the International Code on the ground. 
One must also consider that in 2019, the UK’s Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health decided to no longer accept financial contributions from the baby formula industry.  63
Moreover, also in 2019, the Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR)  concluded that 64
Nestlé sponsored a five-hospital study on infant milk substitutes and, therefore, violated 
India’s Infant Milk Substitutes Acts. Both serve as recent examples of how the private 
sector can indirectly influence governments and local hospitals, among others.  
The tobacco industry is another example of undue influence at the WHO and how non-
State actors have been playing key roles. According to the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), ‘the participation of civil society is essential in achieving the 
objective of the Convention and its protocols’. According to Roemer et al. (2011), the FCTC 
has its origins back in 1993, in a meeting at the UCLA Faculty Center where professors 
discussed how the WHO could apply its disused constitutional authority ‘to promote the 
development and implementation of international law to advance global public health (…) 
Ruth Roemer suggested the enforcement of her ideas  to develop a specific international 65
regulatory mechanism for tobacco control’. Simultaneously, confidential documents of 
tobacco companies were released, exposing their attempt to deliberately undermine the 
WHO’s efforts to control tobacco use. 
The tobacco companies’ own documents show that they viewed WHO, an 
international public health agency, as one of their foremost enemies. The documents 
show further that the tobacco companies instigated global strategies to discredit and 
impede WHO’s ability to carry out its mission. The tobacco companies’ campaign 
against WHO was rarely directed at the merits of the public health issues raised by 
 FENSA, not a “fence” to protect public health. Available at: https://www.ibfan-icdc.org/fensa-not-a-fence-to-62
protect-public-health/ Accessed on 16/12/2019.
 Why the UK’s largest body of pediatricians will no longer take money from baby-formula companies. 63
Available at: https://qz.com/1550656/why-the-uks-largest-body-of-pediatricians-will-no-longer-take-money-
from-baby-formula-companies/ Accessed on 16/12/2019. 
 Nestlé faces heat for sponsoring breastmilk substitute study in India. Available at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/64
eng/legal-limits_nestl%C3%A9-faces-heat-for-sponsoring-breastmilk-substitute-study-in-india/45201236  
Accessed on 16/12/2019. 
 Ruth Roemer was a Professor emeritus at UCLA School of Public Health and author of Legislative Action to 65
Combat the World Tobacco Epidemic.  
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tobacco use. Instead, the documents show that tobacco companies sought to divert 
attention from the public health issues, to reduce budgets for the scientific and policy 
activities carried out by WHO, to pit other UN agencies against WHO, to convince 
developing countries that WHO’s tobacco control program was a “First World” 
agenda carried out at the expense of the developing world, to distort the results of 
important scientific studies on tobacco, and to discredit WHO as an institution. 
(WHO, 2000) 
The research paper Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference 
on Tobacco or Health exposed how tobacco companies hid their role by using external 
scientists and journalists, and even WHO staff as vehicles of influence. To illustrate, Paul 
Dietrich, a US attorney and the President of the Catholic University’s Institute for 
International Health and Development (IIHD),  was appointed to the development 66
committee of PAHO while at the same working alongside BAT and Philip Morris to develop 
a media programme aimed against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health 
(WCToH). According to Muggli and Hurt (2003, p.196), ‘Dietrich wrote articles and 
editorials attacking WHO’s priorities and travelled around the world for key tobacco 
companies, criticising WHO’s priorities to journalists and governments’. 
As a consequence, the WHO sanctioned not only a strict policy of non-engagement 
with the tobacco industry and linked entities to it, but also adopted a policy on the non-
recruitment of smokers or other tobacco users. Moreover, in 2003, the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control was adopted, and in 2005 came into force. Legally binding 
in 181 countries, the treaty includes provisions for lobbying, demand reduction, regulations, 
packaging and labelling, awareness, research and other areas for tobacco control.  One should 
note, however, that China, Japan, Germany and the USA were called the ‘big four’ - the 
principal opponents of FCTC provisions, as a way to reduce its success and practical impact 
on the tobacco industry as they all had strong national tobacco interests.  
According to Mamudu and Glantz (2009), tobacco companies provided written 
statements and oral testimony during the FCTC public hearings and worked directly and 
indirectly through country delegations and other third parties to influence and weaken the 
FCTC. ‘During the negotiation, even directors of BAT as far away as Nigeria were in Geneva 
lobbying delegates. In addition, members of the industry were national delegates of (at least) 
China, Japan, Malawi, Russia and Turkey’ (p.160).  
Finally, yet importantly, the US Sugar industry and other sectors of the food industry 
 A non-profit body considering public health policy in developing nations.66
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lobbied strongly against the Global Strategy on Diet, Nutrition and Physical Exercise, which 
recommended reductions in fat, salt and sugar. The original recommendation was a 10% limit 
of free sugar per day, but the food industry and some governments accused the report of 
lacking scientific evidence. The Sugar Association even wrote to the DG, threatening to 
‘exercise every avenue available to expose the dubious nature’ of the WHO's report. The final 
strategy was then presented as a non-binding document to promote dialogue. ‘Due to direct 
or indirect pressure, WHO has chosen not to take a stand on anything other than education 
because of the huge amount of money at stake within the food industry’.  67
Many interviewees mentioned representatives of the private sector being part of 
national delegations at WHO Governing Bodies’ meetings. The most cited was the Ferrero 
Rocher part of the Italian delegation. In the same direction, a special report from Reuters 
accused the delegations from Mexico and the USA of bringing Coca-Cola and Kellogg’s into 
the joint meeting between the WHO and the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation in 2011. 
It is clear, therefore, that NSAs can influence the WHO indirectly by working close to 
national governments. 
The goal of this chapter was to elucidate the relationship between the WHO and the 
four non-State actors before FENSA, which was fairly blurred. Apart from philanthropic 
foundations, the NSAs were, to some extent, embraced by some guidelines which, however, 
were not comprehensively applied. Since FENSA doesn’t cover potential indirect influence 
from NSAs through the Member States, it is worth emphasising the need for safeguards to 
preserve the WHO’s reputation and trustworthiness, given the many examples of undue 
influence that already occurred. 
 Derek Yach, executive Director of the Noncommunicable Diseases and Mental Health at WHO. Available at: 67
http://www.albionmonitor.com/0405a/copyright/bushgutsobesity.html
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSING THE FRAMEWORK OF 
ENGAGEMENT WITH NON-STATE ACTORS  
Even though international negotiations have historically been one of the most 
unavoidable processes in global politics, international relations researchers have been 
focusing much more on other topics, mainly security studies. The international relations 
research agenda leans towards the securitisation of several themes, including health.  68
Despite the awareness that powerful industry actors and civil society organisations have been 
incessantly seeking to influence legal rules, principles, practices and institutions, the global 
health research agenda scarcely approaches international negotiations. This fourth chapter 
aims to carry out an interdisciplinary analysis of the lengthy negotiation process of the 
framework of engagement with non-State actors and, thus, to embrace both international 
relations and global health perspectives. 
Although there was no opposition among the Member States regarding the inevitability 
and necessity of more engagement with non-State actors, it took almost five years and several 
rounds of discussions and demanding negotiations to reach a consensus. It could be observed 
that the development of collaboration rules which are supposed to control the participation of 
non-State actors in the global health field, specifically through the WHO, occurred in a 
complex scenario of conflict of interests at different levels, embracing both the public and 
private sector. 
The complexity of the negotiation lies in how the vast range of actors can interconnect 
in different ways as, for example, governmental actors can hold shares in private sector 
entities, support academic institutions or provide NGOs with funds for service delivery. This 
contributed to a range of competing interests during the negotiations. 
While chapter two enlightened the proposals on global health governance that took 
place in the World Health Organisation in a historical perspective until 2012, when FENSA 
was proposed, this chapter aims to give voice and meaning to the FENSA negotiation 
process. The methodology used was primarily an exhaustive document analysis 
complemented by excerpts of interviews made and some pertinent existing literature.  
 The theoretical perspective formulated by the Copenhagen School maintains that security threats originate not 68
only from the military sphere, but also from the political, economic, environmental and societal spheres. 
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4.1. FENSA Official Documents: How the Negotiation Process worked.   
As previously discussed in the second chapter, FENSA’s starting point is the burial of 
the idea of a Global Health Forum, requested by the WHA Resolution 64.2. A Special Session 
of the Executive Board in November 2011, therefore, requested the Director-General Dr. 
Margaret Chan, to further analyse proposals to promote engagement with other stakeholders. 
This engagement should be guided by the intergovernmental nature of the WHO’s decision-
making and the use of evidence to develop norms, standards, policies and strategies. 
Later, in January 2012, the 130th Executive Board agreed that additional discussions 
regarding the WHO’s engagement with other stakeholders were necessary, including different 
categories of non-governmental organisations and industry. At the 130th EB, the Secretariat 
proposed that the Principles governing WHO relations with nongovernmental organisations 
from 1987 should be reviewed and updated and should be taken into consideration: 
‘widening and improving the modalities for the participation of non-governmental 
organisations at regional and global governing body meetings; (…) updating practices and 
criteria for accreditation’ (EB, 2012, p.3). Moreover, the report Governance: Promoting 
engagement with other stakeholders and involvement with and oversight of partnerships 
made by the Secretariat also proposed the development of ‘a comprehensive policy 
framework to guide interaction with the private-for-profit sector, as well as not-for-profit 
philanthropic foundations’ (EB, 2012, p.3). 
The sixty-fifth World Health Assembly took place in Geneva between the 21st and 26th 
of May of 2012 and discussed, within the Committee A, the WHO reform. However, the 
requested policy regarding the WHO’s engagement with other stakeholders was not 
submitted, even though the 9th paragraph of the Decisions and list of resolutions (A65/DIV/3, 
2012) requested of the Director-General:  
(a) to present a draft policy paper on WHO’s engagement with nongovernmental 
organisations to the Executive Board at its 132nd session in January 2013; (b) to 
present a draft policy paper on the relationships with private commercial entities to 
the Executive Board at its 133rd session in May 2013. 
In October 2012, the WHO organised the first consultation with NGOs, led by 
Margaret Chan, and the main goal was to understand their perceptions of the WHO’s 
engagement with non-governmental organisations. Sixty-three participants representing 44 
non-governmental organisations attended the meeting on 18 October 2012 in Geneva, those 
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unable to attend could listen to the consultation via Webex.  In her welcome speech, Chan 69
pointed out that: 
As part of efforts to strengthen governance, we were asked to prepare a draft paper 
on WHO’s engagement with NGOs, for discussion during the January Executive 
Board. We are holding this consultation to gather your guidance and advice. We will 
be focusing, in particular, on a framework for ongoing consultation, collaboration, 
and accreditation. The deliberations of this consultation will be summarised and 
made available to Member States. (…) This is not an easy or an entirely 
straightforward assignment. (…) Some issues are still a little fuzzy. Some issues still 
make Member States a little nervous. I think we can all agree with the view of 
WHO’s governing bodies, who have expressed a need to review and update the 
principles governing WHO’s relations with NGOs. (…) I fully understand your 
concern about insufficient safeguards against conflicts of interest, a concern strongly 
voiced by our Member States. At the same time, the NGO community is not a 
uniform group of altruistic organisations. (…) Nothing is clearly black and white. 
(…) There are two final points (…) (that) are especially important, as they reflect the 
strong views of the Member States of this Organization. The first (…) while 
collaboration with multiple stakeholders, including NGOs, is essential, decision 
making remains the prerogative of governments. The intergovernmental nature of 
WHO’s decision-making remains paramount. Second, WHO has been overextended 
and overstretched, which is one justification for reform. An overarching purpose of 
reform is to streamline WHO, to make it leaner, more flexible, and more responsive 
to rapidly changing health needs. Time and time again, our Member States have 
rejected proposals for reform that involve establishing new mechanisms or adding 
additional layers of complexity. In other words, my ability to respond to some of 
your requests may be limited by the explicit wishes of Member States. After all, they 
are the shareholders and owners of this Organization. (CHAN, 2012) 
According to the report on the consultation, there was a consensus regarding the pillars 
of the new policy: consultation, collaboration, and accreditation to WHO governing bodies. 
The NGOs also identified the need to set out mechanisms to address the definition of NGO 
and civil society, conflict of interest, transparency and accountability. Regarding the 
concerns, the report pointed out that the NGOs asked for coherence between a new NGO 
policy and those for partnerships, private sector, and philanthropic entities and for ensuring 
that such new policies would be fully and adequately implemented. The definition of NGOs 
and civil society was a point of disagreement as some NGOs required a clear distinction 
between entities with commercial interests and links and those without. Given that no 
particular differentiation was made, at that time, amongst the non-State not-for-profit 
organisations with which the WHO engages:   
Differing views have been expressed on whether – and, if so, how – WHO should 
 Webex online meetings and presentations, webinars, town halls, online courses and training and online 69
presentations
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define the boundaries between the various constituencies of nongovernmental 
organisations and collaborate with the emerging subgroups. Some nongovernmental 
organisations are of the view that differentiation is unnecessary if full and public 
disclosure of information and interests is achieved. Any potential conflicts of interest 
would then be identified and tackled on a case-by-case basis in accordance with clear 
parameters and procedures (to be defined, as referred to in paragraph 16 
above).Other nongovernmental organisations feel it is critical to differentiate 
between the constituencies of such organisations, particularly with regard to those 
with commercial interests or links. Even among these nongovernmental 
organisations, however, different views have been expressed on how then to treat the 
differentiated subgroups. Some would support housing commercially-linked 
nongovernmental organisations under WHO’s policy on relationships with private 
commercial entities (currently in development). Others consider that commercial 
interests should be viewed in the context of WHO’s specific functions. (WHO, 2013. 
p.5-6) 
Conflict of interest was a significant discussion point for the NGOs that attended the 
consultation, especially considering the process of setting norms and standards. A Declaration 
of Interest (DoI) was suggested and an electronic platform like the Transparency Register 
used by the European Union proposed; it would provide information freely on all non-
governmental organisations collaborating with the WHO, including the nature of 
collaboration, governance structure, sources of funding, and declarations of interest. 
Additionally, while some claimed that the same level of transparency and accountability 
should apply equally to all NGOs, others argued that real concern should be directed to 
NGOs with commercial interests. Yet, the scope of conflicts that could affect the WHO’s 
integrity should be better defined, according to the NGOs’ consultation report.  
There was a consensus that the WHO should be more proactive in seeking interaction 
with NGOs, and that any general framework for collaboration should aim to guide the 
collaboration, while allowing some flexibility to take into consideration the countries’ 
particularities, including the dynamics between civil society and government. A space was 
proposed, for NGOs to serve as a watchdog on how the WHO implements its policies. The 
problem of conflict of interests was once again discussed, as several NGOs pointed out that a 
separate policy should be developed to guide WHO interactions with not-for-profit 
philanthropic organisations, with appropriate safeguards against conflicts of interests. Finally, 
some NGOs highlighted that the differentiation between NGOs with commercial interests 
and links and those without should apply not only to collaboration but also to consultation 
and accreditation.  
Regarding consultation, some NGOs advocated that entities should be involved in the 
planning and conceptualisation of discussions from the beginning. Also, to ease national level 
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consultations and NGO participation, an attempt to boost public voice was considered 
important. On the other hand, certain NGOs asked for an international level of multi-
stakeholder consultations, and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework  was 70
used as a reference. However, a consensus wasn’t reached, as some NGOs argued that the 
WHO should not focus on one model. Conflict of interest, again, was a major concern. It was 
suggested that all names and affiliations should be made publicly available to ensure 
transparency regarding interests involved, particularly commercial interests. The funding of 
NGOs was considered a problematic issue as some NGOs representing patient groups get 
most of their funding from industry and others from governments. Finally, the rise of 
philanthropic actors and their impact and influence on NGOs and international multilateral 
organisations such as the WHO was also highlighted.  
Accreditation to the WHO governing bodies was a topic of primary importance as it 
allows NGOs to engage with Member States. In this sense, it was proposed that accreditation 
to participate in WHO governing bodies should be de-linked from a period of working 
relations and be understood as an autonomous relationship based on the contribution that the 
non-governmental organisation could give to the WHO’s governing bodies. It was suggested 
that the accreditation of non-governmental organisations should be limited to individual 
meetings of governing bodies or to a specific governing body or working group. The existing 
situation was that entities in official relations were able to participate without limit for the 
duration of the validity of that status. It would enhance transparency and improve the 
management of governing bodies’ meetings by ensuring that the participation of relevant 
non-governmental organisations would enrich discussions. 
Several suggestions were made to improve synergy, and some practices at the WHO 
governing body meetings, such as the requirement to submit statements 24 hours in advance, 
the practice of reviewing statements which on occasion may lead to a request being declined 
and permitting NGOs to speak only after Member States, were considered, by some NGOs, 
as an obstacle to effective exchanges between NGOs and Member States.  
After the consultation in October 2012, a report by the Director-General was published 
in January 2013 and debated during the 132nd Executive Board. Key issues for the 
 Developed by the Member States and adopted in 2011 by the 64th World Health Assembly, the Pandemic 70
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework brings together Member States, industry, other stakeholders and WHO 
to implement a global approach to pandemic influenza preparedness and response. Available at: https://
www.who.int/influenza/pip/en/ Last access on 06/12/2019
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development of a policy on engagement with nongovernmental organisations (WHO, EB 
132/5 Add2, 2013) revealed that several crucial issues needed the guidance of Member States 
before a draft policy could be finalised. The following elements were supposed to be 
analysed and discussed:  
1. how best to seek the views of nongovernmental organisations in the development 
of health policies and strategies (consultation); 2. how to improve the methods of 
working with non-governmental organisations on WHO activities and priorities 
across the three levels of WHO (collaboration); 3. how to improve the transparency 
and accountability of collaboration between WHO and non-governmental 
organisations; 4. how best to address engagement with different constituencies of 
nongovernmental organisations; 5. the desirability and feasibility of updating the 
practices and criteria, and of defining parameters for the participation of non-
governmental organisations in the meetings of WHO’s governing bodies 
(accreditation); 6. how best to proceed with the process of consultation for the 
development of WHO’s policy of engagement with nongovernmental organisations, 
including the best means of harmonising this policy with the development of WHO’s 
policy on relationships with private commercial entities. (WHO, 2013, p.1-2) 
Moreover, according to the report, the WHO had no practical and organised tools to 
contemplate the ideas of non-governmental organisations on the development of health 
policies and strategies. Three mechanisms were then considered as important to strengthen 
the engagement and the consultative dimension: web-based or electronic platforms; public 
hearings; and a forum or formalised mechanism (i.e. a civil society mechanism). No-
governmental organisations also identified several specific areas where collaboration with the 
WHO could potentially be strengthened, including ‘action for large epidemics and civil strife, 
and other humanitarian action; transmission of advocacy efforts and information to country 
level; and dissemination of expertise and promotion of knowledge and best practices through 
expanded networks’ (WHO, 2013, p.4).  Lastly, the report requested that the Board deliver 
observations on:  
potential mechanisms for consultation with non-governmental organisations; 
methods to strengthen and widen collaboration between WHO and non-governmental 
organisations related to WHO’s core functions, strategic priorities, and across the 
three levels of the Organization; mechanisms to improve transparency and 
accountability; approaches both to differentiation of nongovernmental organisations 
and to WHO’s interaction with the different constituencies of such organisations; 
revisions to accreditation procedures for nongovernmental organisations. (WHO, 
2013, P.7) 
The decisions and list of resolutions of the EB 132nd session invited the Director-
General to submit overarching principles but separate operational procedures for non-
governmental organisations and private commercial entities. The EB also pointed out the 
need to keep reviewing the accreditation procedures for the WHO’s governing bodies and to 
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include them in a draft to be presented in the 133rd EB, in May 2013. Finally, one public web-
based consultation and two distinct consultations were demanded - one with Member States 
and NGOs  and one with Member States and the private commercial sector.  
In May 2013, a report by the Secretariat on the WHO governance reform was released 
to be analysed during the EB 133rd session and illustrated ‘opinions expressed through 
governing body discussions and in consultations with the stakeholders’. The first consultation 
happened between the 6th and 24th March and was public web-based. It requested opinions 
on:  
the scope and range of non-State actors, how and whether they should be 
categorised; what benefits accrue to non-State actors from their relationship with 
WHO; what challenges are likely to arise in different contexts, including those 
related to non-State financing of WHO; what would constitute a set of overreaching 
principles to guide engagement, and what modalities are needed beyond such general 
principles to guide interaction in different circumstances.  
Since the beginning of the negotiations, some issues have caused recurrent 
disagreements, e.g. conflict of interest, potential reputation damage due to engagement with 
particular actors and resources from non-State actors. Regarding the typology of non-State 
actors, the report pointed out that after the consultation a group strongly argued that the 
WHO should differentiate organisations purely devoted to public-interest issues from those 
linked with commercial concerns, while another group claimed that no differentiation was 
necessary.  
To distinguish the different types of engagement was also a controversial topic, as 
some declared that ‘any relationship with a commercial entity, even with adequate safeguards 
to prevent conflict of interest, can be seen as a benefit to the company concerned and a 
reputation risk to WHO’ whereas others alleged that the key to avoiding commercial 
influence was full transparency of all interests, commercial or not. In this sense, some 
defended that groups whose activities have the potential to harm the public health, both in 
civil society and the private sector, should be excluded from any relationship with the WHO. 
Funding from non-State actors only reached a consensus regarding prohibition of the 
WHO being sponsored for activities that influence the commercial interests of the donor. 
However, many were worried that any funding from non-State sources would distort or 
weaken the intergovernmental process of priority setting. 
Regarding the overarching principles, four were proposed by the Secretariat, to apply 
to all interactions: the decision-making process should be exclusive responsibility of the 
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Member States; the development of norms, standards, policies and strategies should be based 
on evidence and protected from undue influence; the nature of the WHO’s relations with non-
State actors should be public; the management of conflicts of interest should apply to all 
aspects of WHO’s work. 
The Secretariat also identified six basic types of interaction: consultation, 
collaboration, financing, contractual, non-State actors in the WHO’s governance and the 
WHO as part of the governance of non-State actors. In the report of May 2013, it was 
advocated that the rules of engagement should embrace the principles of 1987 between the 
WHO and NGOs, alongside the guidelines on interaction with commercial enterprises, as 
well as the WHO’s processes concerning collaborating centres and policy relating to 
partnerships. After an agreement on the overall principles, the next step according to the 
Secretariat report (WHO, 2013, p.6) should be ‘to review where there are already structures 
and systems in place that can form the basis of a more rigorous and comprehensive 
operational framework. These pieces will then be strengthened, refined or adjusted as 
necessary’. 
Finally, regarding transparency and conflicts of interest, the Secretariat specified an 
‘architecture’ for managing conflict of interest that would include a way of improving the 
transparency of interaction, a definition of what constitutes an institutional conflict of 
interest, tools for declaration of interest, and capacity and mechanisms to assess conflicts of 
interests. The definition proposed was ‘a conflict of interest can be defined as a set of 
circumstances that creates a risk that judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be 
unduly influenced by a secondary interest’ (WHO, 2013, p.7). One must consider that the 
definition of conflict of interest changed during FENSA negotiations and this is different 
from the one specified in the final version of the Framework. 
Considering the deliberations of the 133rd Executive Board, the Director-General was 
requested to move forward with the development of a framework on the WHO’s engagement 
with non-State actors. The main focus should be on transparency, risk and conflict of interest. 
It was expected to be analysed by the Board at the 134th session in January 2014. 
Between the 17th and 18th of October 2013, the first informal consultation with the 
Member States and non-State actors occurred at the WHO headquarters in Geneva, and was 
chaired by the Director-General, Margaret Chan. More than 320 representatives from 
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Member States and non-State actors participated in the consultation in person or via webcast. 
The goal wasn’t to reach a consensus but to debate presented proposals for due diligence, 
management of risks (including conflicts of interest) and transparency to be submitted to the 
134th Executive Board.  
The consultation was divided into five parts: the welcome and meeting objectives; an 
introduction, where the Secretariat described the key issues related to engagement with non-
State actors and presented an overview of the current relationship and the proposal for 
reform; proposed changes in due diligence, management of risk of engagement and 
transparency; enhancing engagement with non-State actors; and a conclusion and a look at 
the way forward.  
Professor Thomas Zeltner, a public health expert who acted as Special Envoy, 
highlighted that above all the most outstanding problems were the lack of trust and clarity of 
the existing mechanisms of the WHO’s engagement, inconsistency in the application of the 
rules, and the unsettled definition of roles, among others. Julio Mercado, the diplomat who 
chaired the FENSA negotiations from 2015 until its approval in 2016, also affirmed that 
‘most of the process was trying to understand the organisation, trying to know what the 
organisation was doing, to see how we have to change that’. 
According to the report, the participants requested that the Secretariat propose a 
definition of non-State actors and launch a mapping of non-State actors who were engaging 
with the WHO at the time. It should also include a description of the types of engagements. 
The discussion paper used in the informal consultation in October 2013 pointed out that the 
already-agreed overreaching principles should apply to all non-State actors and the 
boundaries for the relationships. Moreover, it proposed to strengthen due diligence, 
strengthen the management of risk, including conflicts of interest, and increase transparency. 
Regarding due diligence, it was proposed that the procedures should not only be 
expanded and reinforced but also applied to all sorts of engagement at all levels of the 
Organisation. According to the document, ‘the revised procedure could also involve a public 
scrutiny phase where the public would be invited to draw attention to potential risks of 
engagement with a particular non-State actor that is being examined’. Similarly, it was 
proposed that a comprehensive risk management approach should apply to all the WHO’s 
engagements at all levels and should be based on a clear definition of the risks. Concerning 
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transparency, an online transparency register was proposed, to provide basic information on 
the non-State actor with which the WHO engages and detail the nature of their interaction.  
It was pointed out in the report that although private entities were not allowed to attend 
the sessions of the governing bodies, NGOs representing them could attend if they were in 
official relations. Two suggestions, therefore, were made by the NSAs and Member States. 
The first was to create an extra system specifically for the attendance of WHO governing 
body sessions. The second was to restructure and to update the official relations in order to 
allow the entrance of NGOs that cannot prove ‘collaborative programmes with WHO’ but 
which could offer contributions to governing bodies.  
According to interviewee 14, from an NGO with official relations status and an 
attendee of this consultation, the meeting featured aggressive debate between some NGOs 
and the pharmaceutical industries. Afterwards, non-State actors were no longer invited to the 
negotiations. 
With regards to the first informal consultation on the WHO’s engagement with non-
State actors, I only had access to the summary report, the comments on the discussion paper 
for the informal consultation and the comments written by two Member States, Chile and 
France, and seven NSAs. But, as previously mentioned, around 320 representatives of NSAs 
and Member States participated. 
Three points are significant to this thesis. Firstly, the participants seemed to be 
concerned about the suggested examination of non-State actors before they engage with 
WHO and recommended that the level of due diligence should be tailored to the type of 
engagement. Secondly, they emphasised the need for different procedures for different types 
of non-State actors. Thirdly, there were multiple opinions about ‘the various types of non-
State actors; a typology of interactions with non-State actors; need and feasibility of 
differentiation, especially amongst the NGOs’ (WHO, 2013). 
Apart from proposing a definition of a non-State actor and developing a register of 
WHO engagements with NSAs, the Secretariat stepped forward by publishing participants’ 
comments on the WHO website. At this juncture, it is crucial to emphasise that during the 
elaboration of this doctoral thesis, the WHO website was being restructured, which caused 
the loss of access to several previously-available documents. Additionally, several documents 
were removed from the WHO website without further explanation. 
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Regarding the comments written by the Member States, Mr Guy Fones, part of the 
permanent mission of Chile to UNOG, wrote that the WHO should prioritise the four pillars 
that were defining and guiding the management of the engagements. Three of them were 
proposed by the Secretariat: due diligence; management of risk, including conflict of interest, 
and transparency. The fourth pillar was proposed by Finland and strongly supported by Chile 
– it referred to the assessment of public health added value.  
France reinforced the argument that the WHO should remain an intergovernmental 
organisation while aligning its commitment with the United Nations principles and guidelines 
for cooperation with the private sector. The country also advocated for applying the existing 
mechanisms and for Member States to conduct the WHO Reform process. Transparency was 
mentioned as the key element for collaboration with non-State actors as well as the concept 
of due diligence, seen as necessary to be implemented ‘systematically’. Risk management, 
‘depending on their nature’, was also cited as a crucial element in maintaining the integrity of 
the WHO whenever it could be translated into practical and efficient measures.  
France also welcomed the idea of a transparency register that would be accessible on 
the Internet. It would provide details of all the non-State actors which were collaborating 
with the WHO, as well as the source and the destination of their fundings ‘when appropriate’. 
Regarding the controversial topic of the differentiation of non-State actors, France advocated 
an ‘inclusive definition which would encourage WHO's collaboration with a broad spectrum 
of non-state actors, in the exclusion of industries whose interest is fundamentally 
irreconcilable with public health purposes (tobacco, arms)’ . 71
Furthermore, in response to the informal consultation, the European Alcohol Policy 
Alliance (EUROCARE) pointed out that the WHO should differentiate entities from 
economic operators as they ‘should be treated similarly to the tobacco industry, and excluded 
from engagement with the WHO”. EUROCARE also criticised the approach of categorising 
all external actors under ‘the generic umbrella of “non-state actors”’. According to the 
organisation, ‘while overreaching principles should govern all interaction with external 
actors, separate policies are needed to ensure clarity and transparency regarding the 
 Translated from the orginal: “La France recommande une définition inclusive, de nature à favoriser la 71
collaboration de l'OMS avec un large spectre d'acteurs no étatiques, à l'expection des industries dont l'intérêt est 
fondomentalement irréconciliable avec l'objectif de santé publique (tabac, arms)”. Available at https://
www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/fensa/informal-consultations-who-nonstateactors-comments-
france-oct2013.pdf?sfvrsn=e44e2e2d_2 Accessed on 09.12.2019
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fundamental difference between NGOs and entities that represent or are linked to commercial 
entities’. Finally, EUROCARE requested that the WHO exclude the alcohol industry from 
FENSA. 
In contrast, the International Food & Beverage Alliance (IFBA) advocated a 
homogeneous policy for all kinds of non-State actors and at all levels of the Organisation. 
Arguing that ‘everyone has vested interests’, the IFBA endorsed that a strengthened due 
diligence system should be applied to NGOs and that ‘perceptions’ should not surpass facts 
and positive results. In this sense, IFBA criticised the NGOs’ preferred access to governing 
bodies and also warned that a ‘hierarchy’ of non-State actors with different roles and access 
to the WHO would jeopardise the work of the Organisation. Lastly, it was pointed out that 
when considering  
(…) opportunities for enhanced engagement in such areas as research and evidence 
generation, technical consultation, financing and advocacy and awareness raising, we 
urge you to ensure that WHO´s engagement policies are balanced, inclusive and 
conductive to effective cooperation and interaction with both private sector and 
NGOs. The policies should not imply or assume that conflict of interest concerns 
apply only and uniformly to the private sector; nor should they appear to give the 
private sector a lesser or subordinate role to NGOs. They should recognise the 
importance and legitimacy of the private sector's role and contributions, as 
recognised in the Political Declaration, and encourage them regardless of whether 
those involved are formally accredited to WHO or not.  
In this direction, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations (IFPMA) argue that every actor, even those without a commercial interest, has 
potential conflicts of interest, and also advocated that all non-State actors should have equal 
access. The IFPMA also claimed that a robust transparency policy should be applied similarly 
to all stakeholders: ‘conflict of interest issues must be addressed in an open and transparent 
manner but should be not used as a reason to exclude any stakeholder who can positively 
contribute to improving health’. Finally, the IFBMA supported the maintenance of the 3-year 
collaboration plan and the adoption of a Transparency Register as used by the EU. 
The NCD Alliance (NCDA) advocated for a more flexible accreditation system to 
admit the access of NGOs and other entities without official relations status to WHO 
governing bodies. Furthermore, in its written comments, the Alliance endorsed that the due 
diligence policy should be addressed according to the type of engagement and the kind of 
entity. 
The main demand of the UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies (UKCTAS) is to 
be found in paragraph 4 and states that ‘WHO does not engage with industries that make 
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products that directly harm human health” and that should include the alcohol industry. 
Concerning the role of NSAs in funding WHO, the UKCTAS warned about the risks – e.g. 
dependency and distorting priorities – that could arise from WHO accepting funding from 
“individual entities [that] could represent a conflict of interest”. UKCTAS also supported the 
WHO practice of excluding individuals working for the private sector from serving in 
guidelines development. 
Finally, the comments written jointly by the Corporate Accountability International, 
the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN), the Medicus Mundis International 
Network (MMI) and Forum for Public Health emphasised not only the dangerous link 
between public health and commercial interests but also the WHO’s engagement with 
philanthropic organisations. They underlined that when in the role of donors, these 
foundations ‘have great power to influence WHO’s directions and decisions through their 
financial leverage’. Moreover, their major concern was that FENSA, instead of improving 
WHO relations with non-State actors, would oppositely weaken WHO’s position as the prime 
actor in public health. In this sense, the main suggestion was ‘different engagement for 
different types of actors’. 
After the consultation in October 2013, a first FENSA draft was presented by the 
Secretariat in January 2014, during the 134th session of the Executive Board.  This moment 
allowed for more general considerations, such as ‘Objectives, principles and boundaries’, 
‘working definitions’, ‘strengthening the management of engagement’, and the next steps 
which would include further consultations among the Member States to develop distinct 
policies, and operational procedures for the different non-State actors. Afterwards, it would 
be submitted to the Executive Board at its 135th session, in 2015. 
As requested by the participants of the first consultation in October 2013, the paper 
Mapping of WHO’s engagement with non-State actors  was presented at the Executive 72
Board to offer an overview of WHO engagement with non-State actors. At that time, WHO 
was engaging with 729 non-State actors, including 298 nongovernmental organisations, 44 
private sector entities, 24 philanthropic foundations and 363 academic institutions. It was 
pointed out, however, that ‘although some areas of engagement can be illustrated with initial 
data, others are not documented in easily accessible databases, particularly those that are 
 Available at: https://www.who.int/about/who_reform/governance/mapping-of-WHO-engagement-with-non-72
State-actors.pdf?ua=1 Last access on 06/12/2019 
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specific to one country, and too many informal collaborations at all levels of the 
Organization. The distinction between non-State and State actors can be difficult’. Regarding 
participation in Governing Bodies: 
Participation in Governing Bodies meetings is open to the 187 NGOs in official 
relations. In 2013, 55 NGOs with 275 delegates participated in the January Executive 
Board, 86 NGOs with 809 delegates in the World Health Assembly and 26 NGOs 
with 116 delegates in the May Executive Board. For previous years participation of 
NGOs in official relations at the World Health Assembly ranged from 33% to 
41%and at the January Executive Board from 24% to 30%. Private sector entities do 
not participate in Governing Bodies other than their staff being members of 
delegations of business associations when these are NGOs in official relations. 
Philanthropic foundations and academic institutions do not regularly participate in 
Governing Bodies. Some of those entities have been invited to meetings on an ad hoc 
basis depending on the issues on the agenda. Participation in informal consultations 
is handled on a case-by-case basis. There is currently no central database 
documenting this participation. 
The paper also detailed financial contributions from NSAs, which in 2012 corresponded to 
25.5% of the total income; 4.8% was from NGOs, 1.5% from the private sector, 18.9% from 
philanthropic foundations and 0.2% from academic institutions. In-kind contributions were 
considered ‘difficult to distinguish those resources provided by non-State actors to WHO from 
those resources used directly by the non-State actor in the context of its collaboration with 
WHO’. Moreover, the WHO seemed to have no documentation regarding human resources 
provided by NSAs, as it used to occur through ‘stand-by agreements for emergencies and other 
established human resources mechanisms’. Finally, concerning advocacy, it was not ‘thus far 
systematically documented (…) [and] no data are available on advocacy with the private sector, 
philanthropic foundations and academic institutions’.   
The first version of FENSA also proposed, for immediate application, changes to the 
practices of implementing the policy regarding non-governmental organizations. For instance, 
non-governmental organisations wouldn’t have to submit their statements for authorisation in 
advance anymore and the WHO should provide webpages for the posting of statements from 
NGOs in official relations for sessions of the World Health Assembly, the Executive Board and 
regional committees. Regarding transparency, the measures that should be promptly adopted 
were a designation of a head of each NGO’s delegation and the indication of 
the organisational affiliation of all its delegates. Also, the access to the documentation submitted 
to the Board’s Standing Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations, which was restricted, 
should be posted on the WHO website.  
As requested by the 134 EB, on the 27th and 28th of March, the second informal 
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consultation on the draft framework, policies and operational procedures was held. Unlike 
the previous consultation, only the Member States took part. It was chaired by Professor 
Thomas Zeltner. The debate should guide the Secretariat to draft a FENSA proposal, to be 
submitted to the 67th WHA in May. Differently from the first consultation, it seems that 
written comments were not submitted; at the WHO website only the background document 
and the summary report are available. It is not possible, therefore, to track the Member 
States’ positions in this specific moment, nor which countries were involved since the 
beginning of the negotiations. The summary report, however, indicated that ‘nearly 200 
Member States’ representatives participated in person or virtually’. 
One must consider that at this point, only the engagement with NGOs and the private 
sector was being discussed. The background document was, hence, divided into an 
overarching framework for engagement with non-State actors: WHO policy and operational 
procedures on engagement with non-governmental organisations; WHO policy and 
operational procedures on engagement with the private sector; WHO policy and operational 
procedures on the management of engagement with non-State actors. However, according to 
the summary report, there was a consensus among participants on two additional policies to 
address philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. To this effect, Member States 
requested that the Secretariat develop these policies and their operational procedures to result 
in one composite draft document.  
In this regard, it is worth noting that interviewee 19, the first individual responsible for 
developing the new procedures of engagement with non-State actors at the WHO, affirmed 
that the initial idea was to have two landmarks, one for NGOs and one for the private sector 
and philanthropic sector:  
It's two logics, it's two different things, we can't mix, I said. And there were many 
NGOs in official relationship with WHO funded by the private sector. I said we 
could not keep that, that we had to have NGOs that are really people-oriented and not 
business-oriented. My position was very clear on that. And I think that at that time, 
neither the authorities, the Secretariat and many countries were in line with my 
position (…) And then the discussion started (…) [For me] we shouldn't mix the two 
relationship milestones. But then it changed the position of the Secretariat, I think by 
a lot of pressure from some Member States, who began to say that they preferred to 
have only one framework of relationship for all non-State actors. (…) Of Course, the 
Member States that have pushed the most in this direction are the member States that 
have more conservative and thematic positions on these governance issues: the 
United States, the UK, some countries – not all – of the European Union.  We have 
many Member States that had a clear position that they could not restrict the space of 
insertion of the private sector (…) So, I think the first situation that was negative was 
when the Secretariat said we would not continue with both, that we would make a 
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unified proposal, responding to pressure from Member States.   
At the beginning of May of 2014, a new draft of the framework was presented and 
debated during the 67th World Health Assembly. According to a report from the Intellectual 
Property Watch (non-profit independent news service which closely followed FENSA 
negotiations) ‘some countries proposed to adopt the draft resolution on the framework, such 
as Finland, Canada, the United States and Australia, while others such as Pakistan and the 
UNASUR group considered that more discussion was needed’. Although South Africa was 
advocating that different actors play different roles, the country did not want to reopen the 
debate. Even though almost all the interviewees in this thesis stressed that Member States 
wanted to maintain the intergovernmental nature of the WHO during FENSA negotiations, 
according to the report, Thailand was supporting the presence of non-State actors at the 
negotiation table as it would be better than ‘having them working behind the scenes’. The 
organised civil society which usually promotes side meetings to the Executive Board and the 
Health Assembly was concerned with the private sector as it could carry out activities 
incompatible with the WHO’s purposes.  
While FENSA was one of the most divisive topics of the 67WHA and it was being 
‘passionately discussed’, as stated by a former public-interest NGO staff member, Melinda 
Gates made a speech at the opening of the Health Assembly highlighting that ‘progress 
requires working with other government officials, not to mention the private sector, civil 
society, religious organisations, and community leaders’.  Moreover, as some Member 73
States were pushing to adopt the framework during the Assembly, a working group was 
established. However, in the end, the framework was not adopted as controversial views over 
many key issues persisted.   
Some interviewees explained that there was insufficient time to analyse and debate the 
document. Although it was dated 5th May, it was available on the web on the 9th of May, ten 
days before the World Health Assembly. In this sense, the WHA67 decision stressed the need 
for ‘further consultations and discussions on issues including conflict of interest and relations 
with the private sector’. The Decision and List of Resolutions (WHO A67/DIV/3) stated that 
despite the progress made on the draft, further consultations and discussions were needed on 
some issues, specifically in relation to conflict of interest and relations with the private 
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sector. Therefore, it was decided that the Member States should submit their detailed follow-
up comments and questions to the Director-General in the next month (17 June 2014) and 
that the regional committees should discuss FENSA and submit a report on their 
considerations to the 68th World Health Assembly. Additionally, the Director-General was 
requested to prepare a ‘comprehensive report’ with the comments made by the Member 
States during the Health Assembly as well as the follow-up notes. The DG should also submit 
a paper to be discussed at the Executive Board in January 2015.  
Comments written by Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States, Bolivia, Brazil, 
India, Mexico were available at the WHO website, however, it was not possible to see which 
other countries submitted their follow-up. Contrary to 2013, non-State actors didn’t submit 
anything. It is worth noting that the WHO website was restructured and the individual 
comments submitted by the Member States in June 2014 after the WHA67 cannot be found 
on the WHO website anymore. 
Canada commented on differentiation, conflict of interest, funding, secondments and 
evaluation. As well as the European Committee, the Canada Delegation position was to adopt 
FENSA, as it was presented in the WHA67, and propose an evaluation in two years to 
identify gaps. Moreover, the country supported ‘a framework that applies to all NSAs, 
coupled with specific and uncomplicated policies and procedures for each group of NSAs 
(….) which will enable inclusive and effective treatment’. 
France submitted its written comments on the 16th June of 2014 and it supported ‘the 
adoption at the earliest opportunity of the framework of engagement with non-State actors’. 
The country described FENSA as ‘crucial and essential’ to WHO reform and believed it 
could be improved from the outcomes of practical application. 
Regarding the WHO’s operational capacity, France stated that FENSA would ‘allow 
WHO to leverage its operational capacity by mobilising non-State actors to give practical 
effect to the strategies decreed by the governing bodies; the Organisation (….) might require 
the resources – whether in terms of expertise, financing or mobilisation – of non-State actors 
in order to take effective action’. This argument matches the interview made with a Norway 
representative (France did not answer my request for an interview for this thesis), for whom 
the main focus of developed countries (specifically the European group) was ‘the practical 
aspects of a building system that we felt would effectively work and that would deliver 
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security without interfering with the efficiency and workability of the organisation’. 
The non-distinction between the different types of non-State actors was one of the 
controversial topics of FENSA. In this regard, France supported a single framework with 
common rules and principles ‘based around a classification of the different sorts of 
interactions rather than the different categories of actors’ and detailed procedures according 
to the different categories of NSAs. However, to France, mechanisms to prevent conflicts of 
interest were more important than the categorisation of actors. Finally, France supported ‘an 
inclusive definition (…) with the exception of those industries whose interests are 
fundamentally irreconcilable with the ends of public health (for example tobacco and arms)’. 
Likewise, France, Canada and the United Kingdom wanted FENSA approved as soon 
as possible and supported the same framework for all NSAs. In its comments, the UK 
advocated a broad framework which should not be excessively strict as it would hinder rather 
than support the WHO’s ability to deliver its mandate. This argument is not only in 
accordance with France and Canada’s written comments but also to the interview made with 
the UK representative who alleged that Ebola crisis which took place during FENSA 
negotiations ‘showed us that we needed an enabling framework and not a prohibitive one’. 
Regarding transparency, the United Kingdom requested a clarification of the NSAs’ 
engagement with the WHO, to include funding and purpose. The country also suggested 
improvements in potentially ambiguous phrases such as ‘significant risk’ and ‘important and 
intentional cases’.  
Secondments were also a contentious topic of FENSA. While France and Canada did 
not mention them, the UK stated that ‘in the draft WHO policy and operational procedures on 
engagement with philanthropic foundations, the secondment policy is missing (…) we would 
encourage WHO to include secondment arrangements in the policy’. In this sense, it is 
essential to note that the FENSA-approved and final version excluded secondments from the 
private sector. The interviewee from the United Kingdom reaffirmed the country’s support to 
secondments. ‘The UK does not agree with WHO not accepting secondments from private 
sector: ‘regrettable’. The overall position was in favour of bringing expertise from wherever. 
By forbidding secondments from the private sector, potential sources of expertise and 
networking might be lost. Secondments happen at the national level, but then it cannot 
happen at the WHO? Why?” 
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The United States was in favour of FENSA being in alignment with other United 
Nations’ policies and practices such as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s Five-Year 
Action Agenda (The future we want). Moreover, the US disagreed with the advocated 
definition as it was ‘quite narrow [and] it does not reflect the wide concept of advocacy as 
influencing public policy and resource allocation decisions’. According to the country, 
FENSA should strengthen the benefits of engagement while treating the risks as identified 
risks. Regarding transparency, the US supported the online register of actors and requested 
more progress on that, including the types of data that would be collected, the frequency of 
updates, roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the country demanded clarification on how 
FENSA would be applied at the regional and country level. 
It is important to note that many of the interviewees pointed out the US as a strong 
supporter of the private sector at the WHO. Therefore, regarding conflict of interest, the 
country stated that ‘commercial interests are not the only interests through which conflicts 
can arise [and] conflict of interest should be uniform across all policies’. Additionally, the US 
suggested an adjustment in the opening paragraph on engagement with private sector entities 
to ‘support and encourage positive engagement from the private sector’. 
In contrast to the comments from the UK, the US, France and Canada, Bolivia wrote 
that although FENSA was a reasonable basis for establishing healthy relationships with non-
State actors, ‘the document still needs to refined before it can be adopted by States’. 
The assertion that ‘WHO does not engage with industries making products that 
directly harm human health, including specifically the tobacco or arms industries’ (paragraph 
6c, p. 3, 2014) was a point of contention. Bolivia advocated that the word ‘directly’ should be 
removed as it could be seen that the WHO could maintain relations with businesses which 
indirectly harm public health. 
Bolivia also noted that private entities regularly work through non-governmental 
organisations and academic institutions. FENSA should, therefore, be clear that if a NSA is 
influenced by a private sector entity, it should be considered as private sector. Although 
paragraph 11 states that if controlled by a private entity, a philanthropic foundation will be 
considered private sector, Bolivia highlighted cases in which philanthropies had a stake in 
private entities, which were not addressed. Bolivia also pointed out the subjectively of 
paragraph 34 ‘when other non-State actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, 
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philanthropic foundations and academic institutions, receive funding from private sector 
entities, they will not automatically be considered as being themselves private sector entities, 
unless the level and modalities of funding are such that the non-State actor can no longer be 
considered as independent of the funding private sector entities.’ Finally, while paragraph 37 
stated that ‘the Secretariat distinguishes non-State actors on the basis of their nature, 
objectives, governance, independence, and membership, not necessarily on the basis of their 
legal status or funding’, Bolivia’s position was the opposite - funding is the key element for 
defining the nature of a non-State actor as main elements are limited and conditioned by the 
source of funds. India adopted the same position in paragraph 37.  
During my interviews, it was evident that NGOs were pushing for a differentiation 
among NSAs considering the different levels of conflict of interest. In this regard, Bolivia 
argued that ‘while some risks may be common to all the actors, it is also evident that relations 
with some specific actors entail greater risk. Relations with nongovernmental organisations, 
philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions should perhaps be differentiated from 
the risk posed by relations with private entities’. Bolivia also requested how and who would 
define what an indirect interest is, given the assertion ‘Caution should be exercised in 
accepting financing from private sector entities that have even an indirect interest in the 
outcome of the project’ of paragraph 11c of the draft Policy and Operational Procedure on 
Engagement with Private Sector Entities. 
Concerning paragraph 19: ‘WHO does not accept in principle secondments from 
private sector entities’, Bolivia argued that the Member States rejected the topic in the 
previous draft. Finally, regarding funding, contributions, and donations from the private 
sector, Bolivia's position was that they should be through the Organisation’s general budget 
and not conditional on any activity in particular. The country also requested further 
information on Public-Private-Partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives. This 
information was also requested by Brazil and India, who wanted to know which public-
private partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives the WHO was engaging with and what 
the budget was. 
Brazil and India started their comments on the FENSA Draft requesting all questions, 
comments, suggestions raised by the Member States during the discussions of the drafting 
group sessions, and the WHA 2014 NSA Committee A, in addition to all documents and 
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policies relevant to FENSA debate. Brazil also requested the number of seconded personnel 
from non-State actors to the Organisation and to indicate who seconded them. 
Alongside Bolivia, Brazil pointed out the need for the distinction of non-State actors 
concerning funding sources and also the specific risks associated with engagement with each 
type of them. Moreover, Bolivia and Brazil supported information requests on the origins of 
funding of NGOs. Brazil also demanded the removal of paragraphs which allowed 
secondments from NGOs, from the private sector and academic institutions. At the end of the 
document, Brazil stated that it ‘considers that secondment of personnel from non-State actors 
is not appropriate because it can risk WHO’s integrity and reputation.’ The deletion of the 
paragraph on contributions from the private sector for financing staff salaries was also 
demanded. Again, like Bolivia, Brazil advocated that any input from private sector entities 
should be made only to the regular budget. India took the same position. 
Paragraph 36 of Draft WHO Policy and Operational Procedures on Engagement with 
Private Sector Entities specified that ‘technical collaboration with the private sector is 
welcomed if potential risks of engagement are managed or mitigated, provided that the 
normative work of WHO is protected from any undue influence and there is no interference 
with WHO’s advisory function to Member States’. Brazil asked for specification of which 
types of technical collaboration would be allowed and the risks that could arise from each 
practice. The country requested the same for technical collaboration from philanthropic 
foundations. 
Regarding paragraph 15 of the Draft WHO Policy and Operational Procedures on 
Engagement with Philanthropic Foundations, ‘contributions received from philanthropic 
foundations are listed in the financial report and audited financial statements of WHO as well 
as the Programme budget web portal and the WHO register of non-State actors’, Brazil 
argued that it would be necessary to inform, in financial reports, the programs or activities 
that received funds from philanthropic foundations. Finally, Brazil suggested that the 
Secretariat should put in brackets points that Member States have already expressed 
restrictions during debates that took place before and during the 67th WHA. 
Like Brazil, India asked for complete information on secondments from NSAs. India 
also asked for details of all financial and in-kind contributions made by non-state actors in 
the previous five years, specifying the name of NSA, amounts contributed, and the specific 
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destination (project/programme/activity). Finally, the country requested the existing practice 
and experience of the WHO in dealing with conflict of interests. 
Similar to Bolivia, regarding paragraph 6 on industries that generate products that 
directly harm human health, India asked for a list of which these were, apart from tobacco 
and arms. According to the interviews, India was trying to mention the food and beverage 
industries precisely. Moreover, India pointed out the contradiction between paragraph 34 and 
37; while paragraph 34 stated that an entity would not be re-categorised as a private sector 
entity, paragraph 37 stated that the attribution of an NSA could change over time. 
An alignment between the so-called public-interest NGOs and India’s comments is 
evident. A distinction between a real and perceived conflict of interests, and between an 
individual and institutional conflict of interest were encouraged by both. In this direction, 
India’s position on the different types of NSAs was that the risk of engagement with some 
categories is higher than with others: ‘It is important to acknowledge that WHO’s 
engagement with the private sector/businesses associations poses a much greater risk 
particularly where the private sector has a commercial or financial interest at stake’. 
Furthermore, India advocated that NGOs which were not in official relations should not ‘be 
denied the opportunity to participate in governing board meetings and to observe WHO 
proceedings. Thus, it would be useful for WHO to distinguish between formal collaboration 
(which will require official relations) and accreditation at least with regard to NGOs’. Some 
interviewees, such as 7, 9, 20 and 21, affirmed that some NGOs had written statements for 
India. 
Like Brazil, India’s position was against secondments from non-State actors as they 
‘may undermine the independence and integrity of WHO (…) may also provide access to 
critical information (…). In our view, if WHO needs personnel for a particular activity, it 
should employ such personnel rather than rely on secondments’. Regarding philanthropic 
foundations, India was against inviting them to participate in the financing dialogue, given 
the lack of flexibility of their contributions. As already discussed in chapter two, the donor-
driven programme priority setting is seen as one of the main problems of WHO, as it has 
been replacing the Member States’ collective priority setting.  
Comments submitted by Mexico reveal a more neutral position. While the alignment 
between Canada, France, United Kingdom and the United States is clear, as well as that 
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between Brazil, Bolivia and India, Mexico did not comment on polemical topics such as 
industries that indirectly harm human health or distinction among non-State actors due to 
different levels of conflict of interest. For instance, Mexico did not advocate against 
secondments, like the other developing countries, but just asked for more precise references 
regarding the role of seconded staff and the budget involved.  
The regional offices also submitted their follow-up comments after the WHA67, 
however they were not available at the WHO website. Information on regional committee 
debates - a document that was part of the provisional agenda of the 136th Session of the 
Executive Board, pointed out that the African Region stated that although transparency of 
FENSA process should be imperative, there was a lack of clarity ‘in the process and criteria 
regarding due diligence and related procedures’. The African Region also pointed out the 
earmarking of funds from private sector non-State actors, as well as the use of such funds for 
the payment of staff salaries. Also mentioned in the report were worries about the influence 
of non-State actors on the WHO’s normative and standard-setting work along with strong 
reservations regarding staff secondments from the private sector. 
The African Region agreed that the WHO should not engage with the tobacco and 
arms industries, highlighting that ‘a number of Member States considered that this restriction 
should be extended to other sectors, including notably the alcohol, food and beverage 
industries’. Finally, the recommendations made by AFRO were: (a) representatives should 
further consult at country level (…); (b) the revised framework should provide a clear policy 
on how the WHO will manage conflicts of interest and define its due diligence processes; (c) 
the revised framework should better reflect the role and function of academic institutions’. 
The Regional Committee for the Americas (PAHO - the Pan American Health 
Organisation) considered that the framework presented at 67WHA ‘lacked detail regarding 
the criteria that non-State actors must meet in order to be classified in each category and the 
way in which each group could engage with WHO. At the same time, Member States 
cautioned against the adoption of an overly prescriptive framework that might not allow 
sufficient flexibility’. Numerous Member States from the PAHO were advocating that any 
interaction with actors whose activities or products were harmful to health, and any 
secondment of personnel from the private sector should be expressly prohibited. One should 
note that within the PAHO, the collaboration must have been troublesome as the Member 
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States of the regional office had very different perspectives at the WHO Headquarters. 
Moreover, it was highlighted that non-governmental organisations and philanthropic and 
academic institutions that received funding from for-profit private companies should be 
specified. Finally, it was pointed out that PAHO experience in interacting with non-State 
actors, including with the pharmaceutical industry, could be shared with the WHO 
Secretariat.  
While secondments were causing controversy, the Regional Committee for South-East 
Asia (SEARO) noted that there were no secondments to the WHO from the private sector and 
requested that the report and recommendations of the Inter-sessional Meeting held in August 
2014 should be taken into consideration; hence, no secondments from non-State actors 
should take place in WHO. 
The Regional Committee for Europe (EURO) ‘strongly urge adoption of the 
Framework of engagement with non-State actors at the Sixty-eighth World Health Assembly 
in 2015’. Although recognising that improvements on management of conflicts of interest 
and process and timetable for evaluation were needed, EURO Member States advised firmly 
against ‘trying to perfect every detail, preferring instead to begin work, trusting in the 
wisdom of the governing bodies to oversee the operation of the framework in practice and 
continue to improve it’. Although interviewee 10, from the European Union, affirmed that the 
EU Member States did not reach a consensus, the States interviewed, the UK, Norway and 
Germany, had very similar positions, including being against ‘line-by-line’ negotiation. 
The Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean Office (EMRO) reinforced the 
need for comprehensive guidelines for WHO interaction with non-State actors and pointed 
out the following areas for improvement: management of conflicts of interest; clarification of 
boundaries, especially with the private sector and business associations; definition of actors; 
acceptance of donations of pharmaceutical products; and technology transfers. 
The Regional Committee for the Western Pacific (WPRO) argued that ‘WHO should 
be able to engage with the private sector in its commercial capacity to advance the research 
and development of new medical products’ and suggested that the Framework should 
establish the concept of competitive neutrality. 
Lastly, it was pointed out that in a regional meeting of the PAHO, the establishment of 
an office to oversee FENSA implementation was suggested. The office would not only 
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‘exercise a watchdog function but also play a facilitating role in promoting engagement and 
actively support WHO programmes in their efforts to reach out to non-State actors, including 
the private sector. Mechanisms for receiving funds from private sector entities should be 
aligned with national health sector strategies’ (EB, 2014, p.4). 
In December 2014, the Secretariat released a report to be discussed at the 136th 
Executive Board of January 2015. It presented the comments and the follow-up observations 
made by the Member States during and after the 67th World Health Assembly. It can be 
observed that conflict of interest and how it could be efficiently managed had been a topic of 
central concern since the beginning. Process and criteria of due diligence were also cited. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, financial resources from the private sector have always 
been a polemical issue within the WHO. Therefore, according to the report, ‘Member States 
stressed that WHO should accept financial resources from private sector entities only if 
potential conflicts of interest are ruled out and if this engagement does not compromise 
WHO’s integrity and reputation’ (EB, 2014, p.2). Regarding secondments, some Member 
States proposed that the WHO should not allow secondments from any non-State actors, 
while others pursued to exclude only secondments from the private sector. Moreover, some 
suggested that NGOs, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions not ‘at arm’s 
length’ from private sector entities should also be considered as private sector entities and 
that the WHO should consider adding the definition of “international business associations” 
as a subcategory of “private sector entities”.  
In relation to entities with which the WHO should not engage, some Member States 
were advocating that the non-engagement with tobacco and arms industries should be 
extended to alcohol, food and beverage industries. Besides, some suggested that the 
involvement of the private sector should be open to Member States’ examination and that 
Member States should be involved in due diligence.  
It was pointed out that it was not clear if FENSA would also be applied to partnerships 
nor how conflicts of interest should be managed in such partnerships. An improvement of the 
concept of ‘non-State actor’ was also suggested, as it should include entities falling outside 
the definition, such as public-private partnerships and multistakeholder initiatives. The 
concept of ‘competitive neutrality’ was also suggested as a way of safeguarding interaction 
with entities that are subject to market forces, so that they would not confer undue 
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competitive advantages. Medicine donations, safeguarding of the WHO’s name and emblem, 
assessment of the framework and the role of academic institutions were mentioned in the 
report. 
The second part of the report contained the Secretariat’s proposals to address the issues 
raised by Member States. Regarding conflicts of interest, a section on the management of 
institutional conflict of interest and other risks of engagement was added to the framework. 
‘The new section defines conflict of interest, both in general and in the institutional context. 
For the WHO, the most important institutional conflicts of interest arise in situations where 
the economic interests of private sector entities are in conflict with the Organisation’s 
interests, its independence and impartiality in setting norms and standards’. The report also 
clarified that the rules for engagement with private sector entities were more detailed and 
more restrictive than the rules for other non-State actors aiming to preserve the WHO’s 
integrity when accepting financial contributions from the private sector. It was also proposed 
by the Secretariat that the WHO should not accept secondments from any NSA. Moreover:  
any non-State actor clearly influenced by private sector entities will be considered as 
a private sector entity. Thus, engagement with such entities will be circumscribed by 
the policy on engagement with private sector entities with its more stringent rules. If 
a non-State actor is clearly independent from private sector entities, but still receives 
funding from such entities, the individual engagement will be examined to determine 
if the provisions of the private sector policy should be applied. Funding from such a 
non-State actor would for instant not be acceptable for normative work linked to the 
interest of those private sector entities that provide funding to them. Evidence 
provided by such non-State actors would be considered as potentially influenced, 
while funding for, or other collaborations on, an implementation project in the area 
of expertise of this non-State actor could be acceptable. (EB, 2014, p.5) 
The Secretariat declared that Member States were consensual in keeping the system of 
official relations, instead of replacing it by another accreditation system. 
Furthermore, the broad interpretation that has always been given to the term ‘non-
governmental organisations’ was recognised, which had allowed business associations and 
philanthropic foundations to have official relations with the WHO. The draft, therefore, 
‘proposes to increase transparency by narrowing the definition of nongovernmental 
organisations compared with past practice, while still allowing international business 
associations and philanthropic foundations to be accepted as non-State actors in official 
relations’. However, entities considered by the WHO as private sector entities, and which do 
not represent a business sector, would not be suitable for admission into official relations. 
It is worth noting that FENSA should be applied to engagement with all non-State 
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actors, not only to those in official relations, different to the 1987 Principles which were 
applied only to NGOs in official relations. Regarding the non-engagement with the tobacco 
and arms industries, it was moved into a new paragraph on engagement with particular 
industries, and other industries affecting health. While prohibiting any engagement was not 
proposed, the WHO should apply particular caution when engaging with them. 
The clause on competitive neutrality was added to the private sector policy, and the 
policy on engagement with academic institutions should be applied, combined with the 
Regulations for Study and Scientific Groups, Collaborating Institutions and Other 
Mechanisms of Collaboration. Finally, an item requiring systematic monitoring of the 
implementation of the framework was added. Furthermore, the implementation of the 
framework should be periodically evaluated, and it was proposed that the first evaluation and 
revision of FENSA should be made at the Seventieth World Health Assembly in 2017. The 
70WHA report on FENSA stated that after the adoption, regional committees were discussing 
the implementation of the Framework and the PAHO had already decided to adopt and 
implement during the 55th Directing Council of the WHO and the PAHO. The WHO register 
of non-State actors and the electronic workflow were also mentioned as advancements in 
implementation. Moreover, a guide for staff and a handbook for non-State actors were being 
finalised at the time and should be ‘regularly updated in the light of the experience gained in 
the implementation of the Framework and will be made available on the WHO 
website’ (WHA, 2017, p.3) Finally, a set of criteria and principles for secondments from 
NGOs, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions was also prepared.  
Based on the comments of those consultations, the Secretariat drafted a third version 
of the FENSA for the 136th EB in January 2015. The EB symbolises a turning point in the 
negotiation process as it was decided that FENSA would be moved to an open-ended 
intergovernmental meeting (OEIM) to discuss ‘textual proposals submitted by Member States 
and, where applicable, regional economic integration organisations’. The goal was to adopt 
them at the 68WHA in May. Therefore, a drafting group was created, and Argentina was 
appointed by Margaret Chan to chair the discussions. FENSA discussion then shifted from 
the Secretariat to a called Member-States’ phase. The EB136 decisions and list of resolutions 
included a ‘non-exhaustive list of issues which seem to need more work amongst Member 
States’. The issues cited were:  
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conflict of interest (including individual conflict of interest); criteria of due diligence 
and process of risk management; transparency; secondments and provision of 
personnel; role of private sector (acceptance of funds, pooling mechanism, evidence 
generation and advocacy); engagement with particular industries; criteria for 
attribution to type of non-State actors, including criteria applied to classify some 
nongovernmental organisations as international business associations; in which kind 
of meetings can non-State actors participate; use of funds provided by non-State 
actors to support the salary of WHO staff; official relations (some aspects); policy, 
norms and standard setting; applicability of the framework to all levels of the 
Organization and all 6 regions; general principles that guide collaboration; definition 
of terms (“arm’s length”, “resources”, etc); support to policy making at national 
level. (EB, 2015, p.3)  
The open-ended intergovernmental meeting took place in Geneva from 30 March to 1 
April 2015 and was chaired by Dr. Andrea Carbone from Argentina. At the meeting, the draft 
was reviewed, taking into account the proposals submitted by the Member States for 
amendments, additions or deletions. The product of the open-ended intergovernmental 
meeting was a reviewed version of FENSA, reflecting discussions at the meeting. The 
Director-General reported the outcomes to the 68th World Health Assembly. 
The topics that the open-ended intergovernmental meeting could not reach a consensus 
upon were: resources, management of conflict of interest, conflict of interest, due diligence 
and risk assessment, risk management, transparency, and secondments. (WHO, 2015).  74
Before the 68th WHA, a report on the financial and administrative implications for the 
Secretariat regarding FENSA was released. The Framework was part of the Leadership and 
Governance programme area, and its adoption was seen as a tool to ‘provide a solid basis for 
the ongoing strengthening of due diligence and risk assessment’. The cost required for 
FENSA implementation and activities for the period 2014-2019 was estimated to be 
$10,508,800. Of which $8,238,300 would be for staff and $2,270,500 for activities. While the 
costs were incurred at the WHO headquarters in Geneva, it was argued that the 
implementation of the framework would impact ‘work processes at all three levels of the 
Organization’. It can also be observed in the report that FENSA could not be implemented by 
existing staff and it would ‘increase the team conducting due diligence and managing 
interaction with non-State actors from four full-time professional staff members to five’. 
Three draft versions were considered at the 68th World Health Assembly between the 
18th and 26th of May 2015. At that time, a consensus was reached in many parts, including 
introduction, rationale, principles, benefits of engagement, risks of engagement, non-State 
 Framework of engagement with non-State actors, Report by the Director-General. Available at: http://74
apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA68/A68_5-en.pdf?ua=1 Last access on 02/01/2020.
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actors, and types of interaction.  
According to interviewee 2, ‘many meetings took place in the Programme, Budget and 
Administration Committee (PBAC), to which we had no access and for which there are no 
reports. There are, for example, no verbatim or even summary PBAC reports giving any 
information about MS’ positions. More importantly perhaps, throughout the six years, since 
the official start of the Reform, there had been many meetings behind closed doors as well as 
many drafting or working groups during EBs and WHAs’. At the 68th WHA, the 
disagreement between the Member States was echoed as no consensus was reached and 
FENSA, once again, was left to be considered for adoption at the 69th WHA. 
It is worth noting that during the 68WHA, non-State actors, precisely the NGOs, were 
more active as many reports and articles were written in the margins of the meeting. In this 
sense, the controversy surrounding FENSA seemed not only to be among Member States but 
also between different NGOs, something that is expressed in their official statements made at 
the 68th WHA. According to the Third World Network,  Health Action International 75
(HAI) advocated that the WHO should exercise particular caution when engaging with 
industries affecting human health or affected by WHOs norms and standards. HAI was 
furthermore asking that FENSA should clearly define the industries with which caution 
should be taken. The International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) argued that the 
FENSA draft reasserted old channels of undue influence as, instead of reviewing the 
constitutionality of recognising business-interest associations as ‘NGOs’, it proposed their 
comprehensive admission – the same of philanthropies too. IBFAN also pointed out the 
inadequate concept of conflicts of interest. Medicus Mundi International and the People’s 
Health Movement called the FENSA draft ‘obscure and complex’, which would not be able 
to prevent improper influence. 
Given the impasse, a resolution was adopted and it was requested that the WHO 
convene ‘as soon as possible and no later than October 2015, an open-ended 
intergovernmental meeting to finalize the draft framework of engagement with non-state 
actors on the basis of progress made’ during the Health Assembly. The resolution also asked 
the DG ‘to develop a register for non-State actors’ in time for the 69th WHA. Consequently, 
further OEIGMs were held. The open-ended intergovernmental group met twice officially in 
 WHO:  Work on non-State actors engagement framework to continue. Available at: https://www.twn.my/75
title2/health.info/2015/hi150512.htm Last access on 02/01/2020
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2015, from the 8th to the 10th of July and from the 7th to the 9th of December, as well as for 
informal consultations for nine days in September and October 2015. The third and last 
meeting took place from the 25th to the 27th of April 2016. 
In October 2015, a non-paper of the Implication of Implementation the Framework of 
Engagement with non-State actors was released by the Secretariat for consideration at the 
informal meeting of Member States on 19th to the 23rd of October. It was argued that while 
FENSA would put the relationship between the WHO and non-State actors ‘on a more solid 
basis and strengthen the management of risks of engagement’, the Framework, as it was 
drafted, could also lead to an ‘unintentional restriction of WHO’s engagement with non-State 
actors’. The non-paper was divided into two sections: Intended Consequences of FENSA 
Implementation and Risks of Unintended Consequences of FENSA Implementation. 
The paper highlighted the proposal of establishing an oversight function of the 
Executive Board through its PBAC. Moreover, the Executive Board Standing Committee on 
NGOs would be abolished, and its functions transferred to the PBAC. Regarding the financial 
and human resource costs, the paper stated that a significant part of the additional workload 
should happen at the country level. It also detailed seven risks regarding FENSA 
implementation, including a systematic overload of the clearance system: ‘if all engagements 
from a minor engagement with a small NGO (…) to a major financial contribution have to go 
through the full system and the same process’. Moreover, transparency beyond a certain level 
could ‘conflict with legal undertakings entered into by WHO with regards to accessing or 
disclosing certain information’. Also cited were: applying the full FENSA system during 
emergencies, and conflict of interest with individuals, such as experts from universities, that 
might have links to non-State actors. 
The paper also mentioned more than seven risks from proposed but not agreed 
provisions of FENSA. The first one was a ceiling for earmarked contributions which would 
‘deter non-state contributors from making such contribution and have important resource 
mobilisation implication’. Regarding experts associated to non-State actors, ‘WHO could not 
perform its work on preparing norm and standards if no experts connected to a non-State 
actor could be involved, since a large part of the expert knowledge WHO need is outside of 
state actors’. Moreover, it was argued that ‘an extensive interpretation of the non-engagement 
with the arms industry could lead to important missed opportunities, such as engagement 
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with the IT sector on e-health on e-health and m-health, since most of companies operating in 
this field have either close ties with defence industry or have developed expertise, branches 
and subsidiaries in this area’. Due diligence and risk assessment were mentioned as potential 
risks as they ‘may put at stake WHO’s reputation and may encourage non-State actors to 
press charges against WHO’. The exclusion of secondments and an eventual separate 
accreditation procedure were also cited. 
As a response, 44 public-interest civil society networks signed an open letter  to 76
Margaret Chan arguing that ‘the non-paper prepared by the Secretariat (…) provides no 
constructive contribution to the new Member-State-led process’ and questioning ‘the motives 
behind such a paper as it comes in the middle of the negotiations’. The organisations 
expressed their concern as the paper could ‘undermine further strengthening of a FENSA and 
prevent it becoming a truly robust framework as the paper lists the potential ‘unintended 
consequences’ often in an exaggerated manner, as assumptions, without providing empirical 
evidence to back up these claims’. Finally, they requested that Secretariat support a 
‘constructive finalisation’ of FENSA, which should include forceful provisions to avoid 
undue influence from the private sector, as well as corporate philanthropies, considering that 
the WHO’s concern to secure funding should not ‘collide with the WHO constitutional 
mandate, a conflict of interest that global public health cannot afford’.   
Given the report of the open-ended intergovernmental meeting and of the Programme, 
Budget and Administration Committee of the Executive Board, it was decided in the 138th 
Session of the Executive Board to have a final session from the 25th to the 27th April 2016 of 
the open-ended intergovernmental meeting, in order to submit a consensus text of FENSA to 
the 69th World Health Assembly. Moreover, in March 2016, a report from the External 
Auditor was released, on the implication for the WHO of the implementation of FENSA. As 
the Member States didn’t reach a consensus:  
the Executive Board adopted the decision, among others, to request the Secretariat to 
prepare an objective and balanced analysis of the implications for WHO of 
implementing the framework, with inputs from headquarters and the regional and 
country offices. The purpose of the paper was to provide an overview of the possible 
implications of the implementation of FENSA, describing its impact and effects from 
a policy, financial and human resource perspective at all levels of WHO.  In order to 
ensure a balanced and objective report to Member States, the assistance of the 
External Auditor was sought on the aspects of validating and commenting on the 
 Civil Society Letter of Concern on FENSA ‘non-paper’. Available at: http://www.babymilkaction.org/wp-76
content/uploads/2015/10/NGOs_Chan_67.pdf  Last access on 02/01/2020 
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replies to a questionnaire, as well as commenting on and enhancing the detailed 
matrix of analysis of the implications for WHO of the implementation of FENSA, 
and thereafter writing a final report on the matter. Hence, this report contains the 
results of the independent assessment conducted by the External Auditor (WHO, 
2016, p.4) 
The report was based on a questionnaire given to the six regional offices, 17 country 
offices and seven groups at the WHO. While there was a shared view that FENSA could 
result in positive opportunities, risks were pointed out that would need to be efficiently 
managed and avoided. According to the report, the critical areas of FENSA were due 
diligence and risk assessment procedures, transparency and accountability, the registering of 
non-State actors, conflict of interest, and oversight of engagement. Additionally, applicability 
to emergencies, due diligence and risk assessment procedures, and the receipt  and provision 
of resources were topics that required improvement. 
According to the report, in 2015, NGOs had the highest percentage of NSAs engaging 
with the WHO, within the three levels of the Organisation, corresponding to 40% of the total 
NSAs. The academic institutions followed them, with 32%, then the private sector entities 
with 21%, and the philanthropic institutions counted as the lowest, with 7%. It should be 
noted that the methodology used did not prevent double counting in instances where different 
departments, regional offices or country offices engaged with the same NSA. Furthermore, 
all kinds of engagements, from one particular participation in a meeting to a vast resource 
contribution, were considered as one engagement. Regarding the kind of engagement, 
according to the report, ‘participation’ was the main one for all categories of NSAs, 
corresponding to 38%. This was followed by technical collaboration (34%), advocacy (13%), 
evidence (10%) and resources (5%). The report then showed engagement in emergencies. 
While NGOs still accounted for the highest volume of engagements with 46%, philanthropic 
foundations shift from the last to the second-highest level of engagement, followed by the 
private sector and academic institutions. 
While highlighting the importance of FENSA, the report also pointed out the 
improvements needed with regards to the ‘clarity of the framework itself and the 
acknowledgement that specific policies and guidance must be crafted’. Another concern 
confirmed later during the interviews was that process proposed by FENSA could prove 
burdensome and delay engagements.  
Other noteworthy point was the required adoption of rigid measures so that ‘all 
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engagements by all offices and at all levels of the Organization abide by the framework. As 
provided for in the draft framework, non-compliance by an NSA can have consequences after 
due process, including a reminder, a warning, a cease and desist letter, or other measures.’ 
Furthermore, that clarity should be apparent in the detailed operational guidelines and 
procedures:  
The adoption of the overarching framework and the resulting operational guidelines 
and processes should streamline activities and simplify accreditation of actors. It is 
only when transitioning from the existing system to the proposed framework and 
operational processes that changes in the volume of transactions will be noted. The 
system should operate much more smoothly and efficiently once it is in place and all 
staff and NSAs become accustomed to how it functions. 
Regarding due diligence and risk assessment procedures, according to the report, it 
was mainly a matter of priority, ‘a system that is quick and easy, but does not assure 
safeguards for the interests of WHO; or a system that is rigid and firm, protecting the 
reputation and integrity of the Organization, though requiring time and resources to perfect 
and institutionalize the system through tried and tested operational procedures’. It was also 
noted that given no structured and systematic monitoring and documentation process for 
engagements with NSAs existed, FENSA would offer ‘a single, unified system and 
transparent policy for all types of engagements with NSAs across the Organization’. 
Moreover, FENSA guidelines should offer proper and necessary controls to manage the risk 
of policy override as ‘on the basis of lessons learned from past engagements with NSAs, 
WHO may reconsider the adoption of alternative control processes for voluminous, recurring 
and less risky engagements’.  
Finally, the report highlighted that discussions on FENSA have been going on for 
years, ‘a long, arduous and costly’ policy development which ‘has barely taken off, at least in 
the form of a formal framework from which specific policies can emanate’. It was then 
recommended that a decision on its implementation should be made at the 69th World Health 
Assembly. It was reminded that the WHO was engaging with NSAs for years, without an 
overall formal framework being applied consistently and uniformly across all levels of the 
Organisation, thus relentlessly taking the risk of compromising its mandate of providing 
global leadership in public health. 
As demanded, the final session of the open-ended intergovernmental meeting 
(OEIGM) on the draft framework of engagement with non-State actors took place in Geneva 
from the 25th to the 27th April 2016. One day before, on the 24th of April, the Secretariat 
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presented additional information on the ‘Cost implication for WHO of the implementation of 
FENSA’. On 25th April, the Civil Society Statement Save the World Health Organisation 
from the undue influence of corporations and corporate linked entities was released. The 
public interest civil society organisations called the participants of the meeting to ensure that 
the framework would not fall below the existing safeguards that prevent undue influence 
from the private sector. The topics stressed were: the acceptance of financial resources from 
the private sector to support salaries of WHO staff; the allowance of groups that are primarily 
of a commercial or profit-making nature to establish official relations with the WHO, and to 
participate in meetings of governing bodies; the wrong conceptualisation of conflict of 
interest; the failiure to apply FENSA in the case of humanitarian emergencies; the use of 
FENSA as a fund-raising strategy. 
Based on the outcome of the OEIGMs, the 69th WHA adopted FENSA in May 2016. It 
is the first arrangement to manage the relationship between a United Nations organisation 
and non-governmental actors. Although broadly celebrated by the Member States after four 
years of discussions, some non-State actors were, and remain, more uncertain about the 
framework. Chapters five and six will outline the perspective of some selected Member 
States and some non-State actors.   
4.2 Progress in FENSA Negotiations: Tracking Changes.  
Between the first version of FENSA (2014) and the approved one (May 2016), several 
drafts and reports were released. To examine the changes in the document, eight versions will 
be considered in this part. I decided to exclude the first draft that was presented to the 134th 
session of the Executive Board (January 2014), because, as I already mentioned, it was a 
basic version divided into three parts: Objectives, Principles and Boundaries; Working 
Definitions; and Strengthening Management of Engagement. Since May 2014, FENSA 
included an overarching framework and four separate policies and operational procedures on 
engagement with non-governmental organisations, private sector entities, philanthropic 
foundations and academic institutions. In this topic, the findings will be detailed and 
discussed afterwards, alongside the interviews in the last chapter (seven). 
One could observe that the structure of FENSA followed the same pattern from 
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Considering that it would be useless and exhausting to point out every single change 
that occurred through the negotiation process, as many language adjustments were requested, 
the focus will be on the content of FENSA, especially relating to the controversial points.  
An introduction for the framework, paragraph 1, was added in version 2 and remained 
the same until the approved version. The four paragraphs (2 to 5) of the Rationale became 
three (2 to 4) but remained almost the same. Paragraphs 3 and 4 (version 1) or 4 and 5 (other 
versions) were merged into one. Regarding the overarching principles of the WHO’s 
engagement with non-State actors, five were cited in version 1: a) demonstrate a clear benefit 
to public health; b) respect the intergovernmental nature of the WHO; c) support and enhance 
the scientific and evidence-based approach that underpins the WHO’s work; d) be actively 
managed so as to reduce and mitigate any form of risk to the WHO (including conflict of 
interest); e) be conducted on the basis of transparency, openness, inclusiveness, 
accountability, integrity and mutual respect. In version 2, point B was complemented by the 
phrase ‘(…) where the decision-making by WHO’s governing bodies is the exclusive 
prerogative of Member States’. Moreover, two other points were added: ‘protect WHO’s 
processes in setting norms and standards from any undue influence’ and ‘avoid 
compromising WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation’. Version 4, 
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Constitution, mandate and general programme of work’. The final version of FENSA 
establish eight guiding principles: 
WHO’s engagement with non-State actors is guided by the following overarching 
principles. Any engagement must: (a) demonstrate a clear benefit to public health;  
(b) conform with WHO’s Constitution, mandate and general programme of work  
(c) respect the intergovernmental nature of WHO and the decision-making authority 
of Member States as set out in the WHO’s Constitution; (d) support and enhance, 
without compromising, the scientific and evidence-based approach that underpins 
WHO’s work; (e) protect WHO from any undue influence, in particular on the 
processes in setting and applying policies, norms and standards; (f) not compromise 
WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation; (g) be effectively 
managed, including by, where possible avoiding conflict of interest and other forms 
of risks to WHO; (h) be conducted on the basis of transparency, openness, 
inclusiveness, accountability, integrity and mutual respect. (WHO, 2016, p.5)  
The topic ‘Boundaries’, of version 1, which included four points, was reallocated 
within the Framework. The topic ‘Benefits of Engagement’ was initially alongside ‘Risks of 
Engagement’ (Version 1, paragraph 21 to 24) but, since version 2, became one single topic 
with one paragraph. The text of Benefits of Engagement changed slightly from the version 1 
until version 3:  
WHO’s engagement with non-State actors can bring important benefits to global 
public health and to the Organization itself. For this reason, WHO engages 
extensively with non-State actors. Engagements range from major, longer-term 
collaborations to smaller, briefer interactions. Some engagements focus on the 
benefits that non-State actors can bring to the work of WHO, whereas others focus 
either on (i) the influence that WHO can have on non-State actors to enhance their 
impact on global public health or to influence the social, economic and 
environmental determinants of health or on (ii) enabling WHO to fulfil its directing 
and coordinating role in global health. (WHA, 2015, p.3) 
Then, the version presented to the 68th WHA had a more far-reaching text:  
WHO’s engagement with non-State actors can bring important benefits to global 
public health and to the Organization itself in fulfilment of its constitutional 
principles and objectives, including its directing and coordinating role in global 
health. Engagements range from major, longer-term collaborations to smaller, briefer 
interactions. Benefits arising from such engagement can also include: a) (DELETED) 
b) the contribution of non-State actors to the work of WHO c) the influence that 
WHO can have on non-State actors to enhance their impact on global public health 
or to influence the social, economic and environmental determinants of health d) the 
influence that WHO can have on non-State actors’ compliance with WHO’s policies, 
norms and standards e) the additional resources non-State actors can contribute to 
WHO’s work f) the wider dissemination of and adherence by non-State actors to 
WHO’s policies, norms and standards (WHA, 2015, p.5) 
It was also suggested to add a point G, stating that ‘non-State actors engaging with WHO 
[fully implement or more readily conform with] WHO public health policies [norms and 
standards], including in their own activities in the areas of food safety, chemical safety, 
ethical promotion of medicinal drug products, tobacco control and others.]’. In the final 
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version, point G was not added, and the benefits remained those presented in May 2015.  
Regarding the Risks of Engagement, initially these were considered: undue or 
improper influence, a negative impact on WHO’s reputation and credibility and misuse by a 
non-State actor for its interest. Moreover, a paragraph (24 in version 1) detailed the concept 
of conflict of interest, initially considered ‘a set of circumstances in which professional 
judgment or actions regarding a primary interest (WHO’s work) may be unduly influenced by 
a secondary interest (a vested interest in the outcome of WHO’s work in given area). This 
secondary interest may affect or may reasonably be seen to affect the independence and 
objectivity of WHO’s work. A conflict of interest can be individual or institutional and can be 
based on a commercial or financial or any other interest’. From version 2 to version 6, the 
paragraph remained virtually unchanged by naming the risks and moving the concept of 
conflict of interest to another part of the framework. In this sense:         
WHO’s engagement with non-State actors can involve risks which need to be 
avoided or mitigated in accordance with WHO’s risk management framework. Major 
risks relate to the occurrence of the following: (a) conflicts of interest; (b) undue or 
improper influence exercised by a non-State actor on WHO’s work, especially in, but 
not limited to, normative and standard-setting activities;  (c) a negative impact on 
WHO’s reputation and credibility; (d) the collaboration being primarily used to serve 
the interests of the non-State actor concerned with limited benefits for WHO and 
public health; (e) the collaboration conferring an endorsement of the non-State 
actor’s name, brand, product or activity; (f) the whitewashing of a non-State actor’s 
image through an association with WHO; (g) a competitive advantage for a non-State 
actor. (WHA, 2015, p.4) 
The final and approved version of FENSA changed the beginning to ‘risks which need to be 
effectively managed and, where appropriate, avoided’ while preserved the seven risks 
recognised since December 2014.  
Regarding non-State actors embraced by the Framework, version 1 recognised: non-
governmental organisations, private sector entities, international business associations, 
philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions. From version 3 (May 2015) until the 
approved FENSA, international business associations were placed as part of the private 
sector. One must note that the description of all NSAs remained almost intact, apart from 
international business associations which were first described as entities and then as private 
sector entities. Footnotes were added, explaining what an entity ‘at arm’s length’ is and 
including think tanks, which are policy-oriented institutions, as academic institutions were 
added.  
The types of interaction of non-State actors from the first until the final version 
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included: participation, resources, evidence, advocacy and technical collaboration. The 
paragraph about participation remained almost untouched. The phrase ‘there are no limits 
imposed on non-State actors’ participation at such meetings’ concerning consultations and 
other meetings was added in version 2 but then removed in version 4, presented at the 68th 
WHA. About resources, pro-bono work was accepted in version 1 but withdrawn since 
version 2. Moreover, the last Intergovernmental Meeting Group from April 2016 requested to 
add a footnote enlightening that ‘free provision of services’ would not include secondments, 
which are covered in another paragraph of FENSA. Technical collaboration initially included 
‘support to policy-making at the national level’, but it was removed.   
Evidence was the only topic that suffered a substantial change. Version 1 to 3 
established that evidence ‘includes gathering and generation of information and management 
of knowledge and research’. The text started being amended at the 68WHA and ended up as: 
For the purposes of this framework, evidence refers to inputs based on up-to-date 
information, knowledge on technical issues, and consideration of scientific facts, 
independently analysed by WHO. Evidence generation by WHO includes 
information gathering, analysis, generation of information and the management of 
knowledge and research. Non-State actors may provide their up-to-date information 
and knowledge on technical issues, and share their experience with WHO, as 
appropriate, subject to the provisions of this framework, its four specific policies and 
operational procedures, and other applicable WHO rules, policies and procedures. 
Such contribution should be made publicly available, as appropriate, wherever 
possible. Scientific evidence generated should be made publicly available. (WHO, 
2016, p. 9)     
In version 1, conflict of interest was part of the ‘Benefits and Risks of Engagement’ 
section, while ‘Due Diligence, Risk Assessment and Risk Management’ were one other topic. 
Since version 2 it all became part of one division called Management of Conflict of Interest 
and other risks of Engagement. One should note that the definition of conflict of interest gave 
rise to many criticisms, especially from public-interested NGOs. Since version 2 (EB136/5, 
December 2014), conflict of interest was more detailed, as in version 1 only one paragraph 
(24) specified the definition and, afterwards, four or five paragraphs presented the concept 
and its relations.  Therefore, paragraph 23 of version 2 defined conflict of interest as:  
[arising] in circumstances where a secondary interest (a vested interest in the 
outcome of WHO’s work in a given area) unduly influences, or may reasonably be 
perceived to unduly influence the independence or objectivity of professional 
judgement or actions regarding a primary interest (WHO’s work). The existence of 
conflict of interest does not mean that improper action has occurred, but rather that 
the risk of such improper action occurring exists 
The definition of conflict of interest in version 3 had a language change; it was added that a 
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conflict of interest arises in circumstances where there is potential for a secondary interest 
and that ‘conflicts of interest are not only financial but can take other forms as well’. It was 
also requested that a footnote be added to paragraph 23 regarding individual conflicts of 
interest: ‘Individual conflicts of interests within WHO are those involving experts, regardless 
of their label, and staff members; these will be addressed in accordance with the policies 
listed under paragraph 48 of the present framework’. This definition was maintained in the 
final version, and the footnote became one paragraph (23). 
Another noteworthy change related to an institutional conflict of interest. In version 2, 
paragraph 26 stated that ‘for WHO, the most important institutional conflicts of interest arise 
in situations where the economic interests of private sector entities are in conflict with 
WHO’s interests, especially the Organization’s independence and impartiality in setting 
norms and standards’ (EB, 2014, p.15). According to document A68/5 from 1st May 2015, no 
consensus was reached in this paragraph, therefore it was proposed to add financial interests 
to the excerpt and to change private sector entities to ‘non-State actors addressed under this 
framework’. However, some Member States requested that ‘in particular private sector 
entities’ should be added. Some Member States even suggested deleting the paragraph and 
others to add footnotes referring to the norms and standards and evidence gathering. Another 
proposal was to add the footnote ‘being aware that economic interest is the important 
institutional conflict of interest, nonetheless other forms of conflicts of interest should also be 
taken into consideration, to protect WHO’s integrity as a UN specialized agency (see 
paragraph 67)]’.  
The Chairperson proposed: ‘for WHO the most important institutional conflicts of 
interest arise in situations where the economic, commercial or financial interests of non-State 
actors, in particular private sector entities, are in conflict with WHO’s public health and 
constitutional mandate and interests’. Nevertheless, in final version, the text is ‘For WHO, 
the potential risk of institutional conflicts of interest could be the highest in situations where 
the interest of non-State actors, in particular economic, commercial or financial, are in 
conflict with WHO’s public health policies, constitutional mandate and interests, in particular 
the Organization’s independence and impartiality in setting policies, norms and 
standards’ (WHO, 2016, p. 10). 
Paragraphs with regards to Due Diligence had minor changes between version 2 and 
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FENSA final text. In the Document EB136/5, paragraph 28 stated that:  
before engaging with any non-State actor, WHO, in order to preserve its integrity, 
conducts due diligence. This refers to the steps taken by WHO to find and verify 
information on a non-State actor and to reach a basic understanding of its profile. 
While due diligence refers to the nature of the non-State actor concerned, risk 
assessment refers to the assessment of a specific proposed engagement with that non-
State actor. (EB, 2014, p.11)  
While some Member States proposed only minor language adjustments, such as to add risk 
assessment in the first line: ‘(…) conducts due diligence and risk assessment’ and ‘to find and 
verify all relevant information’; a complete change was also proposed:  
Before engaging with any non-State actors, given the potential benefits for [both 
parties]/[public health] from such engagement, WHO needs to conduct due diligence, 
in order to preserve its integrity. This refers to the steps taken by WHO to find and 
verify information on a non-State actor and to reach a [basic]/[meticulous/definite]/
[clear] understanding of its profile. A risk assessment on a proposed engagement is 
conducted in addition to the due diligence. This involves the assessment of risks 
associated with the engagement with a non-State actor, in particular the risks 
described in paragraph 8. 
In May 2015, the Member States reached a consensus and the final text is:  
Before engaging with any non-State actor, WHO, in order to preserve its integrity, 
conducts due diligence and risk assessment. Due diligence refers to the steps taken 
by WHO to find and verify relevant information on a non-State actor and to reach a 
clear understanding of its profile. While due diligence refers to the nature of the non-
State actor concerned, risk assessment refers to the assessment of a specific 
proposed engagement with that non-State actor.    
With regards to the paragraph that defines which are the principal functions of due 
diligence, initially, five points were mentioned: 
a) clarify the interest of the actor in engaging with WHO and what they expect in 
return; b) establish the “business card” of the entity (general screening); c) determine 
status, area of activities, governance, sources of funding, constitution, statutes and 
by-laws, affiliation; d) define main elements describing the history of the entity: 
human and labour issues, environment ethical and business issues, reputation and 
image as well as the financial stability and the examined entity; e) identify “red 
lines” such as activities that are incompatible with WHO’s work and mandate 
(including specifically activities by the tobacco and arms industries) (WHA, 2014, p. 
6)  
It was required both by the Member States and the Chairperson to separate the bullet A 
into two: ‘clarify the nature and objectives of the entity proposed to engage with WHO’ and 
‘clarify the interest of the entity in engaging with WHO and what they expect in return’. 
Moreover, while version 1 and version 2 proposed to identify ‘red lines’, which would be 
activities irreconcilable with the WHO’s work and mandate (e.g. links to the tobacco and 
arms industries), version 2 added the excerpt ‘or that require the Organization to exercise 
particular caution when engaging with the entity (e.g. links to other industries affecting 
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human health or affected by WHO’s norms and standards)’. Among the suggested 
amendments, there was a request to delete the expression ‘red lines’ and ‘links to’, so the 
bullet point would be ‘activities that are incompatible with WHO’s work and mandate (the 
tobacco and arms industries)’ and to isolate the phrase ‘particular caution’ in another point. 
Some suggested that this last phrase should be deleted. Another request was to delete the 
reference to the tobacco and arms industries or to change the text to ‘identify activities of the 
entity that may require the Organization to consider setting more narrow parameters for the 
engagement, or that are affected by WHO’s norms and standards’. 
Version 4, the one discussed at the 68th WHA, included a text proposed by the Chair: 
‘Identify if the nature or activities of a NSA are incompatible with WHO/s work and mandate 
(e.g. links to be tobacco and arms industries) or if they require the Organization to exercise 
particular caution when engaging with the entity (e.g. links to other industries affecting 
human health or affected by WHO/s norms and standards (FOOTNOTE As described in 
paragraph 44)”.  The consensus was reached only in November 2015 during the 
intergovernmental meeting, and the final version is “identify if paragraph 44 or 45 should be 
applied’.  77
The paragraph concerning risk assessment was initially developed in version 2: ‘Risks 
are the expression of the likelihood and potential impact of an event that would affect the 
Organisation’s ability to achieve its objectives. A risk assessment on a proposed engagement 
is conducted in parallel to due diligence. This involves the assessment of risks associated 
with an engagement with a non-State actor, in particular the risks described in paragraph 8’.  78
In May 2015, during the 68th WHA (version 3), it was suggested to delete the paragraph or 
replace it with ‘while due diligence refers to the nature of the non-State actor concerned, risk 
assessment refers to the assessment of a specific proposed engagement with that non-State 
actor’. The Chairperson proposed to keep the paragraph by just changing ‘a risk assessment 
on a proposed engagement is conducted in addition to due diligence’ instead of ‘is conducted 
in parallel to due diligence’. In the final version the paragraph kept the text suggested by the 
Chairperson in 2015, just adding in ‘(…) and is to be conducted without prejudice to the type 
of non-State actor’ at the end. 
 Paragraphs 44 and 45 are part of specific provisions, which refers to no-go relations and those where 77
particular caution should be exercised. 
 Paragraph 8 in version 2 is the one that lists the risks of engagement. 78
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Version 2 from December 4 included four paragraphs regarding risk management, 
although the draft discussed during the last open-ended intergovernmental meeting, in April 
2016, had the four paragraphs highlighted as agreed during the negotiations; the final version 
includes three paragraphs. Regarding the concept of Risk Management, the paragraph had 
minor changes in an explanatory way. It went from ‘the Secretaries decides’ to ‘the 
Secretariat decides explicitly and justifiably’. While it is clear that most of the changes were 
more focused on clarification, or providing explanatory additions, the Chairperson suggest 
adding that risk management ‘is a management decision taken by the unit engaging with the 
non-State actor, subject to the oversight of the Programme, Budget and Administration 
Committee and the Independent Expert Oversight Advisory Committee in accordance with 
paragraphs 22 and 66 and the transparency for Member States in accordance with paragraph 
38’. It is worth reiterating that FENSA is also seen as a tool for Member States to oversee the 
Secretariat’s actions regarding engagement with non-State actors.  
The paragraph regarding the unit responsible for performing due diligence and risk 
assessment was attached to the previous paragraph, on the concept of risk management. 
Moreover, until April 2016, an Engagement Coordination Group was idealised as ‘a 
Secretariat group appointed by the Director-General that includes representation from 
regional offices’. (EB, 2014, P. 17). While the Member States required a more descriptive 
and detailed text, until April 2016 the paragraph had undergone only the requested linguistic 
adjustments. However, it was profoundly changed in the final version. It was altered from:  
The Engagement Coordination Group reviews proposals of engagement referred to it 
by directors and recommends engagement, continuation of engagement, engagement 
with measures to mitigate risks, non-engagement or disengagement from an existing 
or planned engagement with non-State actors. In cases where the Regional Director 
or Assistant-General disagrees with this recommendation, the final decision rests 
with the Director-General. (A/FENSA/OEIGM/5, 2016, p.15) 
To: 
A dedicated secretariat mechanism reviews proposals of engagement referred to it 
and recommends engagement, continuation of engagement, engagement with 
measures to mitigate risks, non engagement or disengagement from an existing or 
planned engagement with non-State actors. The Director-General, working with the 
Regional Directors, ensures coherence and consistency in implementation and 
interpretation of this Framework across all levels of the Organization (FENSA, 2016, 
p.12)  
It is worth noting that transparency was a topic widely mentioned as controversial 
during the interviews. In version 2 (December 2014), transparency included five paragraphs 
while the final version includes seven. Document EB 136/5 stated that ‘WHO’s interaction 
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with non-State actors is managed transparently. WHO provides the governing bodies with 
annual reports on its engagement with non-State actors and makes publicly available basic 
information on the non-State actors it engages with and the individual engagements 
concerned’. Some suggested adding the work of the Engagement Coordination Group into 
the annual reports, but in the end, as the Coordination Group was not established, the text is 
‘WHO’s interaction with non-State actors is managed transparently. WHO provides an annual 
report to the governing bodies on its engagement with non-State actors, including summary 
information on due diligence, risk assessment and risk management undertaken by the 
Secretariat. WHO also makes publicly available appropriate information on its engagement 
with non-State actors’ (FENSA, 2016, p.12). 
Paragraph 38 on the register of non-State actors changed a lot.  The main suggestion 
was that ‘the register will be finished in March 2016 and can be consulted and updated in an 
on-going fashion, including its preliminary versions’. However, in 2019, three years after the 
proposed deadline, the online register was not fully implemented yet.  Some also proposed to 
add that ‘due diligence and risk assessment reports, as well as decisions on engagement-
related options listed in paragraph 33, will be made available to the Member States’. The 
Chairperson proposed the footnote ‘information on financial contributions received from 
non-State actors is documented in this register and the Programme Budget web portal’, which 
was accepted as the footnote in the final version.   
The responsibility of non-State actors engaging with the WHO to provide information 
on their organisation was improved through the negotiation process and became a separate 
paragraph. It was also suggested to add a paragraph ‘The due diligence reports, including the 
decisions related to risk assessment and risk management, including decisions to refuse to 
engage, will be made available to Member States and relevant information shall be made 
publicly available’. While the Member States proposed the text ‘due diligence and risk 
assessment reports, as well as decisions on engagement-related options listed in paragraph 
33, will be made available to Member States’, the Chair suggested: 
In addition to the publicly available information, Member States have electronic 
access to a summary report on due diligence of non-State actor, and risk assessments 
and risk management on engagement. [Further details of the information used by the 
Secretariat to manage such engagement, can be made available for Member States to 
consult, upon request and as far as legally feasible.] Furthermore Member States can 
search for such information concerning cases considered by the engagement 
coordination group. 
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The text is similar to the final version. Moreover, the two paragraphs about ‘Policy, norms 
and standard-setting’ were deleted from version 3 onwards.  
Unquestionably, the ‘Specific Provisions’ which comprise engagement with particular 
industries and secondments were among the most controversial topics of the FENSA 
negotiation process. The notorious paragraph 44 in version 2 was ‘WHO does not engage 
with the tobacco or arms industries. In addition, WHO will exercise particular caution when 
engaging with other industries affecting human health or affected by WHO’s norms and 
standards’. During the 68WHA paragraph 44 changed to ‘WHO does not engage with the 
tobacco or arms industries’ It was proposed to add ‘and its affiliates’. A supplementary 
paragraph was even considered, but no consensus was reached.  
After issue-specific consultations that took place in September 2015, and informal 
consultations held in October 2015 conducted by the Chair of the intergovernmental meeting, 
FENSA draft (version 5) reached a consensus by stating that: 
44. WHO does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-State actors that work to 
further the interests of the tobacco industry. WHO also does not engage with the 
arms industry. Engagement where particular caution should be exercised; 44bis  79
WHO will exercise particular caution, especially while conducting due diligence, 
risk assessment and risk management, when engaging with private sector entities and 
other non-State actors whose policies or activities are negatively affecting human 
health and are not in line with WHO’s policies, norms and standards, in particular 
those related to noncommunicable diseases and their determinants. 
Secondments were another topic perceived to have caused disagreements between the 
Member States during the interviews. Therefore, while paragraph 46 of the Document 
EB136/5 stated ‘WHO does not accept secondments from non-State actors’, Member States 
proposed two alternative texts in May 2015: ‘WHO does not accept secondments from 
private sector entities. Secondments from other types of non-State actors shall be accepted, in 
accordance with WHA67/7’, or, ‘WHO can accept secondments from non-State actors for 
technical work or implementation of WHO’s programmes and policies and emergency 
response’. In the draft discussed during the 68WHA, it can be observed that the Chair 
proposed that the WHO should not accept secondments from non-State actors. The last 
intergovernmental meeting was still discussing secondments, and the final version (paragraph 
47) forbids secondments only from private sector entities.  
Regarding Official Relations, the main paragraph was kept from the first to the last, 
approved version, assuring that it is ‘a privilege that the Executive Board may grant to 
 Paragraph 45 in the FENSA final version. 79
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nongovernmental organisations, international business associations and philanthropic 
foundations that have  a sustained and systematic engagement in the interest of the 80
Organization’. 
The topic ‘Procedure for admitting and reviewing organizations in official relations’ 
remained practically the same throughout the negotiation process. In the document (version 
3) presented and discussed during the 68th World Health Assembly, it was suggested to add 
the topic ‘Accreditation of NGOs’. The Chair suggested removing the topic while others 
suggested to move it to the specific policies and procedures on engagement with NGOs. In 
the final version, the topic was deleted, and paragraph 53 was added, affirming that:  
For nongovernmental organizations working on global health issues, sustained and 
systematic engagement could include research and active advocacy around WHO 
meetings and WHO’s policies, norms and standards. Official relations may be 
considered for such nongovernmental organizations based on at least three years of 
their activities and future work plan on research and advocacy on global public 
health issues (FENSA, 2016, p. 16) 
Regarding the Oversight of Engagement, the establishment of a Committee on non-
State actors was proposed as a subcommittee of the Executive Board in order to offer some 
control to the Member States. A Senior Management Committee was also suggested as a 
Secretariat committee, appointed by the Director-General, which should include 
representation from regional offices. Both proposals were quickly forgotten as it was decided 
that the Programme, Budget and Administration Committee should take the responsibility. 
Therefore, the outcome draft of the open-ended intergovernmental meeting indicated, on 1st 
May 2015, that ‘the Executive Board, through its Programme, Budget and Administration 
Committee, oversees the implementation of WHO’s policy on engagement with non-State 
actors, proposes revisions to the framework and can grant the privileges of official relations 
to international nongovernmental organisations, philanthropic foundations and international 
business associations’. The text reached consensus and remained the same until the final and 
approved version.  
Finally, the topics ‘Non-compliance with this Framework’ and ‘Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the Framework’ had minor language and clarification adjustments during the 
negotiation. The topic on Implementation was added for deliberations of the last open-ended 
intergovernmental meeting. 
Initially, the Policy and Operational Procedures on Engagement with 
 Final version: “that have had and continue to have”. 80
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Nongovernmental Organisations highlighted the contributions of NGOs in paragraph 1. 
While not reaching a consensus among the Member States, in the draft discussed during the 
68th WHA, the Chair advocated keeping the paragraph, but it was deleted. Regarding 
participation, in version 1, the draft stated that:  
WHO can hold consultations with nongovernmental organisations in the preparation 
of policies. Consultations can be electronic or in person, and may take the form of 
hearings at which nongovernmental organisations can present their views. The 
format of such consultations is decided on a case-by-case basis either by the 
governing body at the session at which a hearing or consultation is mandated or in 
other cases by the Secretariat.  
After the 68WHA, the paragraph was deleted, and a consensus was reached in three 
paragraphs that should constitute the topic ‘Participation by nongovernmental organisations 
in WHO meetings’. The text changed from ‘WHO can invite non-governmental organisations 
to participate in other WHO meetings’ to ‘WHO can invite NGOs to participate in 
consultations, hearings or other meetings in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Overarching 
Framework’ and a new paragraph was added and remained the same until the approved 
version.  
The nature of participation of nongovernmental organisations depends on the type of 
meeting concerned. The format, modalities, and the participation of 
nongovernmental organisations in consultations, hearings, and other meetings is 
decided on a case-by-case basis by the WHO governing bodies or by the Secretariat. 
Participation and inputs received from nongovernmental organisations shall be made 
publicly available, wherever possible. Nongovernmental organisations do not take 
part in any decision making process of the Organization. 
Within the topic ‘Involvement of the Secretariat in meetings organised by nongovernmental 
organisations’, the subtopic ‘Operational Procedures’ had its title changed to ‘Specific 
policies and operational procedures.’  
Regarding Resources, in version 1 (May 2014) the WHO was allowed to accept 
‘funds, personnel and in-kind contributions’. After the 68WHA debate, the Chair suggested 
keeping the text but adding a footnote to personnel, stating that ‘Contribution of personnel 
are only acceptable for short term assignments that do not involve normative work and if 
potential risks are managed in accordance with this framework’. In October 2015, the Chair 
proposed a new text that was kept in the final version: ‘WHO can accept financial and in-
kind contributions from nongovernmental organisations as long as such contributions fall 
within WHO’s General Programme of Work, do not create conflicts of interest, are managed 
in accordance with the framework, and comply with other relevant regulations, rules and 
policies of WHO’.  
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The intergovernmental meeting in October also proposed a new paragraph about the 
conditions for accepting contributions (whether in cash or in kind). The paragraph on the 
WHO providing resources to NGOs for implementation of work was developed in a more 
explanatory way, and the paragraph about acceptance of resources from NGOs added, in 
April 2016, that this should also be in accordance with ‘WHO’s guidelines for medicine 
donations and WHO’s guidelines for health care equipment donations’. 
It has already been mentioned that secondments were a controversial topic of FENSA 
negotiations. The draft presented by the Secretariat on 5th May 2014 (version 1) included a 
paragraph on secondments from NGOs, which was withdrawn in the draft developed in 
December 2014; that was discussed at the 136th Session of the Executive Board, in January 
2015. The paragraph on Evidence, which until the 68WHA was ‘nongovernmental 
organisations can provide up-to-date information and knowledge on technical issues, and 
share their experience and engage with WHO in the following: generation of evidence, 
knowledge management, scientific reviews, information gathering and research’ underwent 
some adjustments and ended up as:  
Nongovernmental organisations may provide their up-to-date information and 
knowledge on technical issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, 
subject to the provisions of the overarching framework, and this specific policy and 
operational procedures, and other applicable WHO rules, policies and procedures. 
Such contribution should be made publicly available, as appropriate, wherever 
possible. Scientific evidence generated should be made publicly available. 
Advocacy is a topic that grew from two paragraphs to four in the final version. While 
the first paragraph on advocacy remained the same, the second paragraph stated that ‘WHO 
favours independent monitoring functions and therefore engages with nongovernmental 
organisations working in this field’. In the intergovernmental meeting of October 2015, it 
was suggested to change the excerpt to ‘WHO encourages critical engagement and therefore 
engages in this constructive spirit with non-State actors’ or ‘WHO recognises the usefulness 
of an independent monitoring function provided by some NGOs in the field’ or ‘WHO 
engages with NGOs which provide an independent monitoring function’. However, the 
suggestion accepted was actually to delete the text. Moreover, a third paragraph on NGOs 
being encouraged to ‘implement and advocate for the implementation of WHO’s norms and 
standards’ was suggested. 
Technical collaboration from NGOs was the only topic that could not reach consensus 
until the final version of FENSA. The first text of the paragraph was ‘The Secretariat is 
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encouraged to undertake technical collaboration with nongovernmental organisations, 
provided that it is in the interests of the Organization and managed in accordance with the 
framework for engagement with non-State actors’. The text proposed by the Chair after the 
Informal Consultations of 2015 was ‘Technical collaboration [ADD FOOTNOTE: as defined 
in the overarching framework] with NGOs is encouraged. This collaboration must be in the 
interest of WHO, and managed in accordance with this framework to protect WHO, and in 
particular, its normative work, from any undue influence and to ensure there is no 
interference with WHO’s advisory function to member states’, but this wasn’t accepted by all 
Member States. In the final version, the paragraph solely suffered language adjustments. 
Similarly to the Policy and Operational Procedure on Engagement with NGOs, the 
specific provision for the engagement with the private sector also stressed initially the role 
played by private sector entities in health. After, during 68WHA, the following text was 
proposed: ‘this policy applies to private sector firms, international business associations, 
academic institutions and philanthropic foundations not at arm’s length with the private 
sector and other not-for-profit organisations, which are not qualified as NGOs under the 
overarching framework on the engagement of non-State actors’. However, after the debates 
of the intergovernmental meeting in September 2015, the paragraph was deleted. Moreover, 
the draft from 15th December 2014 (version 2) added a paragraph stating that ‘In engaging 
with private sector entities, WHO will aim to operate on a competitively neutral basis’ which 
was requested, by some Member States, to be deleted, but remained in the final version. At 
the last intergovernmental meeting, in April 2016, it was suggested to add a paragraph 
declaring that:  
When establishing relationships with private sector entities, it should be borne in 
mind that WHO’s activities affect the commercial sector in broader ways, through for 
example, its public health guidance, its recommendations on regulatory standards, or 
other work that might influence product costs, market demand, or profitability of 
specific goods and services. Such activities include setting of norms for quality, 
safety, and efficacy of pharmaceuticals and related promotional practices, 
dissemination of information on pharmaceuticals; provision of guidelines for 
diagnostics and treatment or advice that might affect the market for individual 
products and product categories; establishment of chemical safety standards; and 
formulation of nutritional guidelines.   
The final and approved version of FENSA, while keeping three initial explanatory 
paragraphs, removed, from the text proposed in April 2016, the passage that starts at ‘such 
activities include’ until the end. It withdrew any straight reference to pharmaceuticals and 
nutrition and thus to the pharmaceutical and to the food and beverage industries.  
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Like the policy for NGOs, the topic of ‘Participation’ grew from two paragraphs to 
three, and the text was adjusted from ‘WHO can invite private sector entities to participate in 
other WHO meetings’ to ‘WHO can invite private sector entities to participate in 
consultations, hearings or other meetings in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Overarching 
Framework’. It is worth noting that despite all the effort of public-interest NGOs to 
distinguish how NGOs and the private sector participates at the WHO, in the final version, 
both NSAs have the same procedures for participation. Regarding the subtopic of 
‘Participation’, ‘Specific policies and operational procedures’, the text of paragraph 8 
changed from ‘WHO does not cosponsor meetings organised by specific private sector 
entities’ to ‘WHO does not cosponsor meetings organised wholly or partly by private sector 
entities’. All other paragraphs of the subtopic remained the same from version 1 until the 
approval.  
Accepting resources from the private sector was another polemical point during the 
debates both inside and outside the negotiation rooms. Many paragraphs related to this took 
time to achieve consensus among the Member States. For instance, in version 1 (May 2014), 
the first paragraph on Resources (paragraph 11) included three subparagraphs, then the draft 
resolution presented and debated during the 68WHA (version 3) added more two 
subparagraphs, and the final and approved version has four. Firstly, one should note that the 
word ‘funds’ changed to ‘financial contributions’. In this sense, the text of subparagraph A 
was improved from ‘funds may be accepted from private sector entities whose business is 
unrelated to that of WHO, provided they are not engaged in any activity that is incompatible 
with WHO’s work’ to ‘financial contributions may be accepted from private sector entities 
whose business is unrelated to that of WHO, provided they are not engaged in any activity or 
have close ties with any entity that is incompatible with WHO’s mandate and work’. While 
subparagraphs D and E were suggested without reaching consensus, the Chair advocated to 
delete both.  
(d) WHO shall not receive financial resources from private sector entities as well as 
non-state actors with links to private sector entities whose activities [or advocacy] 
are undermining the mandate of WHO as stated in its Constitution. (e) The WHO 
should establish ceiling in the voluntary contribution from non-state actors. Any 
contribution beyond that amount should go to the core voluntary fund which gives 
enough freedom to the Secretariat to allocate resources to underfunded programmes. 
The Member States assessed contributions should be allocated to the programmes 
that are underfunded under voluntary contribution.  
None of the paragraphs is in the final version, which added one subparagraph with the 
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following text: ‘The provisions set out in paragraph shall be without prejudice to specific 
mechanisms, such as the PIP Framework, set up by the Health Assembly that involve the 
receipt and pooling of resources’. India was the main actor pushing for ceilings to funds from 
the private sector. 
The paragraph that establishes the conditions upon which financial and in kind 
contributions from private sector entities to WHO programmes can be accepted reached 
consensus in the early stages of negotiations, therefore, there are no changes from version 1 
to the final framework. Although not reaching consensus until April 2016, paragraph 13 (in 
version 1 only, paragraph14 in other versions) stated that:  
The Director-General can set up mechanisms for pooling contributions from multiple 
sources, if the mechanisms are designed in such a manner as to avoid any perceived 
influence from the contributors on WHO’s work; if the mechanism is open to all 
interested contributors; and if the mechanism is subject to the conditions in 
paragraph 12 above and transparency is achieved through the WHO register of non-
State actors and the Programme budget web portal. 
In the last intergovernmental meeting, of April 2016, some suggestions were made, in the 
final version, however, the paragraph was withdrawn.  
The paragraph which recognised that ‘any acceptance of financial, personnel or in-kind 
contribution from private sector entities shall be managed in accordance with this framework 
and based on a signed agreement’ was initially proposed to add a footnote to ‘personnel’: 
‘Contribution of personnel are only acceptable for short term assignments that do not involve 
normative work and if potential risks are managed in accordance with this framework’. 
However, the consensus reached was to change to ‘acceptance of resources’. The paragraph 
on private sector entities using the results of the WHO’s work for commercial purposes had 
minor language corrections.  
Concerning secondments, the first version of FENSA presented to the 67th World 
Health Assembly stated that ‘WHO does not accept in principle secondments from private 
sector entities’. Although many Member States were against this exclusion as will be later 
considered, the paragraph was quickly deleted as it became part of the overarching 
framework. Furthermore, paragraphs concerning donations of medicines and other health 
technologies, financial contributions for clinical trial, contributions for WHO meetings, 
contributions for WHO staff participating in external meetings, contributions for 
publications, and cost recovery, did not raise intense debates. Let us consider the topic 
‘Contributions for financing staff salaries’, whose text indicated that ‘Funds designated to 
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support the salary of specific staff members or posts (including short-term consultants) may 
not be accepted from private sector entities if they could give rise to a real or perceived 
conflict of interest in relation to WHO’s work’. While some suggested removing the words 
‘if they could give…’, the entire paragraph was deleted. 
With regards to Evidence, version 1 included the two following paragraphs:  
31. WHO can only collaborate with private sector entities in the generation of 
evidence, in knowledge management, in information gathering and in research when 
potential conflicts of interest are managed in accordance with this framework and the 
collaboration is transparent. 32. Individuals working for interested private sector 
entities are excluded from participating in advisory groups; however, expert groups 
need to be able, where appropriate, to conduct hearings with such individuals in 
order to access their knowledge.  
The text of paragraph 31 was substituted with ‘Private sector entities may provide their up-
to-date information and knowledge on technical issues, and share their experience with 
WHO, as appropriate, subject to the provisions of the overarching framework, and this 
specific policy and operational procedures, and other applicable WHO rules, policies and 
procedures. Such contribution should be made publicly available, as appropriate, wherever 
possible. Scientific evidence generated should be made publicly available’. On the other 
hand, paragraph 32 could not be agreed upon and some Member States requested its removal 
or a change to ‘Individuals working for interested private sector entities are excluded from 
participating in expert groups; however, expert groups need to be able, where appropriate, to 
conduct hearings with such individuals in order to access their knowledge’. It was also 
suggested to add a third paragraph stating that ‘If information gathering is done in the 
preparation of the development of norms and standards, private sector entities can only be 
involved in the form of hearings’. The final and approved version, however, maintained only 
the aforementioned consensual text of paragraph 31. 
While paragraphs about advocacy had only language adjustments, technical 
collaboration with the private sector figured as a controversial topic. The text initially 
proposed was ‘Technical collaboration with the private sector is welcomed if potential risks 
of engagement are managed or mitigated and provided that the normative work of WHO is 
protected from any undue influence and there is no interference with WHO’s advisory 
function to Member States’. In the FENSA draft presented to the 68WHA, the Chair proposal 
was ‘technical collaboration with the private sector is welcomed provided that it is in the 
interests of the Organization and managed in accordance with this framework and in 
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particular provided that the normative work of WHO is protected from any undue influence 
and there is no interference with WHO’s advisory function to Member States’, but no 
consensus was reached. In the December 2015 meeting, the Chair proposed another option - 
‘Technical collaboration [ADD FOOTNOTE: as defined in overarching framework 
paragraph 21] with private sector entities is encouraged. This collaboration must be in the 
interest of WHO, and managed in accordance with this framework to protect WHO, and in 
particular, its normative work, from any undue influence and to ensure there is no 
interference with WHO’s advisory function to Member States’, which was accepted.  
Finally, about product development, the initial text was: 
WHO collaborates with private sector entities in the development of health-related 
technology, either by conducting research and development on their products and 
supporting transfers and licensing of technology or by licensing its intellectual 
property to such enterprises. Collaborative research and development, technology 
transfer and licensing should, as a general rule, be undertaken only if WHO and the 
entity concerned have concluded an agreement cleared by the Office of the Legal 
Counsel that ensures that the final product will ultimately be made widely available 
and  accessible, including to the public sector of low- and middle-income countries at 
a preferential price. If such an agreement is concluded, financing may be accepted 
from the private sector entity for a clinical trial arranged by WHO on the product in 
question, as contractual commitments obtained from the entity in the public interest 
outweigh any potential conflict of interest in accepting the financial contribution. 
These contributions should be distinguished from the acceptance of contributions for 
a clinical trial arranged by WHO on a proprietary product as described in paragraph 
23.  
There were disagreements regarding whether to use the word affordable and if ‘public sector’ 
and ‘at a preferential price’ should be in the text. An alternative language was proposed by 
the Chair but could not be agreed amongst the Member States, and they a consensus was only 
reached in the last intergovernmental meeting in April 2016:  
WHO may collaborate with private sector entities in the research and development of 
health related technologies that contribute to increasing access to quality, safe, 
efficacious and affordable medical products. Collaborative research and development 
should, as a general rule, be undertaken only if WHO and the private sector entity 
have concluded an agreement which ensures that the final product will ultimately be 
widely available, including to the public sector of developing countries at a 
preferential price. If such an agreement is concluded, financing may be accepted 
from the private sector entity for a trial arranged by WHO on the product in question, 
on the basis that contractual commitments obtained from the private sector entity 
outweigh any potential conflict of interest in accepting such financing. (FENSA, 
2016, p.29) 
  
The Policy and Operational Procedures on Engagement with Philanthropic 
Foundations underlined initially ‘the significant contributions to global health in general and 
to WHO’s work in particular in many areas ranging from innovation to capacity-building to 
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service delivery’. The text was kept until the 68WHA, and although the Chair recommended 
keeping the paragraph, it was deleted after the intergovernmental meeting of September 
2015. Similarly to the policy for NGOs and the private sector, the topic of Participation grew 
from two to three paragraphs and the text was adjusted from ‘WHO can invite philanthropic 
foundations to participate in other WHO meetings’ to ‘WHO can invite philanthropic 
foundations to participate in consultations, hearings or other meetings in accordance with 
paragraph 16 of the Overarching Framework’. 
The first paragraph about resources changed from accepting ‘funds, personnel and 
in-kind contributions’ to ‘financial and in-kind contributions’. At the intergovernmental 
meeting of September 2015, it was suggested to add a footnote to ‘personnel’ stating that 
‘contribution of personnel are only acceptable for short term assignments that do not involve 
normative work and if potential risks are managed in accordance with this framework’, even 
though, it was later deleted. The paragraph about Evidence was changed in a sense, to clarify 
the text, as it initially detailed that ‘philanthropic foundations can provide up-to-date 
information and knowledge on technical issues, and share their experience and engage with 
WHO in the generation of evidence, in knowledge management, in scientific reviews, in 
information gathering in research’ and in the approved version it states that: 
Philanthropic foundations may provide their up-to-date information and knowledge 
on technical issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, subject to 
the provisions of the overarching framework, and this specific policy and operational 
procedures, and other applicable WHO rules, policies and procedures. Such 
contribution should be made publicly available, as appropriate, wherever possible. 
Scientific evidence generated should be made publicly available 
One should note that mentions of the generation of evidence, knowledge management, 
scientific reviews, information gathering and research were withdrawn from the paragraph.  
Regarding advocacy, although previous FENSA drafts indicate that a consensus was 
reached, the version presented to the last open-ended intergovernmental meeting of April 
2016 had two further paragraphs:   
18bis WHO encourages Philanthropic foundations to implement and advocate for the 
implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and standards. WHO engages in dialogue 
with Philanthropic foundations in order to promote the implementation of WHO’s 
policies, norms and standards. (ADD FOOTNOTE: Philanthropic foundations 
working with WHO will be expected to conform to WHO’s public health policies in 
areas such as food safety, chemical safety, ethical promotion of medicinal drug 
products, tobacco control, noncommunicable diseases, as well as health and safety at 
work) 18ter Philanthropic foundations can only collaborate with WHO in advocacy 
for the implementation of WHO policies norms or standards if they commit 
themselves to implement these policies, norms or standards in their entirety. No 
partial or selective implementation is acceptable 
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Finally, the paragraph on Technical Collaboration has, in the final version, more detailed text, 
which was proposed during the informal consultation of September 2015.  
Following the pattern, the paragraph that addressed the contributions of academic 
institutions to global health was removed, and the paragraph on participation also changed 
from ‘WHO can invite academic institutions to participate in other WHO meetings’ to ‘WHO 
can invite academic institutions to participate in consultations, hearings or other meetings in 
accordance with paragraph 16 of the Overarching Framework’. With regards to Resources, 
part of the text of the paragraph on the WHO providing resources to academic institutions 
was withdrawn: ‘Grants are normally provided on the basis of review and recommendations 
by a group of external convened by WHO. If no such review mechanism is followed, WHO’s 
Contract Review Committee should be consulted. The provision of financial resources for a 
project organised or coordinated by WHO is subject to WHO’s procurement rules’.   
Like the policy for NGOs, the draft presented by the Secretariat on 5th May 2014 
(version 1) included the topic ‘Seconded Personnel’, stating that ‘secondments from 
academic institutions are acceptable, provided that a) there is no conflict of interest’. The 
whole paragraph was withdrawn in the draft developed in December 2014. The paragraph 
about Evidence had a similar path to the one concerning the relation with philanthropic 
foundations - it was changed into a clearer text. With regards to ‘Advocacy’, the topic 
initially included only one paragraph and ended with three. One should note that the excerpt 
‘WHO favours independent monitoring functions and therefore engages with academic 
institutions working in this field’, of the first paragraph on advocacy, was removed. 
Finally, when it comes to ‘Technical Collaboration’, it is worth noting that the four 
specific policies ended up with the same paragraph which changed from ‘The Secretariat is 
encouraged to undertake technical collaboration with academic institutions, provided that it is 
in the interests of the Organization and managed in accordance with the framework for 
engagement with non-State actors’ to: 
WHO may engage with academic institutions as defined in overarching framework 
paragraph 20. Technical collaboration with academic institutions is encouraged. This 
collaboration must be in the interest of WHO, and managed in accordance with the 
overarching framework and this policy to protect WHO, and in particular, its 
normative work, from any undue influence or conflict of interest and to ensure there 
is no interference with WHO’s advisory function to Member States. 
When tracking changes between these documents specifically, it can be noted that 
there were almost no changes in the operational procedures. Perhaps the major change on the 
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way NSAs can engage with the WHO was the withdrawal of the possibility to support policy-
making at the national level. The document changed more in a way of improving the 
structure, the explanation of polemical concepts – such as conflict of interests – and the 
development of safeguards. 
4.3 The Position of the Member States According to the Documents  
While I previously compared several versions of the FENSA, aiming to track the most 
significant changes of the document, in this part of the chapter, I will look at the textual 
proposals submitted by the Member States after the 136th Session of the Executive Board. As 
already clarified in the Introduction, the Member States were selected given their 
participation, which was considered based on official documents, media reports and 
interviews. Initially, the Member States from the Global North which were more active, 
considering documents and media reports were: Canada, France, Norway, United Kingdom 
and the United States; from the Global South they were: Bolivia, Brazil, India, Mexico and 
Zambia. However, all research has its limitations and researchers should not try 
to deny such limitations. Five representatives from those countries agreed to be interviewed 
for this thesis but the other five Member States remained essential to this analysis. In order to 
avoid a deadlock, I decided to consider the written comments from the Member States, which 
were initially selected but denied the request for an interview. Therefore, the proposals 
submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Germany, India, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Zambia, Mexico, Argentina and Egypt were taken into consideration.       

4.3.1 Canada 
According to the methodology chosen, Canada was one of the most active Member 
States during the negotiations. Three emails were sent requesting an interview for this thesis, 
but the answer was that the Ambassador was travelling. Even though I explained that I would 
be conducting interviews for the next eight months, the answer was ‘unfortunately our 
current Health officers were not involved in the negotiations and are not well placed to speak 
on the issues’. Therefore, the position taken by Canada during FENSA negotiations will be 
analysed, taking into consideration the available documents, media reports and interviewees 
who may have mentioned the Canadian participation. The primary source used, however, is a 
non-paper with the textual proposal submitted by the Member States on the draft of FENSA 
which was presented and discussed during the EB136. 
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The first comment made by Canada was in relation to paragraph 16 on Participation 
sustaining that the country was ‘satisfied with the Framework’s current policies regarding 
non-State actors participation in WHO meetings’ but stressed that it was important that the 
WHO should remain open ‘to the views of all interested parties during hearings and 
consultations’. Concerning paragraph 27 on due diligence and risk assessment, Canada was 
also satisfied, but pointed out that the practices outlined in the Framework could be more 
refined ‘to include existing WHO structures, such as the Office of Compliance, Risk 
Management, and Ethics, and should be amended to protect against individual conflicts of 
interest’. About due diligence detailed in paragraph 29, Canada advocated that while non-
State actors should not be able to directly fund the salaries of WHO staff, they could 
‘contribute funds to a pooled human resources fund, or contribute to a programme, then have 
their contributions spent as the programme area deemed appropriate’. 
Considering the general comments presented in the section ‘Management of conflict of 
interest, and other risks of engagement’, Canada agreed that it required the WHO to ‘equip 
itself with the right tools to transparently manage its engagement with non-State actors. In 
our view, the proposed registry and disclosure policies as demonstrated at PBAC will assure 
transparency of the Organisation’s engagements’. Regarding the controversial paragraph 44, 
which stated that the WHO does not engage with the tobacco or arms industries, Canada, 
while recognising the importance of excluding engagement with the tobacco and arms 
industries, asserted that it ‘would not like to see any further limitations formalised. Canada 
trusts the WHO to use sound judgement to engage appropriately with actors from different 
sectors while respecting the provisions of the Framework; we also understand that these 
provisions should be closely monitored and modified as necessary to ensure the 
organisation’s protection from undue influence’. 
Concerning the section ‘Official Relations’, Canada submitted general comments 
affirming that it was pleased with the procedures delineated in the Framework. Whereas 
consultations and hearings should be open to a comprehensive variety of actors, ‘WHO 
should remain vigilant and judicious in selecting the NSAs to which it confers the privileges 
of official relations. We appreciate that organisations in official relations will be reviewed 
every three years and that they are required to provide yearly reports on progress made in 
implementing the plan of collaboration that will be published in the register of NSAs’. 
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Canada did not submit any comment about the Policy and Operational Procedures on 
Engagement with Nongovernmental Organisations, Philanthropic Foundations or Academic 
Institutions. The country made just one observation on the specific engagement with the 
private sector, precisely on the section about resources, claiming that it was satisfied that the 
conditions for resources from private sector entities providers had the ‘necessary safeguards 
to protect against undue influence’. Therefore, ‘respecting the principles of fairness and 
inclusivity, private sector actors should be able to contribute funds like other non-State 
actors, as long as there is a clear policy that ensures that WHO staff are void from any 
obligation to donors and that they remain neutral and unbiased’. 
Finally, Canada’s general comments on the draft of the framework of engagement with 
non-State actors, presented and discussed during the EB136, were that FENSA should not 
contain policies and regulations that would limit the WHO’s ability to engage with the 
necessary non-State actors. The country also advocated that the Framework should be 
adopted ‘on a trial basis’ to check which practices would be more effective and then to 
improve policies throughout the implementation. Moreover, Canada underlined that the 
Framework should be applied ‘consistently’ across all levels of the Organisation and all 
regions. Regarding the controversial issue of secondments, Canada argued that, while 
recognising that the WHO and Member States benefit from the work of personnel from non-
State actors, the FENSA should clarify the cases in which the WHO could accept personnel 
from NSAs and also suggested that these individuals should be required to complete a 
declaration of interests with the Office of Risk Management, Compliance and Ethics, as 
should staff and external experts. 
While encouraging the FENSA to be ‘as inclusive as possible’, Canada claimed that, 
given that the attribution of a non-State actor to any one of the four categories may change 
over time, ‘the criteria to inform and the mechanism responsible for decisions regarding the 
categorisation of non-State actors be made explicit (…). This addition should include 
instructions on the process for evaluating non-State actor classifications and should specify 
the frequency at which these evaluations should take place’. Lastly, regarding the private 
sector, Canada requested that the same robust criteria required for private sector actors to 
collaborate for the generation of evidence should be applied to all non-State actor; ‘it is 
possible that NGOs, philanthropic organisations and academic institutions have vested 
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competing interests and these risks must be mitigated diligently and fairly’. 

4.3.2 United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom was another country selected, considering the chosen 
methodology. The positions taken by the UK during the FENSA negotiations will be analysed 
considering the available documents, media reports and an interview conducted on the 6th of 
December of 2018; this will be further discussed in chapters 5 and 7. At the moment, the 
leading source is the non-paper with the textual proposal submitted by the Member States on 
the draft of FENSA in February 2015, in which the United Kingdom made 26 comments, 
only behind India, Bolivia and the United States. 
The UK initially remarked that the excerpt ‘The functions of the WHO, as set out in 
Article 2 of its Constitution, include: (…) to establish and maintain effective collaboration 
with diverse organisations’ was a critical point to the country as it provides a constitutional 
basis for proactive engagement with non-State actors. In paragraph 7 (benefits of 
engagement), the UK once more underlined the importance of an extensive engagement with 
NSAs. The United Kingdom also made some language observations which do not need to be 
specified. 
Paragraph 7 details the WHO’s involvement in meetings organised by a non-State 
actor and the UK suggested an additional provision for Member State-sponsored events 
which are co-sponsored by an NSA. Regarding paragraph 24 on conflict of interests, the UK 
suggested a more precise understanding of what an institutional conflict of interest would be 
and what elements should be covered by non-institutional conflict of interest. Moreover, 
because paragraph 26 stated that ‘For WHO the most important institutional conflicts of 
interest arise in situations where the economic interests of private sector entities are in 
conflict with WHO’s interests, especially the Organisation’s independence and impartiality in 
setting norms and standards’, the UK required a ‘strong rationale’ for just the private sector 
being mentioned in the paragraph. Paragraph 30 establishes the main functions of due 
diligence; in this regard, the UK argued that topic D of paragraph 30, which stated: ‘identify 
“red lines” such as: activities that are incompatible with WHO’s work and mandate (e.g. links 
to the tobacco and arms industries) or that require the Organization to exercise particular 
caution when engaging with the entity (e.g. links to other industries affecting human health or 
affected by WHO’s norms and standards)’, the use of the expression ‘links to’ was 
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obstructive as it could potentially include a very broad range of entities, ‘some of whom may 
have a positive role to play in global health’. The UK, on the whole, supported the principle 
‘but the language needs to be tightened’. 
The United Kingdom also expressed its support of the establishment of an engagement 
coordination group and a non-State actor register. Regarding the controversial secondments, 
the UK suggested deleting the paragraph that forbids secondments from non-State actors and 
argued that ‘WHO should accept secondments from non-State actors but based on the robust 
due diligence and risk management processes set out in this framework’. The last comment 
of the United Kingdom on the overarching framework was on the topic ‘Relation of the 
framework to WHO’s other policies’. Given that paragraph 48 asserts that the FENSA would 
apply for the management of risks of the WHO’s engagement in partnerships, the UK 
affirmed that it was concerned about the practical implications of hosted partnerships and 
special programme operations. 
With regards to the Policy and Operational Procedures on Engagement with 
Nongovernmental Organisations, the United Kingdom commented equivalently on paragraph 
6, about the participation of the WHO in meetings organised by nongovernmental 
organisations, on paragraph 16 , about NGOs being encouraged to disseminate the WHO’s 
policies, guidelines, norms and standards and on paragraph 31 about the generation of 
evidence. On the whole, the UK pointed out that the language ‘should be consistent with the 
other non-State actors' policies’. Furthermore, the UK enquired as to the reason why 
paragraph 6 on participation in meetings organised by a private sector entity had the excerpt 
‘as long as the integrity, independence and reputation of the Organization are preserved’ 
added. 
When it comes to Resources, the UK criticised that, differently from the NGO policy, 
there was no provision for personnel contributions from the private sector. Paragraph 26 is 
part of the topic Contributions for WHO meetings and states that ‘WHO receptions and 
similar functions shall not be paid for by private sector entities’. In this regard, the UK was 
advocating for a more flexible approach as ‘against an agreed and robust set of criteria, a 
private sector entity could host and/or part fund events/meetings’. 
The UK did not provide further notes on the specific policies for philanthropic 
foundations and academic institutions. Overall, it can be noted that the United Kingdom was 
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seeking the same treatment for all NSAs and broader engagement with all kinds of non-State 
actors in order to strengthen the WHO’s role in the global health landscape. This perspective 
was also observed during the interview. Therefore, in the general comments on FENSA, the 
country declared that: 
We believe that it is impossible for WHO to fulfil its convening role, if it is unable to 
engage with all actors who are able to contribute to the global health agenda 
(…)Secondly, we believe it is vital that the policy be a platform for a proactive 
engagement with all actors that have a legitimate and positive role to play in 
advancing public health for all. So it should enable more engagement, not less. (….) 
While we agree that there is a need, in some instances, for non-State actors to be 
treated differently, we want to see a focus on commonalities within the Framework, 
with a clear rationale where difference is necessary. In the current draft there remain 
a number of areas where the rationale for such differences is unclear  
To conclude, the United Kingdom highlighted that the country could not accept a prohibition 
on all secondments from non-State actors; this affirmation was also made in the interview.

4.3.3 France 
Despite having made significant interventions, as shown by documents, France was 
not highly mentioned in media reports nor in preliminary interviews. I have tried to contact 
different individuals who were involved in FENSA negotiations but with no answer. Similar 
to Canada, the comments submitted by France in February 2015, to be discussed in the open-
ended intergovernmental meeting from 30th March to 1st April 2015 will be taken into 
consideration in the analysis of results provided in chapter 7. 
Already in paragraph 1, France advocated to specifically list where the framework 
would apply: headquarters, regional offices and country offices, as well as hosted 
partnerships and entities set up under the WHO. The country also pointed out some language 
issues, mainly due to translations that ended up having different meanings. Regarding the 
subparagraph B ‘Consultations’, part of paragraph 16 about non-State actors’ participation in 
meetings organised by the WHO, France proposed some edits in order to have a less 
ambiguous text. The country also criticised the passage ‘there are no limits imposed on non-
State actors’ participation at such meetings’, arguing that this could not be categorically 
stated, given that occasionally the Member States can decide ‘to meet alone, among 
themselves, for intermediate consultations outside meetings of the governing bodies’. 
In relation to the section ‘Management of Conflict of Interest, and other risks of 
engagement’, France proposed to change the phrase  ‘Risks of engagement need to be 
managed and communicated coherently throughout the Organization’ to ‘Risks of 
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engagement need to be managed and communicated coherently in each of the three levels of 
the Organization and throughout the Organization’. France made many suggestions to edit 
text without modifying the substance. For instance, in paragraph 36 on risk management, 
France suggested that ‘a precise definition of the ‘risk management framework’ referred to 
here would be very helpful’. Furthermore, the country pointed out that the concept of 
‘WHO’s interests’ was not precisely defined as the concept ‘seems to vary slightly depending 
on the paragraph of the text (…) it would, therefore, be preferable to provide a clear 
definition in the future glossary and then to ensure concordance with paragraph 23 which 
identifies the ‘primary interests’ (of WHO) exclusively with WHO’s work.’ 
Paragraph 38 details the register of non-State actors as ‘an internet-based, publicly 
available electronic tool used by the Secretariat to document and coordinate engagement with 
non-State actors’ and France suggested converting part of the paragraph into a new one ‘Non-
State actors engaging with WHO are required to provide information on their organisation. 
This information includes: name, legal status, objective, governance structure, composition 
of main decision-making bodies, assets, annual income and funding sources, main relevant 
affiliations, webpage and one or more focal points for WHO contacts’. Regarding the 
contentious paragraph 44, France affirmed that ‘the important thing is to have a clear and 
fixed definition of the excluded sectors, leaving no room for multiple interpretations that 
would have to be decided upon on a case-by-case basis’. 
Finally, France recommended that the Secretariat should develop, by way of a glossary 
or terminological annexe, a series of fixed definitions that should facilitate the interpretation 
of the framework. The country also highlighted that FENSA draft contained contradictory, or 
‘not entirely consistent definitions’ in numerous paragraphs.

4.3.4 United States  
As would be expected, the United States had a protagonistic role during the FENSA 
negotiations. The country was the one from the Global North that made more proposals on 
FENSA draft of the EB136, second only to India. In order to analyse the US position on 
FENSA alongside the interviews and media report, this chapter will detail the written 
comments submitted by the country in February 2015. 
The first comment was regarding paragraph 5, part of the ‘Rationale’. The US 
proposed to add that due diligence and transparency measures would be applicable to all non-
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State actors. Then, in paragraph 6, which determined the overarching principles of 
engagement, it was suggested to add a bullet point, asserting that any engagement should 
conform with the WHO’s mandate and work programme. The country also proposed to 
change the sub-section title Risks of Engagement to Management of Engagement. Therefore, 
with regard to paragraph 8 on the topic, it was suggested to change the phrase ‘engagement 
with non-State actors can involve risks which need to avoided or mitigated’ to ‘engagement 
with non-States actors should involve the management of risks’.  
One should note that the US asked to delete ‘entities not ‘at arm’s length’ from their 
commercial sponsors’ as well as the footnote explaining what an ‘entity at arm’s length’ 
actually is from paragraph 11, which establishes what should be considered private sector. 
According to paragraph 14, the overarching framework and the respective specific policy on 
engagement should apply to each NSA, while due diligence would determine ‘if a non-State 
actor is subject to the influence of private sector entities such that the non-State actor has to 
be considered itself a private sector entity’. The United States, however, proposed a new 
wording: ‘For all non-State actors, the overarching framework and the respective specific 
policy on engagement apply. WHO will determine through its due diligence if a non-State 
actor does not meet the criteria above and take appropriate action, with opportunity for the 
non-State actor in question to have opportunity to both provide further information and to 
seek information on the WHO assessment.’ The country also proposed a new paragraph 
including public-private partnerships, highlighting that ‘WHO’s engagement with public-
private partnerships should not be prohibited or restricted solely on the basis of a business 
model which includes multiple types of non-State actors’. The United States also 
recommended talking about risks and benefits, instead of just risks. 
Regarding the section ‘conflict of interest’, the US asked to delete from paragraph 23 
the excerpt ‘(conflict of interest) may reasonably be perceived to unduly influence’ and to 
add that conflicts of interest are not always financial. The country also suggested to withdraw 
the definition of institutional conflict of interest from paragraph 24 and its subsequent 
mention in paragraph 25. Finally, the total deletion of paragraph 26 was recommended: ‘For 
WHO the most important institutional conflicts of interest arise in situations where the 
economic interests of private sector entities are in conflict with WHO’s interests, especially 
the Organisation’s independence and impartiality in setting norms and standards’.  
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The country also made comments about all paragraphs included in the section ‘Due 
diligence and risk assessment’. For instance, the US suggested adding the following passage 
to paragraph 28: ‘A benefit/risk assessment on a proposed engagement is conducted in 
parallel to due diligence. This involves the assessment of risks associated with an 
engagement with a non-State actor, in particular the risks described in paragraph 8’. 
Additionally, to change ‘public’ for ‘legal’ in paragraph 29, which stated that due diligence 
would not only review the information provided by the non-State actor, but search for 
information about the entity from other sources. Paragraph 30, on functions of due diligence, 
was also mentioned. The country suggested that the fourth bullet point on ‘red lines’ be 
changed from ‘that require the Organization to exercise particular caution when engaging 
with the entity (e.g. links to other industries affecting human health or affected by WHO’s 
norms and standards)’ to ‘identify activities of the entity that may require the Organization to 
consider setting more narrow parameters for the engagement, or that are affected by WHO’s 
norms and standards’. In paragraph 31, the United States recommended the removal of the 
passage that allowed the Secretariat to categorise each non-State based on ‘its nature, 
objectives, governance, funding, independence and membership’.  Finally, it asked to delete 
paragraph 32, about risks. 
As will be discussed in the next chapters, paragraph 44 was central to the United 
States, as affirmed by interviewee 7. The country, hence, requested the deletion of the 
passage ‘WHO will exercise particular caution when engaging with other industries affecting 
human health or affected by WHO’s norms and standards’. The country also sought the 
removal of paragraph 46 which was forbidding secondments from non-State actors and 
pointed out that the section ‘Procedure for admitting and reviewing organizations in official 
relations’ lacked mechanisms for discussion with a non-State actor, in the case of 
disagreement on the determination of eligibility. The last comment on the overarching 
principles was suggesting the addition of a passage to paragraph 71 on FENSA 
implementation and evaluation, both concerning results relating to the protection of the 
organisation from conflicts of interest. The US position was clearly towards facilitating 
‘meaningful engagement with non-State actors to shared global health goals’. 
With regards to the Policy and Operational Procedures on Engagement with 
Nongovernmental Organisations, the United States started suggesting two new paragraphs to 
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complement paragraph 1. One to state that the engagement with NGOs at the institutional 
level should be distinguished from the collaboration with individual experts working for non-
governmental organisations, and the other to suggest that when engaging with non-
governmental organisations, the WHO should operate on a competitively neutral basis. The 
country also proposed that in paragraph 14, about NGOs being able to engage with the WHO 
in the generation of evidence, knowledge management and others, it should be added that this 
collaboration should take place ‘when potential conflicts of interest are managed in 
accordance with this framework, and the collaboration is transparent’. 
The specific policy for the private sector can be considered to be of great importance 
to the United States as the country made several recommendations, starting at paragraph 1, 
suggesting some improvements. For instance, that the engagement between the WHO and the 
private sector would maximize the positive contribution and advance efforts to reduce 
significant health risks. As recommended for NGOs, a new paragraph on engagement with 
the private sector at the institutional level should distinguish it from the collaboration with 
individual experts. Regarding paragraphs 8 and 9, about meetings organised by the private 
sector, the US commented that the paragraphs ‘should not be restrictive in comparison to 
other policy frameworks such as CODEX where WHO cosponsors workshops parallel with 
CODEX meetings’. As for paragraph 12, on the acceptance of resources from private sector, 
the US suggested to switch ‘Funds may not be sought or accepted from private sector entities 
that have (…) a direct commercial interest in the outcome of the project toward which they 
would be contributing’ to ‘(…) direct effects on profits or competitive advantage (…)’. 
Concerning the conditions under which financial and in kind contributions from the 
private sector could be accepted, the United States made three observations. The first one was 
on the passage ‘(c) the proportion of funding of any activity coming from the private sector 
cannot be such that the programme’s continuation would become dependent on this support’. 
The country stressed that more explanation was required, as ‘not only Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness, but also many NTD programs, are highly reliant on industry contributions for 
their success’. The second was on the passage ‘(e) the contributor may not use the results of 
WHO’s work for commercial purposes or use the fact of its contribution in its promotional 
material’. The US argued that whilst it understood the need to protect the WHO’s brand from 
being used for commercial purposes, ‘public profiling of partnerships are important, both for 
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building momentum and additional contributions (…) Too restrictive interpretation of this 
language could lead to loss of effectiveness of WHO as a global convener on global health 
matters from NCDs to pandemic preparedness’. The third observation was made on ‘(g) the 
acceptance of the contribution does not offer the contributor any possibility for advising, 
influencing, participating in being in command of the management or implementation of 
operational activities’. Although the United States agreed that the private sector should not be 
involved in advising, influencing or leading the management of operational activities, 
excluding their participation could result in loss of  ‘valuable additional resources and 
expertise in a given project or even emergency response situation’. 
Paragraph 24 states that ‘For meetings convened by WHO, a contribution from a 
private sector entity may not be accepted if it is designated to support the participation of 
specific invitees (including such invitees’ travel and accommodation), regardless of whether 
such contribution would be provided directly to the participants or channelled through 
WHO’. The United States suggested to complement this with ‘WHO can accept such 
financial contributions, only if the meeting would not take place without WHO’s involvement 
or if WHO’s involvement is necessary in order to ensure that the work is undertaken in 
conformity with internationally accepted technical and ethical standards and guidelines’. 
The USA suggested an entire change in paragraphs 31 and 34, about evidence and 
advocacy, respectively. The new texts would be: 
Paragraph 31 - Private sector entities can provide up-to-date information and 
knowledge on technical issues, and share their experience and engage with WHO in 
the generation of evidence, knowledge management, scientific reviews, information 
gathering and research, when potential conflicts of interest are managed in accordance 
with this framework and the collaboration is transparent.   
Paragraph 34 - WHO may collaborate with private sector entities to advocate for the 
implementation of a WHO norm or standard if the entity commits to implement the 
subject norms and standards in their entirety.  
Regarding the paragraph on technical collaboration, the passage ‘technical collaboration with 
the private sector is welcomed if potential risks of engagement are managed or mitigated and 
provided that the normative work of WHO is protected from any undue influence and there is 
no interference with WHO’s advisory function to Member States’ should be replaced by 
‘technical collaboration with the private sector is welcomed provided that it is in the interests 
of the Organization and managed in accordance with the framework for engagement with 
non-State actors’.   
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Lastly, it is worth noting that the United States highlighted that the country ‘applauds 
innovative solutions to global health challenges like the recent Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework, which includes provisions for the industry to provide financial 
support to WHO for the functioning of the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System. We wish to ensure that nothing in this framework would impede such collaboration 
now or in the future’.  
On the specific policies for Philanthropic Foundations and Academic Institutions, the 
United States made the same overall observations made about NGOs. The country then ended 
with a note arguing that the WHO should align and harmonise its institutional and individual 
policies concerning conflict of interest. It was also pointed out the ‘undue emphasis on 
financial interests of the private sector implies that potential financial conflict of interest of 
private entities are somehow more important than any type of conflict of interest of any other 
type of-non-State actors’. During the negotiations, the country advocated that financial and 
non-financial conflict of interest should be managed consistently across all types of non-State 
actors.  
4.3.5 Norway  
Norway was not among the first selected countries to be analysed as, according to the 
documents, the country made fewer interventions than the UK, US, France, Canada and 
Finland. However, after analysing the media reports and also some exploratory interviews, 
Norway was pointed out as an essential country during FENSA negotiations. 
Norway made four suggestions on FENSA draft, as requested in the 136th Session of 
the Executive Board. The first one was related to the Section ‘Engagement: rationale, 
principles, benefits and risks’. The country highlighted the importance of preserving the 
balance between ‘the safeguards to protect WHO against undue influence on the one hand, 
and the need for WHO to fulfil its leadership role and to foster the use of non-state actors’ 
resources on the other’. Regarding Due Diligence, Norway stated that the final framework 
should maintain the possibility for non-State actors to earmark financial contributions ‘as 
appropriate’ as well as for the WHO to use part of such contributions on staff salaries, 
‘provided that the contributions fall within the priorities and activities reflected in any 
adopted programme budget and when all relevant safeguards in the framework has been 
applied’. 
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Paragraph 44 was also mentioned by Norway. While fully supporting the non-
engagement of the WHO with the tobacco or arms industries, the country affirmed that when 
mentioning particular caution with other industries, the Framework had provided ‘sufficient 
safeguards concerning potential engagement with other industries and would not want to see 
any additional industries or sectors specified, keeping in mind that the purpose of the 
framework should be for the WHO to manage risk rather than attempting to eliminate it’. 
Norway also emphasised the importance of coherence amongst all the six regions and 
the three levels of the organisation, therefore, the final framework should apply across the 
whole organisation. This point was significantly cited during interviews.

4.3.6. India 
India was the country that made the most comments on FENSA draft used here, and it 
was also referred to as a very active Member State by both media and interviewees. Given 
this protagonistic role, we tried to reach any representative from India several times and 
through different approaches: writing to the Indian Embassy in Geneva, writing to names 
indicated by other interviewees, writing to diplomats whose names were on WHO 
documents. Nonetheless, we never received any kind of answer. 
The first amended proposed by India was for the 1st paragraph, the excerpt ‘this 
overarching framework and four specific policies shall govern WHO’s all types of 
engagement with non-State actors including alliance or collaboration or partnership 
irrespective of any existing policies’ should be added. For paragraph 2, apart from a language 
adjustment, the main proposal was to delete ‘WHO engages with non-State actors in the 
advancement and protection of public health in order to foster the use of non-State actors’ 
resources (including knowledge, expertise, commodities, personnel and finances) in favour of 
public health and to encourage non-State actors to improve their own activities to protect and 
promote public health’. On paragraph 5, it was suggested to add ‘WHO needs simultaneously 
to strengthen its framework for engagement to avoid, or where unavoidable appropriately 
managed of the associated potential risks’. 
 Paragraph 6 defined the principles of engagement and, for India, engagements should 
not compromise the scientific and evidence-based approach. Hence, instead of ‘protect WHO 
from any undue influence’, the text should be ‘protect WHO from any undue influence in 
particular the process of evidence and information gathering, in elaborating regulatory 
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frameworks and treaties, setting norms and standards, as well as policy implementation’. 
Similarly, subparagraph F should change from ‘be actively managed so as to mitigate any 
form of risk to WHO (including conflicts of interest)’ to ‘actively avoid, or where 
unavoidable, appropriately manage both actual and perceived conflict of interest as well as to 
mitigate any other form of risk to WHO’.  
Regarding the risks of engagement, India suggested two amendments. The first was to 
add ‘evidence and information gathering’ among the issues that could be unduly influenced. 
The second was to include integrity and independence in the text ‘a negative impact on 
WHO’s reputation and credibility’.  
To the section ‘Non-State Actors’, India proposed to add the following text in 
paragraph 10 about NGOs:  
The membership, governing or advisory bodies of the NGO shall not include private 
sector entities, individuals working for the private sector entities, philanthropic 
foundations or academic institutions which are not at arm’s length from the private 
sector entities including individuals working for such academic institutions or 
philanthropic foundations (…)Private commercial or profit-making nature is assessed 
not only on the basis of the document of incorporation but also from its activities, 
governance structure, source of finance etc. NGOs shall not receive more than 30% 
of their financial resources from the private sector entities, philanthropic foundations 
or academic institutions which are not at arm’s length from the private sector entities. 
In the paragraph about private sector entities, India recommended adjusting the footnote 
about an entity being ‘at arm’s length’ from another entity to not only being influenced in its 
decisions but also objectives and activities. Regarding philanthropic foundations, it was 
required to add that they should be independent of any private sector entity, not only in their 
governance and decision-making but also in their objectives, programs and activities. 
Moreover ‘their programs and activities shall not further the commercial interest of the 
donor/donors’. For academic institutions, the following text was proposed:  
(Academic institutions are entities engaged in the pursuit and dissemination of 
knowledge through research, education and training) as part of an university or 
public funded institutions. Academic institutions established by the private sector or 
the presence of private sector in the administration including governing and 
academic bodies would be treated as private sector entities. Further if an academic 
institution receives more than 30 % of their total revenue from private sector entities 
or any funding from private sector in the area where it seeks engagement with WHO 
would be considered as private sector. 
The country also proposed to delete from paragraph 14 the excerpt ‘if the decision-
making processes of a non-State actor remain independent of the private sector influence, 
WHO can decide to consider the entity as a nongovernmental organisation, a philanthropic 
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foundation or an academic institution, but may apply relevant provisions of the private sector 
policy, such as not accepting funding for normative work’. Instead, the passage ‘to ensure 
consistency and certainty, if in its due diligence, the non-State actor fulfils one or more of the 
following criteria, such an entity shall be categorised as a private sector entity’ should be 
added. Four bullet points were also recommended:  
 • Private sector entities including international business associations; philanthropic 
foundations and academic institutions not at arm’s length from the private sector 
entities, are present in the membership or governing bodies or advisory bodies of the 
non-State actor.  
• More than 30% of the non-State actor’s revenue or funding is from private sector 
entities including international business associations; philanthropic foundations and 
academic institutions not at arm’s length with the private sector entities.  
• The activities and publications of the non-State actor to find out whether it 
promotes the interest of private sector entities against public health goals.  
• The key office bearers of the non-State actor have significant past and present 
connections with private sector entities.  
On types of interaction, India proposed to highlight that the framework should apply to 
any existing or future collaborations and partnership, both hosted and external. Additionally, 
the phrase about no limits to non-State actors’ participation at WHO meetings should be 
replaced by ‘participation of non-State actors in Consultations are subject to the 
corresponding mandate from the Governing Bodies and in absence of such mandate the 
consultation shall be carried out on web-based platform and inputs received from non-State 
actors shall be made publicly available’. The country also suggested a new subparagraph 
defining that ‘Meetings of Bodies for setting Norms, Standards and Policies: private sector 
entities, as well as non-State actors with links to private sector entities, shall not be allowed 
to attend or participate in any WHO meetings including expert committee meetings or 
intergovernmental negotiations, involved in the formulation or setting of policies, norms, 
standards or guidelines’.  
The country was against allowing personnel as a form of resource and of NSAs being 
allowed to support policymaking at the national level as an activity of technical 
collaboration. On paragraph 19 about evidence, it suggested adding ‘utmost care should be 
taken to ensure that gathering, analyses and generation of information and the management 
of knowledge and research is free from the conflict of interest. The Secretariat should always 
make available the evidence gathered with the cooperation of non-state actors for 
independent verification’. 
Concerning conflict of interest, India suggested starting paragraph 22 with 
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‘Avoiding and if unavoidable appropriately managing (…)’. The same passage was 
recommended to paragraph 23, which should also add three types of conflict of interest: 
individual, institutional and conflicting interest. A new paragraph was proposed, defining that 
an individual conflict of interest ‘occurs when an individual who is a consultant or expert 
engaged or commissioned by WHO, influences the decisions of WHO at the cost of its 
integrity, independence and objectivity of WHO’. Besides, some examples were given of 
situations in which an individual conflict of interest could happen. 
The country asked to remove ‘all institutions have multiple interests, which means 
that in engaging with non-State actors WHO is often faced with a combination of converging 
and conflicting interests’ from paragraph 24.  The proposed new text was:  
An institutional conflict of interest is a situation where WHO’s primary interest as 
articulated in its Constitution may be influenced or compromised by an individual or 
individuals acting on behalf of WHO the conflicting interest of a non-State actor in a 
way that affects, or may reasonably be perceived to affect, the independence, 
integrity and objectivity of WHO’s constitutional functions and work mentioned in 
the General Programme of Work.  
For India, paragraph 25 and 26 should be deleted and replaced by:  
In addition to individual and institutional conflict of interests, of important concern 
are situations of conflicting interests where the commercial interests of private sector 
entities including international business associations or other non-State actors not at 
arm’s length from the private sector entities are in conflict with WHO’s 
constitutional mandate and affect the Organisation’s independence and impartiality in 
evidence and information gathering, setting norms and standards and policy 
implementation. A conflicting interest can occur inter alia in the following 
circumstances: (a) Private sector entities influences or is perceived to influence 
WHO, in pursuance of direct or indirect commercial interest, and thereby 
compromising the objectivity, independence and integrity of WHO; (b) The 
likelihood of private sector entities using its engagement with WHO to further its 
commercial interests; (c) Potential or real conflict or divergence of objectives, 
interest or activities of private sector entities and the public health goals or mandate 
of WHO as per its Constitution, decisions or resolutions of the governing Bodies.   
Given that paragraph 30 defines the primary function of due diligence, India proposed 
two extra functions ‘clarify the nature and objectives of the entity proposed to engage with 
WHO’ and ‘examine whether the entity complies with the norms, standards, guideline, 
strategies or action plans established by WHO or whether its activities undermine any of 
WHO’s norms, standards, guideline, strategies or action plans established by WHO’. 
Furthermore, the excerpt ‘due diligence reports including the risk assessment report shall be 
made available in public domain for independent verification and scrutiny’ was supposed to 
be added to paragraph 31. Paragraph 34 established a unit responsible for due diligence and 
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risk assessment. For India, it should be a specialised central unit, and the recommendations 
regarding risk management should be made public, along with the reasons.  
In paragraph 44, India suggested that the WHO should not engage with the tobacco and 
arms industries, nor with ‘organisations having any direct or indirect affiliation with 
these industries’. Additionally the WHO should set up ‘a mechanism of screening and 
identification of such organisations’ and, “when engaging with other industries affecting 
human health or affected by WHO’s norms and standards such as food and beverages, 
alcohol, infant formula, WHO will exercise particular caution and WHO’s engagement will be 
strictly limited to assisting such industries to comply with WHO’s norms and standards or 
guideline or policy’. On the topic of secondments, the country only suggested changing 
‘WHO does not accept’ to ‘WHO shall not accept’.   
Regarding official relations, specifically the paragraph 53 on NSAs being invited to 
participate in the WHO’s governing bodies, it was recommended to add the passage ‘when 
making the statement, international business associations and philanthropic foundations 
should declare their interest, particularly commercial interest, in the item’. Furthermore, the 
country suggested a new paragraph establishing norms for the accreditation of NGOs to 
governing bodies:    
To be eligible for accreditation to the Health Assembly, Executive Board and 
committees and conferences convened under their authority, a nongovernmental 
organisation shall: (a) have aims and purposes consistent with WHO’s Constitution 
and in conformity with the policies of the Organization as well as resolutions and 
decisions adopted by the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly; (b) 
demonstrate competence in a field of activity related to the work of WHO; (c) have 
membership and/or activities that are international in scope; (d) be non-profit and 
public interest in nature, and in its activities and advocacy; (e) have an established 
structure, a constitutive act, and accountability mechanisms; (f) for a membership 
organisation, have the authority to speak for its members and have a representative 
structure; The Membership should not contain private sector entities, individuals 
associated with private sector entities or philanthropic foundations and academic 
institutions not at arm’s length with private sector. ; (g) have existed formally for at 
least three years as of date of receipt of the application by WHO; (h) disclose 
information on its objectives, structure, membership of executive body, field of 
activities and source of financing, and, where applicable, its status with other entities 
of the United Nations system; (i) agree to provide WHO regularly with updated 
information as well as to inform WHO of any changes with respect to its status as « 
non-governmental organisation » as soon such changes take place.  
India proposed a report from the Independent Oversight Committee Advisory 
Committee every two years on engagement with non-State actors as part of the surveillance 
of FENSA implementation. Moreover, it exemplified situations which should be considered 
non-compliance with the framework, such as: activities that go against the WHO’s mandate, 
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decisions and resolutions of the Governing Bodies; actions or activities that negatively affect 
the independence, integrity, reputation or credibility of WHO; and activities of the non-State 
actor after the establishment of engagement lead to actual and perceived conflict of interest. 
For India, the implementation should be evaluated every two years after the adoption. 
Finally, a new paragraph was suggested, containing steps to be followed ‘for the effective 
implementation’ of FENSA. It included a review of the existing list of non-State actors in 
official relations as well as their categorisation, a review of the WHO’s existing external and 
hosted partnerships and collaborations, among others. 
To analyse the comments made by India in the four specific policies, we will first point 
out the suggestions for NGOs, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions, which 
were more similar, and then the policy for the private sector. One should note that India was 
against the WHO accepting personnel as a form of resource from all NSAs. When it comes to 
participation, India recommended that all inputs should be publicly available. However, for 
philanthropic foundations, the country added that all information about the participation of 
philanthropies should be available, as well as presentation and oral or written submission. 
Regarding contributions and donations, the country suggested that the source of contributions 
from NGOs and philanthropic foundation should be disclosed.  
Concerning ‘Evidence’, India highlighted that for NGOs ‘utmost care should be taken 
to ensure that gathering, analyses and generation of information and the management of 
knowledge and research is free from the conflict of interest’. While for philanthropic 
foundation and academic institutions, any decision on evidence should only be taken ‘after 
proper risk assessment, including the actual or perceived conflict of interest. This risk 
assessment report shall be made public’. Lastly, for technical collaboration from NGOs, the 
following amendment to paragraph 17 was proposed: ‘the collaboration for product 
development shall be based on the delinking principle to ensure innovation and access to the 
developed product at affordable cost”. The suggestion for academic institutions was similar. 
One can observe that, principally, India and the United States polarised the debate on 
the participation of the private sector. Thus, regarding participation, India recommended that 
all information related in consultation, hearing or any other meeting at the WHO should be 
made public. Moreover, the private sector should only be allowed to participate after a 
‘proper risk assessment, including the actual or perceived conflict of interest’ and the WHO 
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should not cosponsor meetings organised by the private sector. With regard to resources, 
India advocated that the WHO should not accept funds from ‘food and beverages, or alcohol, 
or infant formula industry for its work in NCD or WHO shall not accept resources from 
pharmaceutical industry for implementation of quality and safety standards of medical 
products’ and should not also accept financial resources from the private sector as specified 
voluntary contribution. The country also suggested that no project except product 
development and clinical trials should be implemented with more than 50% of the financial 
resources from the private sector, and that activities leading to the production of WHO 
guidelines or recommendations should not also receive funds from business entities. 
Paragraph 14 on pooling contributions from multiple sources was requested to be deleted and 
a suggested addition to paragraph 19 was that anonymous donations should not be accepted 
under any circumstances. Moreover, a received donation which was subsequently discovered 
to be non-compliant with FENSA should be returned to the donor.  
India also proposed three new subparagraphs to paragraph 22 on product development, 
‘(c) The clinical trial data shall be made available for public, (d) The clinical trial follows the 
ethical standards laid down in the Helsinki Protocol, (e) The final product shall be made 
accessible to the needy people’. A new sub-section ‘Donations for preparation of guidelines 
or recommendations’ was also recommended, and it should establish that ‘financing may not 
be accepted from commercial enterprises for activities leading to the production of WHO 
guidelines or recommendations’. As a final point on resources, India was against the WHO 
accepting contributions from the private sector to support the salary of staff, including short-
term consultancy. 
On ‘Evidence’, India was against the WHO collaborating with private sector entities in 
the generation of evidence, in knowledge management, in information gathering and 
research. On ‘Advocacy’, the country suggested changing ‘Private sector entities can only 
collaborate with WHO in advocacy for the implementation of a WHO norm or standard’ to 
‘Private sector entities can only collaborate with WHO for the technical assistance for the 
implementation of a WHO norm or standard’.  Regarding paragraph 36 on technical 
collaboration, India did not agree with the WHO collaborating with the private sector for the 
implementation of norms and capacity building; an exception could be made for providing 
technical assistance to the private sector to implement WHO norms. 
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Regarding product development, India proposed the excerpt ‘(Collaborative research 
and development, technology transfer and licensing should, as a general rule, be undertaken) 
only if WHO and the entity concerned have concluded an agreement cleared by the Office of 
the Legal Counsel that ensures that the final product will ultimately be made widely available 
and accessible, at affordable prices’.  
Overall, according to documents and interviews, India was the leading country 
advocating for public-interest NGOs and the primary opponent to the private sector. 

4.3.7 Bolivia 
As already explained, this thesis initially proposed a North-South division hypothesis. 
Therefore, Member States from the Global North and the Global South were selected. Bolivia 
was one of the most active Member States, according to the available documentation. Three 
emails were sent to different individuals who were involved in FENSA negotiations, to 
request an interview. While one did not answer, others denied the request due to a change of 
position. Like Canada, France and India, the positions taken by Bolivia will be analysed 
considering the available documents, media reports and interviewees who may have cited its 
participation. The main source, however, will be the non-paper on the draft of FENSA which 
was presented and discussed during the EB136. Bolivia was the third country that made more 
contributions to this document, only behind India and the United States. 
The first comment was on paragraph 2 of the section ‘Engagement: rationale, 
principles, benefits and risks’. The country suggested to deleted the excerpt ‘WHO can only 
fulfil its leadership role in global health and its mandate if the Organization proactively 
engages with Member States, other international organisations and non-State actors’ and 
rewrite it as ‘WHO engages with non-State actors as appropriate to fulfil its constitutional 
mandate’. The country also suggested some amendments regarding language in order to 
elucidate the text. 
Paragraph 6 establishes the overarching principles to guide the engagement between 
the WHO and non-State actors, and Bolivia proposed to change ‘support and enhance the 
scientific and evidence-based approach’ to ‘not compromise the scientific and evidence-based 
approach’. Moreover, it suggested adding ‘evidence and information gathering and 
implementation’ to the subparagraph that mentions which processes should be protected from 
undue influence. Subparagraph F was suggested to be changed from ‘be actively managed so 
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as to mitigate any form of risk to WHO (including conflicts of interest)’ to ‘actively avoid, or 
where unavoidable, appropriately manage both actual and perceived conflict of interest as 
well as to mitigate any form of risk to WHO’. Finally, the country suggested the addition of 
an eighth paragraph stating that any engagement should not divert from its public health 
mandate.  
 Bolivia suggested adding, among the risks, that engagement with non-State actors 
could bring about a negative impact on integrity, independence and the public health mandate 
of the WHO, besides the risks to the Organisation’s reputation and credibility, which were 
already predicted.  
Regarding the non-State actors embraced by FENSA, Bolivia made comments on 
philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. Paragraph 12 defined that philanthropic 
foundations should be clearly independent from any private sector entity in their governance 
and decision-making; the country advocated to also add objectives, programs and activities, 
and to state that ‘their programs and activities shall not further the commercial interest of the 
donor/donors’.  Paragraph 13 recognised academic institutions as entities ‘engaged in the 
pursuit and dissemination of knowledge through research, education and training’. Bolivia 
suggested to add the passage ‘academic institutions established by the private sector or the 
presence of private sector in the administration including governing and academic bodies 
would be treated as private sector entities’. 
In the section ‘Types of Interaction’, Bolivia recommended adding a new paragraph on 
participation stating that ‘participation of non-State actors in WHO bodies dealing with 
formulation or setting of policies, norms or standards, frameworks, strategies, plan of action, 
guidelines, toolkits, strategies etc. such as expert committee meetings or intergovernmental 
negotiations, shall not be allowed unless Members States decide otherwise to include non-
State actors participation’. The country also suggested removing personnel as a form of 
resource and the support to policymaking at the national level as a form of technical 
collaboration.  Moreover, it was also requested to complement paragraph 19 on evidence with 
‘evidence gathered with the cooperation of non-state shall be available for independent 
verification’. 
Regarding due diligence, approached in paragraph 31 - Bolivia proposed that due 
diligence reports, including the risk assessment, should be made available in public domain. 
 199
For Bolivia, the section ‘Policy, norms and standard-setting’ should be deleted from the 
document. The country’s general comment on ‘Management of Conflict of Interest and other 
Risks of Engagement’ was that a comprehensive Conflict of Interest policy should be 
developed but without suggestions about the subject. 
Regarding the infamous paragraph 44, Bolivia suggested that in the passage ‘WHO 
will exercise particular caution when engaging with other industries affecting human health 
or affected by WHO’s norms and standards’, the excerpt ‘in particular aiming to get 
compliance with WHO’s public health mandate, norms, standards, guideline or policy’ should 
be added. Bolivia also advocated that in case of conflict with other policies, FENSA should 
prevail. Moreover, international business associations and philanthropic foundations should 
not be granted ‘official relations’ status and a set of rules for accreditation of NGOs should be 
developed. 
On the specific policy for non-governmental organisations draft, Bolivia proposed that 
all input of NGOs provided during consultation or hearing should be made public, and also 
suggested to remove personnel as a resource accepted by the WHO. Furthermore, while 
paragraph 10 guaranteed that due to transparency ‘contributions and donations from 
nongovernmental organisations must be publicly acknowledged by WHO in accordance with 
its policies and practices’, Bolivia also recommended to add that ‘the contributing NGO shall 
disclose the source of its contribution and the Secretariat shall make this information publicly 
available’. 
With regard to the policy and operational procedure for the private sector, Bolivia 
advocated removing paragraph 3 on the WHO operating in a competitively neutral basis and 
including non-State actors with links to private sector entities as part of the private sector. 
Since paragraph 5 established that private sector entities could be invited to participate in 
other WHO meetings, Bolivia recommended adding that they should only be invited ‘if there 
is a mandate from the governing bodies and if those meetings are not involved in the 
formulation or setting of policies, norms, standards or guidelines. In the absence of such 
mandate, applicable rules, policies and procedures of the organization shall apply’.  
The country also proposed a new paragraph, establishing that information concerning 
participation of private sector entities as well as non-State actors with links to private sector 
entities ‘in consultation or hearing or any other WHO meeting including inputs of the private 
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sector entities as well as non-State actors with links to private sector entities in such meetings 
such as presentation or oral or written submission shall be made publicly available’. This was 
the same suggestion made by India. 
Bolivia then recommended that paragraph 8 should only define that the WHO does not 
cosponsor meetings organised by private sector entities (the paragraph, however, talks about 
specific private sector entities) and the rest of the text should be deleted. 
Regarding ‘Resources’, Bolivia suggested adding a subparagraph D to paragraph 12 on 
the risks associated with the acceptance of resources from private sector entities. The text 
proposed was: ‘WHO shall not receive financial resources from private sector entities as well 
as non-State actors with links to private sector entities whose activities or advocacy are 
undermining the mandate of WHO as stated in its Constitution or decisions and resolutions of 
governing bodies’. The country also recommended two new paragraphs for the session, one 
stating that anonymous donations should not be accepted and one declaring that ‘any 
donation received by WHO which is subsequently discovered to be noncompliant with this 
Framework shall be returned to the donor’. India also proposed both texts in the same style. 
Paragraph 22, about financial contributions for clinical trials, had many changes 
recommended. For instance, Bolivia asked to delete subparagraphs B and C:  
(b) the research is conducted at WHO’s request and potential conflicts of interest are 
managed; (c) WHO only accepts such financial contributions, if the research would 
not take place without WHO’s involvement or if WHO’s involvement is necessary in 
order to ensure that the research is undertaken in conformity with internationally 
accepted technical and ethical standards and guidelines. 
Instead to add three different subparagraphs:  
(b) the clinical trial data shall be made available for public scrutiny; (c) the clinical 
trial follows the ethical standards laid down in the Helsinki Protocol  (d) the final 
product shall be made accessible accessible and affordable to the patients, in 
particular in developing countries.  
Bolivia was against contributions for financing staff salaries and therefore suggested 
the following text for paragraph 29: ‘WHO shall not accept contributions from private sector 
entities to support the salary of staff including short-term consultancy’. Finally, paragraph 38, 
on product development, as previously mentioned, took time to achieve consensus. Bolivia 
was amongst the countries who asked that final products should be widely accessible at 
affordable prices. 
Regarding the specific policies for philanthropic foundations, Bolivia initially 
suggested that they should not take part, through consultations, in the preparation of policies. 
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In general it can be observed that the suggestions for philanthropic foundations were similar 
to those made to private sector entities. For instance, in paragraph 6 on operational 
procedures, Bolivia suggested adding the excerpt ‘any decision with regard to the 
participation of WHO staff in the meeting can be done only after proper risk assessment 
including the actual or perceived conflict of interest. This risk assessment report shall be 
made public’ and to delete personnel from paragraph 7, which establishes funds accepted by 
the WHO. The main focus of the country concerned risk assessment and transparency.  
The WHO Policy and Operational Procedures on Engagement with Academic 
Institutions had five amendments suggested by Bolivia. The country recommended deleting 
the possibility of academic institutions taking part in the preparation of policies and instead 
proposed that the WHO could hold consultations if there is a mandate from the governing 
bodies. The country also highlighted the importance of publicising the inputs received from 
academic institutions regarding their participation in WHO meetings. Similar to the other 
three non-State actors, Bolivia asked to remove personnel from paragraph 8, that defines 
which kind of resources are accepted by the WHO. Paragraph 16, stating ‘intellectual 
property arising from collaborations with academic institutions is regulated by the agreement 
with the academic institution. This should be addressed in consultation with the Office of the 
Legal Counsel’ was suggested to have the passage ‘addressed by the Legal Counsel’ removed 
and replaced by ‘WHO shall ensure that the intellectual property arising from collaboration 
with academic institutions are freely accessible for further research and development or 
studies as well as other non-commercial uses’.   
As a final point, Bolivia proposed to add the following excerpt to paragraph 19 on 
scientific collaborations: ‘(In case of collaboration for product development collaborative 
research and development, technology transfer and licensing should, as a general rule, be 
undertaken) only if WHO and the entity concerned have concluded an agreement cleared by 
the Office of the Legal Counsel that ensures that the final product will ultimately be made 
widely accessible at affordable prices’. This was the same text suggested by India.

4.3.8 Zambia 
Zambia was included in the selected countries due to written comments from official 
documents, media reports and exploratory interviews. The Zambian position will be further 
analysed in chapters 5 and 7, analysing the available documents, media reports and the 
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interview conducted on the 24th of July of 2019. In this session, the textual proposals 
submitted by the country on the draft of FENSA in February 2015 will also be detailed. 
Zambia suggested a footnote for paragraph 22 on steps required to manage conflict of 
interest and other risks of engagement stating that ‘The framework is designed to regulate 
institutional engagements; its implementation is closely coordinated with the implementation 
of other organisational policies regulating conflict of interest in respect of individuals (see 
paragraph 48)’. The country argued that conflicts of interest at the institutional level are 
usually defined as conflict of financial interests. The draft was, therefore, overlooking ‘the 
possibility of non-State actors’ bias due to their non-financial interests – like strongly held 
personal or professional beliefs, declared policy positions, personal relationships (even 
adversarial), or the desire for individual or organisational recognition or advancement’. 
Zambia criticised the word ‘may’ in paragraph 23; ‘A conflict of interest arises in 
circumstances where a secondary interest unduly influences, or may reasonably be perceived 
to unduly influence’ and stressed that undue or improper influence exercised on the WHO’s 
work was one of the most significant risks of engagement. Accordingly, conflict of interest 
represents a potential for, and not the occurrence of, undue influence. Yet on the issue of 
conflict of interest, Zambia suggested the deletion of paragraph 26,  arguing that it was 81
wrongly implied that financial conflict of interest of the private sector is more important than 
the financial conflict of interest of other non-State actors. The framework was, therefore, 
creating ‘a clear bias against the private sector’. The country suggested a new text for 
paragraph 24 on institutional conflict of interest: 
The quality, independence and objectivity of the WHO’s work are all primary 
interests of the WHO, which should not be unduly influenced by the competing 
interests of any non-State actors. Thus, the draft does not clearly distinguish 
institutional conflict of interest from conflict of interest generally. Nor should it. 
Institutional conflict of interest are equated with financial conflict of interest – an 
improperly narrow scope for this framework. The framework must instead address 
financial and non-financial conflict of interest, at institutional and individual levels. 
Concerning paragraph 30 about due diligence, for Zambia, the bullet point ‘identify 
‘red lines’ such as activities that are incompatible with WHO’s work and mandate (e.g. links 
to the tobacco and arms industries) or that require the Organization to exercise particular 
caution when engaging with the entity (e.g. links to other industries affecting human health or 
 For WHO the most important institutional conflicts of interest arise in situations where the economic interests 81
of private sector entities are in conflict with WHO’s interests, especially the Organization’s independence and 
impartiality in setting norms and standards
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affected by WHO’s norms and standards)’ was incompatible with paragraph 44. The country 
argued that barring the engagement with any entity with links to the tobacco industry would 
‘for example, bar the WHO from engaging with anyone connected to the current effort to 
produce Ebola and other vaccines more quickly by growing them in tobacco leaves’. 
Moreover, the country claimed that the phrase ‘Industries affecting human health or affected 
by WHO’s norms and standards’ was too broad and applying such particular caution to any 
entity with links to these industries could be arbitrarily applied in order to exclude some 
entities. Zambia, then, asked to delete the 4th bullet point. 
Zambia also argued that, according to paragraph 34, since the Secretariat could collect 
supplementary information on non-State actors from sources which are not necessarily 
reliable or neutral, NSAs should be allowed to review and respond to the information on 
which risk assessments, recommendations and risk management decisions are based. 
The general comment on the section ‘Management of Conflict of Interest and other 
risks of engagement’ made by Zambia was ‘quality, independence and objectivity of the 
WHO’s work are all primary interests of the WHO, which should not be unduly influenced 
by the competing interests of any non-State actor’. The country also pointed out that the draft 
did not clearly distinguish institutional conflict of interest from conflict of interest generally 
and that FENSA should address financial and non-financial conflict of interest, at 
institutional and individual levels. Regarding the well-known paragraph 44, Zambia argued 
that ‘particular caution’ was neither defined nor limited and, consequently, could be 
interpreted and applied differently at different levels of the WHO - ‘eliminating the 
inclusiveness and predictability intended by the framework, and needlessly denying WHO 
access to appropriate input from qualified non-State actors’. 
Regarding the four specific policies, Zambia commented on non-governmental 
organisations’ possibility to cooperate in the generation of evidence and technical 
collaboration by arguing that ‘managing risks of engagement with consistent diligence and 
transparency requires that the provisions in this paragraph be identical across each type of 
non-State actors’. In paragraph 31 about evidence from private sector entities, the country 
advocated that ‘Private sector entities do not inherently present risks for the WHO by their 
participation in scientific reviews on any and every subject. Indeed, the private sector may 
well have the most authoritative expertise on some issues. There is no justification for this 
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paragraph’s sweeping exclusion of private sector entities from any collaborating on any type 
of scientific review’.  
Paragraph 32 stated that ‘Individuals working for interested private sector entities are 
excluded from participating in advisory groups; however, expert groups need to be able, 
where appropriate, to conduct hearings with such individuals in order to access their 
knowledge’. For Zambia, it was not clear why advocacy groups and expert groups should not 
benefit ‘from the full participation of appropriate professionals’ given that any risk should be 
managed through the transparent application of FENSA, instead of ‘random exclusion of 
even highly qualified professionals’. Finally, regarding advocacy from the private sector, 
Zambia argued that other non-State actors were not subject the conditionality of only being 
able to collaborate in advocacy ‘if they commit themselves to implement these norms and 
standards in their entirety’.  Therefore, ‘these conditions set the bar for private sector 
engagement impassably high. In so doing, the provision creates an unfairly broad argument 
to exclude a private sector entity, contradicting the spirit that Member States seek to capture 
in this framework’. 
On the specific policy for philanthropic foundations and academic institutions, Zambia 
only requested identical appliance of provisions across all non-State actors. The country 
noted that the paragraphs dealing with technical collaboration were ‘redundant and 
unnecessarily confusing’ as there was no need to state that ‘collaboration must be in the 
interests of the WHO (….) Any collaboration managed in accordance with the framework 
will necessarily be in the interests of the Organization’. 
4.3.9 Brazil  
Brazil was chosen due to participation in official documents and presence in media 
reports but, above all, because it was widely mentioned in the interviews. Almost all 
interviewees pointed to Brazil as one of the essential Member States during FENSA 
negotiations, as the country acted as the leader of the Global South. Two interviews were 
conducted with different Brazilian diplomats and they will be further analysed in chapters 5 
and 7, combined with the written comments which will be now presented. 
The first comment from Brazil was regarding subparagraph B of paragraph 6, which 
establishes the overarching principles of the engagement with non-State actors. The country 
suggested deleting ‘by WHO’s governing bodies’ from the text ‘respect the 
 205
intergovernmental nature of WHO, where the decision-making by WHO’s governing bodies 
is the exclusive prerogative of Member States’. Therefore, to Brazil, all the decision-making 
in the WHO should be carried out by Member States.  
Paragraph 16, on the types of meetings organised by WHO in which NSAs were 
allowed to participate, Brazil recommended removing the section ‘there are no limits 
imposed on non-State actors’ participation at such meetings’. Instead, the text would read 
‘the format of such other meetings/consultations and the participation of non-state actors is 
decided on a case-by-case basis either by the governing body at the session at which it is 
mandated or in other cases by the Secretariat’. 
On conflict of interest, Brazil suggested that, in paragraph 26, ‘conflict with the 
promotion of public health among the situations where the most critical institutional conflicts 
may arise’, should be added. The country also recommended the withdrawal of paragraph 43, 
which stated that ‘references elsewhere in this framework to the norms and standard-setting 
process and normative work concern the second type of activity’. Regarding paragraph 44, 
Brazil requested to add that the WHO should exercise particular care ‘especially while 
conducting due diligence and risk assessment analyses’ when engaging with industries 
affecting human health. Similar to Bolivia and India, Brazil was opposed to granting official 
relations to international business associations and philanthropic foundations. Instead, it 
suggested that they would be granted ‘observer’ status.  
With regards to the specific policies, Brazil suggested a new paragraph in the section 
‘Resources from nongovernmental organisations’, asserting that they should be ‘invited to 
participate in the financing dialogue, which is designed to improve the alignment, 
predictability, flexibility and transparency of WHO’s funding and to reduce budgetary 
vulnerability’. The country also proposed to change paragraph 14, about evidence, to the 
following text: ‘WHO can only collaborate with non-governmental organizations in the 
generation of evidence, in knowledge management, in information gathering and in research 
when potential conflicts of interest are managed in accordance with this framework and the 
collaboration is transparent’.  
When it comes to the private sector, Brazil alleged that paragraph 29, which allowed 
contributions to financing staff salary, should be deleted. Moreover, the country requested 
that in the text concerning product development, the final product should be affordable. 
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Regarding the policy and operational procedures for philanthropic foundations and academic 
institutions, Brazil was against accepting personnel as a form of resource accepted by WHO. 
The country also suggested changing the paragraphs about evidence to ‘WHO can only 
collaborate with philanthropic foundations/academic institutions in the generation of 
evidence, in knowledge management, in information gathering and in research when 
potential conflicts of interest are managed in accordance with this framework and the 
collaboration is transparent’. 
One can observe the convergence between positions advocated by Brazil, India and 




Although not providing considerable comments on FENSA draft in February 2015 nor 
being mentioned much in media reports, since the beginning of the ‘Member States’ phase of 
the negotiations, Argentina is singled out to be the Chair by Margaret Chan. In this chapter, 
the primary source to analyse the positions taken by Argentina will be the non-paper on the 
draft of FENSA, which was presented and discussed during the EB136; in chapter 7 it will be 
combined with the interview with a diplomat who chaired the discussions, along with media 
reports and relevant mentions by other interviewees.  
The first comment made by Argentina was regarding paragraph 22, on the steps 
required to manage conflict of interest and other risks of engagement. The country proposed 
two options for the paragraph, the first was that due diligence would be audited by a group of 
twelve representatives of Member States, called the Group, which would be composed of two 
representatives from each Regional Office. The Group would also review risk assessments. 
The second option would be, instead of the establishment of the Group, the Member States 
would conduct due diligence and risk assessment through the open-ended group. 
Concerning due diligence and risk assessment, Argentina suggested that the 
responsibility for conducting them should be of technical specialised units or of Member 
States through the open-ended group. The country also recommended the withdrawal of 
paragraphs 34, 35 and 36, all included in the risk management section. Paragraph 38 on 
‘Transparency’ stated that ‘The WHO register of non-State actors is an Internet-based, 
publicly available electronic tool used by the Secretariat to document and coordinate 
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engagement with non-State actors’. Argentina suggested that it should be a tool used by the 
Secretariat and the Member States.  
While paragraph 39 recognised that the Secretariat possessed responsibility to decide 
on an engagement with a non-State actor, Argentina recommended that ‘the open-ended 
group with the advice of the technical units’ should decide. Regarding paragraph 44, it was 
suggested to change ‘WHO will exercise particular caution when engaging’ to ‘WHO will 
exercise particular caution during the process of due diligence, risk assessment and 
management of risks’. Argentina did not provide explicit comments on the specific policies 
but affirmed that ‘in the draft WHO policies and operational procedures on engagement with 
nongovernmental organisations, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations and 
academic institutions, all references to the possibility of WHO’s accepting secondments from 
the aforementioned non-State actors should be deleted’.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSING INTERVIEWS; WHAT WERE THE 
MEMBER STATES’ POSITIONS ON FENSA NEGOTIATION? 
This chapter aims to scrutinise interviews with individuals from nine Member States who were 
involved in the FENSA negotiations at any point. As already explained, the Member States were 
initially selected by considering their participation according to official documents, and by bearing in 
mind the hypothesis of a cleavage between the North and South at the World Health Organisation. 
However, after preliminary interviews and emails requesting participation, the selected countries were 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt and Zambia. The 
European Union was also selected, as many European countries were pointed out to be very vocal and, 
often, seeking a coalition among them.  
As advocated by Merton & Kendall (1946) and Morse & Field (1995), a Semi-Structured 
Interview (SSI) aims to gather personal perspectives from individuals regarding a particular 
situation. According to the same authors, the SSI demands a reasonably detailed interview 
guide and may be used when there is proper objective knowledge about the phenomenon 
which will be analysed, but where the subjective knowledge is lacking. To analyse the SSIs 
conducted, the most usual way is to compare participants’ responses, considering they were 
all asked the same questions in almost the same order. The data collected is, therefore, 
comparable. The interviews conducted were divided into two parts, first aiming to deepen 
knowledge about the Member States’ expectations regarding FENSA, and then to clarify the 
Member State’s position on the controversial topics of the negotiation. Apart from the United 
Kingdom, whose interviewee did not allow recording, all interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.   
While this chapter will summarise the Member States’ perspectives on FENSA without 
further analysis, Chapter 7 will combine the interviews and the document analysis, leading to 
the final results of this thesis.    
5.1 What is the Official Position Regarding the Framework of Engagement with on-
State actors (FENSA)?  
To Brazil, FENSA is an essential and unprecedented milestone within the United 
Nations system for regulating the relationship between the Secretariat and non-State actors in 
the broad sense, civil society and the private sector. According to interviewee 4, in the global 
public health scenario, there is meaningful participation of philanthropic entities which do 
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not necessarily or strictly fit within the categories of civil society, non-governmental 
organisation or the private sector. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to have clear, 
transparent and objective rules. Considering the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
of which one of the driving ideas is precisely to reinforce global partnerships including with 
civil society and the private sector, Brazil believes in dialogue and partnerships. However, 
rules, along with updated and revised practices, are needed. Interviewee 4 affirmed, ‘as I 
understand it, [the Brazilian participation was] very present, very active and in this line of 
preserving the legitimacy of WHO, minimising or eliminating the possibilities/opportunities 
for conflict of interest’.  The country believes that the WHO needs to increase not only the 82
level but the quality of health worldwide. To achieve this, non-State actors have to 
collaborate. The focus, therefore, should be on a research-based relationship, founded on 
technical advice, and without undue interference from economic agents or of another nature. 
Egypt was officially supportive of FENSA due to the awareness of non-State actors’ 
increasing role in the global public health domain. Moreover, according to the interviewee, 
the documents that previously regulated the engagement between the World Health 
Organisation and the non-State actors, the Principles of 1987, were not specific and 
comprehensive enough, according to the Egyptian interviewee. 
For Germany, the main goal during the negotiations was to strengthen the WHO vis-à-
vis other global actors. In other words, ‘WHO has to engage’ while keeping transparency and 
safeguarding the reputation of the Organisation. According to the interviewee, the country 
was trying to avoid a bureaucratic tiger that would deny the WHO the possibility to enter into 
an appropriate engagement with non-State actors. If FENSA were to establish an onerous 
bureaucratic regime, then Germany would have been against it. 
One must consider that, according to the interviewee from the European Union (EU), 
whenever a topic comes up with the World Health Organisation, the EU tries to coordinate a 
position, and this can only be done by consensus. If there is no unanimity, the EU cannot 
have a position and the Member States should participate in their national capacity. This 
happened during FENSA negotiations. The European Union, therefore, only supported 
FENSA when it was agreed, and currently ‘consistently support its full implementation 
across all of the WHO’. The interviewee admitted, however, that ‘the EU is very supportive 
 Interview conducted in Portuguese and translated by the author. 82
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of WHO even if we are critical sometimes, (…) and we always try to reach a coordinated 
position on any topic. If we cannot, this is a very good predictor that whether the WHO 
Member States discusses there will not be in agreement, it will be difficult. So FENSA was a 
very good example of that. Migration is another one’. 
For Norway, a framework to more carefully regulate the interaction between the WHO 
and the private sector and NSAs, in general, was necessary. Accordingly, the country 
advocated that FENSA should introduce necessary safeguards, but without interfering with 
the efficiency and workability of the WHO. According to the Norwegian interviewee: 
as everyone else, we shared the starting point that there is an inherent risk to interact 
with the private sector, particularly some sectors such as food and drinks’ industry. At 
the same time, other sectors at WHO are very dependent on interacting close to the 
private sector, particularly with regards to NGOs in crisis-related, the response in 
humanitarian work, vaccines development, and some development areas where 
NSAs play crucial roles and WHO really needs to work in all seamlessly with that 
type of actor.  
For the United Kingdom, FENSA was seen as an essential tool for WHO operation and 
engagement with non-State actors. However, during the negotiations, the UK was concerned 
that all engagements could stop until FENSA was approved, which would be a significant 
risk to the Organisation. 
The United States of America described themselves as ‘strong supporters of FENSA’ 
as the Framework would be an important achievement for the WHO to be able to ‘work 
effectively with all categories of non-State actors’, especially civil society and the private 
sector, the main focus of US delegation during the negotiations. The interviewee argued that 
‘FENSA is important both to protect WHO, write the kind of rules of the road, but also it 
should be helping to enable engagement and to kind of promote and faster engagement as 
much as protect the organisation. So it should have a dual function really’. 
Zambia’s position ‘was based on principles’ and on the fact that the WHO was 
struggling financially and, consequently, allowing undue influence. According to the 
interviewee, the WHO has a coordinating role and, to advance in health care, should bring 
every player to the table rather than distance them. The WHO, therefore, should engage more 
with more non-State actors, but the Member States are those who should develop the 
guidelines. The interviewee, hence, affirmed that: 
We should guide the organisation (…) because what we were seeing was that the 
organisation was just following the money. Where they were putting money, is where 
the organisation went. It wasn't following the agenda that was being set by the 
countries; it was more following the agendas of who was putting money on the table, 
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whatever if it was a country or business (…) [if] a country X would want to influence 
what's happening in country Y in the South, X could use WHO by putting money 
into WHO to go and influence what's happening in country Y. So they'll put in 200 
million and then send your people into WHO, when those people go to country Y, 
country Y view those people as the experts coming from WHO, when it’s actually X 
country experts.  
Argentina was chosen as the chair of FENSA negotiations, and although supporting the 
framework since the beginning until the end, the interviewee affirmed that it ‘was a total nightmare. 
At the very beginning, some Member States wanted to have a co-Chair (…), and I did not 
want, I thought that having a co-Chair would be hard for the process. (…) I assumed all the 
responsibility, but in the end, I was exhausted, I was hoping to have a co-chair because I 
could share every single meeting that we had on FENSA. So for me, it was completely 
exhausting’. Moreover, according to the diplomat, the Member States ‘didn't know exactly 
what [they] were doing at the very beginning’ and underestimated ‘how deep one issue had to 
go because we wanted to have something useful (…) every time we met with a naive 
thinking that in three hours we're going to finish the document and we were almost two years 
in sessions and from the very beginning, from the first session, we thought with one session 
we would cover everything’.  
The interviewee also explained that most of the long process was trying to understand 
the WHO, but at the very beginning, part of the Secretariat was reluctant because the 
Member States were scrutinising their actions. Overall, Argentina believes that the WHO is 
‘a very strong [organisation] with excellent professionals, people who work very consciously, 
very devoted and committed to the work. After the FENSA process, my view of the 
organisation was much better’. The former chair stated that although being happy and 
supportive of FENSA, ‘we are not talking of the final document, that is why we have this 
evaluation process to know if it is working or not. So I am not totally, completely committed 
to that document, because it was decided [that] if we did something that at that time we 
thought it was good and now by implementing it, we realise that it is wrong or harming, or 
whatever, we have to be open when it is not working, to change’.   
5.2 What Was the Nature of the Debate About Replacing the 1987 Principles with 
FENSA?  
As already pointed out in Chapter 3, FENSA replaced the Principles Governing 
Relations between the World Health Organisation and Nongovernmental Organisations 
(1987) and the Guidelines on Working with the Private Sector to Achieve Health Outcomes 
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(2001). The interviewed individuals from Member States were asked how this replacement 
occurred, if the States were consulted and involved, and if they were in favour of it.  
According to the Brazilian perspective, given the higher level of participation by civil 
society, the private sector and new actors from the late 1980s through the 1990s, which 
permeated the entire multilateralism system, an update in the normative framework for the 
WHO was needed. The interviewee highlighted that the last update had happened in the late 
1980s, in a still bipolar Cold War scenario, which no longer reflected the needs and 
characteristics of the current system. Moreover, the Brazilian representative argued that the 
previous definition of non-governmental organisations was excessively flexible and caused 
many debates, because it used to include other forms of non-State actors instead of being 
limited to the strict sense of a non-governmental organisation. As the WHO became 
increasingly and frequently more related to non-State actors who would not, strictly 
speaking, be non-governmental organisations, it was necessary to update the normative legal 
framework for the relationship. To illustrate, one can observe that although the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) classifies itself as an 
international business association, it was in official relations with the WHO before FENSA 
under this broad concept of a NGO. 
Interviewee 4 also reiterated that the backdrop of the negotiations was the issue of 
funding, due to the large proportion of the budget that relied on voluntary contribution. It was 
also mentioned that the WHO has normative functions that could directly impact on highly 
profitable economic activities. The funding issue, alongside the normative functions, creates 
the perfect scenario for opportunities of conflict of interest to arise. The pharmaceutical 
industry was used to illustrate the argument. This context would be an additional reason for 
having a ‘clear, transparent, consensual framework to guide the Secretariat on how to relate 
in such cases and to avoid or minimize the risk of conflict of interest’. Finally, Brazil at that 
time was in favour of the replacement and perceived itself as among the main actors of the 
negotiations that ended up with FENSA approved. Other interviewees confirmed this 
protagonistic role. 
For Egypt, the replacement of the documents by FENSA was ‘some sort of agreement 
among all the negotiating countries that we need new documents’ considering that the 
previous rules didn’t reflect the current reality which involves diversified actors playing a 
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very significant role. Consequently, the Principles of 1987 did not reflect the ‘comprehensive 
and complex environment that the WHO is working right now’. 
As mentioned above, the representative did not participate in the negotiations, given 
that the European Union countries did not have a coordinating position. Similarly, the 
interviewee from Norway did not know how the discussions on the replacement of the two 
documents by FENSA were conducted. 
The diplomat from Germany explained that it all started with some Member States, 
including Germany, arguing that the WHO should have the opportunity to engage with all 
relevant actors in order to be able to coordinate and lead them. However, the German idea 
was not the Member States negotiating everything, ‘line by line’, which is what happened in 
the end. The interviewee also assured that it was only during the negotiations that became 
clear that FENSA would replace something, but it was not the initial goal, ‘we did not start 
off by saying we need to replace something, but only through all the exercise we realised we 
already have something and that has to be replaced by FENSA. So there was no vote, but 
there were lengthy debates on that’. 
Disagreeing with the German perspective, the United Kingdom declared that the 
replacement was part of the process, given that the WHO recognised that the 1987 principles 
were mostly outdated, and not enough to provide proper support to WHO in the 21st century. 
The UK interviewee explained that the origin of FENSA was some Member States’ concern 
about WHO relations with the Private Sector, although it was not only this. Moreover, the 
WHO itself felt that a better policy was needed as the Secretariat was having problems 
explaining all the decisions taken. However, for the United Kingdom, a ‘Pandora’s box was 
opened as became clear that it was a much more complex and complicated process’. The 
interviewee pointed out that FENSA firstly started just with NGOs but then ‘became clear 
that the main problem was not the NGOs but the private sector’. 
The United States representative defined the discussion on the replacement of the 
existing documents by FENSA as ‘a mess’, which ‘we did not expect, I do not think anyone 
expected it to be so big when it started, to be honest’. The interviewee explained that the 
broad context was the WHO Reform proposed by the former Director-General Margaret 
Chan. Consequently, several small reforms were also happening, on budgeting processes and 
transparency, and on priority setting. The interviewee then highlighted that a ‘number of 
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those successes (…) happened because we, the US and Brazil could work together and I 
think as you can imagine, we are often on the opposite sides, especially historically’. 
The interviewee also clarified that the private sector principles debated in 2001 were 
not agreed, but only ‘noted by the Board and not approved or endorsed’. Thus, the 
discussions were regarding civil society and the private sector. Afterwards, some Member 
States proposed to also include the academia and philanthropies, mainly due to issues related 
to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, given that its role as a large funder of the WHO 
was seen by many as ‘an undemocratic situation where one funder who is not accountable to 
anyone, is driving a lot’. The interviewee assured that the initial idea of FENSA was to be the 
replacement or update of the 1987 principles and the guidelines for the private sector. 
However, it was not supposed to be a Member States’ negotiation, it was meant to be an 
update process from the Secretariat, which would be informed and approved by the Member 
States. 
When the interviewee from Zambia started to become involved with FENSA 
negotiations, it was already in the Member States phase. The Zambian perception is that the 
replacement of the existing documents by FENSA was a Member States move, because they 
perceived that: 
the organisation was being hijacked by a few entities and a few countries that were 
trying to influence (…) So we found problems with it because the documents were in 
place, but these things were going on (…) So the Member States started initiatives to 
try to correct the problems that were being faced because we found the Organisation 
malfunctioning. For example, if Bill Gates thinks we should work on devices, all of a 
sudden there was a big program. (…) The structure of the organisation was following 
the money”. 
Argentina answered that the principles ‘were good and worked for a long time, but 
they were not enough, they were very general, they were very open, and the Member States 
wanted something more specific, more clear procedures’. Therefore, there was a consensus 
among the negotiating countries that they needed to protect the reputation of the WHO. With 
this in mind, FENSA was proposed.   
5.3 Which Coalitions Could Be Observed During FENSA Negotiations? 
This research started with the North-South cleavage hypothesis, based on Nitsan 
Chorev’s book ‘The WHO between the North and the South’ (2012). Chorev (2012) focuses 
on the strategic practices organised by WHO governing bodies to balance the demands of 
nations from the Global North and South, once called developed and developing countries. 
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Therefore, the first hypothesis of this thesis is ‘the North/South conflict that characterises 
WHO's evolution was reflected in FENSA negotiations, with the conformation of two groups 
of negotiators: developed and developing countries’. 
The Brazilian interviewee explained that in negotiations both at the WHO and within 
the multilateral system as a whole, formal coordination processes do exist. In the specific 
case of the WHO, there are the so-called ‘regional groups’. Brazil usually participates as part 
of the ‘Americas’ group, however, depending on the topics, a formation of other coalitions 
occurs, ‘sometimes more transversal [the coalitions], but it is very variable and very dynamic 
even within the same negotiation. There are times when, in the beginning, you participate in 
some informal groups, informal conversations about certain topics (…), sometimes you 
switch groups, sometimes you do not maintain that coordination for others. So this is all very 
variable’. However, regarding FENSA negotiation specifically, interviewee 4 reported that 
‘there was an attempt to articulate with developing countries (…). And the other members 
too, they organised themselves into a European Group, African Group’.  
One must consider the explanation given by interviewee 4, a Brazilian Ambassador 
who brought to FENSA negotiations the TRIPs agreement, negotiated at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) between 1984 and 1994: 
The issue of pharmaceutical patents was a defeat for the south at TRIPS 
negotiations(...) The pharmaceutical industry is so powerful that it was considered 
the drive of the negotiations (...) After that, a bitterness remained within developing 
countries, because we felt the defeat, that we were unable to negotiate properly, 
because many small countries were couldn’t afford to "confront" the power of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Health is a central area and one of the largest budgets in any 
country. If you pick a fight with the pharmaceutical industry, the country would be 
weakened, especially if it is a country in Africa, not very rich. (...) As soon as the 
result came out, the “big octopus” was not very visible, it was a technical negotiation, 
only diplomats or lawyers in the commercial area who were understanding. But a 
few years later, and somehow linked to HIV/AIDS epidemic, the interrelation 
between the patent and the cost of the medicine became more visible than politically 
sensitive for everyone (...), because it was profit above public interest, human rights 
and health (...) [the rich countries] managed to create very strong and politically 
active NGOs, so the topic was highlighted on the agenda. With that, the whole issue 
of the influence of big companies and conflict of interests regarding public interest 
became a social movement (...), evidently the WHO became a bit involved because 
as an entity of the United Nations with a mandate to defend the public interest at the 
world level, obviously it was expected that it could not protect the interests of 
multinationals and corporate profits. WHO had to be sensitive. So, the South shift the 
claim to WHO and we started pushing so WHO could be place where we could 
slightly mitigate the focus on trade and focus on public interest. 
The Brazilian Ambassador also explained that several confrontational dialogues between 
developing and developed countries occurred due to pressures from pharmaceutical lobby: 
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‘so we suffered pressure from England, the Nordics, Switzerland, the United States and the 
pharmaceutical industry have a representation [at WHO] of the size of ours with 20 members, 
just to cover these forums dealing with issues with public repercussions and commercial 
interests’. Another argument presented was that health increasingly became one of the major 
areas of technical cooperation, and many poor countries rely on health aids from huge donors 
such as Norway, Sweden - influential countries within the WHO. These external dynamics, 
therefore, should also be considered when analysing the establishment of coalitions:  
If you go to WHO you will see that governance is not very multilateral. There are 
some countries that are politically active, for instance, from the South, there are 
Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, which are also active in trade negotiations. Then, 
you have, disproportionately, many countries from the Global North where, in 
general, there are the headquarters of large pharmaceutical companies, such as 
United States, England, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Norway…, or they are home 
for pharmaceutical industries or they have scientific research capacity in the medical 
field, or they are important donors to poor southern countries. So, in reality, the 
debate takes place between around 40 countries, it is more or less the governance of 
WHO. 
From Egypt’s perspective, there were two main groups among the negotiating 
countries with a clear division. The first group was inclined to accept engagements with non-
State actors but with enough precautions to prevent undue influence on the work of the 
Organisation. While the second group, although agreeing to avoid undue influence, believed 
that necessary criteria and necessary precautions were lacking. In this regard, the interviewee 
asserted that: 
So basically I can say (…) that the developed countries (…) have well established 
civil society and well-established environment for the work of non-state actors and 
non-State actors present a very significant partner in the implementation of the 
domestic policies. So they are already aware of the dynamics (…) that would make 
such engagement on the domestic level very easy. I think that this group was that 
group that didn't want to put any obstacles whatsoever in front of engagement 
between WHO and NSAs. While the developing countries from another side were 
agreeing basically that non-State actors have a very significant role to play, but we 
want to make sure that WHO is an intergovernmental organisation and is not going to 
be affected or unduly influenced by NSAs. But this idea was related to the rules of 
the private sector (…), so if we are going to have an engagement with the private 
sector, we need to make sure that the WHO was not going to be negatively affected.  
When asked if it was a strict division and whether it permeated all topics of FENSA 
negotiations, the Egypt representative’s reply was unequivocal: ‘yes, it was a strict division 
and pretty clear’.  
Although there are always coalitions of Member States within the negotiations at 
WHO, for Germany, unlike Egypt, FENSA was very comprehensive and, consequently, there 
were different notions and diverging views but ‘there was no clear cut’. According to 
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interviewee 8, there are more important variables which are based on history and the national 
definition of democracy:  
I guess if you have nationally concept where you engage a lot with non-State actors 
and where this is seen as a principle or pillar of democracy, then you obviously start 
from somewhere else, then if you have a system where that doesn't exist. So I think 
there I would see the divide, whether that's north and south, I wouldn't know because 
they are enough south countries who have exact exactly the same history and have 
democracies where voices from non-State actors are consulted and heard. (…)  In the 
EU there are some Member States who are very clear about where WHO’s 
engagement with non-State actors should stop. And I think they are clearer than 
many countries from Latin America. So no, I think there is no clear cut. (…) I think 
that some Member States were more outspoken than others, so we expect that they 
are representing blocks, but sometimes that's not the case.  
When asked to explain the dynamics of the coalitions established during FENSA 
negotiations, the German interviewee pointed out that Argentina played an important role and 
was supported by Latin American countries; in contrast the African group was not very 
coordinated. Moreover, while India and Brazil had strong involvement with the South 
network, the European countries were, as usual, coordinating their positions. It is important 
to note, however, that according to the European Union representative, the EU did not reach a 
consensus.  
The German interviewee assured that coalitions depended on the specific item that was 
being discussed and this division was ‘part of a show’. To illustrate, Latin America could not 
be seen as one homogenous bloc due to diverging views of the Member States who compete 
with each other. Another alliance mentioned was between Cuba and Iran.  
The European Union interviewee does not agree with the idea of a North/South 
division; ‘maybe it was in the past but it is not now’. The argument was that the BRICS 
would be seeking their agenda and that in many areas such as human rights, the European 
Union and South America ‘are right much on the same page’. Thus, the alliances change 
depending on the paragraph. 
For Norway, it is relevant to note that there was a general position in broader issues, 
and then some countries had specific issues they used to care more about. For the 
interviewee, in FENSA negotiations, the Member States were broadly divided into two 
groups. One group of countries which were ‘sceptical towards the solutions that were 
gradually emerging with thorough procedures to be applied without exemptions or any sort 
leeway’. This group would broadly be the European countries, Canada, Australia and the 
United States. On the other hand, a group of countries was ‘wedded to the notion of having a 
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waterproof legal system with extensive mechanisms for control, including a role for the 
Member States in overseeing even individual cases’. This second group was formed by Brazil 
(seen by the Norwegian representative as the key one) and was supported by countries from 
the GRULAC (Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries).  
When asked about a division between the Global North and the Global South, the 
interviewee from Norway said that perhaps ‘it is a little bit too simplistic as of generalisations 
inevitably are, but certainly, I think the FENSA discussion very well brought out the general 
divides whistle in differences of an overall approach to the organisation’. Additionally, it was 
pointed out that a country’s experience on how the WHO operated in their own country was 
an important variable. Thus, the second group would have a more critical view, considering 
that most of the western countries do not have WHO offices or actions in their countries. The 
Norwegian critical perspective, however, was that the other group failed to take into account 
the enormous volume of interactions that the WHO had with non-State actors and risked the 
mandate to an unworkable system that could compromise the ability of the Organisation to 
operate. 
For the United Kingdom, ‘polarisation fairly dominated the negotiations’, and the 
western countries were mostly the European countries, except Russia, Canada and the United 
States. In contrast, Global South countries were India, Pakistan, North Africa, Egypt, Brazil, 
Central/Latin America, Cuba, Nigeria. Like Germany, the UK interviewee confirmed that 
there was not a clear African position as they split. Moreover, it was pointed out that some 
individuals were very active solely, and not as a bloc, like Ghana and Zambia. Furthermore, 
given that the European Union presidency changes every six months, different countries were 
more active depending on the date of the meeting. The interviewee, however, assured that 
although agreeing with the EU, the United Kingdom had its positions and speeches. 
For the United States, the cleavage between the North and the South came out in some 
points ‘absolutely’. According to the interviewee, ‘broadly speaking there was an alignment 
of interests I think between the WEOG  countries on the one hand and sort of India, Latin 83
America and Africa, on the other hand’. However, it was pointed out that, in contrast with the 
United Nations headquarters in New York, where alliances are very static and do not ever 
shift, at the WHO the coalitions usually shift.  
 The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) is one of five unofficial Regional Groups in the United 83
Nations that act as voting blocs and negotiation forums
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The interviewee from the United States highlighted the role played by India, 
Bangladesh (‘to a certain extent’), the African Group, and Brazil as dominant negotiators 
from the developing countries. On the North side, the US and the European Union were 
mentioned. To illustrate the less than strict division, the interviewee argued that the Americas 
worked together as a bloc, with support from Argentina, Colombia, Canada, i.e. developed 
and developing countries.  
Zambia explained that coalitions are always formed, not just in FENSA, but in any 
negotiating table at the United Nations or the WHO. To illustrate, the interviewee pointed out 
that the European Union always negotiate as the European Union, even though each country 
may have ‘little spikes of what they are interested in’. Another coalition that was mentioned 
was that between Russia, Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela who are ‘always kind of working 
together’ and also Africa that always negotiates together: ‘we only stick joint positions 
because we have strength in numbers’. 
Regarding the division between North and South, the interviewee from Zambia clearly 
assured that:  
There was a clear difference between what the developing countries wanted and what 
developed countries wanted. It was very clear because (…) if you look at this 
structure and start thinking, we never give a lot of money, we don't give an amount of 
funding to the WHO from the developing world. What we wanted as developing 
countries, for example, on the issue financing we wanted to increase our assessed 
contribution but the Western world blocked up because they're the ones who benefit 
from the earmarked funding. They're the ones with the staff going into WHO, they're 
the ones who are directing what WHO should do with your money. So, you know, we 
have differences there.  
Although assuming the difference of position between North and South, the Zambian 
interviewee guaranteed it was not very rigid. It is significant to highlight that the interviewee 
was very critical about different treatments of the North and the South at the WHO: ‘the 
South didn't get much at all, they didn't get the jobs, they didn’t get positions (…) and yet the 
organisation was mostly working in the South. Everything that WHO does, it does in the 
South. You do not see WHO Europe doing anything (…), because the European countries do 
what they want and not what the WHO says’. 
Still regarding the coalitions, the Zambian interviewee mentioned the BRICS and the 
eastern countries, specifically Southeast Asia, even though neither were seen as powerful or 
united groups. In the end, the interviewee admitted a division along developed and 
developing countries lines, as the African position was similar to South America and a bit 
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similar to East Asia ‘because there are a lot of resemblances with them, which do not happen 
with Europe or North America’.  
Without mentioning any country specifically, Argentina just confirmed that FENSA 
negotiations divided the Member States between those who wanted more engagement and 
those who wanted less engagement. In this sense, according to the interview, ‘for Argentina, 
it was clear that we needed to have more interactions with different organisations’. When 
asked about a North/South division, the interviewee sidestepped by saying that ‘this North/
South issue is always present, but we try to avoid that’. However, in the end, they assumed 
the different positions taken by ‘those countries with more money for organisations or those 
who host NGOs or the private sector who was interested in having something more relaxed. 
And those countries with less private sector who wanted a more strict framework. I cannot 
deny that there was that kind of division’.  
5.4 How Was the Involvement of Non-State Actors Perceived During FENSA 
Negotiations? Did They Try to Influence the Outcomes? 
Interviewee 5, from Brazil, clarified that the WHO was suffering a progressive 
capture over the years by the private sector, what the Zambian interviewee referred to as a 
‘hijack’. However, the private sector exercised its influence on the Organisation through 
developed countries ‘because they treat the interests of multinationals as a national interest’. 
On the other hand, there was an alignment between diplomats from developing countries and 
the organised civil society of rich countries: 
We, negotiators from developing countries, did not have allies in companies nor in 
countries with clear positions towards national interest. Nobody says it, but that's 
what Trump today verbalizes: America first. That is, whoever has strength/power, 
imposes their perspective/position although trying to disguise it as a global interest, 
but basically it is not. So who we had to support us? Organised groups from 
developed countries, which had structure, resources from other sources and did not 
depend on private sector companies. Therefore they could confront powerful 
companies. Moreover, civil society in developed countries had access to international 
media and managed to publish an article in the New York Times, in the Guardian. 
And we joined these movements as a way of counterbalancing our lack of 
negotiating power. They sometimes helped us in many positions that we were 
advocating because issues can be very technical, negotiators from poor countries are 
more unprepared and insecure. They managed to give us access to renowned 
professors from major American universities, so we wrote with them or held 
seminars presenting a perspective to defy a purely commercial vision (...) As a 
diplomat, if you don't have real power, you have to find alliances, find people that 
will listen to you and take you seriously. 
For Egypt, all categories of non-State actor followed the FENSA process meticulously. 
Considering that all negotiations happened behind closed doors, NSAs tried to influence, 
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through the Member States, the Capitals or countries’ missions in Geneva. It was the only 
way for them to put their points of view on the negotiation table. However, the interviewee 
argued that this was expected behaviour, as FENSA has the potential to impact NSAs’ work 
directly. Some non-State actors, e.g. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, donate millions 
of dollars to the global public health arena. Consequently:  
(…) we took on board as well because this affected our negotiating positions. Not in 
a negative way, but in a positive way because we stressed when we had these non-
State actors trying to influence the capitals of governments, we working in our points 
of views that we want to perceive them reflected in the documents because of this, 
because they started to lobby and they started to try to influence the negotiating 
process.  
Notwithstanding this attempt to influence FENSA negotiations, The Egyptian representative 
argued that this is normal in multilateral negotiations, and that ‘in FENSA process, my 
personal judgement is that even with all the complexities that were surrounding the 
negotiating process, we managed to have a strong document that if properly implemented in 
WHO, it will protect WHO from any negative or undue influence’.  
Although they could not assure it, the European Union interviewee did believe that 
non-State actors could have influenced ‘at least in the initial stages, in the design phases’. 
When asked if non-State actors were trying to influence FENSA negotiations through the 
Member States, Norway argued that although it is a natural suspicion, it could not be 
confirmed.  
On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s perspective was that ‘powerful non-State 
actors were lobbying for their own demands’ during FENSA negotiations through the 
Member States as there were around 25 diplomats who were very active in health topics, 
‘probably because they get lobby from some companies’. Although the interviewee did not 
mention any NSA in particular, they affirmed that some NGOs in Geneva were writing the 
speech for developing countries ‘like a script of what they should argue’. For the UK 
representative, this happened due to capacity issues and close work relations. In this same 
direction, the interviewee said that many probably thought that the private sector was 
influencing the UK, but ‘this close relationship is a government policy. No one is going to 
write what we are going to say’.  
The United States confirmed that several NSAs were very actively following the 
FENSA and cited as example IBFAN, the Third-World Network, the South Centre, and the 
NCD Alliance. Moreover, the interviewee claimed that the Third-World Network and South 
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Centre were ‘very close with India and helping to feed some of their thoughts in and their 
approaches in’. For the North American interviewee, some groups of NSAs wanted a 
‘blacklist’ that would include not only tobacco and firearms but also alcohol, food and 
beverage companies and some other companies, such as Big Pharma. Hence, there were a lot 
of debate and coalitions regarding this issue, which included some of the ‘most active NGOs’ 
such as IBFAN and the Third-World-Network. These discussions relate to paragraph 44 of 
the FENSA document and will be further analysed in this chapter.  
Additionally, the interviewee from the U.S believes that in the first phase of FENSA 
negotiations when the non-State actors were more involved, they were not very strategic 
‘because they were coming at it very aggressively from their side. And once we went to the 
Member State portion of the negotiations, it went back to the normal, diplomatic way. And 
then they still provided input. They would meet with us outside of the room (…) we would 
meet with everyone, and it was very helpful’. IFBAN and IFPMA were explicitly mentioned. 
For Zambia, the NSAs were undoubtedly trying to influence FENSA negotiation 
behind the scenes as they would be alarmed by the new rules. Although assertively declaring 
that FENSA was strictly a Member States agenda and that non-State actors were not allowed 
to participate, the interviewee, similarly to the Egyptian interviewee, affirmed that non-State 
actors were trying to influence through the Capitals. Moreover, the Zambian representative 
also confirmed that this happens in every resolution: ‘the non-state actors feel threatened or 
want to influence Member States position because they have no space at the table’. As NSAs 
are never allowed in the negotiation room, they try to exert influence through national 
governments. As an example, the interviewee said that in the western countries, the 
pharmaceutical industry probably thought they were under threat, therefore they were 
possibly influencing their governments, which perchance buckled as ‘they cannot shoot 
themselves in the foot, and nobody is putting things that destroy your industry and your 
interests’. Thus, non-State actors can influence the agenda and the negotiations at the United 
Nations in any resolution including FENSA, they never did it by sitting at the negotiation 
table or standing at the corridors. They have to act through the Member States.  
Regarding how non-State actors were acting among themselves, the interviewee from 
Zambia assured that as the private sector and NGOs have more to lose, and the decisions of 
the WHO affect them greatly, they were more active and more organised, because:  
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they [philanthropic foundations] have the money anyway, so you follow that and you 
engage with them (…) if you don't want money from philanthropic organisations, do 
they lose anything? No. If you don't want to engage with academic institutions, do 
they lose anything? No. But the private sector and NGO was found to lose a lot from 
the engagement with the organization. So those two yes indeed were the most 
interested in this negotiation and process.  
Not only for FENSA, but in many negotiations, NGOs are usually more organised as a 
group to work together, while the private sector, even within the same group, is not 
synchronised. However, there is a big split within NGOs as they see each other as 
competitors. For Zambia, the NSAs must be better coordinated because ‘it is difficult to listen 
and to work with one entity; therefore, the more fragmented they are, the more their voice is 
not strong;. 
For Argentina, as the chair of the negotiations: 
 I was always open and I received anyone who wanted to see me, I had four maybe 
five meetings with different private sectors, maybe one NGO that was concerned 
about what we were doing. But to be honest, I never felt pressured or influences in 
some way to do one thing or another. (…) And I'm not saying that they were not 
worried and they were not always around, (…) but, I never received direct pressure, I 
just received some comments.   
The interviewee, however, assured that NSAs did not try to influence the negotiations behind 
the scenes. 
5.4.1. With Which Non-State Actor Did the Member State Have Closest Relations 
During the FENSA Negotiation? 
As already mentioned, Brazil confirmed having had close relations with civil society 
from developed countries and cited some NGOs such as the Quaker United Nations Office, 
PAX and the South Center. 
Egypt used to have informal meetings with the so-called watchdog organisations 
which, according to the interviewee, although they ‘do not have the capacity or the aptitude 
to engage on the same level like, for example, Bill and Melinda Gates, a philanthropic 
foundation that has a very significant role right now in engaging with WHO, they were keen 
to follow the process very carefully’. In these meetings, the NSAs used to underline the 
problems they saw in the text. The interviewee, however, assured that the country did not 
adopt these watchdog organisations’ views 100%, because ‘at the end of the day, they 
represent a non-state actor and we are representing governments. Governments usually have 
their own views while they might hear the voice of non-state actors’. Moreover, the Egyptian 
representative highlighted that various non-State actors were interested in FENSA 
negotiations and were coordinating particularly with developed countries how the framework 
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could impact their work. ‘But as a developing country, I think our basic engagement was with 
these watchdog organisations’. 
Regarding the allegation that non-State actors were trying to influence the Member 
States in their capitals, Egypt affirmed that ‘[I] used to regularly feedback our Ministry of 
Health back in Cairo and I'm sure they used to communicate with domestic non-state actors, 
I'm not really familiar with the outcomes of such kind of consultations, but the Ministry of 
Health used to support all the views that our mission had in the negotiating process’. The 
interviewee also mentioned that the United States contacted the Egyptian Ministry of Health 
at the level of capital to make sure their views were well known to the team in charge of 
FENSA. These views, however, ‘were somehow not all in agreement with views taken by a 
developing country in Geneva’. 
Germany assumed close relationships with all non-State actors, and not only those 
related to health or global health topics, since ‘anybody who is affected by German politics 
has to be consulted’. Therefore, the German government comprehensively engages with non-
State actors through consultation, recommendations, among others. According to the 
interviewee, ‘that's part of the German overall policy line, we are in favour of hearing the 
voices of civil society as well as academia, as well as the private sector as well as potentially 
the elderly, vulnerable groups, they are all part of our democracy model’. For this reason, 
Germany does not distinguish different sectors, although being aware they have specific 
interests. 
According to the European Union, the bloc does not have ‘any favourites’ and usually 
accepts requests for meetings no matter who is making the request. The interviewee said that 
before one World Health Assembly, the EU organised a meeting and invited civil society 
based in Geneva, including NGOs, industry and foundations. The EU asked the WHO for a 
list of non-State actors that could be invited, so that the EU member states could hear their 
views before finalising their positions. The WHO, however, did not provide the information. 
The United Kingdom interviewee affirmed to have spoken to many NGOs and 
institutions that were influencing Member States’ positions, without explicitly mentioning 
anyone.  Interviewee 7 stressed that this is how diplomacy works, ‘we spoke to them, 
informal conversations outside the negotiations table, in small groups to try to make progress 
outside the room’. 
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The United States admitted to have always been interested in meeting all interested 
stakeholders. During the FENSA negotiation process, the government individuals met with 
public-interested NGOs such as the Third-World Network and the NCD Alliance and also 
with IFPMA and IFBA, part of the private sector. It is important to note, however, that the 
IFBA does not have official relations with the WHO. Regarding the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the interviewee said the US and the Foundation:  
(…) kept each other informed, but I would say they were less engaged in FENSA. 
Their attitude throughout it was that this is a Member State decision and that they'll 
abide by whatever the Member States said. And I think that was actually a helpful 
position that they took because they already have kind of conspiratorial feelings 
toward that. So, it was good that they took a hands-off and supportive approach (…) 
But we also worked very hard to make sure that FENSA wouldn’t break them. And 
I'll be honest (…) I remember one conversation with my Brazilian counterpart at that 
time, we wanted to increase the transparency, increase the pressure on them, but we 
don't want to kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Because we can't, none of us can 
afford to pay to the money that Gates pays to WHO.  
Zambia claimed to be home to all non-State actors at the domestic level, but these non-
State actors do not play key roles in the UN as they are more focused on local issues. The 
interviewee explained that the huge non-State actors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundations, are ‘active on our ground’. Therefore, the country does not have NSAs to 
request how Zambian diplomats should negotiate. Therefore, Zambia’s positions on FENSA 
were based only on ‘[their] principles of a truthful and responsive Organisation’.  
As the chair of the Member States negotiation phase, Argentina confirmed that it 
talked  ‘mainly to the private sector and one NGO’. The interviewee, however, explained that 
most of the time, NSAs were requesting information. Regarding the private sector, 
interviewee 13 affirmed that ‘we would not see that they were very well briefed or very well 
and prepared to see me. (…) They had some general ideas, and they wanted more 
information’. When asked about the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s involvement in the 
FENSA process given their massive donations, the interviewee assumed that the Foundation 
was following closely, but ‘I assume that they acted through the national delegates. Probably 
they have contact with their own delegates or delegates from different countries (…) So, they 
have sent their representatives from the countries, or different countries to come to the 
negotiation through the delegations. That is totally fine’. The interviewee also stressed that 
no non-State actor tried to influence the process through the Chair.  
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5.5 Which Issues of FENSA Were Seen As Of Particular Concern? 
For Brazil, the critical point during FENSA negotiations was the relationship between 
the WHO and the private sector, as it was a diffuse relationship, due to the lack of clarity 
exhibited by the Principles of 1987, which raised doubts if industries were also embraced as 
business-oriented NGOs were in official relations with WHO. Therefore, the establishment of 
rules that would cover the relationship with the private sector was the most important and 
most sensitive topic, according to the interviewee, because it was the point with the most 
room for conflicts of interest, undue interference, and manipulation of the WHO Agenda for 
purposes beyond its objectives or the interests of the Member States. The Brazilian 
representative also mentioned another important element, not only for Brazil but also for the 
Latin American countries - the adherence to FENSA rules by the three levels of the World 
Health Organisation, namely, at the global level (the headquarters in Geneva) and at WHO 
regional offices and country offices. 
For Egypt, the fundamental issue was conflict of interest: ‘WHO is the international 
organisation responsible for putting the norms and standards for global public health. If we 
open the door for any non-State actor to influence this process, then we have undermined the 
work of WHO’. This principle, therefore, should be reflected through the FENSA document 
for any engagement. To enable this, safeguards and precautions against conflict of interest 
might be implemented. Thus, just the same as Brazil, the Egyptian interviewee asserted that 
the conflict of interest was a concerning topic when considering the private sector. 
For the European Union, despite not being part of the negations, the different 
categories of actor was a point of concern, as the focus was relying more on the idea of risk 
avoidance rather than risk management. ‘I see no problems inviting industry into a meeting, 
as long as everybody knows this is an industry. You have to listen to what they are saying 
with the filter, knowing where they are coming from’. 
Germany pointed out that paragraph 44 ‘WHO does not engage with the tobacco 
industry or non-State actors that work to further the interests of the tobacco industry. WHO 
also does not engage with the arms industry’ was controversial; this was confirmed by the 
United States’ interviewee. Moreover, the German interviewee also mentioned the conceptual 
discussion on undue influence, different interests, groups and:  
this major diversion in between the Member States as some of them wanted to enable 
engagement but safeguards WHO reputation and WHO independence. Others didn't 
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want engagement, they wanted to cut engagement. So that was a heavy debate. And I 
think there was also a debate, but that was at the very start, whether there should be 
one framework for everything or whether there should be different approaches to the 
different types of non-State actors. 
To Norway, the broad capacity for implementation, the effectiveness, and the cost of 
FENSA were the most important, as was the impact on the WHO’s ability to operate, in 
particular in a health crisis context: ‘finding a type of arrangement that provided increased 
security against undue influence by non-state actors, but at the same time did not hinder 
WHO’s interaction with the kind of non-state actors we wanted the organisation to be even 
more able to interact with’. Lastly, the interviewee pointed to the application of FENSA in 
regional offices, highlighting PAHO.   
For the United States, paragraph 44 was ‘the biggest thing’ as ‘there was a lot of 
concern in Washington that some countries would push for an expanded blacklist of 
companies. And some even did actually saying at certain points, like pharmaceuticals should 
be on that list or something because of their market behaviour (…) we pushed back very hard 
on as it would just be too crippling for the organisation’. The interviewee also mentioned the 
specific policies of the four non-State actors. In this regard, ‘we fought very hard for the 
information coming in [to] be treated the same. Basically, the text in the four policies should 
be the same for the information coming in’. The interviewee also argued that although 
agreeing that the Expert Committee and the Secretariat should be clear-eyed and unbiased 
about the information, ‘if it's coming from industry or from the civil society or from 
advocacy groups (…) they have to be aware that's coming from that point of view, but we 
wanted all the information treated the same, we don't want a front door for the good 
information to come in and the back door for the bad information. Information is just 
information’. The country advocated that the Member States should trust that the WHO’s 
experts would sort the right and useful information. 
Zambia wanted a functional organisation: 
Meaning that if we do pass the resolution, that resolution should be implemented, at 
least 90, 80, 70% should be implemented. We wanted an organisation that was 
leading health and leading health in the modern era was not speaking to the 1948 
agenda. The world has changed. We need an organisation that could be responsive 
and we're trying to go into partnership. In the new era, you can't move forward 
without partnerships.  
The interviewee highlighted, however, that although the engagement was seen as essential to 
implement the resolutions, it should be pursued and done ‘with caution, with integrity, 
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engage not with special interests’.  
For Argentina, the main concern was having a balance between ‘trying to regulate the 
engagement, but not to stop people, not to complicate. So we wanted transparency’. 
According to the interviewee, the WHO is a “huge bureaucracy”, hence, it is difficult to get 
information, especially for those Member States with limited resources. Argentina, therefore, 
as the Chair of the negotiations ‘wanted to promote a more transparent process’.  
5.5.1 Distinction Between the Different Types of Non-State Actors 
Brazil was in favour of differentiating the non-State actors, and its most significant 
concern was with the private sector. According to interviewee 5, the country also had some 
reservations with philanthropies, since the Gates Foundation, by acting like a ‘parasite’ had 
attached itself to the WHO, representing about 10-15% of the Organisation's annual budget 
and making the WHO dependent, even concerning other projects - not only those financed by 
the Foundation. The Brazilian interviewee admitted to having a bit of concern with the 
academic sector as it is very government-related and receives a lot of money typically from 
companies. They had no significant worries with NGOs. 
For Egypt, the idea of separating the different types of non-States actors was raised at 
the beginning of the negotiations, but the Member States opted to have an overarching 
framework to be fully applied to the four categories of non-State actors. However, taking into 
account that each non-State actor has its own domain of work as well as its own dynamics of 
interacting with the WHO, and its own, separate interests, it was decided to have separate 
documents for each NSA. The interviewee pointed out that apart from the four specified 
groups of non-state actors, Egypt sought to insert think tanks as the country sees them as 
players with a very significant role as well as being funded by the private sector or 
philanthropic foundations. ‘So we were keen to have reference to think tanks to make sure 
that if these think-tanks are reflecting in their academic studies a specific point of view, then 
we should be careful when there is engagement with think-tanks that are supported by the 
private sector or a philanthropic foundation’. 
For Germany, this topic was polarised into ‘who is the good one, who is the bad one’. 
According to the interviewee, the Member States were taking positions in light of their 
culture of engaging with non-State actors domestically, therefore the focus was not only in 
the interests of the private sector, as for other countries civil society groups would be more 
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challenging. This argument is in line with the Zambian interviewee, who pointed out that 
NGOs are domestically problematic. Germany’s point of view, given internal politics, is that 
nobody comes free of any interest: ‘nobody - apart from democratically elected 
representatives who represent the people -, neither civil society nor academia, nor private 
sector, nor foundations. So from that point of view, they are all one group vis-à-vis the non-
State actors (…) So that notion to argue that the private sector is always coming with 
commercial interests while others come with the right interests I think that is not real’. 
Germany, consequently, was advocating for the same standards for all NSAs. 
Norway confirmed that the distinction between the categories of NSAs was an issue 
that indeed provoked much debate during the negotiations and ‘we spent an entire day on two 
paragraphs of that (...) I think we ended up with a fairly rational result on that in the end. 
Certainly, one that we could live with’.  The interviewee explained that the WHO needs to 
work very closely with research and academic institutions given its role as a leading 
normative organisation. Therefore, if the Member States decided to limit the WHO’s ability 
to work with institutions that are privately funded, it would be a problem as ‘quite a lot of the 
best academic institutions of the world are privately funded’. The same argument was used 
for the development of vaccines, and to conclude affirming that ‘there is simply no way of 
avoiding interaction with private entities. You have to take that into account. There has to be 
a pragmatic balance, and you have to interact with things as they actually exist. Rather than 
we would have ideally liked them to be’.  
For the United Kingdom, the WHO should be able to engage with any relevant 
organisations. They were also concerned about the parity between NSAs because if the 
Member States decided to have different rules, they would need good reasons to justify. 
Therefore, a common framework should apply to everyone, and it was essential to be clear 
that there was parity in the requirements. The interviewee asserted that there was a clear 
division between delegations that wanted different requirements for each NSAs and those 
who wanted parity and advocated that the WHO should be able to engage with any 
organisation as long as they had compelling reasons for that. ‘Sometimes you need to talk to 
bad guys to do good things’. Moreover, the British interviewee clarified that while the 
western group wanted a more homogeneous framework, India wanted clear differentiation 
between NSAs. 
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For the United States, the distinction between the different types of non-State actors 
‘was another big fight that we have spent a lot of energy on’. The interviewee explained that 
some countries (without mentioning any in particular) were trying to set out ‘even clearer 
distinctions’ while the US wanted ‘to protect public-private partnerships and not to penalise 
different entities’. Although ‘personally agreeing’ that there are different risks among  non-
State actors and assuming that the power asymmetry is real, ‘it is not practical, it is not 
realistic’. Therefore:  
What we tried to do with FENSA and with the four policies was to keep the 
symmetry where it made sense, like on the information, but to allow differences. So 
for example, we did allow the exclusion of private sector representatives from expert 
committees (…). So we did recognize that there needed to be places where the 
private sector was treated differently, but we just tried to look at each of those 
particular scenarios and situations on their merits and not on whether is it just private 
sector.  
Zambia confirmed the contentious debate among the Member States regarding non-
State actors being treated differently, ‘I remember there were some publications, kind of 
social media from India who always wanted to demonise private sector’. Zambia, however, 
did not agree with the idea of treating non-State actors differently because, domestically, the 
country has more problems with NGOs. The interviewee went on to clarify: 
 only the Western world does not have problem with NGOs because they finance 
NGOs, they give NGOs the agenda of what they should do, and most of them are 
working in the developing countries (…) So, we have had problems sometimes with 
NGOs on the country level because they push an agenda that is of other interests (…) 
we found them (NGOs) to be just as problematic, even more problematic because 
you have no accountability mechanisms that we can monitor.   
The Zambian interviewee also argued that while the debate was guided by the 
argument that the private sector is only driven by profit interest, ‘from our perspective, we 
knew that NGOs were also driven by money. They use the money of the agenda that they 
push; they do not push the agenda of the need. They may use the needs on the ground to get 
space in your country. But what they do is deeply guided by who is giving them money and 
they're not accountable’.  
Argentina confirmed that some countries wanted to put Food and Beverage industries 
in the same no-go list as arms and tobacco. The country, however, was against it and wanted 
something more general, instead of having a list of prohibited sectors, to have four policies 
‘with the main characteristics to separate the four categories’. According to the interviewee, 
Brazil proposed to have the differences among the categories, but it was before the Member 
States phase of the negotiation.  
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5.5.2 Secondments 
Given that a seconded individual turns into regular staff, even though the releasing 
entity keeps the responsibility to pay remuneration, secondments raised fears of potential 
conflicts of interest during FENSA negotiations. To this regard, in December 2015, the Third 
World Network criticised secondments from philanthropic foundations, specifically the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation and the United Nations Foundation, to ‘top management 
positions at the World Health Organization’. 
According to a leaked document released by Baby Milk Action in December 2015,  84
there were nine secondments from NGOs, philanthropic foundations and academic 
institutions in 2015. The document also revealed that between 2012 and 2015, the WHO did 
not have secondment from a private sector entity.  The final version of FENSA, however, 
only prohibited secondments from private sector entities.  
Interviewee 5, from Brazil, while arguing that secondments from the private sector 
indeed represent a ‘ridiculous quantity’, the number is small but the influence is not:   
Things are done indirectly, subtly. So it is fair to say that in numerical terms, private 
sector has never been so important. But anyway it was important to block them, even 
though blocking would not prevent their influence as they have other ways of 
influencing. They take part in all projects of any disease, promote workshops, 
seminars, informative material.  
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the private sector can finance secondments through 
programmes. The interviewee gave, as an example, the Junior Professional Officer 
Programme, which annually seconds approximately 120 individuals from Member States. 
Hence, pharmaceutical industries finance Sweden, Denmark, and other developed countries, 
which, in turn, sponsor young people who stay for a year or two:  
[young professionals seconded at WHO] already know everyone, they already know 
the opportunities that will open, it is a totally biased system to integrate labour. (…) 
and it is a way they [private sector] have to keep feeding the staff with new people, 
with their people. And when it is claimed why there are no Brazilians there, it is 
because Brazil has no money and does not finance these young interns. 
Zambia had a similar argument towards internships at the WHO and how different developed 
and developing countries were treated on this topic.   
Germany was against this decision as ‘there should not be any secondments that 
seemed naive and odd, and although this forbiddance was not its viewpoint, the country 
 Available at: http://www.babymilkaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/FENSA-secondment-table-9-84
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accepted in the spirit of compromise’. Interviewee 8 argued that Germany was, and still is, 
favourable to secondments from all non-State actors. However, ‘obviously we would not be 
in favour of having a thousand staff members being seconded, and one would have to ensure 
that there is no undue influence when it especially comes to norms and standards-setting 
from non-State actors’.  To illustrate, the interviewee affirmed  that:  
During the negotiations, it became clear that the Gates Foundation was seconding 
one or two staff members to the Polio eradication initiative, which is a program 
under WHO. And that was then seen as a major scandal while also there the Gates 
Foundation has invested billions of dollars into the polio eradication initiative. It 
seems strange then not to allow seconding someone to the organisation if they are not 
writing norms and standards. So we believe it's possible to handle these potential 
conflicts of interests. 
The United Kingdom was supportive of secondments and did not agree with the 
FENSA final version of not accepting secondments from the private sector. The interviewee 
described it as a regrettable decision. The country’s broad position was of bringing expertise 
‘from wherever they are, by forbidding secondments from the private sector, a potential 
source of expertise and network can be lost’. Finally, the interviewee posed the question that 
if secondments happen at the national level, why could they not happen at the WHO?   
For Zambia, like Brazil, the secondments were problematic because the WHO was 
only accepting many secondments from the Western countries, from academic institutions, 
from philanthropic organisations, ‘even from governments (…) and secondment was based 
on who can finance it. And that's not fair; you know that in this world not everybody has 
money’. To illustrate, the interviewee talked about the internship programme at WHO: 
[the internship programme] was problematic, because WHO never found resources, 
which they could if they wanted to find resources that would pay for the interns when 
they come to do their internship in WHO. But, our people in the South don't have the 
capacity and money to come and live in Geneva. So they never could come and do 
internships and because they don't have that experience in WHO and in the UN, 
when they apply for jobs they never get accepted because (…). If you went to WHO 
the interns you found were only from the west. I think WHO is a little bit opening up 
and is offering a little bit of payment for the interns and is also trying to make it a 
little bit more universal, so interns come from everywhere. 
The interviewee also explained that another problem with secondments at the WHO 
was that people would switch immediately from a seconded position into being full staff, 
which was clearly in unfair competition with qualified people outside the organisation. 
Zambia suggested a gap between the secondment and the job and proposed a two year gap 
before the seconded person could be considered for a position as staff in the WHO. For the 
Zambian interviewee, the issue with secondment was mostly to do with fairness. 
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Additionally, seconded staff may allow donors to influence the organisation and, 
consequently, influence other countries. 
Zambia, however, did not agree with the FENSA final version which banned only 
secondments from the private sector: ‘When I was in WHO there was not nonsense like that, 
everybody wants to be treated the same. So as I said, whether they came from governments, 
they came from any other non-State actor, they were putting money into WHO as earmarked 
funds, that money came with human beings as secondments’. The interviewee ended by 
asserting that secondments in the WHO were unfair and a way to elevate people with their 
own agenda and interests, which were not the same as all Member States. ‘WHO must work 
on what Member States vote to do and not what a country or an NSA alone wants’. 
Argentina highlighted that ‘a long debate, mainly around transparency’ regarding 
secondments took place during the negotiations. The interviewee explained that it all started 
when the Member States requested a list of the seconded organisations of the Secretariat and 
‘realised that they did not have a list of the organisations. So we started to request 
information (…), and then we discovered some secondments from the private sector in the 
organisation (…) then we decided we wanted a clear policy of this. But during FENSA 
negotiation we decided that would deserve another process’.  
In this regard, it is important to note that the FENSA final version, in paragraph 3, 
demanded of the Director-General:  
to develop, in consultation with Member States, a set of criteria and principles for 
secondments to WHO from nongovernmental organisations, philanthropic 
foundations and academic institutions and to submit the criteria and principles for the 
consideration of and establishment by, as appropriate, the Seventieth World Health 
Assembly, through the Executive Board, taking into account, among others, the 
following identified issues: (a) specific technical expertise needed and exclusion of 
managerial and/or sensitive positions; (b) the promotion of equitable geographical 
distribution; (c) transparency and clarity around positions sought, including public 
announcements; (d) secondments are temporary in nature, not exceeding two 
years.”   
The Director-General, in fact, presented at the Executive Board 142, in January 2018, a 
report on ‘Criteria and principles for secondments from nongovernmental organisations, 
philanthropic foundations and academic institutions’.  
5.5.3 Emergency Crisis  
As analysed in Chapter 2, the World Health Organisation was hugely criticised during 
the Ebola outbreak. In this regard, it is important to note that FENSA negotiations were 
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happening for a while, alongside the epidemic. During some interviews, the topic of Ebola 
emerged as a variable which could have influenced the positions of the Member States. 
For Germany, even though Ebola didn’t play a significant role, it, in fact, influenced 
how the WHO should engage with non-State actors in cases of emergencies. In the end, the 
solution was that in an emergency, the WHO has to act and use all the support it could get. 
Practically, it means that FENSA should not be a deterrent for the WHO to engage in crises 
as ‘in a case of emergency you do not have time to a lengthy process’. The interviewee also 
mentioned that even though there was some controversy about this emergency clause, there 
was an overall consensus that the main focus regarding the engagement with non-State actors 
was the normative and standard settings, which are not linked to health emergencies.  
Crisis response, however, was a topic that made Norway ‘seriously considered 
blocking it (FENSA)’.  For the interviewee, the Ebola outbreak revealed quite serious 
shortcomings in how the WHO used to operate in a health crisis context and, therefore, the 
sort of changes needed in its methods for working with emergency situations also extended to 
the general humanitarian work. The Norwegian interviewee explained that the previous 
system required the WHO to do ‘a sort of eight-week procedure every time they were going 
to talk to an NGO in the field’, which seemed incompatible with the required speed of 
operation and field flexibility. The country, therefore, was advocating for a language that 
would create an opt-out for an emergency context that would enable the WHO not to apply 
FENSA in a crisis response operation. Thus, it was ‘an absolute precondition for delivering 
FENSA (…), this was kind of a complete red line for many countries’. 
For the United Kingdom, the Ebola crisis was essential in showing that the Member 
States should seek an enabling framework instead of a prohibitive one: ‘when Ebola started, 
this entire tension shift as it could be seen that it was not Western position but the reality’.  
According to the United States, elaborating an emergency response took much effort 
and required separate negotiation. The interviewee pointed out that the main opponent for 
more flexibility on FENSA in cases of emergency was Iran, along with ‘a few, very few 
countries supporting so that they were not alone’.  
(…) in fact, what I should also do is put Switzerland and a little bit UK on the spot in 
that emergency negotiation as well. They were for it, but they were for an extreme 
version. So, they were making a deal impossible because they were not interested in 
giving Iran any kind of assurances. So what Iran was kind of asking, for example, 
was some basic notification from WHO that the flexibilities around FENSA were 
going to be used in X response that's in the region or something like that. And I think 
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we got to something fairly like that with very flexible implementation instructions 
that basically leaving it to the discretion of the DG how to do that. But the Swiss and 
a few of the other Europeans at first didn't want to have any of that, they wanted just 
a full carve-out with no caveats. So that's the main challenge, actually, bringing them 
together. And I think it was Norway actually in Switzerland in particular.  
Interviewee 9, however, did not mention Norway, which, according to media reports and to 
the Norwegian interviewee itself, was the leading country on the issue. The topic was so 
contentious that the former DG Margaret Chan had to return to Geneva earlier from the Paris 
climate negotiations to try to help broker a deal. ‘It was super crazy and very difficult 
because we wanted to make sure that in emergency situations, the paperwork could come 
later’. Given that the WHO was hugely criticised during the Ebola outbreak, the interviewee 
argued that ‘we did not want FENSA, one good thing, to create unintended consequences in 
future emergencies’. The interviewee also explained that the United States and South Africa 
were leading the subgroup, which was discussing the emergency crisis as both countries had 
led the Ebola special session negotiations on the health emergencies work.  
For Zambia, the Ebola outbreak did influence FENSA debate and the Member States’ 
positions. Zambia was leading the African states, and they ‘were not very happy with the 
response, the speed of the response, the nature of the response. We are also not very happy 
that they use some of the response to do things like testing vaccines that are not proven to be 
effective at all, just because it is an emergency situation’.  
The interviewee reiterated that when people are dying, no one is able to see if help is 
coming from the private sector, if ethics are going to be followed or not. Therefore: 
When you want to come up with a new product in medicine, it goes through a lot of 
rigorous processes, but because of the emergency, you throw away all those ethics 
for the name of trying to save lives. But for us, we know that in this world there are 
many governments that have done experiments with other people. And I can't remove 
Ebola from that topic. It's possible that an amount of experiments were done with our 
people, using the Ebola outbreak as an excuse. So yes, it did influence FENSA 
negotiation for the emergencies and shipped the discussions. But we were stuck 
between the devil and the deep blue sea.  
Thus, for Zambia the guidelines should not be flexible in an emergency context as ‘they [the 
rules] should be solid, emergencies come and go’. In the end, the Western countries were:  
trying to make us back them on certain positions so that we can solve [the deadlock], 
because we were crying that we needed these emergencies to be addressed, but you 
have to be flexible with this, otherwise, we will not have any way to help in an 
emergency (….) There is no way it can follow the regular process of FENSA because 
it is cumbersome, it is long, and you need a response very quickly. So how do we do 
that? So they used that to push the agenda. But overall, it was like I said, it was a 
fleet situation, too tricky things going on at the same time. So it was very difficult. 
Ideally, we would love, we would have loved that negotiation with FENSA to place 
 236
without the outbreak but it was there so it did influence, unfortunately. 
Argentina occupied a definite position on the ‘emergencies’ topic, which resulted in 
discussions and disagreements between the Member States. According to the interviewee, 
‘we wanted FENSA to be applied, but we wanted flexibility. For us, it was not possible just 
to say if there is an emergency that will not apply at all. But we wanted some flexibility, 
some reasonable flexibility, because when you have to respond to an emergency, then you 
cannot go through the process, that's clear’. The Chair of negotiations stressed that while 
some Member States were not delighted with the flexibility, others wanted to suspend 
FENSA at all during an emergency, ‘but for us, that was very risky. So we negotiated some 
balance. I think, in the end, we managed to find a flexible solution for emergencies’. 
Paragraph 72 of FENSA states that ‘when responding to acute public health events 
described in the International Health Regulations (2005) or other emergencies with health 
consequences’, the Director-General must act in accordance with both the WHO Constitution 
and FENSA, however, ‘may exercise flexibility as might be needed in the application of the 
procedures of this framework in those responses, when he/she deems necessary, in 
accordance with WHO’s responsibilities as health cluster lead, and the need to engage 
quickly and broadly with non-State actors for coordination, scale-up and service delivery’.  
5.5.4 PAHO and Regional Offices  
When conducting the document analysis, the Pan America Health Organisation 
(PAHO) was not perceived as an important topic; however, during the interviews, it could be 
observed that the PAHO was a ‘thorn in one's side’, especially for the European countries. 
Interviewee 5, from Brazil, confirmed the contention surrounding the PAHO and said 
that Europe wanted to control it from Geneva. 
PAHO is our domain, we are in charge, we did not want a straitjacket (…) PAHO and 
the regional governments have great permeability and we are beyond the central 
control from Geneva. (…) This is another tension between the centralised control by 
WHO of its regional arms and the regional arms not wanting to be controlled by the 
“mothership”. Because in our region, we want Latin American standards and a 
certain regional protectionism, we don't want the Nordics to have the same influence 
they have in Geneva. So that tension did exist.     
Egypt confirmed that ‘European countries had a concern that they might be buying 
FENSA and (…) and PAHO might not do the same. They were seeking some sort of a 
guarantee that this document is going to be applied to all regional offices, including PAHO’. 
For Germany, the PAHO was part of the starting point as ‘whatever we decide here 
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[WHO Headquarters] should also apply to PAHO, clearly’. The interviewee argued that the 
Europeans were concerned that the Latin American countries, that were so outspoken in 
negotiating FENSA, could not have the Framework applied to the entire region. So, the 
German perspective was that FENSA should either apply to all or nobody. It was an 
unequivocal position as, according to the interviewee, some Member States were only 
focusing on headquarters and ‘for us that was unacceptable because WHO is one 
organisation, so if we set up rules for WHO then they apply to the entire organisation’. 
Zambia agreed that the PAHO became an issue during the negotiations, as almost all 
the Member States wanted the FENSA to be applicable at all levels and in all regions:  
We actually find the whole PAHO policy to be kind of double standards. We don't 
like it. It's only the people at PAHO who like that - it's not only the FENSA 
resolution, it's every resolution. If we design something in Geneva, it doesn't get 
automatically implemented in PAHO. Somehow PAHO has the seed to do it again or 
say we can do it or not. So why should they have that flexibility when all of us do 
not? Because it was kind of a hypocritical for the PAHO Member States to come and 
push a lot of things there when they not even are going to implement in the region. 
Or even take very strong positions there when they knew that may not be applicable 
and they can change it. 
The interviewee also reiterated that all WHO regional offices have autonomy, and they could 
also make their own decisions, but instead they were all following FENSA.  
Argentina also confirmed that, given the PAHO is older than the WHO, with different 
conditions when compared to the other regional offices, ‘PAHO always feels that they 
deserve different treatments’. Moreover, as already affirmed by the Brazilian interviewee, the 
PAHO works effortlessly with the region, therefore ‘in many policies that WHO decides in 
Geneva, PAHO thinks differently. Mostly because for PAHO, the region works together’. 
Regarding FENSA negotiations:  
at the very beginning, we are that region, we knew that this problem existed. So we 
invite invited PAHO to participate in the negotiation. We invited all the regions, but 
we invited specially PAHO. And PAHO said, “maybe later, now you work in Geneva, 
then we see what we do here in our region”. And that was uncomfortable because the 
Member States from our region were being very active. (…) and it's very difficult to 
say, okay, we're going to approve something that would be good for Geneva, but we 
don't know if it's going to be good for PAHO. Then, PAHO finally started to 
participate in the conversations because we insisted them to come. They started to 
meet us, the Member States of the region, to do some analysis, some papers and 
discussions that they were very useful (…) And finally, when we approved the 
document in Geneva, PAHO was the first region that started to apply FENSA. In the 
beginning, they tried to approve something different, something adapted to the 
region, but our commitment in Geneva was that all regions would apply the same 
way, that no regions have the right to change FENSA. And it was actually the first 
region after the approval that started to apply.  
In order to hear a counterargument, I contacted PAHO three times (12/06/2019, 
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02/07/2019 and 17/07/2019), without response. According to the document CD55/8, 
discussed during the 68th Session of the Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas in 
September 2016, four months after FENSA approval, due to the PAHO’s independent legal 
status: 
once FENSA was adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA), it would not 
automatically apply to PAHO until such time as PAHO Member States expressly 
approved and adopted it through PAHO’s Governing Bodies (…) Having considered 
the implications for PAHO to implement FENSA, PAHO Member States at the 69th 
WHA in May 2016 committed to adopt FENSA through PAHO Governing Bodies in 
a manner that respects PAHO’s independent legal status as an international 
organisation. Accordingly, PAHO Member States understood that certain 
accommodations and adjustments to FENSA would be required, but that these would 
not affect the substantive provisions of FENSA or prevent coherent and consistent 
global application. The required accommodations relate to matters of PAHO 
Constitution, e.g., oversight by PAHO Governing Bodies and decision-making 
authority resting with PAHOs Director. These are imperative, as PAHO must retain 
responsibility over those activities for which it has legal and fiduciary obligations, 
such as its engagement with non-State actors, i.e., the same way that PAHO 
independently enters into agreements with State actors, PAHO must retain authority 
to review, analyse, and make its own decisions on this Organisation’s interactions 
with non-State actors. PAHO’s Secretariat will work closely with WHO’s Secretariat 
in the implementation of FENSA. (…) PAHO Member States should note that the 
FENSA document adopted by the 69th WHA also modified WHO’s process for 
granting nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) the status of “Official Relations”. It 
is therefore proposed that PAHO Member States follow similar procedures for 
granting NGOs “Official Relations” with PAHO. (PAHO, 2016, p.2-3) 
In the end, the PAHO was the first regional office to adopt and implement the Framework.  
5.5.5 Industries Affecting Human Health  
During the preliminary interviews, it was noted that paragraph 44 had raised many 
controversial perspectives during FENSA negotiations. In the initial version of the 
Framework, paragraph 44 was ‘WHO does not engage with the tobacco or arms industries. In 
addition, WHO will exercise particular caution when engaging with other industries affecting 
human health or affected by WHO’s norms and standards’. In the approved version, 
Paragraph 44 states that ‘WHO does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-State actors 
that work to further the interests of the tobacco industry. WHO also does not engage with the 
arms industry’. Moreover, paragraph 45 added ‘WHO will exercise particular caution, 
especially while conducting due diligence, risk assessment and risk management, when 
engaging with private sector entities and other non-State actors whose policies or activities 
are negatively affecting human health and are not in line with WHO’s policies, norms and 
standards, in particular, those related to non-communicable diseases and their determinant’. 
Egypt reiterated that India proposed, in the fragment ‘industries that direct or indirect 
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harm the human health’, that there should be an explicit clarification of which industries were 
being referred to. Egypt and Iran supported the proposal. The interviewee argued that these 
countries wanted an explicit reference to Food and Beverage companies. However, some 
developed countries, specifically the United States and the United Kingdom, objected, since 
‘they have domestic interest that they do not want to harm, from another part, they argued 
that if we do so, then we are sending a negative message to these non-state actors. And this 
negative message might tempter or impede the WHO’s role in trying to influence the 
standards and rule of non-state actors industries’.  
Nevertheless, Egypt believes that as paragraph 45 was inserted, it became clear that 
some NSAs might have a negative impact on WHO. ‘To me, even if we are not explicitly 
referring to these companies, the current formulation as used in paragraph 45 reflects the 
reality and stick precautions to make sure that these companies are not engaging with WHO’. 
For the United States, paragraph 44 was ‘the key paragraph (…) which resulted in a lot 
of discussion and a lot of coalitions relating to the non-State actors themselves. I think some 
groups wanted not only the blacklist for tobacco and firearms but to extend it to alcohol, food 
and beverage companies and some other companies, even Pharma’. For the North American 
interviewee, it was problematic because, although there are problems related to Big Pharma, 
the WHO obviously has to work with them:  
Anyway, and that was a very fundamental part of the debate. And we as the US and 
others who agreed with us, we're successful in saying, we should, the blacklist should 
stay the same: tobacco and firearms because there's no, for those two industries 
there's no other side of the coin. Both of those industries exist only to harm humans, 
and so there's no benefit for WHO to work with them. But the other industries are all 
much more nuanced and all play different, much different roles in all of our 
communities. I mean, everybody has to eat and drink and everybody doesn't have to 
drink alcohol, but a lot of people choose to. So how do you work with? It's just kind 
of working effectively.  
Interviewee 9 also pointed out that many discussions surrounding paragraph 44 took 
place with the African group as they were engaging a lot with some NGOs, such as IBFAN 
and the Third-World-Network. 
For the United States, the WHO should meet with ‘Nike or Adidas when working with 
physical activity’ and also ‘with Coca-Cola and Nestlé to talk about reformulation’. The 
interviewee then affirmed that ‘a lot of countries, mostly the WEOG countries supported us 
in terms of having a difference between tobacco and arms, which is the no-go area and, and 
the other industries affecting human health’. However, they pointed out that Norway wanted 
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‘much more restrictions on the health effecting industries then than ultimately went there’. 
Finally, the US interviewee also called attention to the discussion over the language that 
should be used in paragraph 44 – explicitly whether it should be softer or harder. In the end, 
‘particular caution while engaging’ was negotiated and the Member States ended up agreeing 
on the exact wording. 
For Zambia, paragraph 44 represented a fight between two positions from different 
groups headed by the United States and India with their corresponding allies. The 
interviewee, however, assured the country was neutral on this topic and saw sense in both 
sides:  
Why do I say so? The arms industry is definitely, we don't see anything good that 
comes out of arms. Not only in health, but in everything. […] But then, for example, 
India wanted to frame the industries that affect human health, […] when you also 
look at it from the American perspective, everything affects health. There is no 
industry that doesn't affect health. So when you say arms industries that affect human 
health, then you're just saying everyone as well. So I think we'd use that as the 
counter-argument, which they did and it makes sense.  
  According to Argentina, while some Member States wanted a list of industries that 
should have restricted engagement with the WHO, ‘for the US, it was very difficult to deal 
with that’. The interviewee affirmed that, in the end, the Member States managed to find a 
balance for paragraph 44; ‘the US was happy with that, other members were happy with that. 
Maybe it is not the best solution (…), but we just tried to cover every position. I do not 
remember exactly paragraph 44, but I do remember that was the maximum possibility that 
had to approve and the USA would be happy with that’. Interviewee 13 stressed that although 
the US ‘covered the food industry very strong’, they were not alone in the controversy about 
paragraph 44 ‘they were maybe leading that position, but they were not alone’. The 
interviewee concluded by stating that Argentina was not in favour of the restrictive list.  
5.6 Can FENSA be Seen as a Tool to Address the WHO’s Underfunding Crisis?  
To Brazil, FENSA precisely helps to shed light to non-State actors’ contributions, to 
increase transparency, in order to keep the donations aligned with the WHO’s purposes, 
objectives and its mandate. Interviewee 4, however, affirmed that one needs to exercise a 
great deal of realism, as in the short and indeed medium term, there is no Member State in a 
position or willing to cover this funding from non-State sources. ‘I see neither political nor 
financial conditions to cover this gap’. 
For Egypt, if the WHO was in a good financial state, Member States might not have 
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negotiated FENSA.  
WHO has been facing a chronic financial problem in relation to its funds. You have 
the assessed contributions from one side and you have the voluntary contributions 
from one side. More than 80% of the biennial budget of WHO came from voluntary 
contributions, while the remaining part comes from the assessed contributions. So 
this is not enough to support the work of WHO in the field and you are aware that we 
have three levels of work in WHO, we have the headquarters in Geneva, then we 
have the regional offices and we have the country offices. And right now there is 
really increasing emergency demanding crises that require the attention of WHO. 
And this really aggravated the financial crisis of WHO. 
According to the interviewee, as a result, developed countries wanted to use the engagement 
with non-State actors, particularly with philanthropic foundations and the private sector, to 
try to alleviate the WHO’s financial crisis. While not having a problem with this, ‘we needed 
from our side as developing countries to take into account that this might undue influence the 
work of WHO’.  
For the Egyptian interviewee, the main challenge during the negotiations was to have 
enough principles to address conflicts of interest and norms for risk management and risk 
assessment. In this regard, there were two main points of view; ‘one side wanted the 
engagement to alleviate the financial crisis of the WHO, even if this comes in contradiction 
with the mandate of WHO. It was something we totally refused as developing countries, and 
we did not object to the engagement as long as the work of WHO will not be defeated’. 
Without explicitly mentioning anyone, the interviewee affirmed that the financial crisis was 
one of the reasons behind the pressure that some countries have exerted to allow more 
engagement with non-State actors.  
For Germany the criticism that FENSA would open the door for private funding to the 
WHO is ‘nonsense because there is private funding in quotation marks already’. In this 
regard, the interviewee affirmed that the Gates Foundation, Rotary and other non-State actors 
provide funding to the WHO or to specific programmess, and these programmess might, to 
some extent, be heavily dependent on those resources, ‘to argue that only FENSA now allows 
that money to come in is not true because it was possible before’. The interviewee did not 
agree that this was one of the critical concerns for the Members States during FENSA 
negotiations.  
For Norway, that was a fanciful notion as FENSA was contrarily creating a regime that 
would reduce the organisation’s ability to bring significant resources to the field. However, 
‘if you have a framework in place that strengthens WHO’s reputation with regard to having a 
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sort of clean and credible relation to nonstate actors that might, in the long run, prove image 
organisation, hence its attractiveness as a funding option’.  
For the United States, ‘hopefully [WHO] can use the tools in FENSA that are provided 
to set up other funding mechanisms, whether it is voluntary funds or what you have to be 
able to collect resources and address those issues’. According to the interviewee, as long as 
the essential functions (the normative function, the technical work and the policy-making 
work) are protected from undue influence, the WHO should be able to use FENSA to address 
some of the funding gaps. Moreover, ‘the US government would also support that as a 
general matter, as the largest funder to WHO, we are always sort of officially encouraging 
WHO to broaden their donor base’.  
For Zambia, funding was one of the issues, as the Member States started feeling that 
few entities deviated the whole functioning of the organisation.  
5.7 Is the FENSA Enough to Address the Initially-Proposed WHO Challenges? 
For Germany, it is not yet possible to say for certain, as the FENSA still needs to be 
evaluated. Thus, the interviewee asserted that one crucial point was to make sure that the 
FENSA would not establish a non-usable regime. The German diplomat also affirmed that an 
‘interesting part about FENSA’ was that the Framework was heavily negotiated, line by line, 
for long periods, ‘every single word as if it was a war in between member states’. However, 
once it is adopted, nobody cares anymore. 
For Zambia, FENSA is just the start. According to the interviewee, the Member States 
developed a document to improve the relations of the organisation with non-State actors, 
however, ‘I do not think that is a very very good document that all of us now closed and go 
home and think something will happen very well’. Interviewee 12 also pointed out that 
FENSA is not only just the starting document, but, as the negotiations took many years and it 
was not an easy process, ‘in the end, most of us were very keen just to get the work done. 
Even when you look at the actual document, we had to compromise, most almost all of us 
had to compromise so we could close the negotiations. Because time was running out’. The 
interviewee also argued that without approving FENSA, the organisation was frozen, ‘could 
not function, could not really work because we were waiting for the position. So you know, if 
that goes on for three, four years, you know, the impact of that is to paralyze the institution. 
So everybody was very keen to have this engagement and discussion and negotiation closed’. 
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For Zambia, the only positive element of FENSA was that the Member States were able to 
come up with a starting document. 
For Argentina, the WHO was revolutionising the multilateral system with FENSA as it 
was a totally a new process. ‘We did not have precedence to use, so we knew every time we 
met that we were creating something totally new, out of the blue, something necessary, 
something that we need to cover, but something completely new’. The country chaired the 
Member States’ phase of the negotiations and argued that the MS managed to cover 
everything and although not being sure if FENSA ‘is an excellent document or the perfect 
document, it was a positive document at that time. We decided what we wanted, and we said 
all the time that we would not close the door for change’. The interviewee, however, 
highlighted the importance of the evaluation process, as during the negotiations the focus was 
to approve the text. Afterwards, the implementation could start, to finally be able to see 
whether it is working or not. The former chair concluded assuring that if the FENSA needs to 
change, the Member States will change.  
5.8 Is FENSA a Model to be Applied to Other UN Agencies?  
Even if FENSA raised different perspectives, the only certain thing is that it sets a 
precedent, as it is the first comprehensive regulatory framework within the United Nations 
system that covers all types of interaction with non-State actors. Considering that a semi-
structured interview allows the researcher to approach other subjects as they arise during the 
interview, the idea of FENSA being a template that could be applied in other UN agencies 
was not mentioned to all interviewees. However, among those to whom it was mentioned, it 
remained controversial whether FENSA could be a blueprint for future regulatory 
frameworks. 
To Brazil, the general idea could indeed be applied, especially when it came to 
relations based on more transparency and opportunities for the Member States to see how 
these relationships would unfold. Interviewee 4 pointed out that the 2030 Development 
Agenda placed the private sector as one of the partners in implementing sustainable 
development goals alongside civil society, which is universal recognition of the role of the 
private sector not only in the WHO but generally in all UN agencies. Therefore, as the 
relations with non-State actors are becoming universal through the multilateral organisations, 
‘the basic and conductive idea of FENSA is an idea that deserves to be explored within the 
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United Nations’, especially in a broad spectrum context of a crisis in agencies’ budgets, 
which demands additional resources. To conclude, the Brazilian representative asserted that 
‘this discussion is very pertinent not only to the WHO, at least I understand that the FENSA 
main idea is indeed replicable, or should be examined to be replicated in various United 
Nations bodies’. 
Along the same lines, Egypt considers that the FENSA represents a ‘sort of a model or 
a template’ which other organisations could build on: ‘I believe that this document is really a 
very strong document that could be actually used as a template or a model to govern the 
engagement between other UN organisations and non-State actors’. 
For Germany, conversely, FENSA was a cumbersome exercise and should not be 
recommended for all international organisations as it was ‘to some extent (…) frustrating, 
long, heavy, (…) and at some stages too politicised’. 
The United States’ opinion was a midpoint between the two aforementioned 
perspectives. For the interviewee, FENSA could not be seen as a blueprint yet, ‘but hopefully 
in the future, if we accomplish it, it could be okay’. The interviewee argued that the WHO 
could indeed be a trailblazer within the UN system because if FENSA were fully 
implemented, then it would be a unique tool to actually protect, communicate, and encourage 
engagement as in the multilateral system either you have very little engagement at all or 
basically no rules. However, they concluded that “I think I would say no for right now”.   
For Argentina, FENSA ‘absolutely’ can be used as a model, although the interviewee 
was not sure if would apply directly as every organisation has a different nature, ‘but at least 
when other organisations start working with that kind of framework, they will have as a 
precedent what WHO did. And they can use it or not, but at least they can use it as reference’. 
Interviewee 14 strongly believes that other international organisations will have to start 
dealing with NSAs at some point, and explained that the WHO was the first one due to its 
normative work. In this sense, the interviewee explained: 
We need to protect the normative work from the influence on non-State actors. But, 
the point is NSAs are there and we need to work them more and more. The United 
Nations needs to work with them more and more. So it's not a matter of engaging or 
not, it's a matter of regulating. (…) And for those who used to think or say that 
having a framework like this in WHO would prevent country offices to work with 
non-State actors, for country offices was difficult to engage with non-State actors 
sometimes because before [FENSA], if they think the work was risky, they would 
prefer not to engage because they didn't want to take the risks. So actually we wanted 
to give people working in the countries with NGOs and private sector, clear norms, 
clear procedure to engage without any risk, without taking personal risks. 
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5.7 Does Final and Approved FENSA Text Embrace the Position of Some Member 
States More than Others? 
Brazil believes that its positions were considered in the final version of the FENSA. 
While interviewee 5 saw FENSA as ‘a victory’, interviewee 4 suggested that the parameter to 
judge is the consensus reached and even if any element in Brazil's assessment had not been 
addressed, the interviewee however did not mention to which element he was referring, the 
main interests were contemplated. However, for interviewee 4, FENSA was a bit inclined to 
the Global North perspectives ‘but not too much’. 
For Egypt, on the other hand, the FENSA approved version isn’t inclined towards the 
views of any group of countries; it is a well-proportioned document. Although at the end of 
the negotiations, the interviewee was concerned due to the implementation, ‘at the end of the 
day I believe we got a balanced document that has taken on board all the views of the 
negotiating countries. Of course, this is the logical outcome of any intergovernmental and 
multilateral negotiation (…) I think there was a consensus that if we want to know exactly 
whether FENSA was going to be a success or not, we need to follow the implementation 
closely’.  
It is worth noting that the European Union, the United Kingdom and Brazil highlighted 
that not many Member States participated in FENSA negotiations. Therefore, the European 
Union argued that instead of thinking in a Cold War division, one should consider that some 
States are better negotiators than others. Furthermore, if a document is one-sided, it could be 
a consequence of the dynamics in the room, where some diplomats are better prepared. 
In Germany’s opinion, nobody would have supported FENSA in the end if some 
Member States had had more success in the negotiations: 
Not everybody got what they wanted. We started with an overall goal and then you 
obviously have to set compromises, but if you're too far away from your goals and 
the other one gain all, then you don't approve the whole thing. So, no, I think it's, it's 
really a compromised version. I wouldn't see anybody who, I think there was a 
success that this was, that in the end it was successfully adopted. But I wouldn't say 
that there's anybody who was completely happy and anybody who was completely 
upset otherwise. 
To similar effect, the United Kingdom declared that there were no ‘winners’ in the FENSA 
negotiations and that ‘success in any negotiation is if everyone is a little unhappy’.    
For Norway, ‘the basic tenor of the solutions came mostly from those who wrote the 
original proposals’. Nevertheless, the interviewee believes that FENSA outcomes probably 
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looked ‘a good deal more like what about Brazil like-minded proposals than with what we 
[Norway] have proposed’. However, for the interviewee, everything lies in the 
implementation. 
For the United States, in the end ‘there was a strong sense of accomplishment that we 
really did provide a major contribution to how WHO could be governed in an effective way’ 
and the final version treads a balanced path between protection and engagement. 
In contrast, Zambia believes that some States had their inputs in the final version and 
were happier, because ‘even when we negotiate in the spirit of giving a tick, there are 
superpowers, big entities that are so adamant, so strong that they do not want to move from 
the position’. Accordingly, the interviewee explained as Zambia did not have specific 
interests, and after negotiating for ‘hours, days and years’ without success, some countries 
started asking themselves ‘are we going to die if this all goes through? Can we live with it? 
Of course, if it is not worse than what is already there, we may be willing just to let go so that 
we can agree’. 
So definitely some countries did have the acquisitions much more embraced. For us, 
in the Third World, we were fighting for principles. We had no specific special 
interests. So we could tolerate a lot of things that may be set by some countries, but 
generally, those countries then would celebrate. But, on the road, the universal 
feeling was that we wanted to conclude the negotiation and end them.  
For Zambia, the feeling that powerful countries are achieving specific victories is recurrent 
and present not only in FENSA negotiations but in any resolution that the Member States 
have ever negotiated. In addition to that, ‘while some countries meet their demands, some 
countries can live with the trash that comes up’. 
The Chair of the negotiations, Argentina, believes that ‘it is difficult to say that in 
general terms if we lose or we win. Maybe in some parts of the document I have to join the 
consensus against my own feelings and some other parts of the documents is the other way 
around’. The interviewee concluded by arguing that FENSA was a consensus document and 
the outcome was good for the organisation. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PERSPECTIVES OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
ABOUT FENSA 
When analysing FENSA, it is essential to understand the role that non-State actors 
played in the negotiation process, because although decision-making at the WHO resides in 
the hands of Member States, NSAs can influence political processes in the Organisation, as it 
was revealed in chapter 3. This chapter, hence, aims to understand the involvement of non-
State actors the during FENSA negotiations, as well as explore their perspectives on the 
framework.  
According to Ruhlamn (2015) not only do ‘NSAs have a number of alternative 
strategies for impacting global governance’ but ‘states and bureaucracies have not always 
resisted their inclusion’. Despite official participation in the WHO, meetings and hearings  85
are the most recognised tool to impact the health policy agenda, NSAs can also indirectly 
influence international negotiations by doing consultations or holding bilateral meetings with 
States entitled to vote in WHO governing bodies, or by taking part in national delegations. 
Non-State actors can also pressure governments at the national level, where they can make 
their power felt more effectively. This relation is of central importance due to its potential 
impact in global governance; as Matthews (1997) reminds us, NSAs’ ‘easy reach behind 
other states' borders forces governments to consider domestic public opinion in countries 
with which they are dealing, even on matters that governments have traditionally handled 
strictly between themselves’. Not to mention that non-State actors can count with the global 
media and also ‘lobby their own governments to pressure leaders in developing countries, 
creating a circle of influence’. (Matthews, 1997, p.55). 
Building coalitions with other NSAs can also add pressure to particular demands. 
Therefore, while the range of roles and methods of participation for non-State actors have 
expanded, as well as their ability to exercise some authority in the global health agenda, 
different non-State actors play different roles even amongst the same category.  It is worth 
noting, however, that at least when it comes to health, there is much heterogeneity inside 
transnational actors, especially within the private sector. In this regard, an interviewee from 
 NSAs can make statements, and also have the right to submit a statement in the forefront of a WHO meeting 85
and to submit a memorandum to the WHO’s Director General, who chooses the nature and scope of its 
circulation. 
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the UN Foundation affirmed: ‘it is not unanimous (…) one has to avoid a perception that 
non-State actors will want or civil society will want one side and private sector will want the 
other because there is a lot of heterogeneity and viewpoints inside non-State actors’ different 
domains’. 
This chapter, while describing the opinions and behaviours of NSAs regarding the 
FENSA negotiation process, will also check the evidence gathered through Member States’ 
interviews and document analysis. Thus, guided by the key-question ‘what views, role and 
influence NSAs had in the negotiations?’, five semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with representatives of non-State actors. Written statements were also taken into 
consideration. We tried to reach at least two representatives from each category of NSA, and 
the only group that was not considered in this thesis is that of academic institutions as no 
institute accepted or answered our interview request; it is also the group that seems to have 
had the least interest in the FENSA process, according to the interviewees. Moreover, as 
already expounded in Chapter 3, the WHO still engages with academic institutions through 
Collaboration Centres and the Regulations for Study and Scientific Groups, Collaborating 
Institutions and Other Mechanisms of Collaboration was not replaced by FENSA.  
The selected NSAs are Medicus Mundi International (MMI), the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA), the International 
Food & Beverage Alliance (IFBA), the United Nations Foundation (UN Foundation) and the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). The interviews were based on purposive 
sampling, a common technique in qualitative research which aims to identify and to select 
‘individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced 
with a phenomenon of interest. In addition to knowledge and experience, is the importance of 
availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate experiences and 
opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner’ (Palinkas et al., 2015, p.2). 
It is essential to mention that many meetings took place to discuss FENSA in the 
Programme, Budget and Administration Committee, to which no NSAs has access, even 
those in official relations with WHO, and for which there are no reports. Therefore, 
Interviewee 1, a former staff of a public-interest NGO, argues that ‘through the six years, 
since the official start of the Reform, there had been many meetings behind the closed doors 
as well as many drafting or working groups during Executive Boards and World Health 
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Assemblies. We had no access to these, and there are no reports. Transparency was badly 
lacking in these crucial negotiations’ (Participant 1, personal communication, August 31st 
2018). When FENSA was being negotiated, only NGOs could have official relations with the 
WHO, given the principles of 1987. Therefore, it is understandable that amongst all the 
NSAs embraced by the framework, NGOs and some private sector entities had the most 
significant participation, as one must consider that, before FENSA, there was no 
differentiation between business-interest NGOs and public-interest NGOs. 
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first four parts correspond to each non-State 
actor and their corresponding documents, official or not, as well as any relevant information 
gathered from preliminary interviews and exchange of emails. Then, the last part will 
describe the interviews made with representatives of 5 NSAs.

6.1. Non-Governmental Organisations  
When this project started, given the scarcity of reports about the FENSA negotiations 
process, especially from within academia, informal contact was made with some individuals 
who were directly or indirectly involved in the WHO reform. This unstructured informal 
contact is generally conducted as a preliminary step in the research process. It is entirely 
informal and not controlled by a specific set of detailed questions. Instead, the interviewer is 
guided by a pre-defined list of issues. Aware of that, a former staff of a public-interest NGO 
affirmed that the main concern for them were issues related to conflicts of interest, as they 
believed that the FENSA document had never clarified satisfactorily what conflicts of interest 
are. The Organisation, according to this first source, was only focusing on conflicts of 
interest between actors, rather than within a person or institution. 
In this direction, in 2016 a PowerPoint presentation made by a consultant from the 
International Baby Food Association Network (IBFAN) criticised the non-compliance of the 
WHO’s decision in 2014 that stressed the need for ‘further consultations and discussions… 
[including] on issues including conflicts of interest and relations with the private sector’. The 
public-interest NGOs accused the FENSA of proposing ‘a flawed conflicts-of-interest 
concept’, failing, therefore, to state that conflicts of interest are conflicts within a person or 
institution, and not between actors. It was also pointed out that the Conflict of Interest 
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section in FENSA had some gaps, like no reference to whistle-blower protection,  no 86
reference for the revolving door  and no reference to the leadership’s duty to ‘create an 87
organisational culture in which dealing with conflict of interest matters can be freely 
discussed and raised’. Hence, ‘the poor conceptualisation of the Conflict of Interest (…) was 
one of the keep points through which our NGO tried to make the MS see that the policy was 
flawed’. (Interviewee 1, personal communication, August 31 2018). 
Furthermore, it was said that prior to the WHO Reform, the Principles Governing 
Relations with Nongovernmental Organisations had never been properly implemented. 
Therefore, the reform regarding non-State actors could have improved it, instead of 
proposing a new policy, which, in their view, can potentially open Official Relations status to 
‘precisely those interests against which the original policy tried to protect WHO and its 
policy-making spaces’. 
To this effect, Gupta and Lhotská (2015) wrote the article ‘A fox building a chicken 
coop? World Health Organization Reform: Health for All, or more corporate influence?’. 
They argued that NGOs were complaining about the unification of all actors under the term 
‘non-State actors’ (NSA) and that a clear distinction between public-interest and business-
interest actors was needed. This point seems to be one of the major concerns of the public 
interest NGOs. According to a personal document from a consultant of IBFAN, even after the 
2014-15 discussion, the FENSA draft kept ‘blurring lines between public-interest actors and 
corporations and business – interest actors’. The main argument was that placing social 
movements, academia, business associations, public-private partnerships and philanthropies 
under the term non-State actor would be a ‘Trojan horse’ to bring powerful economic 
interests into WHO. In an informal conversation about the non-distinction between the 
different types of non-State actors, it was said that ‘WHO’s Secretariat was manipulative to 
not distinguish non-state actors (…), in my opinion, this was a move that may have been 
 You’re a whistleblower if you’re a worker and you report certain types of wrongdoing. This will usually be 86
something you’ve seen at work - though not always. The wrongdoing you disclose must be in the public 
interest. This means it must affect others, for example the general public. As a whistleblower you’re protected 
by law - you should not be treated unfairly or lose your job because you ‘blow the whistle’. You can raise your 
concern at any time about an incident that happened in the past, is happening now, or you believe will happen in 
the near future. Description available at: https://www.gov.uk/whistleblowing . Last access on 18/12/2019.
 The term ‘revolving door’ refers to the movement of high-level employees from public sector jobs to private 87
sector jobs, and vice versa. The idea is that there is a revolving door between the two sectors as many legislators 
and regulators become lobbyists and consultants for the industries they once regulated and some private 
industry heads or lobbyists receive government appointments that relate to their former private posts. Available 
at: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revolving-door.asp Last access on 18/12/2019 
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requested by transnational corporations, and possible venture philanthropies’ (Participant 2, 
personal communication, September 4th 2018). 
One should note that, almost three years after FENSA approval, in January 2019, the 
civil society meeting ahead of the WHO EB144 promoted by the Geneva Global Health Hub 
(G2H2) was still discussing the inadequacy of the term non-State actor used in FENSA.     
Gupta and Lhotská (2015) criticised that instead of re-examining the constitutionality 
of accrediting business-interest associations as NGOs, FENSA was proposing their 
indiscriminating admission; the same for philanthropies. It was also pointed out that 
legitimising the access of business-interest associations to WHO governing bodies would 
consequently legitimise new channels of inadequate business influence, including through 
staff secondment, pro-bono work, participation in meetings and ‘support’ to policymaking. 
One must consider, however, that in the final version of the FENSA, secondments from the 
private sector were forbidden. 
Germany was mentioned as a country that ‘lobbied against the idea that venture 
philanthropies should not be allowed to second staff, because they have in the meantime 
signed a Memory of Understanding with the Gates Foundation that there would be staff 
exchanges between the German Development Agency’ (Participant 2, personal 
communication, September 4th 2018). 
Interviewee 2 also questioned the fact that FENSA-related material was classified 
under the 20-year protection clause for documents.  Moreover, it was revealed that Professor 88
Thomas Zeltner, acting as special envoy on the relationship with NSA, was asked to contact 
the World Economic Forum  on their expectations regarding the WHO Reform Process but 89
then, the WHO refused access to the detail report, both to the Member States and the general 
public. 
It was widely mentioned that secondments were a controversial point of the 
negotiation process as it raised concerns of conflict of interest, the improper influence of an 
 According to the WHO Archives Access Policy: In most cases, external researchers may access archival 88
records once the records are 20 years old, according to the dates of individual documents consulted or, in the 
case of a file, the date of the most recent document in the file, unless an exception is granted by the Director-
General’s Office. The term "external researchers" includes academic researchers (both professors and students) 
and other members of the public. (Available at: https://www.who.int/archives/about/AccessPolicy.pdf?ua=1 . 
Accessed: 18/03/2019)
 Established in 1971, it is an International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation that “engages the 89
foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry 
agendas”. (Available at: https://www.weforum.org/about/world-economic-forum. Last accessed on 18/12/2019) 
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NSA on the WHO’s work, and potential endorsement of the NSA’s name, views or activity. 
According to interviewee 2, during the negotiations, the Ted Turner Foundation had a 
secondment at the highest level in the WHO and ‘he or she was among other also busy 
advising to displace the NGO Policy with FENSA that opened up the gates to private sector 
NSAs and philanthropic NSAs’ (Participant 2, personal communication, September 18th 
2018). 
The Official Relation policy was another major issue for public-interest NGOs. For 
instance, paragraph 49 of the FENSA draft stated that ‘official relations is a privilege that the 
Executive Board may grant to (…), international business associations … [whose] aims and 
activities … shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of WHO’s 
Constitution’ was widely criticised. It was seen as highly problematic because it would 
promote a ‘wholesale admission of business-interest associations and philanthropies’ to the 
governing bodies and, consequently, shift the WHO’s agenda and work to corporate and 
private donors’ interest. Participation, provision of resources, evidence creation and 
advocacy, were all seen as at high risk of ‘undue industry influence’, therefore: 
we hoped Member States would understand and act upon. However, most MS did not 
pay much attention to incorporation of this new OR policy within FENSA and to the 
fact that it was to replace, without any debate the Principles Governing Relations 
with Nongovernmental Organizations. To them this new OR policy was a part not 
directly related to the workings of WHO, only to the procedural issue of who can 
come to the WHO governance meetings. They failed to understand (or did not want 
to understand) how important the “old” principles had been to safeguard against 
entities with commercial interests entering the Official relations status. (Participant 1, 
personal communication, August 31st 2018) 
It is essential to highlight that business associations were removed, and are not considered an 
NSA in the FENSA final version.  
Due diligence and risk management were seen as having poorly-conceived concepts. 
According to the IBFAN presentation, ‘there is a need to better distinguish between actors 
and to determine how to arrive at appropriate assessment and regulation of interactions’. 
IBFAN seemed to be one of the most active NGOs during FENSA negotiation; to 
them, at the beginning of 2016, the year that FENSA was approved, the WHO still needed to 
‘evaluate the process, clarify concepts, obtain missing evidence, and [carry out] an in-depth 
review of the adequacy of existing relevant WHO policies’. 
After the approval, Professor Judith Richter wrote that ‘WHO’s leadership ignored 
repeated requests of WHO Member States to provide guidance on conflict of interest issues. 
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Ignored were warning that the WHO-NSA relations policy contains a misleading 
conceptualisation of conflict of interest’.   Moreover, Richter accused the WHO of not 90
providing appropriate public debate about the possibility of corporate lobby associations, and 
mega-sponsoring foundations have official relations with the WHO. To illustrate, she argues 
that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was one of the first organisations to benefit from 
the new rules as it gained official relation status in January 2017. She also evoked the speech 
of the Vice President of the Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Heather Grady, during the 
UN General Assembly hearings on the Post-2015 Agenda in May 2015: ‘We do not want to 
be just another ‘non-state actor’, one not even mentioned within the Major Groups. And we 
see recognition in the High-Level Political Forum and Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation processes as positive steps forward in this regard. (…) First, the 
UN and governments must open your arms and create a more enabling environment for 
philanthropy, domestically and across borders’. (Grady, 2015, p.2) 
Considering all sources used in this thesis: interviews, media reports, official and 
personal documents, NGOs, represented by civil society organisations, represented the NSA 
which have expressed the most concern during FENSA negotiations. Although recognising 
that the Framework resulted in some improvements compared with the previous norms and 
practices, CSOs remain worried about transparency and oversight mechanisms, risk 
assessment and management, and classification and evaluation of non-State actors’ 
commercial interests. CSOs, therefore, kept pushing and inspecting the WHO for FENSA 
implementation. The Geneva Global Health Hub, for instance, has been organising and 
hosting civil society meetings ahead of Governing Bodies meetings to discuss WHO 
governance and reform, in which FENSA is a regularly-discussed topic.  
6.2 Private Sector  
As no initial informal contact was made with the Private Sector, this section will be 
based on the available documents, including statements submitted during FENSA 
negotiations. 
The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations 
(IFPMA) sees itself as the ‘voice of the biopharmaceutical innovation and health progress 
 WHO redefines conflicts of interest and opens floodgates to undue influences. Available at: https://mezis.de/90
downloads/6523 (Last accessed 07/03/2020)
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around the world’. Differently from NGOs which were very critical about FENSA, IFPMA 
called for more significant and effective collaboration through embracing partnership 
approaches as being critical to future global health progress, as well as advocated the role of 
the private sector and the need to engage in ‘whatever partnerships are open to us, in 
whatever way we can, to achieve our goal’. In this sense, in the statement IFPMA comments 
on Discussion Paper on the WHO’s engagement with non-State actors, the Federation 
advocates that:  
every actor has a potential conflict of interest. An overall principle (…) lies in the 
management of conflicts of interest (…). IFPMA believes transparency is a cardinal 
element in recognizing and dealing with such potential conflicts. Transparency can 
be achieved through a robust policy applying equally to all stakeholders. Conflict of 
interest issues must be addressed in an open and transparent manner but should not 
be used as a reason to exclude any stakeholders who can positively contribute to 
improving health.  
While NGOs were sharply criticising the possibility of official relations with for-profit 
institutions, IPFMA’s opinion was that all non-State actors should have equal access and that 
participation should be open to all actors sharing the WHO’s vision and mission. 
In May 2016, during the World Health Assembly, IFPMA published a note on its 
website  welcoming the ‘efforts to design a framework allowing WHO to fulfil its leadership 91
role in global health and its mandate by engaging with a varied set of actors, while managing 
any perceived or actual conflict of interest’. Moreover, IFPMA claimed that FENSA would 
give ‘an equitable voice to a community of public and private organisations whose shared 
goal is to make this world healthier’. 
The Federation, however, argued that while the FENSA should ensure that interactions 
continue to grow, the draft framework ‘still appears to be restrictive in a number of areas that 
could hamper non-State actors in their ability to fully contribute to global health outcomes’. 
Again, IPFMA advocated for the equitable application of the provisions of the framework 
across different categories of non-state actors. Regarding conflict of interests, the solution 
proposed was ‘where conflicts of interests may arise, whether commercial or not, it is 
appropriate that these are managed in a robust, clear, transparent and equitable manner with 
all non-state actors. We call for transparent engagement with all non-state actors and 
accountability by all’. IFPMA suggested that the FENSA should be stress-tested against 
 WHA 69, Item 11.3 Framework of engagement with non-State actors. Available at: https://www.ifpma.org/91
resource-centre/wha-69-11-3-framework-of-engagement-with-non-state-actors/  
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existing best practice in the WHO’s interactions with non-State actors so that NSAs could 
witness its impact on important implementation work. Moreover, it was recommended that 
Member States consider a periodic review of the framework to ensure its relevance and to 
amend it as necessary if it becomes a barrier, rather than a facilitator to the WHO achieving 
its objectives. Finally, IFPMA welcomed the flexibilities introduced, such as a phased 
approach to mitigate unintended consequences, and for emergency situations. 
The International Food & Beverage Alliance (IFBA)  is another important actor from 92
the private sector. In 2011, when the discussions about engaging with NSAs were in their 
initial stages at the WHO, IFBA wrote to the Director-General Margaret Chan, affirming that 
‘non-communicable diseases and childhood obesity are major public health problems that 
require multi-stakeholder solutions. As a member of the private sector, we firmly believe that 
the food industry has a role to play as part of the solution, and have committed our time, 
expertise and resources to do our part’. IFBA claims to be working with the WHO to achieve 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals, especially the achievement of Zero Hunger, Good 
Health and Well-Being, Partnerships for the Goals. The companies have been focusing on 
promoting how partnerships could help to deliver a more significant impact on people’s 
health and well-being. On the Nestlé website, for instance, the WHO is among the list of 
‘main relationships’ and it is also declared that, from engaging with diverse stakeholders and 
by working together, ‘we maximise what can be achieved. These stakeholders include 
multilateral agencies, international organisations, governments, academia, nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) and industry bodies’.  FENSA embraces all these actors.  93
In 2015, a journalist from The Times of India, Rema Nagarajan,  denounced the 94
undue influence of IFBA at the World Health Organisation. According to her, a leaked mail 
referred to alliance representatives having several 'outreach meetings' on FENSA with the 
missions of the US, the UK, Canada and Latvia (which held the European Union presidency 
at that time) in Geneva. The report exposed that the Secretary-General of IFBA thanked the 
Food and Consumer Products of Canada (FCPC) and the Grocery Manufacturers Association 
(GMA), from the US, ‘for helping to drive home what would be an acceptable outcome for 
 IFBA is a group of eleven companies (Coca-Cola, Ferrero, General Mills, Grupo Bimbo, Kellogg’s, Mars, 92
McDonald’s, Mondelez International, Nestlé, PepsiCo and Unilever) that defines itself as group that ‘shares a 
common goal of helping people around the world achieve balanced diets and healthy, active lifestyles’. 
 Available at: https://www.nestle.com/csv/what-is-csv/partnerships-alliances Last access on 28/12/2019. 93
 Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/How-food-beverage-giants-influence-WHO-rules/94
articleshow/47378845.cms
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the alliance in the tussle to the frame rules for WHO's engagement with the private 
sector’. Moreover, the mail declared that the WEOG group was fully aligned ‘on a position 
that is essentially equivalent to ours (…) [and] while the WEOG would actively work for the 
framework to be adopted, it will not accept any document that excludes the food and 
beverage industry from the framework’. Yet, according to the report, ‘helpful outreach was 
also conducted by IFBA members, associates and partner organisations in a number of 
capitals which included several emerging economies and developing countries in Africa and 
the Asia Pacific’. Concerning this allegation, an interviewee from Nestlé voiced that indeed 
the US Government held meetings with non-State actors, precisely the private sector, to hear 
their opinions before the FENSA negotiations in Geneva. 
In this sense, one must consider that the FENSA final version did not include Food and 
Beverage industries directly in the controversial paragraph 44 (regarding the engagement 
with specific industries that negatively affect public health). Moreover, as it was pointed out 
in chapter 5, when asked if FENSA represented a response to the lobbying of powerful 
actors, especially in the private sector and philanthropic foundations, interviewee 7 from the 
United Kingdom said: ‘probably yes, there were very active diplomats, more or less 25, in 
health topics, probably because they get lobby from some companies’. 
In October 2013, during the consultation on the WHO’s engagement with non-State 
actors, the IFBA asserted to have been working ‘closely’ with the WHO since 2002 through 
resources and expertise, and sustained the importance of partnerships: 
as multisectoral actions and collaborative partnerships represent one of the most cost-
effective ways to address public health challenges (…) [and] by including the private 
sector you are able to add valuable perspectives; help achieve scale; open the 
possibility of innovative finance mechanisms where public institutions are able to 
leverage private capital; provide leadership to encourage others to participate; and 
bring together different skill sets that can deliver a better and more effective 
outcome.  
IFBA also claimed to work in collaboration with governments and NGOs by offering 
‘product innovation, consumer understanding and communication, R&D expertise, supply 
chain expertise and the potential positive influence on small and medium enterprises’. 
Regarding FENSA specifically, the Alliance welcomed the effort made by the WHO to 
develop ‘a clear policy for the engagement of all non-State actors and the management of 
these relationships in a way that can harness the knowledge, expertise and resources non-
State actors can contribute to advance the goals of public health while safeguarding WHO 
and public health from undue influence and reputational risks’. Moreover, by using Margaret 
 257
Chan’s argument that ‘everyone has vested interests’, IFBA supported the idea that the 
WHO’s engagement policy should be inclusive, rather than an approach of categorisation and 
exclusion of particular stakeholders. The FENSA, therefore, should be applied 
‘systematically and uniformly to all kinds of non-State actors and at all levels of the 
Organization’. Finally, the statement recognised and respected the decision-making as being 
an exclusive entitlement of Member States as ‘it is not our role to set or define policy. Rather, 
we believe our role is to help inform the development of policy, as evidenced by our past 
engagements with WHO and Member States, and to implement such policies’. 
Inclusiveness, then, was a word used extensively by the private sector. The IFBA’s 
main argument, along with IFPMA, was that the FENSA should be applied equally to all 
non-State actors, as the key point should not be with whom to engage, but rather whether an 
engagement is in the best interest of global health policy. When arguing against the 
‘exclusion’ or different treatment for any ‘for-profit’ stakeholder, the IFBA noted that 
numerous NGOs were aligned with, or funded by, the private sector. Therefore, their 
exclusion would not only be ignoring the complex health scenario and the significant role of 
public-private partnerships and the donor community but also attempting  ‘to arbitrarily 
categorize or classify or create a ‘hierarchy’ of non-State actors, each with special roles and 
differing access to WHO based on a pre-determined view of the value of an organization with 
the goal of exclusion, will inevitably work to the detriment of the organization’. 
In May 2016, when the FENSA was approved, the IBFA made a statement to welcome 
the adoption of the Framework, as the new rules of the WHO’s engagement with NSAs 
included the private sector, and it stated that it was looking forward to ‘building on the work 
already underway and to additional opportunities for engagement’ (IFBA, 2016).  
6.3 Philanthropic Foundations 
As already explained in chapter 3, talking about health and philanthropic foundations 
seems to equate to talking about the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and its controversial 
role at the WHO and overall field of health. Two points, however, should be noted.  
Firstly, the Gates Foundation seems to have distanced itself from FENSA negotiations, 
at least directly. There are no reports, statements or comments available that related to the 
Framework, and the interview with its representative was brief and vague. Although being 
one of the largest donors to the WHO, the Gates Foundation apparently did not show much 
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interest in a Framework that directly benefits it, as for the first time the Foundation found 
itself in official relations with the WHO. In this sense, the interviewee assured that the 
Foundation did not engage in negotiations ‘because of the perceptions and these perceptions 
are false. So all we could do is act responsibly (…) Of course, we were there, but we were 
not engaging in it. We were present at the EB and the WHA when it was discussed. But we in 
no way engaged in any advocacy effort to try to shape it’. 
Secondly, one should note that in contrast with the BMGF, the UN Foundation 
followed the negotiations. On the UN Foundation Blog,  Kate Dodson argues in her 95
statement that civil society groups ‘keep governments honest, advocate for patients, deliver 
services through community connections, and serve the most marginalised and remote 
populations (…) Moreover, civil society groups can leverage their own expertise to inform 
government policy’. The Foundation also warned that the FENSA, while needing to avoid 
conflicts of interest, should not become a wall to keep out the private sector, but to be a 
‘guardrail to facilitate collaboration with appropriate boundaries’.  
It is worth noting that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is a significant funder of 
the UN Foundation. In 2015, Adams and Martens published ‘Fit for whose purpose? Private 
funding and corporate influence in the United Nations’ and affirmed that a large share of the 
UN Foundation’s revenues came from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. ‘Between 1999 
and 2014 Gates gave US$231 million in grants to the UN Foundation, mainly for projects in 
the areas of health and agriculture’ (Adams and Martens, p.23).  
Philanthropic Foundations are seen by many as a tool to open up the WHO to the 
business sector, however they are supposed to do precisely the opposite, to sensitise 
businesses for public interests. Nevertheless, the philanthropic foundations’ extreme 
dependence on private funding, combined with its complicated governance structure and lack 
of accountability and transparency leave little space for the effective oversight of financial 
contributions.  
6.4 Academic Institutions  
FENSA defines academic institutions as ‘entities engaged in the pursuit and 
dissemination of knowledge through research, education and training’. As previously 
 A New Era of Partnership at WHO. Available at: https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/a-new-era-of-partnership-95
at-who/
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mentioned, individuals from academic institutions were not questioned, firstly due to the 
non-response to interview requests and also due to their diminished interest in the FENSA 
process. Moreover, academic institutions were excluded from official relations because, 
otherwise, they would be privileged over the other three groups of NSAs, as they would 
already have the possibility to gain the status of a WHO collaborating centre, one which is 
reserved for academic institutions only.  
One should consider that Professor Ilona Kickbusch, director of the Geneva Graduate 
Institute’s Global Health Centre, was mentioned as having played ‘more of a role in the 
development of FENSA, and certainly now propagate the idea of aligning the health agenda 
with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which includes under the SDG 17 closer, 
‘partnership engagement’. This aligning is totally high on the agenda, and this Institute is 
likely to form the health diplomates for this endeavour’ (Interviewee 2, personal 
communication, September 18th 2018). I tried to contact Professor Kickbusch four times, but 
she never responded. 
Kickbusch argues in her article ‘A new governance space for health’ that given the 
post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations was leading towards a major 
question of global governance. Moreover, it is pointed out that public health must deal with 
‘Big Food, Big Soda, and Big Alcohol’ given that the global health industry represents more 
than an eighth of global economic flows. It is essential, therefore, that:  
global health governance institutions firmly establish processes to link actors within 
and between sectors and define firewalls and conflict of interest strategies. The 
collective problem solving required in the global public health domain requires these 
controversial actors to be involved but without a commonly agreed rule-based system 
for including non-state actors in global governance institutions, it is difficult to 
subject these powerful organizations – large corporations, foundations and NGOs – 
to critical analysis. (Kickbusch, 2015, p.3) 
During the informal consultations, NGOs and private sector entities actively 
participated, while only a few academic institutions and philanthropic foundations took part. 
The UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies (UKCTAS) is a research centre that 
includes thirteen University teams and joined in the consultations of 2013. UKCTAS 
suggested that paragraph 44 ‘WHO does not engage with industries that make products that 
directly harm human health, such as tobacco or arms’ should be extended to the alcohol 
industry. Regarding the participation of non-State actors at the WHO, it was argued that: 
Of the six broad categories of interactions described between WHO and non-State 
actors, there are five for which it is unambiguously inappropriate for the 
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Organisation to engage with individuals, organisations and companies whose 
interests starkly diverge from those of public health: namely Collaboration, 
Financing, Contractual, Non-State actors in WHO’s governance, and WHO as part of 
the governance of non-State actors. Any such interaction would threaten to introduce 
inappropriate influence over priorities and policy and expose WHO to very high 
levels of reputational risk. Current policies and practices clearly preclude such 
interactions with the tobacco industry, and we see the case for the extension of these 
principles and practices to the alcohol industry as equally compelling.  
It can be observed, through document analysis and also by checking the reports of the 
watchdog organisations that were following the negotiations, that academic institutions were 
a minor concern for the Member States. However, as already mentioned, in addition to NGOs 
and philanthropic foundations, academic institutions can be controlled by the private sector, 
leading to conflict of interests. This relationship should not, therefore, be neglected.  
6.5. Analysing Interviews 
Even though NGOs in official relations are allowed to make statements during the governing bodies 
meetings, pursuing a broader and more in-depth understanding of non-State actors’ perspectives on 
FENSA, five semi-structured interviews were conducted. They will not only allow for the cross-
checking of statements made by the different NSAs, but also deliver a triangulation of data regarding 
the hypotheses on their influence through the Member States.  
6.5.1 What Kind of Non-State Actor did the Interviewee Consider Their Institution to 
be and What Kind of Engagement does it have with WHO? 
Medicus Mundi International (MMI) describes itself as an international non-
governmental organisation and an academic network, ‘a network of networks’. It represents 
national networks working on international health in many countries in Europe, such as 
Switzerland, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, the UK, and actors across Africa too. 
The interviewee described the NGO’s mission as health for all, universal access to health and 
health equity. Regarding the relationship with the WHO, given that MMI has existed for 55 
years and has been in a close working relationship with the Organisation throughout, the 
interviewee explained that ‘Medicus Mundi has been always standing for comprehensive 
primary health care and being a constructive partner in making collaboration happen’. 
The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations 
(IFPMA) labels itself as an international business association, ‘which would probably be the 
same as saying private sector. I think it's the same kind of recognition’. The interviewee also 
highlighted the wide-ranging activities that the Federation conducts with the WHO under the 
 261
status of official relations: 
we have a vaccines committee; we have a global health committee which covers 
things like non-communicable diseases, universal health coverage. We also have 
antimicrobial resistance. We have an African engagement committee; we have 
a regulatory in the science committee. So basically we have a lot of different areas in 
which our organization interacts with WHO. So it's a very broad picture. I mean, I 
think some of the biggest pieces of our interaction with WHO would be things like 
the pandemic influence preparedness program, where many of our manufacturers are 
involved in contributing towards that framework, you have the PQ contribution as a 
prequalification contributions towards the WHO which again, our companies are 
involved in this; you have work on non-communicable diseases, so we involve with 
the WHO, we're part of the global coordination mechanism. So we're one of the 
partners on that, which is a multistakeholder dialogue or multi-stakeholder platform 
for addressing prevention and control of NCDs. You have neglected tropical diseases. 
So you know, we have worked with WHO on the NTDs, tuberculosis, mainly in 
terms of giving sort of industry expertise towards some of the technical matters. But I 
mean, it can also be just contributions in terms of financial income contributions 
towards certain events or workshops that the WHO might be organising. (…) We 
have an essential medicines list, we have a task force, this also takes part in 
consultations with WHO (…). I mean it's so varied. I am only just giving you a small 
flavour of how many different ways that we interact with WHO.  
It is imperative to highlight that although the 1987 Principles specified that ‘WHO recognises 
only one category of formal relations, known as official relations, with those NGOs which 
meet the criteria described in the Principles’, it can be observed that the official relations 
could be extended to NGOs representing private sector entities. It contradicts the most 
accepted definitions of NGOs, which are that they should be of a non-profit nature. The 
FENSA, therefore, can be seen as a starting point for a clearer distinction between NGOs and 
the private sector.  
The International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA) described itself as a business 
organisation. Even though IFBA does not have official relations with the WHO, they 
maintain a so-called relationship of dialogue that includes ‘meetings on different issues, it 
includes participation in consultations, hearings, etc. And then I think there are some 
elements that we could describe as collaboration, so technical collaboration, for example, on 
phasing out industrial trans-fats or working on salt reduction’. 
One must consider that according to the Guidelines on interaction with commercial 
enterprises to achieve health outcomes, in order to improve health outcomes:  
WHO regularly interacts with commercial enterprises in various ways, including: 
participation with one or more commercial enterprises in alliances and other 
relationships (sometimes with other public bodies, governments, non-governmental 
organisations and foundations) to address specific health issues; exchange of 
information; product research and development aimed at improving health; 
generation of cash and in-kind donations to WHO; advocacy for health (WHO,, 
2001. p.2). 
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However, as they are internal guidelines and not regulations , the relationship between the 
WHO and the private sector before FENSA was blurred.  
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) considers itself to be private 
philanthropy and describes its engagement with the WHO as ‘certainly a funder’.  
The UN Foundation is classified as a foundation ‘because one of our jobs as a public 
charity is to provide grant support to the United Nations in various agencies, including WHO. 
So, we are a grantmaker to WHO, that's why they classify us as a Foundation, and that's kind 
of where our focal points administratively rest inside WHO, through their foundations' team’. 
The Foundation, however, works with the WHO in ‘a range of other ways, although we're not 
called a civil society actor, we do a lot of work with civil society, and that's how we got 
involved with the civil society task team’. Accordingly, for the interviewee, the work of the 
UN Foundation is more similar to the work that an NGO does due to their operating work. 
That means that the foundation not only gives out grants, but also: ‘[does] our own work; we 
do our own coalition work, our own communications work, our own policy work, our own 
advocacy work, et cetera. But for WHO purposes, they classify us as a foundation because of 
that grant-making dynamic that we have with them’. It is worth noting that the UN 
Foundation has been in official relations with the WHO since approval at the Executive 
Board meeting in January 2019, under FENSA rules.  
6.5.2 Official Position Regarding FENSA 
When asked what position MMI took towards FENSA, the interviewee answered ‘non-
State actors do not have to approve it or not, right? Member States that have approved it. The 
position for Medicus Mundi International is to not to reject it, but to watch it critically’. 
Moreover, from MMI’s perspective, FENSA should protect against conflict of interests, and 
the aim of health for all should be facilitated through the Framework, ‘so that would be a 
fence towards actors that are seen as not legitimate working towards public health and that it 
will be open to actors that would be more contributing to the public interests, the public good 
approach WHO ought to have’. The interviewee also pointed to ‘a whole grey area in-
between’ the debates about conflict of interests, perceived benefits and how to deal with that 
issue. 
For IFPMA, ‘it was very painful to get to having FENSA be adopted and finalised (…) 
we understand the need for FENSA, and of course, there are many industries and sectors 
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where we understand that WHO has to be quite careful about its engagement’. The 
interviewee believes that IFPMA would welcome FENSA if the implementation were to be 
pragmatic, as the framework is seen as ‘an enabling mechanism for private sector 
engagement, depending of course, who the private sector is’. However, according to the 
interviewee, ‘FENSA seems to be often used as an excuse or reason by some parts of WHO 
to slow down in the process of working with the private sector because they're not sure about 
how to work with the private sector’.  
It was also argued that the pharmaceutical industry has many solutions for global 
health challenges, and that it is already involved with the WHO in many different ways, such 
as bringing industry expertise. Finally, for the interviewee: 
as long as they (WHO) see FENSA as an enabling mechanism where they manage 
the risk in a pragmatic way but still use it in a way to enable meaningful engagement 
and meaningful work, find meaningful areas of collaboration with our sector, then it 
can be a very good mechanism. But I think that the issue has been for too long now 
(….), it's true that there's not a lot of clarity on how to consistently implement the 
framework. So that confusion inside of WHO then makes it very difficult to find a 
dynamic path forward for working together. So I think that FENSA sometimes is 
more creating a bit of confusion for some parts of WHO who don't know how to 
implement it. In that way that it was happening, it's actually becoming a problem 
rather than an enabler.  
IFBA supported the adoption of FENSA at the time, and even though did not 
participate in the negotiation, the Alliance was aware that there were a lot of complex 
discussions with the Member States. The interviewee understands that conflicts of interest 
need to be addressed and managed, ‘and so if the WHO requires a formal framework for 
doing that, then we would support it. Particularly because I think, the spirit of FENSA was to 
enable dialogue and where possible increase collaboration with non-State actors’. As well as 
IFPMA, the interviewee argued that the framework should be a tool to facilitate engagement 
while managing conflicts of interest, instead of being an obstacle to engagement. 
The Gates Foundation interviewee was quite vague in all their answers and argued that the 
Foundation did not have a position, but ‘welcomed the clarity that it [FENSA] was attempting to 
bring and we did not engage deeply into the process, but we welcomed it'. 
The UN Foundation describes itself as ‘believers in FENSA’. For the interviewee, 
FENSA is a crucial instrument for ensuring that conflicts of interest are managed and 
mitigated, and to avoid undue influence at the World Health Organisation, especially when it 
comes to normative and technical functions. It was highlighted, however, that FENSA should 
not constrain the WHO’s ability to be an ‘effective, smart and strategic partner with non-State 
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actors’. The interviewee believes that the WHO should maximize its partnership with non-
State actors. Therefore, ‘our position is that there is plenty of room to manoeuvre, for smart, 
effective, strategic partnerships for WHO with non-State actors, even inside the framework of 
FENSA’.   
6.5.3 How Was the Behaviour of the Member States Perceived? Were Coalitions Formed? Did 
Meetings Between NSAs and Member States Happen During the FENSA Process? 
For Medicus Mundi, the Member States were divided ‘a bit along the lines of the G77 
and the Global North but with some mix positions in there’. According to the interviewee, 
Brazil and the Latin American countries were the most vocal against the framework because 
they perceived that it would undermine the role of the State and the legitimacy of the 
Member States’ governance in the WHO. India, another vocal Member State in during the 
negotiations, was seen as ‘relatively supportive and in a kind of a middle position’. On the 
other hand, some European countries and the United States were pushing for the Framework, 
‘but some with caution’. To sum up, the interviewee asserted that:   
China was somehow withdrawn from the debate and (…) the UK and the US have 
always been making the case, (WHO) should be open to other actors as well because 
in the end it was about the role of big financers in WHO, the role of the Gates 
Foundation in collaboration with WHO that was at stake. The Gates Foundation and 
other financers. (…) Countries like Germany and Norway have also been pushing for 
it, but in a very regulatory, moderated way: WHO should change, should work with 
other actors, but we should indeed ensure that the Member States remain in the 
driving seat and that the public interest is being served. Eventually, I think some 
Member States agreed because FENSA became a bit of a headache process. Got 
stuck after several years and this more technocratic approach to managing risks, to 
mitigate risks, also announcing that it would not put a heavy financial burden on 
WHO made all countries accept it eventually in 2016. 
Considering the Member States with a more private sector-focused approach, IFPMA 
mentioned the United States was ‘of course’ the most vocal Member State in terms of 
advocating for pragmatic implementation, specifically in a way that makes the most out of 
public-private sector expertise. 
Moreover, ‘Zambia was another country that at the time quite surprisingly for an 
African Member State was very vocal but in a positive way as well for us’. The interviewee 
also mentioned Japan and Germany (the latter only more recently) as in favour of a 
supportive framework for engagement with the private sector, and Finland ‘probably on the 
other side’. Brazil and India were also mentioned as being very vocal against the private 
sector and in ensuring avoidance of conflict of interests. 
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Regarding a North/South coalition, IFPMA’s interviewee confirmed that:  
in general, it was that, for sure. And what was really surprising about Zambia was 
that it is like an outlier. But I think that it very depends on the individual health 
attaché at the Geneva level. Because if they are very vocal, if they have a particular 
position, if they are very influential in Geneva, then that can also impact how the 
country is perceived. So, at the time, Zambia had a health attaché who was quite 
vocal, quite engaged, involved in FENSA. So I guess sometimes you have situations 
where it's not clearly North/South, it can depend on the individual. (…)  But in 
WHO, if you look at all Member States, there used to be more coalitions, more 
groupings. Now it's not so much.  
When it comes to close relations, the IFPMA ‘tend to kind of communicate quite a bit 
with the United States and some of the European Union Member States as well, traditionally 
the UK’. The interviewee also explained that, traditionally and politically, the countries that 
have big pharmaceutical industries were obviously the Member States that we tried to know 
better. So for example, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, US, Denmark (…), this is a political-
economic thing where you have countries where that is a big part of their economy is that 
industry. And you see that playing out in WHO of course. I mean you see that in all the 
geopolitical discussions’. 
The IFBA’s interviewee pointed out different perspectives between the Member States, 
of which, countries such as the G77 wanted ‘quite a restrictive type of framework’ and 
others, namely in the WEOG group, wanted a more flexible arrangement. ‘At the time we 
issued a position paper or a statement in support of FENSA, (…) But we did not advocate 
specifically with the Member States’. Regarding countries with close relations, the IFBA 
affirmed that it took the view that ‘we should support FENSA as an organisation, we did not 
have a much more specific point of view. So I don't think that we engaged more closely with 
any Member State’. 
The Gates Foundation declared that it didn’t have exceptional relations with any of the 
Member States, nevertheless it ‘consults a lot with the UK, increasingly with Germany, 
sometimes Norway, Sweden, but not formal agreements, it is simply often like-minded 
donors will have conversations’. When asked if the BMGF met with the Member States 
during negotiations, the interviewee denied this, saying that it ‘does not make sense’. Finally, 
regarding trying to find a common position with the US government, the interviewee said 
that this didn’t occur. In this regard, the interviewee from the United States said ‘our 
relationship with the Gates Foundation is close when our interests align’, and, regarding the 
FENSA process ‘I would say we kept each other informed, but I would say they were less 
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engaged. Their attitude throughout it was that this is a Member State decision and that they 
would abide by whatever the Member States said. And I think that was actually a helpful 
position because they already have kind of conspiratorial feelings towards them’.  
For the UN Foundation, coalitions and Member States coming together around aligned 
positions occurs a lot in governance matters at the UN, including in the WHO. The 
interviewee affirmed that while various of those coalitions were reasonably loose, others 
became ‘kind of more formal negotiating blocks’.  However, it was pointed out that:  
some of those [coalitions] changed over time as the politics of certain countries 
changed. You can imagine if a new prime minister or political party came into power 
that had a different kind of policy posture around engagement, around the role of 
civil society or the role of the private sector in any kind of policy formulation 
process, they might then exhibit that differently in terms of their posture at WHO, or 
in regard to FENSA negotiation. So some of that did change over time. I don't think 
it was static for the kind of five years in the lead up to the adoption of FENSA. But I 
think one of the reasons why it took so long was because of these different positions 
and kind of groups of Members States suggesting either a much more enhanced and 
flexible way for WHO to engage with non-State actors versus those who were 
suggesting a much more constrained mode of engagement for WHO and non-State 
actors.  
In 2015, Margaret Chan asked a few Member States to start working together to unblock 
some of the impasses. Together with the IFBA, the UN Foundation representative affirmed 
that the G77 countries were ‘more apt to want a constrained, a more conservative approach’, 
while those representing some countries in Europe and North America were advocating a 
more open relationship. Besides, the interviewee declared that even though FENSA has been 
approved, these positions, especially on the role of the private sector and to a certain extent 
the role of civil society, are a highly political issue in some countries. Therefore, it still plays 
out at the WHO. ‘I mean it plays out in the Executive Board meeting in January; it plays out 
in New York in UN conversations; it plays out every year through the World Health 
Assembly. (…) The US, especially, and others as well, are much more in support of a 
significant role for the private sector. And others negotiating on behalf of a range of countries 
are more apt to want a measured approach to the role of the private sector’. 
When it comes to the relationship between the UN Foundation and Member States, the 
interviewee argued that the Foundation works directly with the Member States to support 
other governments and countries on immunisation or malaria prevention, for example. The 
Foundation also receives grants from several governments. It was highlighted, however, that 
none is related to the governance of the WHO.  
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6.5.4 How Was the Role of NSAs Perceived During the FENSA Negotiation Process?  
Medicus Mundi’ interviewee explained that in 2011 and 2012, the WHO was quite 
open to ‘a more differentiated approach’, therefore, NSAs worked in a loose coalition to try 
to influence the FENSA. NGOs were clearly against a single benchmark because the WHO 
should provide a differentiation between the actors. The interviewee affirmed, however, that 
‘under pressure by some Member States probably to have a more open framework (…) given 
the pressure by donors and Member States, and this is always informal, they shifted the 
debate’. Regarding the behaviour of non-State actors, the interviewee explained that until 
2013 the debate was ‘quite aggressive between the NGOs and pharmaceutical industry 
representatives about who are the good guys, who are the bad guys, who were public-interest 
NGOs, who were the business-interested NGOs. I didn't find that constructive, but WHO 
afterwards changed the governance process’. Therefore, after 2013, the non-State actors were 
not directly invited anymore, but separately meetings were arranged: ‘we were in contact 
with the FENSA office still, but they have closed a little bit the gates’.  
The IFPMA considers itself to have been ‘heavily involved’ with FENSA negotiations 
and mentioned a consultation for the non-State actors ‘to sort of voice our concerns around 
how to ensure that FENSA was worded in a way to be an enabling mechanism to be 
something that encouraged engagement (…)  I remember it felt as if at the time there was a 
good opportunity to input into the development of the framework’. Regarding the 
performance of NSAs, the interviewee explained that ‘some of the NGOs were being very 
vocal on the same, (…) which is about the conflicts of interest and being very concerned that 
the private sector could be influential in a way that is not appropriate to the workings of 
WHO’. The Third World Network, MSF and IBFAN were mentioned as part of this group of 
NGOs. Moreover, interviewee 15 confirmed that there was ‘a fairly kind of broad coalition of 
interests amongst these NGOs that is quite solid and quite consistent’. 
When asked if IFPMA sought to establish coalitions among the private sector, the 
interviewee pointed out the heterogeneity of the private sector: 
You have pharmaceutical, you have the alcohol industry, you have food and 
beverage, you have tobacco and arms. We know that's a complete no-go for WHO. 
But even if you look at food and beverage, alcohol, these are industries that we as 
pharmaceutical we don't want to be associated with (…) because we don't see 
ourselves in the same light at all. We're creating treatment, solutions, cures, that help 
to prolong life, to enable better health outcomes (…), it's a completely different part 
of the private sector. So you see that it's difficult to form a coalition of the private 
sector because you have very different objectives, different things that we work on. 
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So I think in optically and then within WHO be very complicated and not necessarily 
a good thing for us, for example, to associate with other parts of the private sector.  
It was also argued that the private sector became quite isolated in the FENSA negotiation, 
because, although some Member States have shared some of the private sector’s views on the 
Framework, ‘at the end of the day, the likelihood of philanthropic or NGOs or academia 
agreeing with you on common language is very difficult. I think we are kind of a bit on our 
own in some ways’. To finalise, the interviewee admitted that FENSA was an important 
topic, maybe one of the biggest, as IFPMA needed to ensure that the language of FENSA 
came out balanced, as it was significant for the pharmaceutical sector:  
You imagine that if the language came out to be very prohibitive, that would be big 
problems for us in terms of how you engage with WHO and not just for us, for WHO 
as well, to be honest. So, I think it shouldn't be underestimated at the time it was 
really, it was huge (…) we felt that it was really important to ensure the best outcome 
possible for FENSA because it had implications not just for WHO, but implications 
for potentially the whole UN system. 
For IFBA, FENSA negotiation was a Member State-driven process, therefore, any 
request that non-State actors could have carried out would have, by necessity, been addressed 
to the Member States. Hence, regarding non-State actors trying to influence the negotiations 
through the Member States, the interviewed affirmed that there ‘was quite some activity’. 
While some organisations in the private sector were concerned that FENSA could be used to 
impede meaningful engagement, organisations within the civil society were concerned that 
FENSA would open the gates to collaborations with the private sector that would entail 
conflict of interest. In this respect, ‘there was a fair bit of advocacy towards the Member 
States to either have a tougher or a more pragmatic approach’. 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation argued that they ‘stayed pretty much out of 
all of that negotiation’, but ‘certainly we believe very strongly in a vibrant civil society. So 
we would have expected that the NGOs would have been mobilised, but we did not in any 
way engage in that’. When asked if the Foundation exchanged views with the other non-State 
actors during the negotiations, the interviewed assumed that cannot ‘speak for my entire 
organisation, but I do not recall any specific engagement with any other non-State actors’.   
6.5.5 Sensitive Contents of the FENSA  
As previously detailed in this chapter, some points of FENSA raised concerns from 
NSAs, specifically conflict of interest, secondments, and the distinction between non-State 
actors with commercial interests. The interviewees were firstly asked which topics of FENSA 
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were, from their perspective, more sensitive. After, if the polemical topics perceived from 
documents and reports were not mentioned, they were directly questioned. 
For Medicus Mundi International, the most sensitive issue was conflict of interest, 
precisely, what is a perceived or real conflict of interest? Given that a conflict of interest 
implies that commercial or economic interests are being blurred with the public interest, 
which, then, could lead to organisations indirectly influencing policymaking or norm-setting 
by the WHO, the interviewee believes that ‘it is all about how tight or how open you set what 
a conflict of interest is’. To illustrate, the interviewee argued: 
Before (FENSA) it was only about individual conflict of interests, and now it’s also 
about institutional conflict of interest. (….) The NCD Alliance, which is one of the 
biggest non-communicable diseases, it's an NGO Alliance that also has patient 
groups (…) part of it is taken by the American Heart Federation or the Diabetes 
Federation, they receive money from the pharmaceutical industry. So (the money 
goes) from the pharmaceutical industry to the Patient Federation to the NCD 
Alliance. NCD Alliance applies for FENSA and FENSA says it’s all okay with the 
NCD Alliance, it does not have any conflict of interest. And we say if you would 
trace it down, there might be indirectly something that might influence how 
agendas are being shaped.  
Moreover, the interviewee explained that, according to the Director for Partnerships and 
Non-State Actors at the World Health Organisation, Gaudez Silberschmidt, non-State actors 
did need FENSA to indirectly influence the WHO, as they could direct themselves to the 
Member States. To exemplify this argument, it was explained as follows. In the debates about 
guidelines for the amount of sugar, Italy lobbied against it, to lower the norm, as there were 
individuals from Ferrero Rocher in the Italian Mission making the statements. Silberschmidt, 
therefore, argued that for the NGOs, if FENSA did not exist, private sector entities would 
work directly via national missions. The interviewee affirmed that the main argument of the 
WHO was that with FENSA, at least, that it would be a more open process.  
The differentiation between the types of non-State actors was also mentioned by 
Medicus Mundi. According to interviewee 14, the WHO should be more careful regarding 
the topic, and question to be considered would be: ‘Who do these groups really represent?’. 
The interviewee then expanded upon the democratic deficit of non-States actors: 
If the Gates Foundation is on the table and they're paying so much to WHO to 
become the second biggest donor after the US, who do they represent? You could 
also say, do the US really represents its citizens? Well, but at least you can either 
hold them accountable through the democratic process and you could ask questions 
in Congress, et cetera. But with the Gates Foundation, same with an NGO in a sense, 
right? (…)  the main debate is that organisations need to be accountable, they need to 
be transparent, but you hear much less about actual representation. What is their 
agency, who was actually there on the table? (…) So, in the end, it's a political 
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question about how countries want to organise multilateral global health governance 
and how are other actors represented in the decision making and who has allowed 
you to meet a role in that decision making or not?  
The MMI interviewee then recalled that some NGOs were also objecting about the term 
‘non-State actors’. It is worth noting that, before 2014, the debate surrounded NGOs and the 
private sector. Afterwards, it became a non-state topic.  
The interviewee also mentioned engagement with particular industries, in paragraph 
44,  but pointed out that, in the end, industries do not directly influence the WHO but use 
other channels, however, he did not mention would be these channels would be. Finally, 
regarding secondments, the interviewee only affirmed that might be a sensitive matter. 
The IFPMA mentioned ‘a long discussion’ regarding perceived conflict of interest 
versus actual conflict of interest.  ‘Perceived does not mean that it is going to be a conflict 96
of interests; it just means that there might be. Again, it is all down to the interpretation of 
how you choose to use that framework for your organisation if is a risk management 
approach or a risk aversion’. Regarding secondment, the interviewee declared that: 
secondments from the private sector were perhaps more acceptable once upon a time, 
way back. But one thing that we were surprised about with the FENSA adoption was 
that a secondment from private sector was completely no-go, like completely 
forbidden. And I think it's one of those things where you have to consider, is that a 
very clever idea? Not necessarily. If you're lacking expertise in WHO, technical 
expertise and you refuse to have secondment from private sector, then you have a 
gap. You have a knowledge gap.  
For the IFBA, the language regarding the types of non-State actors was ‘particularly 
sensitive’, and the Member States were looking at it with an additional degree of caution as 
‘there are inevitably some grey areas and some difficulties around that’. However, for the 
interviewee, FENSA is a framework for all non-State actors that has distinct subsections and 
specific rules for the different non-State actors, therefore, ‘whether you have one framework 
and four sections or four different frameworks, it does not really make a difference’. 
Regarding a different treatment for the different categories, the interviewee affirmed 
that common rules were needed, but that ‘you need some specific rules for different types of 
non-State actors as the conflict of interest issues that might arise in respect of a not-for-profit 
NGO might well be different to the conflict of interest issues that may arise in relations with 
 According to the World Health Organisation, an actual conflict of interest arises when a vested interest has the 96
potential to unduly influence official or agency judgement/action through the monetary or material benefits it 
confers on the official or agency. A perceived conflict of interest arises when a vested interest has the potential 
to unduly influence official or agency judgement/action through the non-monetary or non-material influences it 
exerts on the official or agency.
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a business organisation. So, there is a case for some additional specific provisions in addition 
to a basic horizontal framework’. To conclude, the interviewee mentioned the concept of 
perceived conflict of interest and argued that ‘personally, I have never understood how that 
should be applied because my perception is necessarily subjective, so it is quite complex to 
apply that concept in relation to the notion of conflict of interest’. 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation mentioned conflicts of interest, which, 
according to the interviewee, need to be managed. ‘We would certainly be very concerned 
about any potential conflicts of interest, whether real or imaginary. But we believe very 
strongly that conflicts and potential conflicts of interests can be managed’. When asked about 
secondments, the interviewee affirmed that the Gates Foundation did not ‘have a view’ on the 
topic. Once asked if the Foundation used to second people to the WHO, the answer was ‘I'm 
not sure we would call it a secondment, but we certainly did provide staff support on the 
polio program’. 
The UN Foundation believes the role of the private sector was, and continues to be, the 
most contentious topic of FENSA negotiations, especially when it comes to access to 
medicines and essential diagnostics and donations to the WHO. The interviewee also 
mentioned the way in which non-State actors can engage in the WHO’s governance and how 
the Framework can potentially create significant obstacles for small NSAs getting into 
official relations:  
The barriers to entry are high enough that it precludes anything other than 
international NGOs from entering into official relations. For instance, you have to 
have an assigned focal point inside WHO, to have a three-year work plan, to show 
proof of existing and prior collaboration with WHO, et cetera. Those barriers to entry 
are sufficiently high that it already restricts and will continue to restrict the inclusion 
of civil society that are nationally based or from lower-middle-income countries or 
regions where those barriers to entry are sometimes just too high. And so then you 
get an inadvertent favouring of big international NGOs. 
Regarding the controversy surrounding secondments, the interviewee confirmed that 
the UN Foundation had seconded personnel at the WHO. Although understanding the fear of 
many NGOs, ‘the barriers to entry are so high and the kind of legal instruments and 
arrangements and agreements between the seconding organisation and the host organisation 
or the WHO are quite rigorous (…) [that we are] inability to influence or prejudice or even 
directly manage any employee of ours that is seconded to WHO’. For the UN Foundation 
interviewee, therefore, secondments should have not loudened so many tenseness.  
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It can be noted that non-State actors have an overall more critical perspective 
regarding FENSA. According to the interviewees, ‘FENSA is not a panacea. FENSA should 
be helpful in structuring the way that WHO engages with the external world. But I think the 
challenges are much bigger than that’ (Private Sector 2); ‘it really comes down to how the 
organisation will implement and how they will interpret FENSA, will they be encouraged and 
empowered to use FENSA in an enabling way and not use it as a fence?’ (Private Sector 1), ‘I 
do not think it is sufficient, it is a technical document to deal with a deep multilateral political 
issue’ (NGO 1). Considering both interviews with NSAs and with MS alongside the 
statements, NGOs and the private sector are revealed to be more interested in the FENSA 
negotiation. At the same time, for academic institutions, FENSA did not seem to be a priority, 
and philanthropic foundations appeared to have conducted dubious behaviour. The next and 
last chapter will consider all the data gathered to discuss and analyse the results with 
reference to the hypothesis and the theoretical approach, and conclude with some final 
remarks. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS	
The Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors was born as part of the Reform 
of the World Health Organisation, launched in 2011. The report entitled ‘WHO reforms for a 
healthy future’, presented in a Special Session of the Executive Board, stated that ‘WHO has 
been at the forefront of improving health around the world since its founding in 1948. But the 
challenges confronting public health have changed in profound ways and with exceptional 
speed. While WHO continues to play a leading role in global health, it needs to evolve to 
keep pace with these changes. This is the overall purpose of reform’ (EB, 2011, p.1). 
While it is typically the Member States that push for reforms in international 
organisations, the reform that started inside the WHO was led by Margaret Chan, the 
Director-General at that time. The preliminary focus was on financing: 
The reform agenda began with a focus on financing and the need for better alignment 
between objectives and resources. A Member State-led process has since evolved to 
address more fundamental questions about WHO’s priorities, its changing role in 
global health governance, and internal governance and managerial reforms needed 
for the Organization to be more effective and accountable. The continuing financial 
crisis means that the need for predictable and sustainable financing remains a central 
concern (EB, 2011, p.1). 
However, it was proven impossible to ignore the functioning of the Organisation due to a 
background of leadership and legitimacy crisis, as analysed in Chapter 2. The reform, 
therefore, was divided into three dimensions: priorities, governance and management.    
FENSA was not initially considered to be a comprehensive global policy, but as a way 
to regulate the relationship of the WHO with non-governmental organisations and the private 
sector. Historically, as explained in Chapter 3, the engagement with the private sector was 
only noted,  and not approved, by the Executive Board. Its implementation, therefore, was 
beholden to the Secretariat, who did not entirely follow through. Additionally, one of the 
main critiques of the 1987 Principles was the lack of distinction between the different types 
of NGOs which, consequently, led to a lack of transparency concerning the interest groups 
behind them.  
The private sector, therefore, has always been seen as the main contentious topic 
within the Organisation that needed to be controlled. According to interviewees 19 and 21, 
current and former high-level staff at the WHO, some Member States blocked many attempts 
to improve regulation of the WHO’s relationship with non-State actors, explicitly non-
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governmental organisations and the private sector. The problem with NGOs, according to the 
interviewees, was that some Member States perceive them as sometimes excessively political 
and active, especially on the domestic side. As explained in Chapter 2, a strict State-centrism 
of some Member States had historically blocked debates to advance in the reform of the 
relationship between the WHO and NGOs in the years before FENSA.  
The initial idea for the new rules was to develop two different documents, one to 
‘people-oriented NGOs’ and another to ‘business-oriented’. As explained, the leading critique 
of the official relations’ policy (part of the ‘Principles governing relations between the World 
Health Organisation and nongovernmental organisations’ (1987)) was that under the rubric of 
NGOs, organisations representing private sector entities were also considered. In this regard, 
according to interviewee 19, a former advisor to the Director-General, the Secretariat 
changed its position and decided upon a single document that would include both NGOs and 
the private sector. Therefore, in March 2013, the Executive Board decided that a document 
should be prepared, outlining overarching principles and operational procedures for non-
governmental organisations and private commercial entities. Interviewee 19 believes that this 
was due to pressure exerted by Member States. Moreover, it was stated that ‘evidently, the 
Member States that have pressed the most in this direction were the countries that historically 
have more conservative positions: the United States, the United Kingdom, some countries - 
not all - of the European Union’. It can, therefore, be observed that the FENSA negotiation 
process was polarised from the beginning. 
According to the documents, the Secretariat proposed the inclusion of not-for-profit 
philanthropic foundations, however, interviewee 20, a former high-level staff member at the 
WHO, affirmed that this was at the request of the Member States, without mentioning 
specifically which. The consensual assertion of the three interviewees from WHO was that 
philanthropies were included because of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, referred to 
by one of the interviewees as ‘the proverbial elephant in the room’. The Gates Foundation 
was also a contentious point between the Member States because, while it was orienting a 
good part of WHO’s policies and priorities (the already explained donor-driven agenda 
problem) without accountability, and, at a certain point, kidnapping the multilateralism and 
collective governance of the Member States, no one was able to afford the amount given by 
the Gates Foundation to the WHO. Interviewee 20, then, affirmed: ‘it is very easy to let the 
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Gates Foundation give us $650, $700 million every two years, so they [the Member States] 
didn't have to put up that money, but inevitably that brought philanthropic foundations into 
FENSA’. It was impossible, therefore, to elaborate a framework to control the interaction 
with non-State actors and leave the Gates Foundation unregulated, as its role, particularly the 
financial role, was immense, and continues to be. Hence, ‘obviously this is not the Gates 
Foundation policy, it is a philanthropic foundation policy, but everybody had in mind Gates’. 
When analysing the available documents since 2012 and comparing them with the 21 
conducted interviews, it became clear which topics were blocking the negotiations: 1) 
conflict of interest; 2) FENSA being applied in all regional offices, including PAHO; 3) 
distinction of the different types of non-State actors; 4) secondments; 5) how to apply 
FENSA during emergencies crisis; 6) engagement with other industries affecting human 
health (paragraph 44); 7) the engagement with the private sector. The disagreements during 
the negotiations went beyond the official discussions between the Member States at the 
WHO’s Governing Bodies, non-State actors, particularly NGOs and the private sector, were 
also trying to indirectly enforce their perspectives and interests.  
7.1 Conflict of Interest  
Conflict of interest occurs at all levels of governance, from local to global, both in the 
public and private spheres. It can influence, and distort, decision-making processes and lead 
to inappropriate outcomes. As outlined in Chapter 3, insufficient safeguards against conflicts 
of interest was one of the weaknesses of the 1987 Principles. Establishing proper 
safeguarding mechanisms against conflicts of interest requires a comprehensive and robust 
definition. The Member States had long-lasting debates on the definitions and 
conceptualisation of conflicts of interest, one of the issues that blocked the negotiations. 
The initially proposed definition was ‘a conflict of interest can be defined as a set of 
circumstances that creates a risk that judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be 
unduly influenced by a secondary interest’ (WHO, 2013, p.7). The final and approved version 
of FENSA establishes that:  
a conflict of interest arises in circumstances where there is potential for a secondary 
interest (a vested interest in the outcome of WHO’s work in a given area) to unduly 
influence, or where it may be reasonably perceived to unduly influence, either the 
independence or objectivity of professional judgement or actions regarding a primary 
interest (WHO’s work). The existence of conflict of interest in all its forms does not 
as such mean that improper action has occurred, but rather the risk of such improper 
action occurring. Conflicts of interest are not only financial but can take other forms 
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as well. (WHA69.10, 2016, p.10) 
Entities representing the private sector such as IFBA and IFPMA, as well as all 
developed countries interviewed, along with Zambia, advocated that FENSA should not 
imply or assume that conflict of interest concerns apply only to the private sector and, 
therefore, be used to exclude any stakeholder ‘who can positively contribute to improving 
health’. In the same direction, the United States, a clear supporter of the private sector, took 
the position that conflict of interest should be uniform across the four specific policies. 
On the other hand, the so-called publicly interested NGOs heavily criticised what they 
called a poor conceptualisation of conflict of interest, precisely what a perceived or real 
conflict of interest would be. The alignment between these NGOs and India, Bolivia Brazil 
and Egypt, as perceived through the document analysis, is clear. They were all interested in 
the distinction between real and perceived conflicts of interest as well as that between 
individual and institutional conflicts of interest. Moreover, for them, conflict of interest was a 
concerning topic when considering the private sector, or non-State actors with links to the 
private sector.  
One should note that, considering the Member States’ positions as analysed through 
documents and interviews, the position taken by Zambia contrasts with those taken by the 
developing countries group as a whole. Zambia warned that FENSA should not imply that the 
financial conflict of interest of the private sector would be somehow more important than of 
other non-State actors, as this would create ‘a clear bias against the private sector’. The 
Zambian position was stressed by Interviewee 15, from IFPMA, who affirmed that the 
country ‘was very vocal but in a positive way for us’. In this regard, it is interesting to point 
out that Interviewee 5, from Brazil, put forward that the power imbalances that permeate 
global governance processes represent a way to understand Zambia’s position.  
It is worth noting that scholars of International Relations, particularly from the realist 
school, have an impoverished conception of power, which focuses almost exclusively on 
material capabilities and coercion. In this regard, Barnett and Duvall (2005) present four 
categories of power, providing an important challenge and a vital contribution to IR studies. 
Although the first category still relies on the ‘direct control over another’, the authors 
describe power overall as ‘the production, in and by way of social relations, of effects that 
shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’. The conception of 
institutional power is particularly important for this thesis and is defined by Barnett and 
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Duvall (2005) as ‘actors’ control over socially distant others’ focusing ‘on the formal and 
informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and 
procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non-
actions) and conditions of existence of others’. The focus, therefore, lies on the social 
relations between nation States. Although including the social structures that open the door to 
persuasion and to collective decision-making, Barnett and Duvall excluded persuasion and 
collective decision-making processes per se.  
In health-related negotiations, imbalances can emerge between negotiators that have 
access to public health experts; the Brazilian Interviewee 5 explained the alignment between 
diplomats from developing countries and non-governmental organisations from the global 
North. This can be seen as an example of structural power. Moreover, imbalances in the 
negotiating power and capacity between developed and developing countries is not the only 
variable; one must also consider the inequalities in health, which make low and middle 
countries even less powerful, as their health systems rely on donors’ money.  
Sweden, for instance, is the leading donor to Zambia’s health sector. The country also 
receives large funds from The Global Fund and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Therefore, the literature review of the first chapter cited the article ‘Challenges for 
nationwide vaccine delivery in African countries’ written by Mario Songane (2018), which 
investigates the role of GAVI in the development, purchase, and delivery of vaccines and the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation acting as a sponsor. Zambia is one example of how many 
governments need support from Gavi, currently the largest external funding source for 
vaccine purchases in Africa. One should consider that The Gates Foundation pledged $750 
million to establish Gavi in 1999. The Foundation is a crucial partner of GAVI in vaccine 
market shaping. 
There is another variable that similarly cannot be overlooked and was argued by 
Interviewee 12 from Zambia; NGOs, which usually work in low and middle-income 
countries, are seen as ‘just as problematic as the private sector’. The Zambian perspective 
was that not only are NGOs driven by money, but they usually push an agenda that it is of 
their own interests.   
In light of how the FENSA approached the topic of conflict of interest, it is possible to 
see that the two groups of countries’ (e.g. developing and developed) positions were not 
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consensual. While the United Kingdom suggested a clearer understanding of institutional 
conflict of interest, the United States was advocating for the withdrawal of its definition. 
Initially, institutional conflict of interest was directly linked to ‘the economic interests of 
private sector entities’, however, this raised discussions among Member States, supported by 
NSAs, mainly the private sector aiming to homogenise the rules for all non-State actors, and 
NGOs seeking to curb the WHO’s engagement with for-profit institutions.  
The final document establishes both individual and institutional conflict of interest. 
India, therefore, was partly pleased as already analysed in Chapter 4; the topic was a primary 
concern of the country, which suggested three types of conflict of interest: individual, 
institutional, and conflicting interest. It’s important to note, however, that a direct mention of 
private sector entities was withdrawn, indicating that the developed countries’ perspective, 
mainly that of the United States, was also taken into account.  
7.2 Distinction Between the Different Types of Non-State Actors 
Another major topic was the clear distinction between entities with and without 
commercial interests; this has been a central issue at the WHO for a very long time. In this 
sense, interviewee 20 admitted that most of the sensitive discussions were related to the 
private sector. This can be verified by examining the first consultation that involved the 
Member States and non-State actors, as some NGOs suggested that more strict transparency 
and accountability actions should be taken concerning entities with commercial interests. In 
this regard, some Member States, especially the developed and Global North countries, were 
advocating for standard rules for all non-State actors, arguing that ‘it is not because someone 
is coming from the private sector that it is a bad person’ – as stated by interviewee 10 from 
the European Union. On the other hand, some Member States  like Brazil and India, strongly 
backed by the so-called public-interest NGOs, were seeking stricter rules for private sector 
entities and were extremely critical of the unification of all actors under the term ‘non-State 
actors’.  
The main argument of those backing a generic treatment of non-State actors was that 
differentiation was unnecessary as long as FENSA could provide full and public disclosure of 
information and robust mechanisms for risk assessment. On the other hand, developing 
countries on the whole kept arguing that a relationship with a profitable entity has the 
potential to risk the WHO’s integrity, even with adequate safeguards to prevent conflicts of 
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interest.  
The distinction of the different types of non-States actors was a much-pursued agenda 
by public-interest NGOs. Civil society groups argued that treating the four categories in the 
same way, under the label of NSA, would ‘once and for all, legitimise lobbying by business 
associations and philanthropic foundations at WHO governing bodies’. The NGO 
International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN), for instance, was vigorously active in 
demanding a clear distinction between ‘public-interest actors and those whose primary 
interest is market-led’. As already mentioned, some interviewees, namely 7, 9, 20 and 21, 
even accused NGOs of having written the statements for the most vocal developing 
countries.  
By and large, when analysing documents and the interviews, developing countries 
were pushing for ‘clearer’ distinctions, as they were worried about the implications of an 
excessive engagement, especially with private sector entities and with NGOs, philanthropic 
foundations and academic institutions controlled by the private sector. On the other hand, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, Germany, among others, argued that the WHO’s 
work would be negatively impacted if the FENSA decided to limit work with institutions that 
are privately funded. For developed countries, the FENSA should allow for greater 
engagement between the WHO and all NSAs and focus on providing the necessary 
safeguards against conflicts of interest. 
The hypothesis that a North/South division was not very strict is proven to be correct, 
as Zambia was against a different treatment of NSAs. The FENSA ended up producing 
similar policies for the four categories. For instance, the four policies on Participation in 
WHO meetings are precisely the same, but, regarding involvement in meetings organised by 
NSAs, the participation of WHO staff members in meetings of private sector entities is much 
more restricted.  
7.3 Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) 
Although not initially expected, it was perceived, during interviews, that the Pan 
American Health Organisation (PAHO) was a concern for many Member States and became 
‘a very big issue, especially towards the end of the negotiation’, according to interviewee 20. 
Developed countries, mainly from Europe, claimed that the full appliance of FENSA, in all 
three levels of the Organisation, was as a precondition for the adoption of the Framework.  
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 As already explained in Chapter 5, the FENSA would not be automatically applied to 
the PAHO after its adoption by the World Health Assembly as it would also have to be 
approved by PAHO Member States through its own governing bodies. In this regard, 
interviewee 19, a former staff member at the WHO, who also worked in the PAHO, affirmed 
that the PAHO needs to be more articulated with the Headquarters in Geneva, as the Regional 
Office ‘claims independence’ whenever it is convenient - this happened during FENSA 
negotiations. Many countries, however, perceived a risk of double standards within the WHO 
system, regarding FENSA.  
Brazil argued that the European Union countries wanted to control PAHO through 
WHO Headquarters in Geneva. In fact, the European countries consolidated a strong position 
and were supported by some developing countries, like Zambia. At the final session of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group, in April 2016, Norway led the Europeans on the PAHO 
issue and declared that ‘FENSA needs to be implemented across all WHO levels, with one 
single registry and the DG as final decision-maker’. 
The Pan American Health Organisation, therefore, certainly represents a topic in which 
the logic of North versus South division cannot be applied, as countries from the Americas 
were seeking a common position which was counterbalanced by other countries under 
European leadership.  
7.4 Secondments  
Secondments, particularly from the private sector, evidently polarised the Member 
States into a North/South cleavage, despite notable exceptions. For interviewee 20, this was a 
discussion more focused on the theoretical principle than addressing a real problem, as the 
former WHO staff member assured that the Organisation had almost no seconded personnel 
from the private sector in recent years The United Kingdom appeared to be one of the most 
vocal countries against the prohibition of secondments from commercial entities, and was 
supported mainly by France, Germany and the United States. In contrast, Brazil was against 
the WHO accepting secondments from any non-State actors, but in the interview stressed that 
while the number of seconded personnel from industries could be unimportant, their 
influence was not. Egypt was, until the last moment, seeking to ensure that the ban on private 
sector secondments would be kept. On the other hand, according to a Summary made by the 
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United States Council on International Business,  at the 138th session of the Executive Board 97
(January 2016), the World Heart Federation and the NCD Alliance were trying to preserve 
secondments from NGOs and academic institutions. 
The topic, therefore, divided the Member States into three main groups, one 
recommending that the WHO should not allow secondments from any non-State actors, 
others pursuing to exclude only secondments from the private sector and others, mostly the 
developed countries, in favour of secondments from all NSAs. A clear and direct 
convergence of positions between the Member States and non-State actors can only be 
observed in view of the position taken by developed countries and the private sector entities, 
who were not happy to be the only NSAs excluded. Although mentioning the private sector, 
public-interest NGOs were more worried about secondments from philanthropic foundations, 
specifically the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the United Nations Foundation, a 
concern that cannot be observed among the Member States.  
In May 2016, the FENSA was approved and paragraph 47 of the final version 
establishes that the WHO does not accept secondments from private sector entities. 
Moreover, the General–Director was requested ‘to develop, in consultation with Member 
States, a set of criteria and principles for secondments from nongovernmental organizations, 
philanthropic foundations and academic institutions’, taking into account, ‘specific technical 
expertise needed and excluding managerial and/or sensitive positions; the promotion of 
equitable geographical distribution; transparency and clarity regarding positions sought, 
including public announcements; secondments are temporary in nature not exceeding two 
years’.  
Finally, as only secondments from the private sector were, eventually, prohibited, it 
can be argued that this topic signified a defeat for the Global North.   
7.5 Emergencies  
The engagement with non-State actors in the context of emergencies was another 
controversial point and divided the Member States into two main groups. It is worth 
reiterating that the Ebola outbreak happened during FENSA negotiations, which, for many 
countries, influenced the debate. Developed countries, namely Germany, Norway, the United 
 Brief Summary of the WHO Executive Board Discussion on FENSA. Available at: http://globalhealth.org/wp-97
content/uploads/Brief-Summary-of-the-WHO-Executive-Board-Discussion-on-FENSA-Feb-2016.pdf
 282
States, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, sought to suspend the application of FENSA 
while responding to emergencies. The issue made Norway ‘seriously consider’ blocking the 
Framework, as interviewee 6 declared. Both interviewee 9, from the United States, and 
interviewee 20, from the WHO, affirmed that Iran was the main opponent of flexibilities 
during emergencies crisis with ‘a very few countries supporting it’. However, interviewee 5, 
from Brazil, and 12, from Zambia, declared themselves to also be against using emergency 
contexts to flexibility FENSA.  
The suspension of the FENSA while dealing with an emergency was one of the topics 
that made the European countries, headed by Norway, threat to block the adoption of the 
Framework at the end of the negotiations. In the Executive Board of January 2016, Malta, 
speaking for the European Union affirmed that the EU Member States were worried that a 
limitation on the flexibility of the WHO to act in emergencies could undermine the 
Organisation’s leadership and effectiveness. Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Finland, Iceland, Switzerland and Germany also expressed their concern on the issue, seeing 
it as the most important unresolved subject. During the EB, Egypt, speaking on behalf of the 
EMRO (Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean) was the only country outside the 
European Region to request clarification on NSAs’ engagement rules in emergencies. 
When it comes to the non-State actors, the IFPMA explicitly manifested in favour of 
flexibilities and exceptions in an emergency context. The watchdog NGO Third World 
Network, when reporting Norway’s proposal on emergency exception, claimed that it would 
weaken FENSA rules and neutralise safeguards. At the 139th of the Executive Board, January 
2016, Medicus Mundi International declared that the emergency response clause should not 
be used as an excuse to prevent the adoption of a strong framework (EB, 2012, p.50). 
The final version of FENSA, however, has the text proposed by Norway with few 
language amendments. Paragraph 73 of the Implementation Section establishes, therefore, 
that the Director-General when responding to ‘acute public health events described in the 
International Health Regulations (2005) or other emergencies with health consequences (…) 
may exercise flexibility as might be needed in the application of the procedures of this 
framework in those responses’. This point was certainly a victory for developed countries, 
particularly the Europeans.   
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7.6 Engagement With Other Industries Affecting Human Health  
Paragraph 44 was notably polemical. Although there was an overall division between 
South and North countries, the United States and India were the protagonists on the topic. 
There was a consensus since the beginning that the WHO does not engage with the tobacco 
and arms industry. However, some developing countries, principally India, were pushing to 
add ‘food, beverage, alcohol and infant formula’ industries to the no-go engagement list. The 
influence of the NGO International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN), which mainly 
focuses on breast milk substitutes manufactures such as Nestlé, can be easily noted in its 
criticisms about the engagement of the WHO with the private sector. On the other hand, the 
United States, supported by developed countries such as Norway, Germany, Canada and 
France, were against explicitly mentioning other industries. They advocated for a wide-
ranging clause of extra caution when engaging with the private sector, without mentioning 
any particular industry. 
The original proposal of the Secretariat was only one paragraph stating: ‘WHO does 
not engage with the tobacco or arms industries. In addition, WHO will exercise particular 
caution when engaging with other industries affecting human health or affected by WHO's 
norms and standards’. In the final version of the FENSA, paragraph 44 establishes that 
‘WHO does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-State actors that work to further the 
interests of the tobacco industry. WHO also does not engage with the arms industry’. 
Paragraph 45 was added in the end, asserting that the Organisation ‘will exercise particular 
caution, especially while conducting due diligence, risk assessment and risk management, 
when engaging with private sector entities and other non-State actors whose policies or 
activities are negatively affecting human health and are not in line with WHO’s policies, 
norms and standards, in particular those related to noncommunicable diseases and their 
determinants’. 
Interviewee 9, from the United States, stressed several times that paragraph 44 was a 
key topic for the country, and this was confirmed by data gathered from documents, media 
reports and interviews. For instance, interviewee 20, a former high-level staff member at the 
WHO, affirmed that ‘the US was very active [on paragraph 44], such as big food and 
beverage industries that they felt on the spot clearly’. The debate on paragraph 44, however, 
did not divide the countries into North and South coalitions, as India, Denmark, Finland, 
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Greece and Zimbabwe were recommending a more cautious approach to the alcohol, food and 
beverage industries. Interviewee 20, hence, declared that adding paragraph 45 was adding a 
‘code-language’ for the food and beverage industry. The topic, therefore, ended up with a 
compromised solution. 
7.7 Engagement With the Private Sector  
After considering all the data collected, it can be concluded that the private sector was 
the key topic of the FENSA negotiations. Not only regarding the specific policy and 
operational procedures, but because all topics that were discussed, apart from those merely 
related to language adjustments, had some level of disagreement amongst the Member States 
concerning the private sector. A clear example was the discussion about secondments, 
labelled as ‘surreal’ by the interviewed WHO staff, because even though the Organisation had 
not accepted seconded personnel from the industry for decades, it was the only non-State 
actor from which secondments were forbidden.  
The concern towards the private sector was evident since the beginning; interviewee 
19, who delineated the first proposal for a framework to regulate the relation of WHO with 
non-State actors, recommended two different documents, one for NGOs and another for the 
private sector. In this regard, the FENSA negotiation process clearly called attention to the 
divergent positions of Member States. While there was no opposition to the WHO’s 
engagement with the four NSAs, developing countries mostly took a more restrictive 
approach and pushed for robust firewalls and safeguards, particularly concerning the private 
sector. On the other hand, many developed countries pressed for greater engagement with all 
NSAs and more trust in the Secretariat.  
It is worth noting, however, that all Member States interviewed recognised the 
importance of a more careful attitude towards the private sector, even though some of them 
were advocating for the same treatment of all NSAs during the negotiation process. FENSA 
is not an anti-industry document; nonetheless, an ambivalence towards the private sector can 
be perceived. Almost all Member States affirmed that the FENSA approved text constituted a 
balanced outcome.  
7.8 General Considerations  
Although the private sector was the main focus during the FENSA negotiations, the 
concern of many Member States regarding NGOs cannot be ignored. Interviewee 19 revealed 
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that, initially, the idea was to foster a better dialogue with civil society while maintaining the 
intergovernmental nature of the WHO but seeking more plural governance. Historically, 
many countries, with China being the most prominent example, have a very negative attitude 
towards the participation of civil society due to a perspective of central State control. Giving 
NGOs some ‘excessive’ space, therefore, would undermine the power of State. 
Considering that the Latin American countries were amongst the most outspoken, 
despite some progressive governments, the countries were generally not in favour of 
expanding the space for civil society in decision-making. While they sought more democracy, 
it was very much focused on governments, despite an increasing awareness that civil society 
is an important element of democratic processes. Within all of the United Nations 
organisations, civil societal actors are not allowed to have any kind of formal influence or 
voice over agenda-setting, policy design or implementation processes. However, their 
‘indirect’ influence is very clear, due to their ability to shape the prioritisation of global 
health policies.  
Interventions and positions taken by WHO Member States, therefore, are not linear nor 
easy to understand. While countries such as Brazil, on the one hand, were concerned and 
cautious about the potential undue influence from the private sector in the WHO decision-
making process, on the other hand, they did not pursue more inclusive participation for civil 
society in policy-making processes. When it comes to African countries, where non-
governmental organisations are generally much more active, NGOs were seen to be as 
problematic as the private sector, sometimes even more. From the African perspective, NGOs 
are not only driven by money but also push an agenda that takes other interests into account 
more than local needs. Consequently, African countries had a largely State-centric 
perspective. The interviewee from Zambia made it clear several times during the interview 
that no non-State actor was allowed at ‘the negotiation table’. 
Curiously, philanthropic foundations did not receive considerable attention, especially 
when thinking about the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation which, according to interviewee 
20, was treated like a Member State, as ‘Gates comes to Geneva once or twice a year, if not 
him, the team, the Director of the health program. And they literally sit with the Secretariat, 
like would sit the United States or Japan or Germany’. Although some countries, like Brazil, 
had some reservations about the Gates Foundation, due to its enormous financial role at 
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WHO, no one could afford to pay what Gates donates. When asked why the BMGF was so 
quiet during the negotiations, interviewee 19 answered: ‘There's no FENSA that can stop 
Gates. When you give 600 million, $700 million within a budget of four and a half billion, 
you call the shots. (…) Gates has too much influence’. 
Academic institutions were, undoubtedly, the less controversial category of non-State 
actor during FENSA negotiations, although there were some issues and concerns relating to 
them. They were included because, since the Secretariat was proposing a comprehensive 
framework, it would not make sense to omit an essential sector with which the WHO has 
plentiful engagement. It is important to note, however, that the most common issue 
concerning academic institutions is conflict of interest, given that many universities have 
private funds. Whilst interviewees from the WHO affirmed that academic institutions were 
very much noticed during FENSA negotiations, no Member State or non-State actor 
interviewed mentioned them. In contrast with other categories of NSAs, academic institutions 
can apply for official relations under FENSA rules or be a collaborating centre. Moreover, the 
regulations for collaboration with academic institutions was the only document the FENSA 
did not replace which directly guided a relation with an NSA. While the collaborating centres 
typically perform services for the WHO, the FENSA allows academic institutions to 
participate in meetings, therefore including them in the governance of the WHO. Academic 
institutions are, on the whole, different from NGOs or the private sector, which generally 
have more political and economic interests than bringing expertise to the Organisation. 
Interviewee 20, hence, affirmed that academic institutions could take a more relaxed position 
than NGOs and industry, ‘as FENSA could not really damage them’. 
One should note, however, Shiffman’s (2014) argument that the Lancet has emerged as 
‘one of the most powerful actors in global health’ since the late 1990s. Besides the more 
visible issue of being backed by donors, the author also argued that commissions promoted 
by the medical journal have influenced policy in low- and middle-income countries, a clear 
exertion of normative power that can indeed impact which issues are more likely to be taken 
into account, as well as whose voices should be privileged. 
With respect to the participation of the non-State actors during the negotiation process 
and whether they were able to influence the Member States’ positions, as argued by Lowery 
(2013), there is a paradox when analysing influence in politics; we look for it without being 
 287
able to find evidence of it. NSAs can lobby in the international setting, but they mainly 
pressure governments at the national level. The interviews confirmed this argument. Both 
Member States and NSAs assumed that, during FENSA negotiations, governments and non-
State actors had meetings in the Capitals, far from the WHO headquarters. 
It was clear that NGOs and the private sector were the most active non-State actors 
during FENSA negotiations, insofar as several interviewees affirmed that the discussions 
sometimes turned into ‘who is the good guy and who is the bad guy?’,  a Manichaeism 
approach that does not represent the approved Framework. One justification was that 
academic institutions and philanthropic foundations had less access to the negotiations, as 
many NGOs and private sector, under the umbrella of non-governmental organisations, were 
in official relations and could be ‘physically present’ in many debates that happened during 
the Health Assembly and the Executive Board. 
Even though no empirical investigation was carried out to assure how NSAs’ inputs on 
FENSA were taken into account through the Member States, all interviewees assured that 
NSAs undeniably influenced the negotiation process. The Member States as well the WHO 
staff who were interviewed confirmed that non-State actors were closely following the 
FENSA process and lobbying the national delegations. Interviewee 20, a former high-level 
staff member who followed all the negotiations, affirmed that:  
FENSA is in high polarisation in the WHO, in particular concerning the private 
sector. And you could see that numbers of delegations were clearly lobbied by 
NGOs, sort of public interest NGOs suspicious of the motives of the industry. And 
when you listen to statements by the Member States sometimes after a number of 
years, you start reading between the lines, and you could clearly see that number of 
statements were drafted by NGOs themselves and given to delegation who just read 
them. So legitimately, I think everybody tried to lobby on behalf of its own interest. 
Developed countries, in particular those with big pharmaceutical industries, clearly 
had the interest of the industries in mind. So we have no doubts that there were 
consultations in Geneva, or in capitals with the industry. They [NSAs] certainly work 
behind the scenes.  
Furthermore, it was clear that NGOs, specifically those referred to as public interest, 
were much more organised than the private sector - not only due to shared interests that made 
the coordination of positions more straightforward, but also because the most important 
private sector actor, the pharmaceutical industry, did not want to be aligned with the food, 
beverage and alcohol industries, the other very powerful actors in the negotiation process. 
The pharmaceutical industry, therefore, was more successful in lobbying governments 
instead of making coalitions, in a way that they could leave to the governments (mainly those 
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of developed countries) to try to represent the interests of the industry. This became 
particularly clear when analysing the positions taken by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other industrialised countries. The private sector, therefore, did not have to be 
very aggressive.  
Regarding the pharmaceutical industry, interviewee 5, supported by interviewees 18 
and 20, brought attention to the TRIPs agreement. Bearing in mind that developing countries 
frequently seek to strengthen multilateral approaches to facilitate coordination and, therefore, 
use different forums to discuss specific policies, the dispute between developing countries 
and the private sector, particularly the pharmaceutical industry, was seen as a consequence of 
the TRIPs agreement, negotiated at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Recognising that 
intellectual property protection was a clear victory of the United States and other countries 
that host big pharma, many developing countries, mainly Brazil and India, brought the debate 
to the WHO. By using ‘soft power’ instruments, developing countries tried to delegitimise 
TRIPs’ hard perspective on pharmaceutical patents. This also explains the defensive 
behaviour taken by the pharmaceutical industry as the sector had to deal with an image 
problem – that of a business that just seeks profit without caring about human lives. 
Interviewee 20, however, affirmed that within the WHO, big pharma can lobby governments 
more successfully than any other non-State actor, through their immense financial power and 
influence, and can push their position on key issues. 
Described by many as a ‘Pandora’s Box’, it is undeniable that the FENSA will provide, 
for the first time, a comprehensive policy instrument to guide and regulate the engagement of 
the World Health Organisation with all kinds of NSAs. The way in which FENSA is being 
implemented is a crucial issue that was not assessed in this research. Although all the 
interviewees universally recognised the inevitability of the framework, their perspectives 
towards the document were quite diverse and almost no one, Member State or non-State 
actor, seems fully satisfied with the FENSA.  
7.9 Verifying the Hypothesis   
When formulating the hypothesis of this research, which was initially enlightened by 
Nitsan Chorev’s book ‘The World Health Organization between the North and the South’, I 
designed the objectives to be pursued and the questions to be answered. After detailing the 
interviews and the negotiation-related documentation, I conducted the so-called 
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triangulation method through the cross-verification of the data gathered. The goal was to 
either reject or accept the three hypotheses that were previously presented. 
We learn from Chigbu (2019) that framing and testing hypotheses in qualitative 
research (which does not strictly mean the same thing as in quantitative research) always 
comes with challenges, particularly the issue of bias. Qualitative hypothesis testing is the 
process of using qualitative research data to determine whether the reality of an event 
described in a specific hypothesis is true or false.  
1st Hypothesis: the North/South division that characterises the WHO’s history was 
reflected in FENSA negotiations with the formation of two groups of negotiators: developed 
and developing countries.  
The analysis revealed a general split between two groups: one in favour of extensive 
and standardised engagement with all kinds of non-State actors, as an essential and inevitable 
way to support the WHO’s work as the leader of global health; and another group whose 
primary focus was to protect the WHO from undue influence, particularly from the private 
sector, and therefore advocated a more restrictive approach. On the whole, developed 
countries often advocated for increasing engagement with non-State actors while developing 
countries were more worried about undue influence. Additionally, to some extent, this 
restrictive approach sought by some Member States to protect the WHO from undue 
influence, underlies the effort to diminish the influence of all NSAs, due to a State-centered 
perspective. However, a simple, clear and strict division did not occur. Although the North/
South division that characterises the WHO's history was indeed reflected in the negotiations, 
it did not create cohesive groups of negotiators. The research revealed that Member States 
changed the coalitions depending on the topics being discussed. In this sense, an ambivalent 
dynamic can be observed in the behaviour of most Member States during the FENSA 
negotiations, which inevitably points out how the domestic variable is essential for 
understanding the positions of States in the international negotiations.  
2nd Hypothesis: the final text of the FENSA reflects the positions of North countries 
more than the position of the Global South.  
Even though all countries had to make concessions to have the FENSA approved, from 
the nine Member States interviewed, two believed that the Framework reflects the positions 
of the Global South more, two that it echoes more the demands of the North, four that the 
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FENSA is a consensual document and two did not answer. Conversely, interviewees from the 
World Health Organisation that followed the entire negotiation process (interviewees 20 and 
21) consensually declared that FENSA reflects the perspectives of developing countries 
more. Based on document analysis, it is clear that both groups had important victories, such 
as the prohibition of secondments of the private sector, essentially the Global South’s request, 
and no explicit mention of Food and Beverage industries, a demand mainly pursued by 
developed countries.   
3rd Hypothesis: the positions taken by the most active Member States in the 
negotiations embraced the interests of non-State actors, especially the philanthropic and 
private sectors.  
Regarding the influence of non-State actors on the WHO policy process, it can be 
affirmed that the Member States undoubtedly supported specific interests of some non-State 
actors as it was confirmed by almost all interviewees; only Argentina and Norway did not 
endorse it. There is evidence that, behind the scenes, while the private sector acted through 
developed countries, the so-called public-interest NGOs performed through developing 
countries. Nevertheless, no evidence can support the assertion that philanthropic foundations 
tried to influence the FENSA negotiations through Member States. While four interviewees 
affirmed that the Gates Foundation was lobbying national delegations, it might have been 
done silently, as it was not a consensual assertion amongst the interviewees, nor it was clear 
when analysing the documents. Historically, non-State actors, mainly the private sector, had 
indeed influenced WHO policies indirectly through the Member States and this didn’t differ 
during FENSA negotiations. While the available statements of NGOs in official relations 
during the informal consultations of  2013 do not seem to have influenced the FENSA drafts, 
the analysis points out that the NSAs, did, in fact, influence the negotiation process to some 
extent. The influence of NSAs became expressly apparent as several Member States started 
advocating the positions they were expressing outside the confines of the World Health 
Organisation’s negotiation table.   
This research indicates, therefore, that there is, in fact, an enduring, although not strict, 
division between the global North and South at the WHO. The blurring of North and South 
boundaries in some issues, however, might be a result of power imbalances in global health 
governance, and should be further investigated. Moreover, I conclude that the FENSA 
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negotiation process successfully achieved a balanced outcome, able to please, although not 
entirely, even the most unmanageable and opposing Member States’ positions (specifically, 
the United States versus India) by improving and increasing transparency while expanding 
the range of non-State actors with whom the WHO collaborates, including actors widely 
recognised as being problematic and demanding more accountability. Finally, this research 
also looks further than the traditional and inadequate perspective of power and coercion, 
which would lead to powerful for-profit entities being the only actors able to indirect 
influence the negotiations; this was not the case, as the so-called public-interest non-
governmental organisations played a central and determining role during the FENSA 
negotiations. 
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CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS  
The global health landscape has become more complex as it witnessed an 
unprecedented growth in the number of international actors. The four non-State actors 
embraced by this research constitute an essential portion of these ‘new’ players that can have 
powerful economic, political or social influence at the national and sometimes international 
level, without necessarily aligning themselves to a particular State. If, on one hand, this has 
opened up new spaces for civil society participation in global health governance through their 
role in agenda-setting, advocacy, trustee knowledge, galvanising resources, implementing 
and evaluating public policies and international projects, and bringing attention to 
marginalised communities; on the other hand this participation usually happens without 
formal oversight or the constraints of international law. 
Following demands for more democratic participation in International Organisations, 
but particularly due to the growing dependency on external resources, the World Health 
Organisation has been trying to improve its relationship with civil society and non-
governmental  organisations since the beginning of the 2000s, however, it was precisely in 
the past decade that the WHO started to incisively seek a reform that would embrace a 
multistakeholder approach. The engagement with non-governmental organisations was 
already foreseen in the World Health Organisation constitution of 1948, and the Member 
States have historically been trying to regulate the relationship with NGOs and the private 
sector. However, gradually, the WHO, including the Secretariat but primarily the Member 
States, started to perceive the strong influence of the private philanthropic sector, most 
notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  
In this regard, aware of the inevitability of the engagement with different actors to 
promote public health guidelines and successfully exercise its role as the global health 
authority, but also of conflicts between commercial interests and public health goals, the 
WHO has been seeking to strengthen its engagement with NSAs while simultaneously 
strengthening its management of potential conflict of interests. In a broad context of a budget 
and legitimacy crisis as well as an internal atmosphere of mistrust by the Member States 
towards the Secretariat, Margaret Chan, the Director-General of WHO from 2007 to 2017, 
pushed for a reform with three dimensions: priorities, governance and management. 
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The governance reform included a better alignment of the three levels of the WHO 
headquarters, regions and countries, the working methods of the governing bodies, and the 
engagement with non-State actors. While at the beginning the idea was to include only NGOs 
and the private sector, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions were also added, 
all under the category of non-State actors. The Framework of Engagement with non-State 
Actors which became better known as FENSA was negotiated between 2012 and 2016 when 
it was approved at the 69th session of the World Health Assembly.  
The Framework was designed to encourage more engagement while, at the same time, 
protecting the integrity of the WHO. It recognises five types of interaction: (1) participation 
of NSAs in consultations, hearings, and other meetings of the Organisation; (2) provision of 
financial or in-kind contributions; (3) provision of up-to-date information and knowledge on 
technical issues; (4) advocacy activities; and (5) technical collaboration, including through 
product development, capacity-building, operational collaboration in emergencies and 
contribution to the implementation of the WHO’s policies. It also establishes mechanisms to 
manage conflicts of interest and other risks of engagement.  
FENSA debates initially included some consultations with non-State actors in official 
relations, and it was led by the Secretariat, but then it turned into a Member States’ 
negotiation that started to discuss the document ‘line-by-line’. Formal and informal 
conversations, mainly behind closed doors, were conducted in order to settle differences 
among the Member States. The disagreements, however, went beyond the WHO headquarters 
in Geneva, as the non-State actors embraced by the framework also had different perspectives 
about it and tried to enforce their demands through the Member States. How much influence 
interest groups have on policy outcomes in the World Health Organisation while being highly 
relevant for the democratic legitimacy of the WHO, is this research main limitation, as it was 
impossible to measure precisely this amount of influence. However, the document analysis, 
combined with the interviews conducted leaves no room for doubt about the influence of 
NSAs on policy-making processes. 
The aim of this research was to scrutinise the FENSA negotiation process through the 
positions taken by the Member States, and also by understanding the all-encompassing 
context inside and outside the World Health Organisation that led to the FENSA proposal and 
approval. The primary source was official documents from the WHO which I divided into 
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three categories: Governing Bodies’ documents, basic documents and FENSA-related 
documents, and the interviews conducted with involved actors, which were also divided into 
three categories: Member States, non-State actors and WHO Staff. By comparing how the 
versions evolved from the first full version presented in May 2014 until the final and 
approved version in May 2016, I could map the most controversial topics and analyse which 
changes were made. Therefore, I compared the document analysis with the interviews made 
and reports from watchdog organisations that followed FENSA negotiations. Triangulating 
the three sources enable me to verify my initial hypothesis. Whilst a North/South division, 
although not strict, was observed during the negotiations and Member States were advocating 
positions which met some NSAs’ demands, this research could not prove that the FENSA 
reflects the positions of North countries more than those of the Global South. It was also 
found that there is no homogeneity between non-State actors, even within the same category, 
particularly amongst the private sector, and each side has its own interests and different 
perspectives on the same story. 
It is important to emphasise that although FENSA was accused of being used as a tool 
to address the underfunding of the World Health Organisation, as it would open the 
Organisation to the private sector and philanthropic foundations which, consequently, would 
bring in more funding, this accusation was proven untruthful in this research. Even though 
funding was at the centre of the FENSA’s proposal, this investigation points in a different 
direction. Both private sector entities and philanthropic foundations seemed to be more 
satisfied with the status quo before FENSA, as the framework added many rules which were 
seen as an obstacle to further finance. The Member States were trying to regulate the 
relationship with non-State actors (mainly the private sector and some contentious NGOs) 
with a slight focus on funding, in particular, due to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as 
the Organisation experienced an increasingly donor-driven agenda that didn’t always follow 
the priorities voted for by the Member States. Additionally, there was a lack of confidence in 
the Secretariat, who was seen as excessively close to the Gates Foundation, and to the 
industry. It was, hence, failing to prevent conflicts of interest. Interviews revealed that the 
FENSA was also developed to increase the accountability of the Secretariat’s actions, which 
is controversial since the Framework leaves much discretion to the Secretariat’s interpretation 
to make several decisions on a case-by-case basis, such as deciding which category the NSA 
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falls within. However, one should recognise it as an advancement, because one of the main 
critique of the 1987 Principles was that it failed to distinguish public interest and business-
oriented NGOs. With the FENSA, even if a non-State actor does not categorise itself as a 
private sector entity, the Secretariat is able to determine otherwise if it finds private sector 
influence on the NSA’s interests, objectives, governance, sources of funding and affiliations.  
FENSA was a fairly polarised and contentious negotiation process, mainly related to 
engagement with the private sector. I initially considered both the private sector and 
philanthropic foundations as the most important and forceful NSAs, however, I concluded 
that , in fact, the private sector and NGOs were the key actors. Discussion about the private 
sector referred particularly to the pharmaceutical industry and Big Food, both with a 
background of scandals of undue influence at the WHO, as detailed in chapter three. 
Furthermore, several interviewees affirmed that Big Food individuals took part in national 
delegations to attend the WHO’s governing bodies meetings. Paragraph 44 illustrates both the 
power of Big Food to influence policymaking, and of the United States at the WHO, even 
when it is almost alone supporting a position. FENSA requires the WHO to undertake 
'particular caution’ when 'engaging with private sector entities (…) whose policies (…) are 
negatively affecting human health (…) in particular those related to non-communicable 
diseases’. Despite the scientific consensus that sugar, salt and trans-fats increase the risk of 
NCDs, the United States managed to not directly mention Food and Beverage industries. The 
cause-consequence relationship becomes clear when looking at the domestic level, where 
although the prevalence of obesity in the country was 42.4% in 2017/2018 (CDC, 2020), the 
Food and Beverage industries have spent millions on federal political lobbying while 
financing advocacy groups and scientists to downplay harms from sugar, salt, and saturated 
fats in dietary advice. 
Similar to the negotiation process, the implementation of the FENSA was described as 
a ‘heavy and lengthy process’. While the Member States seemed annoyed and the Secretariat 
was hard-pressed due to the high level of scrutiny, none of the NSAs seemed to be entirely 
satisfied. On one hand, NGOs kept criticising and denouncing conflicts of interest within the 
WHO and accusing FENSA of not being able to address corporate influence in the 
Organisation’s norm-setting activities; on the other hand, private sector entities were more 
worried about the increasing bureaucratic burden of the Framework. Regarding philanthropic 
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foundations, it is important to note that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation entered into 
official relations with the WHO for the first time in January 2017, which was greatly 
criticised by some civil society groups, who argued that a great amount of the BMGF’s 
incomes come not only from investments in the private sector but precisely from Food and 
Beverage entities such as Coca-Cola, Kraft and Big Pharma, like Pfizer; both sectors that are 
seen by civil society as ‘villains’ and very likely to have conflicts of interest. In an open letter 
to the Executive Board, over thirty civil society organisations expressed their concerns about 
conflict of interest and stated that ‘these investments make the Gates Foundation a 
beneficiary of sales of several categories of products that are the subject of WHO standards 
and advice to governments related to nutrition and physical activity (…) It is, of course, 
deeply troubling from a governance standpoint that the Executive Board is being asked to 
approve applicants for Official Relations and verify compliance with conflicts of interest 
safeguards without being provided with any relevant evidence – verified or otherwise – on 
the public record’ .  98
At the 145th Executive Board, January 2020, a report by the Director-General on the 
implementation of FENSA was presented. It was affirmed that the Secretariat had conducted 
numerous due diligence and risk assessments throughout the year 2019. The report pointed 
out that the Secretariat was restructuring the functions of the specialised unit responsible for 
performing due diligence and risk assessment, that training sessions for the staff have been 
developed and conducted, and that the WHO Register of non-State actors, one of the core 
parts of the FENSA, has been improved. However, to observe the implementation is of 
utmost importance as almost all interviewees affirmed that an accurate evaluation of FENSA 
will only be possible after its complete implementation.  
Notwithstanding the enormous disagreements about the content and process of 
FENSA, this research concludes that FENSA has already led to an increase in the 
transparency of the WHO’s engagement with NSAs due to the Register of non-State actors 
that provides: general information, governance structure, financial information, membership, 
activities and country presence (countries where the entity has activities, members and 
regional offices or representatives). The register, however, is not fully implemented yet. 
When checking on the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation register, key information is 
 WHO: Civil society calls for deferment of “official relations” status to Gates Foundation. Available at: https://98
www.twn.my/title2/health.info/2017/hi170104.htm 
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missing - income sources for example. Moreover, a handbook for non-State actors on 
engagement with the WHO and a guide for staff on engagement with non-State actors were 
developed, although the guide is fairly vague and does not robustly determine the criteria for 
identifying private sector influence or conflicts of interest nor for conducting risk assessment 
and due diligence. 
After a profound analysis of the FENSA’s negotiation process, there is no doubt that 
non-State actors have significant influence at the World Health Organisation. The donor-
driven agenda is a consequence not only of the earmarked extrabudgetary funds but also of 
that fact that non-State actors can successfully lobby, especially together with donor 
countries, the WHO to not negatively impact them. As a result, the World Health 
Organisation has been experiencing significant distortion, given that there is a gap between 
what the Member States decide collectively and what they later do as donors. This is possibly 
the main weakness of FENSA, although the Framework establishes that financial 
contributions must ‘fall within WHO’s General Programme of Work’ in a clear aim to reduce 
the donor-driven problem, some critics affirm that this made the WHO’s budget be planned in 
accordance with expected sources. It is no coincidence that a substantial portion of the WHO 
budget goes to the development of vaccines for infectious diseases, which are aligned to 
private industry’s primary focus. There is an increasing focus on expensive, sophisticated and 
technological-oriented programmes over inexpensive and long-term solutions, such as the 
overarching goal strategic priority 4: More effective and efficient WHO providing better 
support to countries, which includes ‘advocate for health as a human right and advance the 
vital role of health in human development at the highest political level’. This understanding 
of the right to health is based on an expanded concept of health that lies upon the social 
determination of health and to establish policies that positively influence social and economic 
conditions can consequently improve health for large numbers of people in ways that can be 
sustained over time. 
Moreover, it is important to highlight that voluntary contributions from Member States 
are not regulated, allowing NSAs to outmanoeuvre the requirement and lobby governments 
to direct funding to specific causes. While the FENSA only addresses the relationship 
between the WHO and NSAs, the influence has proven to rely more on the relation between 
NSAs and Member States.  
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At the end of this doctoral thesis, a new epidemic has assaulted the world, endorsing 
what Albert Camus wrote in his novel The Plague (1947, p.30): ‘there have been as many 
plagues in the world as there have been wars, yet plagues and wars always find people 
equally unprepared’. First reported in Wuhan, China, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30th, 
2020. The World Health Organisation, therefore, is more than ever, at the centre of all 
debates, in a positive and negative sense. Positive, because a once lesser-known organisation, 
now, governments, domestic and transnational institutions not necessarily related to public 
health are realising and recognising the urgent need for public investment in health and the 
importance of an international organisation to lead efforts to tackle a pandemic. It’s important 
to highlight that the WHO is currently leading the strategy to assure fair and equitable access 
to a COVID-19 vaccine. The World Health Organisation is proving to be responsible for 
advocating health as a public common good that must be above profit. However, on the other 
hand, in times of ‘fake news’, unfounded accusations have increased due to a delegitimising 
campaign led by the United States’ president Donald Trump. In the context of a pandemic, 
this thesis is especially relevant as it elucidates the WHO’s roles, responsibilities and limits 
while highlighting the importance of an effective, empowered and independent organisation, 
which the FENSA, if carefully and robustly implemented can have a central role. Moreover, 
as the case of emergencies was a controversial topic during the negotiation process and, in 
the end, the Director-General was allowed to somehow relax the application of FENSA, it is 
essential to observe how FENSA will be applied. More than ever, the World Health 
Organisation faces new challenges and needs to reinvent itself.  
Analysing the FENSA negotiation process was a challenging task. While the context 
and content of the Framework are now disclosed, it is essential to follow the implementation 
stage. Although the initial goal was to achieve full operationalisation within a two-year 
timeframe, according to the interviewees, this has not happened yet. While FENSA 
implementation is being discussed at the Governing Bodies, the Member States do not seem 
particularly involved in the topic anymore. Contrarily, in the midst of organised civil society, 
precisely in the health field, the negotiation and now implementation of FENSA is frequently 
discussed. For example, the Geneva Global Health Hub (G2H2) is a membership-based 
association that has been organising side events to the governing bodies meetings to enable 
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the civil society to share knowledge and create initiatives to advocate for more democratic 
global health governance. Within the academic world, however, researchers have not yet 
demonstrated interest. By looking ahead, some significant enquiries can be pursued. For 
instance, the role of individual negotiators in policy processes and the ‘pre-decision’ stage, 
mainly how non-State actors’ influence at the domestic level is transferred to international 
negotiations.  
Moreover, as the involvement of international organisation with non-State actors is 
increasing and FENSA is the first and only comprehensive and detailed framework to 
encourage engagement while mitigating the risks of such relations within the UN system, this 
research effectively contributes to understanding the successes and limitations of such an 
initiative that can be a model for other IOs. Besides being one of the first, globally, to 
approach this object in-depth, especially from an interdisciplinary approach between Global 
Health and International Relations, this research also contributes to the debate of the power 
and influence of non-State actors on the priorities of the global health agenda by acting 
through the WHO. 
The inclusion of civil society and business in contemporary global health governance 
processes can give a false impression of legitimacy through more participation, however, 
without adequate safeguards, it can capture the decision-making processes. This research 
offers a robust analysis for revealing not only the WHO’s challenges but also how the debate 
of global health governance must adopt a more critical perspective on this much encouraged 
and demanded participation, that can end up hijacking real public interest priorities in the 
global health agenda. 
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1. DECIDES that the Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors shall replace the 
Principles governing relations between the World Health Organization and nongovernmental 
organizations1 and Guidelines on interaction with commercial enterprises to achieve health outcomes;2 
 
2. REQUESTS the Director General: 
 
(1) to immediately start implementation of the Framework of Engagement with Non-State 
Actors; 
 
(2) to take all necessary measures, working with Regional Directors, to fully implement the 
Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors in a coherent and consistent manner across 
all three levels of the Organization, with a view to achieving full operationalization within a 
two-year timeframe; 
 
(3) to expedite the full establishment of the register of non-State actors in time for the 
Seventieth World Health Assembly; 
 
(4) to report on the implementation of the Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors 
to the Executive Board at each of its January sessions under a standing agenda item, through the 
Programme Budget and Administration Committee; 
 
(5) to include in the report on the implementation of the Framework of Engagement with 
Non-State Actors, when deemed necessary, any matter or types of engagement with non-State 
actors that would benefit from further consideration by the Executive Board, through its 
Programme Budget and Administration Committee, due to their unique characteristics and 
relevance; 
 
(6) to conduct an initial evaluation in 2019 of the implementation of the Framework of 
Engagement with Non-State Actors and its impact on the work of WHO with a view to 
submitting the results, together with any proposals for revisions of the Framework, to the 
Executive Board in January 2020, through its Programme Budget and Administration 
Committee; 
 
(7) to include in the guide to staff, measures that pertain to application of the relevant 
provisions contained in the existing WHO policies on conflict of interest, with a view to 
facilitating the implementation of the Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors; 
 
(8) to develop, in consultation with Member States, a set of criteria and principles for 
secondments from nongovernmental organizations, philanthropic foundations and academic 
institutions and to submit the criteria and principles for the consideration of and establishment 
by, as appropriate, the Seventieth World Health Assembly, through the Executive Board, taking 
into account, amongst others, the following identified issues: 
 






1 Adopted in resolution WHA40.25. See Basic documents, 48th ed. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014. 








(a) the promotion of equitable geographical distribution; 
 
(b) transparency and clarity regarding positions sought, including public 
announcements; 
 
(c) secondments are temporary in nature not exceeding two years; 
 
(2) to make reference to secondments from non-State actors in the annual report on 
engagement with non-State actors to be submitted, including justification behind secondments; 
 
2. REQUESTS the Independent Expert Oversight Advisory Committee, in accordance with its 
current terms of reference, to include a section on the implementation of the Framework of 
Engagement with Non-State Actors in its report to the Programme, Budget and Administration 
Committee of the Executive Board at each January session; 
 
3. REQUESTS the Seventieth World Health Assembly to review progress on the implementation 
at the three levels of the Organization, with a view to taking any decisions necessary to enable the full, 









FRAMEWORK OF ENGAGEMENT WITH NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
 
(adopted in resolution WHA69.10) 
 
OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK OF ENGAGEMENT 





1. The overarching framework of engagement with non-State actors and the WHO policy and 
operational procedures on management of engagement with non-State actors apply to all engagements 
with non-State actors at all levels of the Organization,1 whereas the four specific policies and 
operational procedures on engagement are limited in application to, respectively, nongovernmental 
organizations, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. 
 




2. WHO is the directing and coordinating authority in global health in line with its constitutional 
mandate. The global health landscape has become more complex in many respects; among other 
things, there has been an increase in the number of players including non-State actors. WHO engages 
with non-State actors in view of their significant role in global health for the advancement and 
promotion of public health and to encourage non-State actors to use their own activities to protect and 
promote public health. 
 
3. The functions of WHO, as set out in Article 2 of its Constitution, include: to act as the directing 
and coordinating authority on international health work; to establish and maintain effective 
collaboration with diverse organizations; and to promote cooperation among scientific and 
professional groups which contribute to the advancement of health. The Constitution further mandates 
the Health Assembly or the Executive Board, and the Director-General, to enter into specific 
engagements with other organizations.2 WHO shall, in relation to non-State actors, act in conformity 
with its Constitution and resolutions and decisions of the Health Assembly, and bearing in mind those 






1 Headquarters, regional offices and country offices, entities established under WHO, as well as hosted partnerships. 
For hosted partnerships the framework of engagement with non-State actors will apply, subject to the policy on WHO’s 
engagement with global health partnerships and hosting arrangements (resolution WHA63.10). Hosted, as well as external 
partnerships are explained in paragraph 48. 






4. WHO’s engagement with non-State actors supports implementation of the Organization’s 
policies and recommendations as decided by the governing bodies, as well as the application of 
WHO’s technical norms and standards. Such an effective engagement with non-State actors at global, 
regional and country levels, also calls for due diligence and transparency measures applicable to non-
State actors under this framework. In order to be able to strengthen its engagement with non-State 
actors for the benefit and interest of global public health, WHO needs simultaneously to strengthen its 
management of the associated potential risks. This requires a robust framework that enables 
engagement and serves also as an instrument to identify the risks, balancing them against the expected 




5. WHO’s engagement with non-State actors is guided by the following overarching principles. 
 
Any engagement must: 
 
(a) demonstrate a clear benefit to public health; 
 
(b) conform with WHO’s Constitution, mandate and general programme of work 
 
(c) respect the intergovernmental nature of WHO and the decision-making authority of 
Member States as set out in the WHO’s Constitution; 
 
(d) support and enhance, without compromising, the scientific and evidence-based approach 
that underpins WHO’s work; 
 
(e) protect WHO from any undue influence, in particular on the processes in setting and 
applying policies, norms and standards;1 
 
(f) not compromise WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation; 
 
(g) be effectively managed, including by, where possible avoiding conflict of interest2 and 
other forms of risks to WHO; 
 
(h) be conducted on the basis of transparency, openness, inclusiveness, accountability, 
integrity and mutual respect. 
 
Benefits of engagement 
 
6. WHO’s engagement with non-State actors can bring important benefits to global public health 
and to the Organization itself in fulfilment of its constitutional principles and objectives, including its 
directing and coordinating role in global health. Engagements range from major, longer-term 
collaborations to smaller, briefer interactions. Benefits arising from such engagement can also include: 
 
(a) the contribution of non-State actors to the work of WHO 
 
 
1 Policies, norms and standard setting includes information gathering, preparation for, elaboration of and the decision 
on the normative text. 





(b) the influence that WHO can have on non-State actors to enhance their impact on global 
public health or to influence the social, economic and environmental determinants of health 
 
(c) the influence that WHO can have on non-State actors’ compliance with WHO’s policies, 
norms and standards 
 
(d) the additional resources non-State actors can contribute to WHO’s work 
 
(e) the wider dissemination of and adherence by non-State actors to WHO’s policies, norms 
and standards 
 
   Risks of engagement 
 
7.  WHO’s engagement with non-State actors can involve risks which need to be effectively 
managed and, where appropriate, avoided. Risks relate inter alia to the occurrence in particular of 
the following: 
 
(b) conflicts of interest; 
 
(c) undue or improper influence exercised by a non-State actor on WHO’s work, especially 
in, but not limited to, policies, norms and standard setting;1 
 
(d) a negative impact on WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation; and 
public health mandate; 
 
(e) the engagement being primarily used to serve the interests of the non-State actor 
concerned with limited or no benefits for WHO and public health; 
 
(f) the engagement conferring an endorsement of the non-State actor’s name, brand, product, 
views or activity;2 
 
(g) the whitewashing of a non-State actor’s image through an engagement with WHO; 
 




8. For the purpose of this framework, non-State actors are nongovernmental 
organizations, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. 
 
9. Nongovernmental organizations are non-profit entities that operate independently of 
governments. They are usually membership-based, with non-profit entities or individuals as 
members exercising voting rights in relation to the policies of the nongovernmental organization, 
or are otherwise constituted with non-profit, public-interest goals. They are free from 
concerns which are 
 
 
1 Policies, norms and standard setting includes information gathering, preparation for, elaboration of and the decision 
on the normative text. 






primarily of a private, commercial or profit-making nature. They could include, for example, 
grassroots community organizations, civil society groups and networks, faith-based organizations, 
professional groups, disease-specific groups, and patient groups. 
 
10. Private sector entities are commercial enterprises, that is to say businesses that are intended to 
make a profit for their owners. The term also refers to entities that represent, or are governed or 
controlled by, private sector entities. This group includes (but is not limited to) business associations 
representing commercial enterprises, entities not “at arm’s length”1 from their commercial sponsors, 
and partially or fully State-owned commercial enterprises acting like private sector entities. 
 
International business associations are private sector entities that do not intend to make a profit for 
themselves but represent the interests of their members, which are commercial enterprises and/or 
national or other business associations. For the purposes of this framework, they shall have the 
authority to speak for their members through their authorized representatives. Their members shall 
exercise voting rights in relation to the policies of the international business association. 
 
11. Philanthropic foundations are non-profit entities whose assets are provided by donors and 
whose income is spent on socially useful purposes. They shall be clearly independent from any private 
sector entity in their governance and decision-making. 
 
12. Academic institutions are entities engaged in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge 
through research, education and training.2 
 
13. For each of the four groups of entities above, the overarching framework and the respective 
specific policy on engagement apply. WHO will determine through its due diligence if a non-State 
actor is subject to the influence of private sector entities to the extent that the non-State actor has to be 
considered itself a private sector entity. Such influence can be exerted through financing, participation 
in decision making or otherwise. Provided that the decision-making processes and bodies of a non- 
State actor remain independent of undue influence from the private sector, WHO can decide to 
consider the entity as a nongovernmental organization, a philanthropic foundation or an academic 
institution, but may apply relevant provisions of the WHO’s policy and operational procedures on 
engagement with private sector entities, such as not accepting financial and in-kind contributions for 
use in the normative work. 
 
TYPES OF INTERACTION 
 
14. The following are categories of interaction in which WHO engages with non-State actors. Each 
type of interaction can take different forms, be subject to different levels of risk and can involve 







1 An entity is “at arm’s length” from another entity if it is independent from the other entity, does not take 
instructions and is clearly not influenced or clearly not reasonably perceived to be influenced in its decisions and work by the 
other entity. 
2 This can include think tanks which are policy-oriented institutions, as long as they primarily perform research; 










18. For the purposes of this framework, evidence refers to inputs based on up-to-date information, 
knowledge on technical issues, and consideration of scientific facts, independently analysed by WHO. 
Evidence generation by WHO includes information gathering, analysis, generation of information and 
the management of knowledge and research. Non-State actors may provide their up-to-date information 
and knowledge on technical issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, subject to the 
provisions of this framework, its four specific policies and operational procedures, and other applicable 
WHO rules, policies and procedures. Such contribution should be made publicly available, as 




19. Advocacy is action to increase awareness of health issues, including issues that receive 
insufficient attention; to change behaviours in the interest of public health; and to foster collaboration 




20. For the purpose of this framework, technical collaboration refers to other collaboration with 
non-State actors, as appropriate, in activities that fall within the General Programme of Work, 
including: 
 




• operational collaboration in emergencies 
 
• contributing to the implementation of WHO’s policies. 
 
MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND OTHER RISKS OF 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
21. Managing, including by, where appropriate, avoiding, conflict of interest and other risks of 
engagement requires a series of steps, as set out below:1 
 
• WHO needs to know the non-State actors that it engages with. Therefore each non-State actor 
is required to provide all relevant2 information about itself and its activities, following which 
WHO conducts the necessary due diligence. 
 
• WHO conducts a risk assessment in order to identify the specific risks of engagement 
associated with each engagement with a non-State actor. 
 
 
1 The framework is designed to regulate institutional engagements; its implementation is closely coordinated with the 
implementation of other organizational policies regulating conflict of interest in respect of individuals (see paragraph 49). 






• Risks of engagement need to be managed and communicated coherently in each of the three 
levels of the Organization and throughout the Organization. To that end, WHO manages 
engagement through a single, Organization-wide electronic tool.1 
 
• Member States exercise oversight over WHO’s engagement with non-State actors in 
accordance with the provisions in paragraphs 67 and 68. 
 
Conflict of interest 
 
22. A conflict of interest arises in circumstances where there is potential for a secondary interest (a 
vested interest in the outcome of WHO’s work in a given area) to unduly influence, or where it may 
be reasonably perceived to unduly influence, either the independence or objectivity of professional 
judgement or actions regarding a primary interest (WHO’s work) The existence of conflict of interest 
in all its forms does not as such mean that improper action has occurred, but rather the risk of such 
improper action occurring. Conflicts of interest are not only financial, but can take other forms as well. 
 
23  Individual conflicts of interests within WHO are those involving experts, regardless of their   
status, and staff members; these are addressed in accordance with  the  policies  listed  under  
paragraph 49 of the present framework. 
 
24. All institutions have multiple interests, which means that in engaging with non-State actors 
WHO is often faced with a combination of converging and conflicting interests. An institutional 
conflict of interest is a situation where WHO’s primary interest as reflected in its Constitution may be 
unduly influenced by the conflicting interest of a non-State actor in a way that affects, or may 
reasonably be perceived to affect, the independence and objectivity of WHO’s work. 
 
25. In actively managing institutional conflict of interest and the other risks of engagement 
mentioned in paragraph 7 above, WHO aims to avoid allowing the conflicting interests of a non-State 
actor to exert, or be reasonably perceived to exert, undue influence over the Organization’s decision- 
making process or to prevail over its interests. 
 
26. For WHO, the potential risk of institutional conflicts of interest could be the highest in 
situations where the interest of non-State actors, in particular economic, commercial or financial, are 
in conflict with WHO’s public health policies, constitutional mandate and interests, in particular the 
Organization’s independence and impartiality in setting policies, norms and standards. 
 
Due diligence and risk assessment 
 
27. When the possibility of entering into an engagement is being considered, the relevant technical 
unit in the Secretariat conducts an initial examination in order to establish whether such an 
engagement would be in the interest of the Organization and in line with the principles of WHO’s 
engagement with non-State actors in paragraph 5 and the priorities defined in the General Programme 
of Work and Programme budget. If this seems to be the case, the technical unit consults the WHO 
Register on non-State actors and as needed asks the non-State actor to provide its basic information. 
 
 
1 WHO uses an electronic tool for managing engagement. As described in footnote 1 of paragraph 38, the publicly 
visible part of the tool is the register of non-State actors; the tool also provides an electronic workflow for the internal 
management of engagement. A similar electronic tool is used for the management of individual conflicts of interest, in order 
to harmonize the implementation of the framework with the implementation of the policy on management of individual 






Using the Organization-wide electronic tool, the unit then complements this information with a 
description of the proposed engagement and its own assessment of the benefits and risks involved, as 
needed. 
 
28 The technical unit makes an initial assessment. If the engagement is of low risk, for example 
because of its repetitive nature1 or because it does not involve policies, norms and standard setting, a 
simplified due diligence and risk assessment modulating the procedures in paragraphs 29 to 36 as well 
as 39 can be performed by the technical unit and the risk management decision taken, taking such 
steps as are necessary to ensure full compliance with paragraphs 5 to 7.2 For all other engagements full 
procedures apply. 
 
29. Before engaging with any non-State actor, WHO, in order to preserve its integrity, conducts due 
diligence and risk assessment. Due diligence refers to the steps taken by WHO to find and verify 
relevant information on a non-State actor and to reach a clear understanding of its profile. While due 
diligence refers to the nature of the non-State actor concerned, risk assessment refers to the 
assessment of a specific proposed engagement with that non-State actor. 
 
30. Due diligence combines a review of the information provided by the non-State actor, a search 
for information about the entity concerned from other sources, and an analysis of all the information 
obtained. This includes a screening of different public, legal and commercial sources of information, 
including: media; the entity’s website companies’ analyst reports, directories and profiles; and public, 
legal and governmental sources. 
 
31. The core functions of due diligence are to: 
 
• clarify the nature and purpose of the entity proposed to engage with WHO; 
 
• clarify the interest and objectives of the entity in engaging with WHO and what it expects in 
return; 
 
• determine the entity’s legal status, area of activities, membership, governance, sources of 
funding, constitution, statutes, and by-laws and affiliation; 
 
• define the main elements of the history and activities of the entity in terms of the following: 
health, human and labour issues; environmental, ethical and business issues; reputation and 
image; and financial stability; 
 
• identify if paragraph 44 or 45 should be applied. 
 
32. Due diligence also allows the Secretariat for the purpose of its engagement to categorize each 
non-State actor in relation to one of the four groups of non-State actors on the basis of its nature, 
objectives, governance, funding, independence and membership. This categorization is indicated in the 





1 Provided that due diligence and risk assessment have already been carried out and the nature of engagement has 
remained unchanged. 
2 The simplified due diligence and risk assessment, and information to be provided by non-State actors as well as the 






33. Risks are the expression of the likelihood and potential impact of an event that would affect the 
Organization’s ability to achieve its objectives. A risk assessment on a proposed engagement is 
conducted in addition to due diligence. This involves the assessment of risks associated with an 
engagement with a non-State actor, in particular the risks described in paragraph 7 and is to be 




34. Risk management concerns the process leading to a management decision whereby the 
Secretariat decides explicitly and justifiably on entry into engagement,1 continuation of engagement, 
engagement with measures to mitigate risks, non-engagement or disengagement from an existing or 
planned engagement with non-State actors. It is a management decision usually taken by the unit 
engaging with the non-State actor based on a recommendation of the specialized unit responsible for 
performing due diligence and risk assessment. 
 
35. A dedicated secretariat mechanism reviews proposals of engagement referred to it and 
recommends engagement, continuation of engagement, engagement with measures to mitigate risks, 
non engagement or disengagement from an existing or planned engagement with non-State actors. The 
Director-General, working with the Regional Directors, ensures coherence and consistency in 
implementation and interpretation of this Framework across all levels of the Organization. 
 
36. WHO takes a risk-management approach to engagement, only entering into an engagement with 
a non-State actor when the benefits in terms of direct or indirect contributions to public health and the 
fulfilment of the Organization’s mandate as mentioned in paragraph 6 outweigh any residual risks of 
engagement as mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as the time and expense involved in establishing and 




37. WHO’s interaction with non-State actors is managed transparently. WHO provides an annual 
report to the governing bodies on its engagement with non-State actors, including summary 
information on due diligence, risk assessment and risk management undertaken by the Secretariat. 
WHO also makes publicly available appropriate information on its engagement with non-State actors. 
 
38. The WHO register of non-State actors is an Internet-based, publicly available electronic tool 
used by the Secretariat2 to document and coordinate engagement with non-State actors. It contains the 
main standard information provided by non-State actors3 and high-level descriptions of the 





1 Other than decisions related to official relations as set out in paragraphs 50 to 57. 
2 The register of non-State actors is the first level of a tool used by the Secretariat containing four levels of 
information: a publicly available level, a level made available to Member States, a working level for the Secretariat, and a 
level of confidential and sensitive information accessible to a limited number of individuals within the Secretariat. 
3 Information on financial contributions received from non-State actors is documented in this register and in the 
Programme Budget web portal. 
4 The register covers all three levels of the Organization – global, regional and country – and includes hosted 






39 Non-State actors engaging with WHO are required to provide information on their organization. 
This information includes: name, membership, legal status, objective, governance structure, 
composition of main decision-making bodies, assets, annual income and funding sources, main 
relevant affiliations, webpage and one or more focal points for WHO contacts. 
 
40. When the Secretariat decides on an engagement with a non-State actor, a summary of the 
information submitted by that entity and held in the WHO register of non-State actors is made public. 
The accuracy of the information provided by the non-State actor and published in the register is the 
responsibility of the non-State actor  concerned  and does  not  constitute  any form of  endorsement  
by WHO. 
 
41. Non-State actors described in the register must update the information provided on themselves 
annually or upon the request of WHO. Information in the WHO register of non-State actors will be 
dated. Information on entities that are no longer engaged with WHO or that have not updated their 
information will be marked as “archived”. Archived information from the WHO register of non-State 
actors can be considered in relation to future applications for engagement, where relevant. 
 
42. In addition to the publicly available information, Member States have electronic access to a 
summary report on due diligence of each non-State actor and their respective risk assessment and risk 
management on engagement. Member States also have access, on demand, to the associated full report 
through a remote secure access platform. 
 
43. WHO maintains a handbook to guide non-State actors in their interaction with WHO in line 
with this framework. A guide for staff is also maintained on the implementation of the framework of 




44. WHO does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-State actors that work to further the 
interests of the tobacco industry. WHO also does not engage with the arms industry. 
 
Engagement where particular caution should be exercised 
 
45 WHO will exercise particular caution, especially while  conducting  due  diligence,  risk  
assessment and risk management, when engaging with private sector entities and other non-State 
actors whose policies or activities are negatively affecting human health and are not in line with 
WHO’s policies, norms and standards, in particular those related to noncommunicable diseases and 
their determinants. 
 
Association with WHO’s name and emblem 
 
46. WHO’s name and emblem are recognized by the public as symbols of integrity and quality 
assurance. WHO’s name, acronym and emblem shall not, therefore, be used for, or in conjunction 
with, commercial, promotional marketing and advertisement purposes. Any use of the name or 













47. WHO does not accept secondments from private sector entities. 
 
RELATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO WHO’S OTHER POLICIES 
 
48. This framework replaces the Principles Governing Relations between the World Health 
Organization and Nongovernmental Organizations1 and the Guidelines on interaction with commercial 
enterprises to achieve health outcomes (noted by the Executive Board).2 
 
49. The implementation of the policies listed below as they relate to WHO’s engagement with non- 
State actors will be coordinated and aligned with the framework of engagement with non-State actors. 
In the event that a conflict is identified, it will be brought to the attention of the Executive Board 
through its Programme, Budget and Administration Committee. 
 
(a) Policy on WHO’s engagement with global health partnerships and hosting arrangements.3 
 
(i) Hosted partnerships derive their legal personality from WHO and are subject to the 
Organization’s rules and regulations. Therefore the Framework of engagement with non- 
State actors applies to their engagement with non-State actors. They have a formal 
governance structure, separate from that of the WHO governing bodies, in which 
decisions are taken on direction, workplans and budgets; and their programmatic 
accountability frameworks are also independent from those of the Organization. In the 
same way the framework applies to other hosted entities which are subject to the 
Organizations Rules and Regulations. 
 
(ii) WHO’s involvement in external partnerships is regulated by the policy on WHO’s 
engagement with global health partnerships and hosting arrangements. The framework of 
engagement with non-State actors also applies to WHO’s engagement in these 
partnerships.4 
 
(b) Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees and the Guidelines for 
Declaration of Interests (WHO Experts). The management of WHO’s relations with individual 
experts is regulated by the Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees5 and the 
Guidelines for Declaration of Interests (WHO Experts). 
 
(c) Staff Regulations and Staff Rules. All staff are subject to the Organization’s Staff 
Regulations and Staff Rules, noting in particular the provisions of declaration of interest therein: 
 
 
1 Basic documents, 48th ed. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014: pp.97–102. 
2 See document EB107/2001/REC/2, summary record of the twelfth meeting. 
3 Endorsed by the Health Assembly in resolution WHA63.10 on partnerships and its Annex 1. 
4The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an intergovernmental body which is the principal organ of the joint 
FAO/WHO food standards programme for which the administration is not solely provided by WHO. The Commission is 
supported by subsidiary bodies including Codex committees, regional coordinating committees and task forces. 
Meetings of the Commission, Committees, including independent expert committees, and Task Forces are regulated by the 
Rules of Procedure and other decisions adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 






according to Article 1.1 of the Staff Regulations of the World Health Organization, all staff 
members “pledge themselves to discharge their functions and to regulate their conduct with the 
interests of the World Health Organization only in view.” 
 
(a) Regulations for Study and Scientific Groups, Collaborating Institutions and other 
Mechanisms of Collaboration. Scientific collaborations are regulated by the Regulations for 
Study and Scientific Groups, Collaborating Institutions and other Mechanisms of 
Collaboration.1 
 
(b) Financial Rules and Financial Regulations. 
 
(i) The procurement of goods and services is regulated by the Financial Rules and 
Financial Regulations;2 it is not covered by the framework of engagement with non-State 
actors, although pro-bono contributions from non-State actors are covered. 
 
(ii) Like any other financing of WHO, financing from non-State actors is regulated by 
the Financial Rules and Financial Regulations and the decision on accepting such 




50. “Official relations” is a privilege that the Executive Board may grant to nongovernmental 
organizations, international business associations and philanthropic foundations that have had and 
continue to have a sustained and systematic engagement3 in the interest of the Organization. The aims 
and activities of all these entities shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of 
WHO’s Constitution, and they shall contribute significantly to the advancement of public health. 
Organizations in official relations can attend governing body meetings of WHO but are otherwise 
subject to the same rules as other non-State actors when engaging with WHO. 
 
51. Entities in official relations are international in membership and /or scope. All entities in official 
relations shall have a constitution or similar basic document, an established headquarters, a governing 
body, an administrative structure, and a regularly updated entry in the WHO register of non-State 
actors. 
 
52. Official relations shall be based on a plan for collaboration between WHO and the entity with 
agreed objectives and outlining activities for the coming three-year period structured in accordance 
with the General Programme of Work and Programme budget and consistent with this framework. 
This plan shall also be published in the WHO register of non-State actors. These organizations shall 
provide annually a short report on the progress made in implementing the plan of collaboration and 
other related activities which will also be published in the WHO register. These plans shall be free 





1  Basic documents, 48th ed. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014: pp.131–138. 
2  Basic documents, 48th ed. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014: pp.103–113. 
3 At least two years of systematic engagement as documented in the WHO register of non-State actors, assessed by 







53. For nongovernmental organizations working on global health issues, sustained and systematic 
engagement could include research and active advocacy around WHO meetings and WHO’s policies, 
norms and standards. Official relations may be considered for such nongovernmental organizations 
based on at least three years of their activities and future work plan on research and advocacy on 
global public health issues. 
 
54. The Executive Board shall be responsible for deciding on the admission of organizations into 
official relations with WHO and shall review this status every three years. The Director-General may 
propose international nongovernmental organizations, philanthropic foundations and international 
business associations for admission. The Director-General can also propose an earlier review based on 
the experience in the collaboration with the organization concerned. 
 
55. Entities in official relations are invited to participate in sessions of WHO’s governing bodies. 
This privilege shall include: 
 
(a) the possibility to appoint a representative to participate, without right of vote, in meetings 
of WHO’s governing bodies or in meetings of the committees and conferences convened under 
its authority; 
 
(b) the possibility to make a statement if the Chairman of the meeting (i) invites them to do 
so or (ii) accedes to their request when an item in which the related entity is particularly 
interested is being discussed; 
 
(c) the possibility to submit the statement referred to in subparagraph (b) above in advance of 
the debate for the Secretariat to post on a dedicated website. 
 
56. Non-State actors participating in WHO governing bodies’ meetings shall designate a head of 
their delegation and declare the affiliations of their delegates. This declaration shall include the 
function of each delegate within the non-State actor itself and, where applicable, the function of that 
delegate within any affiliated organization. 
 
57. Regional committees may also decide on a procedure granting accreditation to their meetings to 
other international, regional, and national1 non-State actors not in official relations with WHO as long 
as the procedure is managed in accordance with this framework. 
 
Procedure for admitting and reviewing organizations in official relations 
 
58. The application for admission into official relations shall be based on the up-to-date entries in 
the WHO register of non-State actors, providing all the necessary information as requested on the non-
State actor’s nature and activities. The application shall include a summary of past engagement as 
documented in the register of non-State actors and a three-year plan for collaboration with WHO that 
has been developed and agreed on jointly by the non-State actor and WHO. 
 
59. A signed letter certifying the accuracy of the application for official relations submitted online 
shall reach WHO headquarters no later than the end of the month of July for submission to the 
Executive Board at its session the following January. Applications for official relations shall be 










framework. Applications should be transmitted to the Executive Board members  by the Secretariat  
six weeks before the opening of the January session of the Executive Board at which they will be 
considered. 
 
60. During the Board’s January session, the Programme, Budget and Administration Committee of 
the Executive Board shall consider applications submitted and shall make recommendations to the 
Board. A representative of an applicant organization may be invited by the Committee to speak before 
it in connection with that organization’s application. Should the applicant organization be considered 
not to meet the established criteria, and bearing in mind the desirability of ensuring a valuable 
continuing partnership based on defined objectives and evidenced by a record of successful past 
engagement and a framework for future collaborative activities, the Committee may recommend 
postponement of consideration or rejection of an application. 
 
61. The Board, after considering the recommendations of the Committee, shall decide whether an 
organization is to be admitted into official relations with WHO. A reapplication from a non-State actor 
shall not normally be considered until two years have elapsed since the Board’s decision on the 
previous application. 
 
62. The Director-General shall inform each organization of the Board’s decision on its application. 
The Director-General shall document decisions taken within the Secretariat and by the Executive 
Board on applications from non-State actors, reflect this status in the WHO register of non-State 
actors, and maintain a list of the organizations admitted into official relations. 
 
63. The entities in official relations and the Secretariat should name focal points for collaboration who 
are responsible for informing each other and their organizations of any developments in the 
implementation of the plan for collaboration and who are the first points of contact for any changes or 
problems. 
 
64. The Board, through its Programme, Budget and Administration Committee, shall review 
collaboration with each non-State actor in official relations every three years and shall decide on the 
desirability of maintaining official relations or defer the decision on the review to the following year. 
The Board’s review shall be spread over a three-year period, one third of the entities in official 
relations being reviewed each year. 
 
65. The Director-General can propose earlier reviews of a non-State actor’s official relations with 
WHO by the Executive Board through its Programme, Budget and Administration Committee in case 
of issues such as non-fulfilment of the entity’s part in the plan of collaboration, lack of contact, failure 
by the non-State actor to fulfil its reporting requirements or changes in the nature or activities of the 
organization concerned, the non-State actor ceasing to fulfil the criteria for admission, or any potential 
new risks for the collaboration. 
 
66. The Board may discontinue official relations if it considers that such relations are no longer 
appropriate or necessary in the light of changing programmes or other circumstances. Similarly, the 
Board may suspend or discontinue official relations if an organization no longer meets the criteria that 
applied at the time of the establishment of such relations, fails to update its information and report on 
the collaboration in the WHO register on non-State actors or fails to fulfil its part in the agreed 







OVERSIGHT OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
67. The Executive Board, through its Programme, Budget and Administration Committee, oversees 
the implementation of WHO’s framework of engagement with non-State actors, proposes 
revisions to the framework and can grant the privileges of official relations to international 
nongovernmental organizations, philanthropic foundations and international business 
associations. 
 
68. The Programme Budget and Administration Committee of the Executive Board shall review, 
provide guidance and, as appropriate, make recommendations to the Executive Board on: 
 
(a) oversight of WHO’s implementation of the framework of engagement with non-State 
actors including: 
 
(i) consideration of the annual report on engagement with non-State actors submitted 
by the Director-General 
 
(ii) any other matter on engagement referred to the Committee by the Board 
 
(b) entities in official relations with WHO, including: 
 
(i) proposals for admitting non-State actors into official relations 
 
(ii) review of renewals of entities in official relations 
 
(c) any proposal, when needed, for revisions of the framework of engagement with non-State 
actors. 
 
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THIS FRAMEWORK 
 
69. Non-compliance can include inter alia the following: significant delays in the provision of 
information to the WHO register of non-State actors; provision of wrong information; use of the 
engagement with WHO for purposes other than protecting and promoting public health, such as for 
commercial, promotional, marketing and advertisement purposes; misuse of WHO’s name and 
emblem; attempt at undue influence; and abuse of the privileges conferred by official relations. 
 
70. Non-compliance by a non-State actor with the provisions of this framework can have 
consequences for the entity concerned after due process including a reminder, a warning, a cease-and- 
desist letter, a rejection of renewal of engagement and termination of engagement. The review of the 
status of official relations by the Executive Board can be anticipated and non-compliance can be the 
reason for non-renewal of official relations. Except in the case of important and intentional cases of 
non-compliance the non-State actor concerned should not be automatically excluded from other 
engagements with WHO. 
 
71. Any financial contribution received by WHO that is subsequently discovered to be non- 








72. Consistent with the principles identified in paragraph 5, this framework will be implemented in 
its entirety in a manner that manages and strengthens WHO’s engagement with non-State actors 
towards the attainment of public health objectives, including through multistakeholder partnerships, 
whilst protecting and preserving WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation; 
 
73. The Director-General, in the application of this framework, when responding to acute public health 
events described in the International Health Regulations (2005) or other emergencies with health 
consequences, will act according to the WHO Constitution1 and the principles identified in this 
framework. In doing so, the Director-General may exercise flexibility as might be needed in the 
application of the procedures of this framework in those responses, when he/she deems necessary, in 
accordance with WHO’s responsibilities as health cluster lead, and the need to engage quickly and 
broadly with non-State actors for coordination, scale up and service delivery2. The Director-General 
will inform Member States through appropriate means,3 including in particular written 
communication, without undue delay when such a response requires exercise of flexibility,  and 
include summary information with justification on the use of such flexibility in the annual report on 
engagement with non-State actors. 
 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
 
74. The implementation of the framework will be constantly monitored internally and by the 
Executive Board through its Programme, Budget and Administration Committee in the annual report 
on engagement with non-State actors and the assessment of information available in the register of 
non-State actors. 
 
75. Furthermore, the implementation of the framework should be periodically evaluated. The results 
of such evaluation, together with any proposals for revisions of the framework, shall also be submitted 

















1  Including Article 2(d) of the WHO Constitution. 
2 Taking into account resolution WHA65.20 (WHO’s response, and role as the health cluster lead, in meeting the 
growing demands of health in humanitarian emergencies). 
3 Including as described in United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182 (Strengthening of the coordination of 
humanitarian assistance of the United Nations), which establishes the Secretary-General’s emergency relief coordinator, and 






WHO POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ON ENGAGEMENT 
WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
1. This policy regulates specifically WHO’s engagement with nongovernmental organizations by 





Participation by nongovernmental organizations in WHO meetings2 
 
2. WHO can invite nongovernmental organizations to participate in consultations, hearings or 
other meetings in accordance with paragraph 15 of the overarching framework. Consultations and 
hearings can be electronic or in person. 
 
3. Participation in other meetings is on the basis of discussion of an item in which the 
nongovernmental organization has a particular interest and where its participation adds value to the 
deliberations of the meeting. Such participation is for the exchange of information and views, but 
never for the formulation of advice. 
 
4. The nature of participation of nongovernmental organizations depends on the type of meeting 
concerned. The format, modalities, and the participation of nongovernmental organizations in 
consultations, hearings, and other meetings is decided on a case-by-case basis by the WHO governing 
bodies or by the Secretariat. Participation and inputs received from nongovernmental organizations 
shall be made publicly available, wherever possible. Nongovernmental organizations do not take part 
in any decision-making process of the Organization. 
 
Involvement of the Secretariat in meetings organized by nongovernmental organizations 
 
5. WHO can organize joint meetings, or cosponsor meetings organized by nongovernmental 
organizations, as long as the integrity, independence and reputation of the Organization are preserved, 
and as long as this participation furthers WHO’s objectives as expressed in the General Programme of 
Work. WHO staff members may participate in meetings organized by nongovernmental organizations 
in accordance with the internal rules of the Organization. The nongovernmental organization shall not 
misrepresent WHO’s participation as official WHO support for, or endorsement of, the meeting, and 
shall agree not to use WHO’s participation for promotional purposes. 
 
Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
6. The participation of WHO in meetings organized by nongovernmental organizations as co-






1 See paragraphs 14–20 of the overarching framework for the five types of interaction. 









7. WHO can accept financial and in-kind contributions from nongovernmental organizations as 
long as such contributions fall within WHO’s General Programme of Work, do not create conflicts of 
interest, are managed in accordance with the framework, and comply with other relevant regulations, 
rules and policies of WHO. 
 
8. The acceptance of contributions (whether in cash or in kind) should be made subject to the 
following conditions: 
 
(a) the acceptance of a contribution does not constitute an endorsement by WHO of the 
nongovernmental organization; 
 
(b) the acceptance of a contribution does not confer on the contributor any privilege or 
advantage; 
 
(c) the acceptance of a contribution as such does not offer the contributor any possibility for 
advising, influencing, participating in, or being in command of the management or 
implementation of operational activities; 
 
(d) WHO keeps its discretionary right to decline a contribution, without any further 
explanation. 
 
9. WHO can provide resources to a nongovernmental organization for implementation of  
particular work in accordance with the Programme Budget, the Financial Regulations and Financial 
Rules and other applicable rules and policies. The resources concerned can be either for a project of 
the institution which WHO considers merits support and is consistent with WHO’s general programme 
of work, or for a project organized or coordinated by WHO. The former constitutes a grant, the latter a 
service. 
 
Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
10. Any acceptance of resources from a nongovernmental organization is handled in accordance 
with the provisions of this framework and relevant other WHO rules and guidelines such as the Staff 
Regulations and Staff Rules, the Financial Regulations and Financial Rules and policies governing 
procurement, as well as WHO’s guidelines for medicine donations and WHO’s guidelines for health 
care equipment donations; 
 
11. For reasons of transparency, contributions from nongovernmental organizations must be 
publicly acknowledged by WHO in accordance with its policies and practices. 
 
12. Acknowledgements shall usually be worded along the following lines: “The World Health 
Organization gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of [Nongovernmental organization] 
towards [description of the outcome or activity]”. 
 
13. Contributions received from nongovernmental organizations are listed in the financial report  
and audited financial statements of WHO as well as the Programme budget web portal and the WHO 






14. Nongovernmental organizations may not use the fact that they have made a contribution in their 
materials used for commercial, promotional, marketing and advertisement purposes.1 However, they 
may make reference to the contribution in their annual reports or similar documents. In addition, they 
may mention the contribution on their websites, and in special non-promotional publications, provided 




15 Nongovernmental organizations may provide their up-to-date information and knowledge on 
technical issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, subject to the provisions of the 
overarching framework, and this specific policy and operational procedures, and other applicable 
WHO rules, policies and procedures. Such contribution should be made publicly available, as 




16. WHO collaborates with nongovernmental organizations on advocacy for health and increasing 
awareness of health issues; for changing behaviours in the interest of public health; and for fostering 
collaboration and greater coherence between non-State actors where joint action is required. 
 
17. Nongovernmental organizations are encouraged to disseminate WHO’s policies, guidelines, 
norms and standards and other tools through their networks. 
 
18. WHO encourages nongovernmental organizations to implement and advocate for the 
implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and standards. WHO engages in dialogue with 
nongovernmental organizations in order to promote the implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and 
standards.2 
 
19. Nongovernmental organizations can only collaborate with WHO in advocacy for the 
implementation of WHO policies norms or standards if they commit themselves to implement these 




20. WHO may engage with the nongovernmental organizations for technical collaboration as 
defined in the overarching framework paragraph 20. Technical collaboration with nongovernmental 
organizations is encouraged. This collaboration must be in the interest of WHO, and managed in 
accordance with the overarching framework and this policy to protect WHO, and in particular, its 
normative work, from any undue influence or conflict of interest and to ensure there is no interference 






1 In accordance with paragraph 46 of the overarching framework. 
2 Nongovernmental organizations working with WHO will be expected to conform to WHO’s public health policies 
in areas such as food safety, chemical safety, ethical promotion of medicinal drug products, tobacco control, 







WHO POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ON 
ENGAGEMENT WITH PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES 
 
 
1. This policy regulates specifically WHO’s engagement with private sector entities by type of 
interaction.1 The provisions of the overarching framework also apply to all engagements with private 
sector entities. 
 
2. When engaging with private sector entities, it should be borne in mind that WHO’s activities 
affect the commercial sector in broader ways, through, among others, its public health guidance, its 
recommendations on normative standards, or other work that might indirectly or directly influence 
product costs, market demand, or profitability of specific goods and services. 
 





Participation by private sector entities in WHO meetings2 
 
4. WHO can invite private sector entities to participate in consultations, hearings or other meetings 
in accordance with paragraph 15 of the overarching framework. Consultations and hearings can be 
electronic or in person. 
 
5. Participation in other meetings is on the basis of discussion of an item in which the private 
sector entity has a particular interest and where its participation adds value to the deliberations of the 
meeting. Such participation is for the exchange of information and views, but never for the 
formulation of advice. 
 
6. The nature of participation of private sector entities depends on the type of meeting concerned. 
The format, modalities, and the participation of private sector entities in consultations, hearings, and 
other meetings is decided on a case-by-case basis by the WHO governing bodies or by the Secretariat. 
Participation and inputs received from private sector entities shall be made publicly available, 
wherever possible. Private sector entities do not take part in any decision making process of the 
Organization. 
 
Involvement of the Secretariat in meetings organized by private sector entities 
 
7. WHO staff members may participate in meetings organized by a private sector entity as long as 
the integrity, independence and reputation of the Organization are preserved and as long as this 
participation furthers WHO’s objectives as expressed in the General Programme of Work. The private 
sector entity shall not misrepresent WHO’s participation as official WHO support for, or endorsement 





1 See paragraphs 14–20 of the overarching framework for the five types of interaction. 






Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
8. The participation of WHO staff members in meetings of private sector entities as panellists, 
speakers or in any other capacity shall be managed according to the provisions of the overarching 
framework and this specific policy. 
 
9. WHO does not cosponsor meetings organized wholly or partly by private sector entities. It may, 
however, cosponsor a meeting for which the scientific initiators have hired a commercial conference 
organizer to deal with the logistical aspects, provided that the commercial organizer makes no 
contribution to the scientific content of the meeting. 
 
10. WHO does not cosponsor meetings organized by other actors where one or more health-related 
private sector entities are also cosponsors. Other instances of cosponsorship of meetings organized by 
other actors where non health-related private sector entities are also cosponsors should be reviewed on 
a case-by-case basis and are subject to the provisions of this framework. 
 
11. There shall be no commercial exhibitions on WHO premises and at WHO’s meetings. 
 
12. WHO does not cosponsor commercial exhibitions, whether as part of meetings organized by 




13. The level of risk associated with the acceptance of resources from private sector entities 
depends on the field of activity of the private sector entity, the WHO activity for which the resources 
are used and the modalities of the contributions. 
 
(a) Financial contributions may be accepted from private sector entities whose business is 
unrelated to that of WHO, provided they are not engaged in any activity or have close ties with 
any entity that is incompatible with WHO’s mandate and work. 
 
(b) Financial contributions may not be sought or accepted from private sector entities that 
have, themselves or through their affiliated companies, a direct commercial interest in the 
outcome of the project toward which they would be contributing, unless approved in conformity 
with the provisions for clinical trials or product development (see paragraph 36 below). 
 
(c) The provisions set out in paragraph 13(b) shall be without prejudice to specific 
mechanisms, such as the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (“PIP Framework”), set 
up by the Health Assembly that involve the receipt and pooling of resources.1 
 
(d) Caution should be exercised in accepting financial contributions from private sector 
entities that have even an indirect interest in the outcome of the project (i.e. the activity is 
related to the entities’ field of interest, without there being a conflict as referred to above). In 
such an event, other commercial enterprises having a similar indirect interest should be invited 
to contribute, and the reason clearly described if this does not prove possible. The larger the 










avoid the possibility of a conflict of interest or appearance of an inappropriate association with 
one contributor. 
 
14. Financial and in-kind contributions from private sector entities to WHO’s programmes are only 
acceptable in the following conditions: 
 
(a) the contribution is not used for normative work; 
 
(b) if a contribution is used for activities other than normative work in which the private 
sector entity could have a commercial interest, the public health benefit of the engagement 
needs clearly to outweigh its potential risks; 
 
(c) the proportion of funding of any activity coming from the private sector cannot be such 
that the programme’s continuation would become dependent on this support; 
 
(d) the acceptance of the contribution does not constitute an endorsement by WHO of the 
private sector entity, or its activities, products or services; 
 
(e) the contributor may not use the results of WHO’s work for commercial purposes or use 
the fact of its contribution in its promotional material; 
 
(f) the acceptance of the contribution does not afford the contributor any privilege or 
advantage; 
 
(g) the acceptance of the contribution does not offer the contributor any possibility for 
advising, influencing, participating in, or being in command of the management or 
implementation of operational activities; 
 
(h) WHO keeps its discretionary right to decline a contribution, without any further 
explanation. 
 
15. Any acceptance of resources from private sector entities is handled in accordance with the 
provisions of this framework and relevant other WHO rules and guidelines such as the Staff 
Regulations and Staff Rules, the Financial Regulations and Financial Rules and policies governing 
procurement, as well as WHO’s guidelines for medicine donations and WHO’s guidelines for health 
care equipment donations; 
 
16 For reasons of transparency, contributions from private sector entities must be publicly 
acknowledged by WHO in accordance with its policies and practices. 
 
17. Acknowledgements shall usually be worded along the following lines: “The World Health 
Organization gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of [Private sector entity] towards 
[description of the outcome or activity]”. 
 
18. Contributions received from private sector entities, are listed in the financial report and audited 








19. Private sector entities may not use the fact that they have made a contribution in their materials 
used for commercial, promotional, marketing and advertisement purposes.1 However, they may make 
reference to the contribution in their annual reports or similar documents. In addition, they may 
mention the contribution on their websites, and in special non-promotional publications, provided that 
the content and context have been agreed with WHO. 
 
Donations of medicines and other health technologies2 
 
20. In determining the acceptability of large-scale donations of medicines and other health-related 
products, the following criteria should be met. 
 
(a) Sound evidence exists of the safety and efficacy of the product in the indication for which 
it is being donated. The product is approved or otherwise authorized by the recipient country for 
use in that indication; it should also preferably appear in the WHO Model List of Essential 
Medicines for that indication. 
 
(b) Objective and justifiable criteria for the selection of recipient countries, communities or 
patients have been determined. In emergency situations, flexibilities may be required. 
 
(c) A supply system is in place and consideration is given to means of preventing waste, theft 
and misuse (including leakage back into the market). 
 
(d) A training and supervision programme is in place for all personnel involved in the 
efficient administration of supply, storage and distribution at every point from the donor to the 
end-user. 
 
(e) A donation of medicines and other health-related products is not of a promotional nature, 
either with regard to the company itself or insofar as it creates a demand for the products that is 
not sustainable once the donation has ended. 
 
(f) WHO does not accept products at the end of their shelf life. 
 
(g) A phase-out plan for the donation has been agreed upon with recipient countries. 
 
(h) A system for monitoring adverse reactions to the product has been set up with the 
participation of the donating company. 
 
21. In consultation with the department responsible for financial matters in WHO, the value of 
donations of medicines and other health-related products is determined and is formally recorded in the 







1 In accordance with paragraph 46 of the overarching framework. 
2 Such donations shall be in line with interagency guidelines: World Health Organization, Ecumenical Pharmaceutical 
Network, International Pharmaceutical Federation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
International Health Partners, The Partnership for Quality Medical Donations, et al. Guidelines for medicine donations – 







Financial contributions for clinical trials 
 
22. Except as provided in paragraph 36 below on product development, financial contributions from 
a private sector entity for a clinical trial arranged by WHO on that company’s proprietary product are 
considered on a case-by-case basis. In this connection, it should be ensured that: 
 
(a) the research or development activity is of public health importance; 
 
(b) the research is conducted at WHO’s request and potential conflicts of interest are managed; 
 
(c) WHO only accepts such financial contributions, if the research would not take place 
without WHO’s involvement or if WHO’s involvement is necessary in order to ensure that the 
research is undertaken in conformity with internationally accepted technical and ethical 
standards and guidelines. 
 
23 If the above-mentioned requirements are met, a financial contribution may be accepted from a 
company having a direct commercial interest in the trial in question, provided that appropriate 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure that WHO controls the conduct and the dissemination of the 
outcomes of the trials, including the content of any resulting publication, and that the trial results are 
free from any inappropriate influence or perceived influence from the company concerned. 
 
Contributions for WHO meetings 
 
24. For meetings convened by WHO, a contribution from a private sector entity may not be 
accepted if it is designated to support the participation of specific invitees (including such invitees’ 
travel and accommodation), regardless of whether such contribution would be provided directly to the 
participants or channelled through WHO. 
 
25. Contributions may be accepted to support the overall costs of a meeting. 
 
26. WHO receptions and similar functions shall not be paid for by private sector entities. 
 
Contributions for WHO staff participating in external meetings 
 
27. An external meeting is one convened by a party other than WHO. Support from private sector 
entities for travel of WHO staff members to attend external meetings or conferences may fall into two 
categories: 
 
(a) meetings held by the private sector entity paying for travel: financing for travel may be 
accepted in accordance with WHO’s rules if the private sector entity is also  supporting the 
travel and ancillary expenses of other participants in the meeting, and the risk of a conflict of 
interest has been assessed and managed; 
 
(b) meetings held by a third party (i.e. a party other than the private sector entity proposing to 






Contributions for publications 
 
28. Financial contributions may be accepted from private sector entities for meeting the printing 
costs of WHO publications, as long as no conflict of interest arises. In no event may commercial 




29. In cases where a WHO evaluation scheme is in place (i.e. to evaluate certain products, processes 
or services against official WHO guidelines), the Organization may charge private sector entities for 
such services on the basis of cost recovery. The purpose of WHO’s evaluation schemes is always to 
provide advice to governments and/or international organizations for procurement. Evaluation does  




30. Private sector entities may provide their up-to-date information and knowledge on technical 
issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, subject to the provisions of the 
overarching framework, and this specific policy and operational procedures, and other applicable 
WHO rules, policies and procedures. Such contribution should be made publicly available, as 




31. WHO encourages private sector entities to implement and advocate for the implementation of 
WHO’s policies, norms and standards. WHO engages in dialogue with private sector entities in order 
to promote the implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and standards.1 
 
32. Private sector entities can only collaborate with WHO in advocacy for the implementation of 
WHO policies norms or standards if they commit themselves to implement these policies, norms or 
standards in their entirety. No partial or selective implementation is acceptable. 
 
33. International business associations are encouraged to work with their members in order to 




34. WHO may engage with the private sector for technical collaboration as defined in the 
overarching framework paragraph 20. Technical collaboration with private sector entities is 
encouraged. This collaboration must be in the interest of WHO, and managed in accordance with the 
overarching framework and this policy to protect WHO, and in particular, its normative work, from 
any undue influence or conflict of interest and to ensure there is no interference with WHO’s advisory 




1 Private sector entities working with WHO will be expected to conform to WHO’s public health policies in areas 
such as food safety, chemical safety, ethical promotion of medicinal drug products, tobacco control, noncommunicable 








Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
35. If WHO has drawn up official specifications for a product, it may provide technical advice to 
manufacturers for development of their product in accordance with these specifications, provided that 
all private sector entities known to have an interest in such a product are given the opportunity to 
collaborate with WHO in the same way. 
 
36. WHO may collaborate with private sector entities in the research and development of health 
related technologies that contribute to increasing access to quality, safe, efficacious and affordable 
medical products. Collaborative research and development should, as a general rule, be undertaken 
only if WHO and the private sector entity have concluded an agreement which ensures that the final 
product will ultimately be widely available, including to the public sector of developing countries at a 
preferential price. If such an agreement is concluded, financing may be accepted from the private 
sector entity for a trial arranged by WHO on the product in question, on the basis that contractual 
commitments obtained from the private sector entity outweigh any potential conflict of interest in 







WHO POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ON ENGAGEMENT 
WITH PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
1. This policy regulates specifically WHO’s engagement with philanthropic foundations by type of 





Participation by philanthropic foundations in WHO meetings2 
 
2. WHO can invite philanthropic foundations to participate in consultations, hearings or other 
meetings in accordance with paragraph 15 of the overarching framework. Consultations and hearings 
can be electronic or in person. 
 
3. Participation in other meetings is on the basis of discussion of an item in which the 
philanthropic foundation has a particular interest and where its participation adds value to the 
deliberations of the meeting. Such participation is for the exchange of information and views, but 
never for the formulation of advice. 
 
4. The nature of participation of philanthropic foundations depends on the type of meeting 
concerned. The format, modalities, and the participation of philanthropic foundations in consultations, 
hearings, and other meetings is decided on a case-by-case basis by the WHO governing bodies or by 
the Secretariat. Participation and inputs received from philanthropic foundations shall be made 
publicly available, wherever possible. Philanthropic foundations do not take part in any decision 
making process of the Organization. 
 
Involvement of the Secretariat in meetings organized by philanthropic foundations 
 
5. WHO can organize joint meetings, or cosponsor meetings organized by philanthropic 
foundations, as long as the integrity, independence and reputation of the Organization are preserved, 
and as long as this participation furthers WHO’s objectives as expressed in the General Programme of 
Work. WHO staff members may participate in meetings organized by philanthropic foundations in 
accordance with the Organization’s internal rules. The philanthropic foundations shall not 
misrepresent WHO’s participation as official WHO support for, or endorsement of, the meeting, and 
shall agree not to use WHO’s participation for promotional purposes. 
 
Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
6. The participation of WHO in meetings organized by philanthropic foundations as co-organizers, 
cosponsors, panellists or speakers shall be managed according to the provisions of the framework for 





1 See paragraphs 14–20 of the overarching framework for the five types of interaction. 








7. WHO can accept financial and in-kind contributions from philanthropic foundations as long as 
such contributions fall within WHO’s General Programme of Work, do not create conflicts of interest, 
are managed in accordance with the framework, and comply with other relevant regulations, rules and 
policies of WHO. 
 
8. As for all contributors, philanthropic foundations shall align their contributions to the priorities 
set by the Health Assembly in the approved Programme budget. 
 
9. Philanthropic foundations are invited to participate in the financing dialogue, which is designed 
to improve the alignment, predictability, flexibility and transparency of WHO’s funding and to reduce 
budgetary vulnerability. 
 
10. WHO’s programmes and offices should strive to ensure that they do not depend on one single 
source of funding. 
 
11. The acceptance of contributions (whether in cash or in kind) should be made subject to the 
following conditions: 
 
(a) the acceptance of a contribution does not constitute an endorsement by WHO of the 
philanthropic foundation; 
 
(b) the acceptance of a contribution does not confer on the contributor any privilege or 
advantage; 
 
(c) the acceptance of a contribution as such does not offer the contributor any possibility for 
advising, influencing, participating in, or being in command of the management or 
implementation of operational activities; 
 
(d) WHO keeps its discretionary right to decline a contribution, without any further 
explanation. 
 
Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
12. Any acceptance of resources from a philanthropic foundation is handled in accordance with the 
provisions of this framework and relevant other WHO rules and guidelines such as the Staff 
Regulations and Staff Rules, the Financial Regulations and Financial Rules and policies governing 
procurement, as well as WHO’s guidelines for medicine donations and WHO’s guidelines for health 
care equipment donations. 
 
13. For reasons of transparency, contributions from philanthropic foundations must be publicly 
acknowledged by WHO in accordance with its policies and practices. 
 
14. Acknowledgements shall usually be worded along the following lines: “The World Health 
Organization gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of [Philanthropic foundation] towards 






15. Contributions received from philanthropic foundations are listed in the financial report and 
audited financial statements of WHO as well as the Programme budget web portal and the WHO 
register of non-State actors. 
 
16. Philanthropic foundations may not use the fact that they have made a contribution in their 
materials used for commercial, promotional, marketing and advertisement purposes.1 However, they 
may make reference to the contribution in their annual reports or similar documents. In addition, they 
may mention the contribution on their websites, and in special non-promotional publications, provided 




17. Philanthropic foundations may provide their up-to-date information and knowledge on technical 
issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, subject to the provisions of the 
overarching framework, and this specific policy and operational procedures, and other applicable 
WHO rules, policies and procedures. Such contribution should be made publicly available, as 




18. WHO collaborates with philanthropic foundations on advocacy for health and increasing 
awareness of health issues; for changing behaviours in the interest of public health; and for fostering 
collaboration and greater coherence between non-State actors where joint action is required. 
Philanthropic foundations are encouraged to disseminate WHO’s policies, guidelines, norms and 
standards and other tools through their networks so as to extend WHO’s own reach. 
 
19. WHO encourages philanthropic foundations to implement and advocate for the implementation 
of WHO’s policies, norms and standards. WHO engages in dialogue with Philanthropic foundations in 
order to promote the implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and standards.2 
 
20. Philanthropic foundations can only collaborate with WHO in advocacy for the implementation 
of WHO policies norms or standards if they commit themselves to implement these policies, norms or 




21. WHO may engage with the philanthropic foundations for technical collaboration as defined in 
the overarching framework paragraph 20. Technical collaboration with philanthropic foundations is 
encouraged. This collaboration must be in the interest of WHO, and managed in accordance with the 
overarching framework and this policy to protect WHO, and in particular, its normative work, from 
any undue influence or conflict of interest and to ensure there is no interference with WHO’s advisory 




1 In accordance with paragraph 46 of the overarching framework. 
2 Philanthropic foundations working with WHO will be expected to conform to WHO’s public health policies in areas 
such as food safety, chemical safety, ethical promotion of medicinal drug products, tobacco control, noncommunicable 







WHO POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ON ENGAGEMENT 
WITH ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
1. This policy regulates specifically WHO’s engagement with academic institutions by type of 
interaction.1 The provisions of the overarching framework also apply to all engagements with 
academic institutions. 
 
2. The engagement with academic institutions at the institutional level has to be distinguished from 




Participation by academic institutions in WHO meetings 
 
3. WHO can invite academic institutions to participate in consultations, hearings or other meetings 
in accordance with paragraph 15 of the overarching framework. Consultations and hearings can be 
electronic or in person. 
 
4. Participation in other meetings is on the basis of discussion of an item in which the academic 
institution has a particular interest and where its participation adds value to the deliberations of the 
meeting. Such participation is for the exchange of information and views, but never for the 
formulation of advice. 
 
5. The nature of participation of academic institution depends on the type of meeting concerned. 
The format, modalities, and the participation of academic institution in consultations, hearings, and 
other meetings is decided on a case-by-case basis by the WHO governing bodies or by the Secretariat. 
Participation and inputs received from academic institutions shall be made publicly available, 
wherever possible. Academic institutions do not take part in any decision-making process of the 
Organization. 
 
Involvement of the Secretariat in meetings organized by academic institutions 
 
6. WHO can organize joint meetings, or cosponsor meetings organized by academic institutions, as 
long as the integrity, independence and reputation of the Organization are preserved, and as long as 
this participation furthers WHO’s objectives as expressed in the General Programme of Work. WHO 
staff members may participate in meetings organized by academic institutions in accordance with the 
Organization’s internal rules. The academic institution shall not misrepresent WHO’s participation as 
official WHO support for, or endorsement of, the meeting, and shall agree not to use WHO’s 
participation for promotional purposes. 
 
Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
7. The participation of WHO in meetings organized by academic institutions as co-organizers, 













8. WHO can accept financial and in-kind contributions from academic institutions as long as such 
contributions fall within WHO’s General Programme of Work, do not create conflicts of interest, are 
managed in accordance with the framework, and comply with other relevant regulations, rules and 
policies of WHO. 
 
9. WHO can provide resources to an academic institution for implementation of particular work 
(such as research, a clinical trial, laboratory work and preparation of a document), in accordance with 
the Financial Regulations and Financial Rules and other applicable rules and policies. This can be 
either for a project of the institution which WHO considers merits support, based on a clear public 
health interest, and is consistent with WHO’s General Programme of Work, or for a project organized 
or coordinated by WHO. The former constitutes a grant, the latter a service. 
 
Specific policies and operational procedures 
 
10. Any acceptance of resources from an academic institution is handled in accordance with the 
provisions of this framework and relevant other WHO rules and guidelines such as the Staff 
Regulations and Staff Rules, the Financial Regulations and Financial Rules and policies governing 
procurement, as well as WHO’s guidelines for medicine donations and WHO’s guidelines for health 
care equipment donations; 
 
11. For reasons of transparency, contributions from academic institutions must be publicly 
acknowledged by WHO in accordance with its policies and practices. 
 
12. Acknowledgements shall usually be worded along the following lines: “The World Health 
Organization gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of [academic institution] towards 
[description of the outcome or activity]”. 
 
13. Contributions received from academic institutions are listed in the financial report and audited 
financial statements of WHO as well as the Programme budget web portal and the WHO register of 
non-State actors. 
 
14. Academic institutions may not use the fact that they have made a contribution in their materials 
used for commercial, promotional, marketing and advertisement purposes.1 However, they may make 
reference to the contribution in their annual reports or similar documents. In addition, they may 
mention the contribution on their websites, and in special non-promotional publications, provided that 




15. Academic institutions may provide their up-to-date information and knowledge on technical 
issues, and share their experience with WHO, as appropriate, subject to the provisions of the 
overarching framework, and this specific policy and operational procedures, and other applicable 
WHO rules, policies and procedures. Such contribution should be made publicly available, as 










16. Intellectual property arising from collaborations with academic institutions is regulated by 
the agreement with the academic institution. This should be addressed in consultation with the 




17. WHO collaborates with academic institutions on advocacy for health and increasing 
awareness of health issues; for changing behaviours in the interest of public health; and for 
fostering collaboration and greater coherence between non-State actors where joint action is 
required. Academic institutions are encouraged to disseminate WHO’s policies, guidelines, 
norms and standards and other tools through their networks so as to extend WHO’s own reach. 
 
18. WHO encourages academic institutions to implement and advocate for the 
implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and standards. WHO engages in dialogue with 
academic institutions in order to promote the implementation of WHO’s policies, norms and 
standards.1 
 
19. Academic institutions can only collaborate with WHO in advocacy for the implementation 
of WHO policies norms or standards if they commit themselves to implement these policies, 




20. WHO may engage with academic institutions for technical collaboration as defined in the 
overarching framework paragraph 20. Technical collaboration with academic institutions is 
encouraged. This collaboration must be in the interest of WHO, and managed in accordance with 
the overarching framework and this policy to protect WHO, and in particular, its normative 
work, from any undue influence or conflict of interest and to ensure there is no interference with 
WHO’s advisory function to Member States. 
 
21. Scientific collaborations are regulated by the Regulations for Study and Scientific Groups, 
Collaborating Institutions and other Mechanisms of Collaboration.2 
 
22. Academic institutions or parts thereof can be designated as WHO collaborating centres in 
accordance with the Regulations mentioned above. In this context, before granting the status of 
WHO collaborating centre a due diligence and risk assessment in accordance with this 
framework is conducted. The collaboration with these collaborating centres is regulated by the 
aforementioned regulations and reflected in the register of non-State actors. 
 








1 Academic institutions working with WHO will be expected to conform to WHO’s public health policies in 
areas such as food safety, chemical safety, ethical promotion of medicinal drug products, tobacco control, 
noncommunicable diseases, as well as health and safety at work. 
2 Basic documents, 48th ed. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014: pp.131–138. 
